Later in the spring of 2015, media sources quoting Al-Manar’s news site said the Al-Khalifa regime canceled Sheikh Isa Qassim’s nationality of prominent Bahraini Shiite clerics.
In a statement issued by the Bahrain Ministry of the Interior, it was stated that according to paragraph (c) of article 10 of the Bahrain Citizenship Act, the citizenship of Ayatullah Isa Qassim was based on the following: expulsion from citizenship duties and peaceful coexistence; deepening the concepts of tribalism; opposition to the constitution; and Government institutions; creation of divisions in society; as well as efforts to establish clerical rule and religious lawyers. Earlier, Bahraini judicial authorities dissolved Al-Wefaq’s largest population and closed its offices across Bahrain. Bahrain authorities also increased the sentence for Sheikh Ali Salman, Secretary-General of the Al-Wefaq Assembly, from 4 years to 9 years. This action of the Al Khalifa regime has led to a wave of dissent and protest reactions inside and outside Bahrain, which is still ongoing.
Who is Sheikh Isa Qassim?
Ayatollah Haj Sheikh Isa Ahmad Qasem al-Durazi al-Bohrani was born in the village of Daraz, from the villages around Manama, the capital of Bahrain, and pursued elementary education in the same village. He started his religious studies in the 1960s under the leadership of Sheikh Alavi Al-Gharifi, and later he went to Najaf and went to the school of Ayatollah Shahid Seyed Mohammad Bagher Sadr. After the formation of the Bahraini nation, people called for the return of Sheikh Qasim and his presence in parliament for the constitution and the establishment of a parliament. He was able to win a high vote by participating in the elections, and along with the Islamist movement that came to the parliament to contribute to the formulation of the Islamic constitutions of Bahrain. In 1971, Sheikh Qasim once again managed to win the confidence of the Bahraini people and make way for the National Assembly, and until his dissolution, the mandate is to act on its behalf. He was previously a founding member of the Islamic Awakening community in 1971.
In the 1990s, another stage in his scientific life begins, and this time he went to the city of Qom to complete his secondary education, and lecturers such as the great verses of the late Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani, Seyed Mahmoud Hashemi and Seyyed Kazem Haeri learned religious lessons. He stayed in Qom until 2001, and this year he went to Bahrain and pursued the political efforts of Friday prayers. A set of comments by the great Shi’i scholars such as the Supreme Leader, the great verses of Sayyid Kazem Husseini Haieri, Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Sayyid Abdullah Al-Gharifi, and Hojjat Islam Sheikh Ali Salman about Ayatollah Shaykh Isa Qassim indicate his high scientific and moral status among the scholars of the Basin and is religious and now Bahraini Shiites consider him the most popular cleric among the people of this country.
The history of Islamic awakening in Bahrain
The Shi’ites of Bahrain started their protest movement at the same time as the wave of Islamic awakening in the Arab countries began. On February 14, 2011, Bahrain was the scene of the peaceful protests of the people against the ruling dynasty and claims for self-determination.
The history of the protest of the Bahraini people to the governing body, of course, goes back to the years ahead. The majority of the people in the country, including the crisis, the Ajams and the Hoolis (Bahrain’s Tunis), do not have a role in the country’s administration and key positions of the country are largely in the hands of the Al-Khalifa family. Despite the fact that these protests became more widespread during the wake of the wave of Islamic awakening, and given the fact that in many countries they were involved in violent protests, but in protest with peaceful means, only through civil disobedience They were trying to pursue their demands, and the adoption of such a procedure, of course, was the result of the Ayatollah Shaikh Issa Qassim’s expedient leadership. While at the 2012 sermon on Friday prayers in Bahrain announced that the Bahraini people needed reform, he repeatedly emphasized that the Bahraini people’s revolution began peacefully and would continue to be peaceful. During these years, he led the Bahraini protests. His sermons during the Friday prayers of Bahrain were always monitored by al-Khalifa media and security agents. But at the same time, he never encouraged his supporters of violence and always emphasized the use of peaceful means to pursue their wishes.
