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Zhou Enlai’s Legacy in China’s Diplomacy

Wang Li

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Authors: Wang Li & Yang Yi-zhong

In a survey of China’s politics since 1949, Premier Zhou Enlai is an undisputedly great statesman as he took charge of state affairs for 26 years (1949-1976) including his vital roles in policy-making, strategic maneuver and all talks with the former Soviet Union, France, the United States, Japan and many other states. Henry Kissinger recalled that “during his 60 years of public life, I have encountered no more compelling figure than Zhou Enlai. He dominated by exceptional intelligence and capacity to intuit the intangibles of the psychology of his opposite numbers.” True, he was well-known for his talent to persuade or outmaneuver opposition.

Last week (on March 1), the ruling elite of China (CPC) held a symposium to commemorate the 120th birthday of late Premier Zhou Enlai in Beijing. President Xi Jin -ping attended the meeting where he reiterated that Zhou was an outstanding role model who remained true to the original aspiration and kept the faith. In China Zhou’s name has been closely related toits modernization drive which highlights going global economically, open and inclusive socially and culturally and pursuing world peace and justice. Although he did not mention the specific case of Zhou’s legacy in diplomacy, Xi’s remark is clear enough to demonstrate that the route of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era has been made and China’s century-long advancement to the great national rejuvenation that had been in Zhou’s mind from his early age will be fully achieved in the near future.

As a passionate nationalist, Zhou had dedicated himself to Chinese struggle for national independence and then state-reconstruction. Due to this, Zhou who served as Chinese premier for 26 years, became known as one of the key designers of the blueprint for China’s rise. Equally, as a cosmopolitan, foreign-educated advocate for pragmatic engagement with the West, Zhou was content to exploit the world issues through negotiation. He held the validity of diplomacy that it is necessary to the well-being of the state to negotiate ceaselessly, either openly or secretly, and in all places, even in those from which no present fruits are reaped and even still more in those for which no future prospects as yet seem likely. In light of this, he directed the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial-level talks in Warsaw which lasted for 15 years and is called the longest marathon in diplomatic history. Eventually, China and the United States came to their rapprochement until 1972. Today China as a rising power has steadily developed into its final stage of becoming a strong power. Inspired by Zhou’s discourse on diplomacy, Xi has reiterated that China declines to accept the “Thucydides’ Trap” which deems the conflict between the ruling power and the rising power inevitable; instead arguing that “the Pacific is large enough to accommodate China and the United States along with all others involved” in terms of new type of great powers relationship.

In addition to his emphasis upon China’s relationship with the great powers like the United States and the former Soviet Union, Zhou was well-aware of the importance of its neighbors to China’s security, development and long-term stability. Considering the issues caused by the past memories, modern ideologies and border disputes, Zhou saw the necessity of conducting Chinese diplomacy with an emphasis on personal relationships that often goes beyond the tactical. He put it that common sense teaches us the key to the success: “mutual trust and mutual respect”. It grew into the well-known “Five principles of peaceful co-existence” among nations with diverse cultures, ethnics and ideologies. During his tenure as the premier, China was able to maintain good relations with most of its neighbors in general terms, except the border conflicts between China and India in 1962. Now China under President Xi has continuously emphasized the good-neighbor relations in light of win-win doctrine.

During the Cold War, China was illegally excluded from the United Nations for 22 years, during which Zhou had entirely and eagerly worked for Beijing’s legitimate right in the U.N. and in the world as well. He smartly responded to China’s semi-isolated reality with “people’s diplomacy” aiming to project China to the world public that it is a peace-loving rather than a trouble-maker country in the international community. He vividly used a metaphor to describe China’s diplomacy as a bird with twin–wings, the government was the main body of the bird and “people’s diplomacy” acting as two wings, one was economic aid; other cultural exchanges. Both aims to attract and co-opt, rather than by coercion (hard power). That is exactly what it has been termed of the public diplomacy based upon soft power: the ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction. Hence Zhou alongside other Chinese leaders considered continuity of relationships as important task and perhaps more important than formal documents. Nowadays, President Xihas appeared greeting foreign dignitaries or the interlocutors like President Trump and many others as if the friendship are already an established fact between them.

Since China can’t be in isolation from the world for the sake of its modernization and also as a rising power that has steadily moved to the center of the world theatre, what kind of Zhou’s legacy inherited by the new generation of Chinese leaders in Xi’s era is still an open discussion. Recently, Xi noted that Zhou is an outstanding example as he sought self-improvement, dared to shoulder responsibility, fully dedicated himself to missions and stuck firmly to discipline. Here is the point that Zhou used to claim a special moral quality that had evolved under Confucianism and now ascribed to communism: China would maintain a unique approach to international affairs that eschewed the traditional power politics. At the same time, that China’s aspiration for a great power is no more than a logical claim for an equality among the great powers in view of its capacity and responsibility, although it is not easy to achieve in short period.

This is the very reason why it is necessary to approach Zhou’s legacy in order to better understand China’s diplomacy today.

Wang Li is Professor of International Relations and Diplomacy at the School of International and Public Affairs, Jilin University China.