The ruling system in Bahrain, but instead of hearing the demands of the protesters, did not crush any violence against them, and so far in response to the protesters more than 150 of them were martyred and hundreds more wounded. Al-Khalifa’s other strategy for suppressing popular protests was the issuance of a decree of renunciation of revolutionaries and clerics. Reports stating that since 2012, 280 have been abandoned, and many have been exiled, of which only about 200 have become estranged in 2015. However, in line with Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right to be a citizen and no one can be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality. As stated in the 1963 Bahraini Constitution, “Every Arab citizen who is 15 years old and a non-Arab citizen who has been resident in the country for 25 years will be granted Bahraini citizenship. Apart from the contradiction in the declaration of the denial of Sheikh Isa Ahmed Qassim’s Bahraini constitution, it should also be noted that these allegations have not yet been proved in any independent tribunal and equal to the reports of independent human rights institutions such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch , Cases of denial of citizenship and trials in this country regarding political and religious leaders are unequivocal in contravention of international standards and fair grounds, or the grounds for denying citizenship have not been objectively determined.
When Riyadh suppresses Bahraini protesters
Al-Khalifa’s campaign against his political opponents has prompted some analysts to consider some countries, including Saudi Arabia, as the main actors in recent events in Bahrain. According to analysts, Riyadh has played an active role in suppressing the oppressed Shiites of Bahrain, and has had behind-the-scenes hand in denial of Ayatollah Shaykh Isa Qassim. The presence of Saudi troops in suppressing the Bahraini protestors is not a secret, and on the other hand, the regime is suppressing the violence of the Shiite popular protests in the eastern part of the country, and the neighboring Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have created this fear in the hands of the Saudi rulers who have launched a wave of popular Shia protests Bahrain may also include Saudi Arabia.
On the other hand, the history of the execution of Ayatollah Nemir, a senior Shiite cleric in Saudi Arabia, is an experience facing the Al-Khalifa family. It is therefore unlikely that Saudi officials would play a role in dispossession of the great Shiite major in Bahrain. In this regard, the reaction of the February 14 Bahrain Movement is also interactive. After announcing the denial of Sheikh Isa Qassim’s citizenship, the movement, in response to such a decision, issued a statement announcing the move as a political decision that officials from the Saudi regime, whose occupying forces continue to crack down on the Bahraini people, dictated to the authorities of Al-Khalifa.
Global response to human rights abuses in Bahrain
Such a course, of course, was met with numerous reactions in the domestic and foreign arenas. The Bahraini people protested in a protest against the abolition of Sheikh Isa Qassim’s citizenship in al-Daraza district, western Manama, in the capital. Also, mosques in al-Daraza district, west of Manama, called on the Bahraini people to gather in front of Sheikh Isa Qassim’s home. The process has continued so far, and whenever news of the efforts of Bahraini regime officials to arrest Sheikh Isa Qassim is presented, the Bahraini revolutionaries gather for a few days at the house of this prominent Shiite cleric. Bahrain’s Human Rights Center, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran and our country’s political officials condemned the move. The US State Department spokesman John Kirby condemned the prominent cleric, claiming that the action of Manama’s regime was Washington’s worry, even the State Department responded to the Bahraini regime’s reluctance to become a Shiite leader. “We continue to have deep concern about the actions of the Bahraini government to arbitrarily abolish the citizenship of its citizens,” the statement said. In addition to the lack of provision for the defense of Sheikh Isa Qassim against the allegations and the issuance of a sentence through non-transparent legal procedures, the statement Concerned
The position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region has always been based on the lack of interference in the internal affairs of countries, including Bahrain. However, the adoption of such a procedure has never prevented Ahl al-Khalifa from taking a ruthless and peaceful demonstration of the Shiite people of Bahrain Stay silent and not protest. The al-Khalifa family, which is currently facing increasing levels of objection, has always been accused of accusing the Islamic Republic of Iran and accusing our country of interfering in Bahrain’s internal affairs, but the positions of Iranian officials indicate that, according to the Islamic Republic of Iran, That changes in Bahrain come from within.
In this regard the leader of the revolution emphasized in the sermons of Friday prayer in Tehran in the 2010: “Bahraini rulers claimed that Iran intervenes in the cases of Bahrain. This is a lie. No, we do not interfere. We are explicit when we interfere. We intervened in cases of anti-Israelism, which resulted in the victory of the Six Day of War and the victory of the Twenty-fifty war. Thereafter, every nation, any group will fight the Zionist regime, we will be behind it and help it, and there is no reason for anyone to say that. This is the truth and reality. But now, the ruler of the island of Bahrain comes to say that Iran intervenes in the cases of Bahrain, no, that’s not true; it’s a real offense. “If we intervened in Bahrain, things would be different in Bahrain.” He also emphasized in the meeting with the families of the 7th martyrs of martyrs and a group of families of the martyrs of the shrine at the 19th Ramadan: “Look today in Bahrain! The issue of Bahrain is not a Shi’a-Sunni war; the issue of the ferocious sovereign rule of a selfish domineering minority is on a large majority. A small minority is seventy percent, 80 percent of the Bahraini people rule; now [this] Mujahid world has violated Mr. Sheikh Isa Qassim; this is their stupidity, which shows them their stupidity. Sheikh Isa Qasem was the one who, until today and as long as he could speak with people, prevented the armed movements of the people. Not knowing who they were with someone, they do not understand that the attack on Sheikh Isa Qassim means removing the barrier against the passionate young Bahrainis who, if they fall, will not be able to silence them in any way other than the ruling system. ”
In this way, the repression of the people in Bahrain does not only help to stabilize Al-Khalifa’s position in the country, but also lead to an upsurge of protests against dictatorship in this country and the protests could lead to a massive change and a real spring in Bahrain.
A Middle Eastern Westphalia
This book, Towards a Westphalia for the Middle East, is a product of many conferences and seminars between government officials, policy wonks, academics, international organization officials, experts from Europe, and the Middle East; in addition to a host of think tanks. The authors, Brendan Simms, Michael Axworthy, and Patrick Milton “have summarized the results” of the “discussions, provided a detailed account of the most important elements of the Peace of Westphalia, and outlined elements of a possible framework for peace in the Middle East.”
The Westphalia project started with the observation of the parallels between the current situation in the Middle East and the Thirty Year War that ended up with the Westphalia Treaty (1648) to put paid to the “war of all wars.” The German Körber Foundation and the Policy Planning Unit of the Federal Foreign Office in cooperation with Cambridge University launched the project to see if there were lessons to be drawn from the European conflict in the first half of the 17th century and the subsequent peace treaty to shed lights on the current crisis in Syria. The authors are well aware that parallels do not mean similar. “The analogy between the Thirty Years War and the war in Syria informing the present work thus ought to be employed as an analytical framework, and the Peace of Westphalia ought not to be used as a blueprint.”
There are models to regional peace and security other than Westphalia. The authors see Westphalia as the aptest for two reasons. One is structural: the current Middle Eastern crisis comprises a set of interlocking political and religious struggles at the local and the regional levels.” The second is the religious factor: although in both cases, religion cannot be entirely blamed, however, “sectarian tension has tended to merge and interact with other levels of conflict.”
From the outset, the authors debunk two main myths about Westphalia. One is that Westphalia had established sovereign states. Two, Westphalia reduced religious order in favor of a secular one. “Sovereign states existed well before 1648, and interventions in the domestic affairs of other states (and other Imperial Estates) continued well after 1648.” Further, although Westphalia foregrounded secular laws over ecclesiastical laws, “Westphalia was explicitly a Christian peace”. The Treaty reorganized confessional balance into constitutional laws “and regulated relations between Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists in a highly detailed set of confessional laws.”
Turning to the Middle East, the authors see three interconnected factors that influence the dynamics of the conflict. The lack of state legitimacy, according to the authors, harks back a century, i.e., to the inception of these states as a result of Sykes-Picot. The reason is arguably attributed to being contrived by colonial states. After all, it was a colonial power, namely Britain that reneged on its promises to deliver a unified Arab state from Syria to Yemen.