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East Asia

South Korea should go with the United States

Sun Moo Kim

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Now, previous success won’t guarantee same success in future in the age of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, We are expecting generation that ability to create new and missing things is more important than keeping existing assets.

The economic survival strategy also changes.

There is no longer continuous growth in this new era, even for a major growing corporation. For example, an automobile can be a mobile computer with value added on software and electronics. Every industry becomes IT related company, not only food and pharmaceuticals industry, but also construction and banking business as well. Now, a company own by person who counts the money in front of the vault and calculates the stock number can’t be survived. Although the South Korean economy has global competitiveness in mobile phone semiconductors and some industries, South Korea is facing huge challenges.

South Korean companies must challenge upcoming new business in order to servive. South Korea has strong engineering system. But even Germany which has world’s most powerful engineering system is having difficulties in developing new business areas. South Korea has no resources and can’t be self-sufficient. It is the fate of South Korea to look out for the world.

The US and China trade wars of two axis of the global economy are becoming reality.

As the United States imposed a $ 60 billion tariff in retaliation for China`s breach of intellectual property rights, the Chinese Department of Commerce immediately launched a counterattack by imposing a $3 billion tariff on 128 U.S. products.

Global stock markets plummeted dramatically and The WSJ reported that world was horrified by the terrible of uncontrolled commerce war. This trade war is a step in keeping the United States ” Economic security “on the rapid growth of China’s high-tech sector.

China, once called the “World Factory” by cheap labour put their hand to rebellion. To take an instance from smartphone, Huawei, Oppo, Vivo’s superiority in Apple designed by California and produced by China is striking. Oppo and Vivo are focused on advanced technologies, not only low-price.

China is moving from ‘Made in China’ to ‘Created in China’ through the ‘China Manufacturing 2025’ plan for the manufacturing powerhouse. By the manufacturing 2025 project has an ambition to boost China’s competitiveness to surpass the US, Germany, and Japan levels and to become the world’s No.1 in 2049.

According to Financial Times that the Trump government emphasized “economic security is the security of the country,” that is meaning the United States to take aim at the Chinese manufacturing 2025.

It is not so simple in terms of South Korea reality.

In South Korea, China and USA are first and second market highly dependent on exports of Korea that counts 25 percent of China and 12 percent of US market.

If the market shrinks due to the friction between the U.S. and China, South Korea could be caught in the middle of the market and not be able to choose either

But The true global leader in today is the United States and Unites States is really strong.

South Korea should go with the United States.

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East Asia

Power Projection of China

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A coin has always two faces, an analyst is ought to analyze the both sides.

China is considered as flag holder of soft power with a global agenda of peaceful rise. At moment, the world is facing a new emerging global order by the rise of multiple actors in the international arena. Now there are two school of thoughts who are proposing contradictory views like one wing regarded it as optimistic Sino rise who believes that China’s rise is peaceful. Its foreign policy is viewed as one of the most harmonious policy ever structured. They believe in the mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Rise of China is an optimistic opportunity which is justified by different aspects. As African states were facing a massive number of problems at all levels, many super powers came and ruled the world but they didn’t bothered the prosperity of third world countries.

China started invested in African region and assured the chances of prosperity over there. Due to this economic integration of China in Africa, a demise of Indian influence in that has been observed as well. Their economic cooperation is based on model of helping underdeveloped countries by initiating the projects like Belt and Road Initiative. They are extending the helping hand to developing countries by selling products at cheaper rates. They respect the ideologies of other countries, for example, China didn’t celebrated Pig year in Muslim countries. Regarding Pakistan, here the optimistic view is prevailed at higher context. Pakistan’s policy makers favor Chinese investment in Pakistan, as it will help Pakistan in economic prosperity. China helps Pakistan at almost all of the international forum. Friendship of china and Pakistan is the strongest one to be observed. Pakistan can learn a lot from them. The proper use of diplomacy, image building, projection of soft power and individualism in ideologies and beliefs. Long term planning strategies can be learned from them. China is all weather friend of Pakistan but self-skills are significant, as there is a famous Chinese saying, “to serve a guest by fish is a good way but to teach them how to catch fish is the best way to serve them.”

On the other hand, there are supporters of pessimistic Sino rise who believe that China’s rise is threat for globe. This pessimism is oftenly prevailed by western analysts. They think that rise of China can disturb the existing world order. For example, China is competing with American economy in the international market. Balance of power is coin of international politics, so other actors are emerging now. But the rise and demise of powers after a certain time period is one of the laws of nature. Specially America is feeling threatened by this emergence of China as a super power which can be seen through events like Huawei issue over 5G technology, its sensitization, trade war between china and America, claim of copyrights by America etc. increasing influence of China in majority of states is posing the seriousness of issue. Chinese model of Confucianism is spreading as it has started practices in South Korea as well which is predicted through their cultural stimulus.  Pessimistic school of thought deny the authenticity of foreign policy of China, they consider that it is a mere framework which has nothing to do with reality.In reality China’s behavior is like relations having towards Taiwan, South China Sea etc. Interest of states are very important which may differ from each other. Lensing through these views, this unpredictable situation leaves a humans mind into a chaos, whether the rise of China is peaceful or just a myth?