Political Islam cannot solely be ascribed to “secular Arab autocracy and against the failure of Arab nationalism to achieve its aims”, as the authors claim. Islamic revivalism predates secular Arab regimes and had started in the nineteenth century. Moreover, Hassan al-Banna launched his Muslim Brotherhood in 1928; more than two decades before Nasser assumed power in Egypt: It was the defeat of these regimes in the 1967 war, however, that gave political Islam prominence as an alternative ideology to secular nationalism.
The second factor pertains to what the authors call Saudi-Iran dualism and great power rivalry. The geopolitical competition between Riyadh and Tehran has fueled the fire in the region. Various hot spots have seen both countries on opposing sides. The Syrian civil strife witnessed Iran’s direct involvement in support of Assad’s regime and Saudi backing of some opposition groups. Likewise, Yemen has seen both actors and allies supporting the warring sides in that internecine conflict.
Iran is not alone in picking sides in the Middle Eastern confrontations. More recently, Turkey has been playing a significant role in regional maelstroms. The Arab Spring and the ascendancy of political Islam have enticed Turkey to play a larger role in the Arab World. Turkey is involved in several areas of contention. Turkey’s interest in containing the Kurds and fear of irredentist claims led to its involvement in northern Syria. Geoeconomic and geopolitical imperatives, as well as ideological competition, dictated Ankara’s propping up the Government of National Accord in Tripoli; and showing its fangs to the Europeans in the East of the Mediterranean, to boot.
Last, sectarianism is the third factor that influences the regional dynamics. The historical rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites contributed to the current situation. The authors are quite cognizant of the role played by confessional enmity; however, they do not assign a deterministic power to such a factor. Many legitimate demands have nonetheless “descended into sectarianised conflict in many quarters”.
The conflict-ridden region of the Middle East is in a dire need for regional peace. The question is what the Thirty Year War offers in terms of lessons for the Middle East. The European geopolitical scene, according to the authors, was dominated by the rivalry between France and the Habsburg powers. “It is the equivalent of the Saudi–Iranian rivalry in the Middle East, the chief difference being that France and the Habsburgs were not divided by religion (they were both Catholic) and that they often engaged in direct full-scale war.”
The rise of Calvinism in the 1560s has thrown the delicate balance into chaos. Few leading princes had converted to the proscribed creed and had caused a clash with the Lutherans. The Calvinists had upped the ante and resisted the banning of their faith, “and were determined to confessionalise disputes and thereby paralyse the system”.
As with the conflict in the Middle East, the Thirty Year War cannot be characterized as a religious conflict. The polarization was not clearly on confessional lines, and intra-confessional wars had their share of the pervasive conflict. However, religion had colored the threat perception among the warring countries, and faith and geopolitics had interplayed in a very pernicious manner. Similarly, the Middle East in this century has mirrored Europe in the seventeenth century: “the quest for security has become increasingly sectarianised, as it was and is assumed that one will find automatic allies among co-religionists.”
Naturally, one can find similarities and analogies between varieties of conflicts. The question remains how conceptually these conflicts are analogous to warrant the comparison under discussion. The authors found a few structural parallels between Europe in the seventieth century and today’s Middle East.
The authors outline five structural analogies between the two cases. The conflicts then and now tend to be complex and of a variety of types: “state-on-state wars; internal rebellions; civil wars; proxy wars; [and] external interventions in civil wars”. The second parallel is conflict over sovereignty and civil war. Thirdly, the growth of rebellious conflicts into full-fledged wars. Another similarity is great power competition and interventions. Finally, in both situations, no war is declared and wars resulting from the process of state formation.
The authors provide ample examples of such parallels and analogies within these categories. However, the context seems to be glaringly different. For example, one cannot draw a parallel between a secessionist movement in seventeenth-century Bohemia and the rebel forces like ISIS as state-building wars; alternatively, one cannot compare the geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran to dynastic squabbles in early modern Europe.
The authors seem to be more well-grounded in European history than Middle Eastern current affairs, which presents a skewed view of the entire comparison. The idea that “Arab–Israeli problem has been less prominent in regional geopolitics,” shows less perspicacity of the current strategic realignment in the region, and flies in the face of the most recent developments. Israel and oil have been the most important strategic concern for the US in the Middle East. Without both Washington would’ve slept better.
Examples of useful lessons from Westphalia for the Middle East abound. A normative consensus had been a fulcrum of the Westphalia Peace. The authors find in religion, culture, language, and legal tradition, without specification, serve as the basis for normative consensus in the Middle Eastern region.
Other lessons that could be drawn from Westphalia are the establishment of trust, inclusivity, the role of diplomacy and negotiations, mediations, security guarantors, and de-sectarianization of the conflict among others.
There is also the question of why Westphalia and not other regional orders! Can one be selective and draw lessons from, say, Concert of Europe, for example. Alternatively, are there other examples from Africa and Asia that one can look at and select bits and pieces that might work for a new Middle Eastern order?
The problem with the Westphalian order for the Middle East is the diachronic comparison. At the time of Westphalia the world system and had not congealed to what is today. Globalization and great powers rivalry has allowed extra-regional powers to play a bigger role, and not always in the interest of the region.
The book, hopefully, would spark a discussion that is very important for a new security structure in the Middle East. One wishes translations of the book in Middle Eastern languages would appear to allow access to a wider audience in the region.
Shaping Palestinian politics: The UAE has a leg up on Turkey
The United Arab Emirates may have the upper hand in its competition with Turkey in efforts to shape Palestinian politics. Similarly, the UAE’s recognition of the Jewish state gives it a leg up in ensuring that its voice is heard in Israel and Washington irrespective of who wins the November US election.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan didn’t miss a beat during his address to the United Nations General Assembly, insisting that he, unlike the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, would not accept a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is not endorsed by the Palestinians.
Mr. Erdogan’s solemn pledge may earn him brownie points with large segments of Middle Eastern and Muslim public opinion critical of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the two Gulf states but does not strengthen his weak hand.
The UAE, with whom Mr. Erdogan is at loggerheads over Libya, Syria, and the future of political Islam, may have less clout than it thinks in bringing Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table, but has, for now, more cards to play.
What those cards are worth will only emerge over time.
The UAE is betting that a combination of soft power garnered through recognition of Israel and close security, economic and technological cooperation will enable it to convince the Israeli government that an independent Palestinian state is in Israel’s interest.
While there is little reason to believe that the UAE will succeed where others have failed in recent decades, Emirati leaders, in contrast to Turkey, potentially could in cooperation with Israel also try to impose an unpopular Palestinian figure who has close ties to the US, Emirati and Israeli leadership.
The move would be designed to install a leader who would be more conducive to engaging in peace talks on terms that hold out little hope of meeting long-standing Palestinian aspirations.
It is a scenario that 84-year-old Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas appears to be taking seriously and appears to be trying to pre-empt.
The Democratic Reform Bloc, a political group headed by Mohammed Dahlan, a controversial Abu Dhabi-based former Palestinian security chief believed to be close to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE’s de facto ruler, said dozens of his supporters had been arrested or summoned for questioning by Palestinian security forces in recent days.
Mr. Dahlan appeared to be walking a fine line when he recently denied any role in mediating relations between the UAE and Israel.
Mr. Abbas’ suspicions stem from an unsuccessful effort last year by the UAE to engineer a deal in which Hamas, the Islamist group that controls the Gaza Strip, would share power with Mr. Dahlan.
Mr. Dahlan went into exile in the UAE in 2007 after Hamas defeated his US-backed efforts to thwart the group’s control of Gaza. US President George W. Bush described Mr. Dahlan at the time as “our boy.”
He has since been indicted by Mr. Abbas’ Palestine Authority on corruption charges.
UAE recognition of Israel constituted an acknowledgment that the 18-year old Arab peace plan that offered Israel diplomatic relations in exchange for land and a Palestinian state had produced naught.
In its rivalry with Turkey, whose assertive support for the Palestinian cause has likewise failed to produce results so far, the UAE is banking on the expectation that it has the upper hand in getting not only Israeli but also the attention of Washington that under US President Donald J. Trump has disregarded Palestinian rights.
The UAE assumes that it will be able to capitalize on the fact that Emirati recognition of Israel has further complicated Turkey’s relations with its NATO ally, the United States.
Turkey’s relations with the US are already troubled by US support for Syrian Kurds; Turkish military backing of the Libyan government in Tripoli; tensions between Turkey and Greece, another NATO ally, in the Eastern Mediterranean; and Turkey’s acquisition of Russia’s S-400 anti-missile defense system.
The Trump administration hopes to finalize by December the sale of F-35 fighter planes to the UAE in the wake of the deal with Israel. Earlier, it cancelled Turkey’s acquisition of the same plane in response to the country’s S-400 deal with Russia.
For now, Turkey can look at appreciation by important segments of Arab and Muslim public opinion as an upside of its strident support for the Palestinians.
Seeking to capitalize on its Palestinian goodwill, Turkey has been attempting to end the rift between Mr. Abbas’ Al Fatah movement and Hamas in a bid to get the Palestinians to agree on elections and the formation of a joint government.
The two groups, agreed during talks in Istanbul this week to work together and hold long overdue elections in the next six months.
The joker in Turkish-Emirati differences over Israel and Palestine is the upcoming US presidential election in November.
Irrespective of who wins, Turkey has lost to the UAE the beneficial mantle of being Israel’s best Muslim friend.
Nonetheless, an electoral victory by Democratic challenger Joe Biden, who is expected to be more critical of arms purchases by the UAE and other Gulf states and take them to task on human rights issues, could put both Turkey and the Emirates on the back foot.
A Biden victory would be for Turkey a lost opportunity. The very issues that are at the core of its strained relations with the UAE are likely to complicate its relations with a Democratic administration.
Recent media reports reminded Mr. Erdogan that Mr. Biden had described him in a conversation with The New York Times early this year as an “autocrat.” The Democratic candidate suggested that the US. should “embolden” his opponents to defeat him in elections.
In the conversation, Mr. Biden mentioned other issues, including the Kurds, Syria, and tension in the Eastern Mediterranean that do not bode well for US-Turkish relations should the Democrat occupy the White House. Mr. Biden is expected to be also critical of the UAE’s interventions in Yemen and Libya.
Nonetheless, the UAE, despite its own issues with the US, is likely to still find itself in a better place in Washington no matter who emerges victorious from the November election.
Arabs-Israeli Peace must be Well-Anchored, not Neatly Fantasized
Watching a few Emirati and Israeli citizens dance in Chabad House, Dubai to celebrate normalization may give the impression that these nations have realized a genuine peace; a false assumption that disregards the facts that the peace treaty between Israel and two Arab Nations is meant to serve Donald Trump in his upcoming presidential election, values the “ground reality” that clearly favors Israel over United Nations resolutions upholding the “land for peace” principle, and advances western politicians’ view that peace can be imposed top-down, seconded by autocratic Arab rulers.
As an Egyptian, I highly value the peace treaty between my country and Israel that was based on regaining occupied Egyptian land, the Sinai Peninsula. The treaty has helped to alter Egyptians’ views of Israel fundamentally; no longer seen as a permanent enemy, Israel is presently perceived as a “cooperative” neighbor that has offered us millions of tourists and a few sound investments – solid pillars for normalization. Meanwhile, the clear majority of Egyptians, Arabs and Muslims continue to sympathize with the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation – a crisis that can only be resolved by pursuing the same path towards peace as that of Egypt.
For years, the United States has been trying to impose a peace treaty between the Arab nations and Israel based on the concept that Arabs should accept Israeli territorial expansion in return for the injection of substantial U.S. funds to boost the Palestinian economy, a proposition strengthened by Israel’s military power and Arab rulers’ injudicious, hasty attitude towards the crisis. Underneath this reality lurks the further empowerment of the political Islamist proposition that places Israel as a permanent enemy, which could easily drag our region into additional, unpredicted violence.
Arabs societies generally appear to lead a “double life”. On the one hand is the reality that 60% are either poor citizens or citizens who are vulnerable to poverty, an unemployment rate of roughly 11%, the lack of basic freedoms and living under autocratic rule; a sad status that has become even more dramatic with the advent of Covid-19. These factors combined intensify Arab youth’s anger and frustration towards their rulers and towards the United States, seen as a solid supporter of those rulers. Obviously, Palestinians living under Israeli occupation rule have an extra challenge to deal with.
On the other hand is the fantasy life constituted of GDP growth and the implementation of a few mega projects that Arab rulers like to exhibit and that western politicians and scholars tend to recognize as a sign of success – completely overlooking the fact that these projects are often awarded to the rulers’ cronies and that the unequal distribution of wealth will keep large portions of Arabs living in poverty for generations to come, making them more vulnerable to violence. Likewise, expanding trade deals between Arab nations and Israel or receiving economic incentives from the United States have proven to benefit only the same cronies.
Moreover, the present rumour that the United States is building a block of Arab nations and Israel meant to potentially engage in a war with Iran is a catastrophic approach. Should it happen, it will thrust the entire region into a state of intense violence and enduring war that could well lead to the collapse of many of the signed treaties. Furthermore, a peace treaty between Israel and two Arab nations, who are not in conflict with Israel, will not help to resolve either the Palestinian crisis or the Iranian conflict – Bahraini and the Emirati citizens will never validate such a treaty, if it is presented to them fairly.
There is a huge difference between a peace treaty concluded between two mature, democratic nations whose respective governments truly represent their citizens, and an agreement that is imposed on nations whose citizens are – to put it mildly – in disharmony with their rulers. Arab citizens, often accused of engaging in violence and declining to peacefully settle with Israel, are in fact caught between two fires: their autocratic rulers, who deliberately offer them undignified living conditions and Islamic extremists, who promise them eternal salvation as a reward for engaging in violence and terrorism.
Permanent Arab-Israeli peace can only be achieved through a bottom-up approach that is designed to last, which entails keeping away from western pragmatism and enforcement, both of no value to this crisis. Israel is continually working to enhance its security, an absolute necessity for its citizens. It needs to offer Palestinians the opportunity to live a dignified life based, first, on regaining their occupied land and establishing a state of their own, followed by advancing their economic status. Offering the later at the expense of the former will keep us in this vicious circle of violence for decades to come.
Belt and Road in Central and East Europe: Roads of opportunities
The second decade of the 21st century put the geoeconomic emphasis and cooperation within the framework of China’s “One Belt,...
Bernice Notenboom calls for action to tackle “the biggest threat we face – climate change”
“The pandemic gives us some hope because we have proven that we can all join together. But, why do we...
Turkey crossed the red line with Armenia
The red line has been crossed. Turkish Air Force F-16s were deployed against Armenia and shot down an Armenian military...
Nigeria at 60: The Dialectic of a Failing Renaissance
Standing elegantly before the visiting Princess Alexandra of Kent and Governor-General, Sir James Robertson, at the final lowering of the...
Achieving gender equality key to restoring economic resilience in Asia
Business leaders and policymakers in Thailand said today that top priority must be given to empowering women in the workplace...
The fall of the Montenegrin dictator and its impact on the Balkans geopolitical balance
At parliamentary elections held in Montenegro on August 30, for the first time in history, the government was replaced in...
Enough Of Double Standards!
Deutsche Welle recently published a comment on Bosnia-Herzegovina written by Stefan Schwarz,a renowned German politician. In this text, the author...
International Law3 days ago
Why Human Rights Abuses Threaten Regional and Global Security
South Asia2 days ago
Rohingya repatriation: Has the world forgotten about the Rohingya crisis?
Europe3 days ago
An Austro-Franco-German Proposal for a European Post Covid-19 Recovery Programme
South Asia3 days ago
Regional Power politics and Pakistan foreign policy
Russia3 days ago
Did Russia-China Relations Successfully Pass the “COVID,” “Hong Kong,” “India” and “Belarus” Tests?
Intelligence1 day ago
Evolutions of Strategic Intelligence
Economy2 days ago
Amirabad Port: The game changer in Indian foreign trade
Defense2 days ago
The South Asian Dilemma