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East Asia

The origin of the Four Modernizations and President Xi Jinping’s current choices

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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On September 13, 1971 Lin Biao tried to flee to the USSR with all his family, aboard a Trident plane of civil aviation, which had left with little fuel and no active radio contact.

The crash of the aircraft in Mongolia, where both Lin and his whole family died, was caused by the order given directly by Mao to shoot down the plane.

 What had happened, obviously in political and not in personal terms?

 The answer is simple: Lin Biao was very strongly opposed to the new agreement between China and the United States and hence had organized a military coup. For Lin Biao all the room for US geopolitics was to be found in what the Third International’s forces traditionally defined as “imperialism”.

 For Mao Zedong, imperialism was vital for both the USSR and the USA- and considering that he was far from the continent that was the prize for which of the two won the Cold War, namely Europe-he refused to make too many differences between the two.

 As a man of Tao and Zen, Mao treated an evil with another evil.

  Mao Zedong, however, also knew that a new economic relationship with the United States was needed, after the long economic crisis and the factional instability within the Chinese regime. The Soviet Union could certainly not give it economic stability and hence the “Great Helmsman” turned to the distant enemy rather than to the near quasi-friend.

 Nothing can be understood about China, including current China, if geopolitical choices are separated from economic, financial and industrial ones which, however, are subjected to the strategic “policy line” defined by the Party – a policy  line that is cultural and always based on a very long term.

 On September 29, 1972 the diplomatic relationship with Japan were resumed, along with those with the United States. An evident overlapping of different geopolitical lines which, however – in the minds of the Chinese decision-makers -were similar also from the symbolic viewpoint.

 In 1973 Deng Xiaoping reappeared in public, upon direct order by Mao Zedong.

 Those were also the years of the late definitive success of the “policy line” of Zhou Enlai, who had successfully gone through the Great Cultural and Proletarian Revolution, which had partly overwhelmed him, and led the 10thCPC Congress.

 That was the compromise which held the Party together, after Lin Biao’s elimination. An unstable agreement between the reformist “Right” (Zhou had spoken of “four modernizations” many years before, exactly in 1965) and the Left, silenced by Mao, that had crossed the red line of the Cultural Revolution and the failed communization of rural areas.

 In those years, also the Party’s Left lacked mass management of the people and the Party and had to agree with the other factions, while Mao mediated and also created “third wheels”.

  Create something from nothing – one of the Thirty-Six Stratagems of the Chinese Art of War.

 In 1973, just before the equilibrium between Zhou and the old CPC apparata broke again, Deng Xiaoping was fully rehabilitated and also became member of the Chinese regime’s deep axis, namely the Central Military Commission.

 In 1975 Deng was elected vice-President of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

 The connection between the reformists – if we can call them so – siding with Zhou Enlai, and the “centre” of the Party’s apparatus – that regained its roles and posts by ousting the Armed Forces -prevailed once again.

 Again in 1975, the National People’s Congress praised the “Four Modernizations” already proposed by Zhou and, in its final statement, hoped “that China would be turned into a modern and powerful Socialist country in the approximately twenty years before the end of the century”.

 Political transformation through the new economy, as well as preservation of the regime through political transformation itself.

 We could call it “the Tao of geoeconomics”. Acceleration of industrialization and modernization, but without creating the disaster of rural masses, who were objectively unable of providing the start-up capital for implementing any of the Four Modernizations. This was the real difference with the USSR of the 1930s.

 That capital had to be produced in innovative companies and be attracted from outside.

 At the time, however, the CPC was not yet firmly in the hands of any factions. In September 1975, the national Agriculture Conference saw the harsh clash between Deng Xiaoping and the old “Shanghai group” of the Cultural and Proletarian Revolution that, however, no longer controlled most of the Party.

 Zhou Enlai died in January 1976 and shortly afterwards, in Tiananmen Square, there were severe incidents, albeit with the constant presence of many wreaths reminding of Zhou.

 Later there were also strikes and unrest, until the capture and trial of the “Gang of Four” in Shanghai. It had inspired the “Cultural Revolution” and was then directly accused by Hua Guofen – the man appointed by Mao to lead the transition- of having prepared a coup.

 China’s transformation, however, began again from rural areas: at the second Agriculture Conference in Dazhai, in December 1976 – where various cases of corruption and “social polarization” were described and stigmatized- the discussion focused on the First Modernization, namely that of rural areas.

 When you regulate too much, a parallel and illegal market is created. This always happens.

 Obviously this also happens when total communization is applied to the economic cycle of rural areas.

 Certainly those were residues of Sovietism in the CPC’s  doctrine, but also of the a-dialectical implementation of Marxism-Leninism in historical and social contexts in which the analysis of the founder of “scientific Communism” had never focused.

 In fact, when you read the works and correspondence that Marx dedicated to the Russian agricultural issue, you note that the author of “Capital” foresaw a direct Socialist social transformation stemming from the maintenance of the social and community networks in traditional villages. It may seem strange, but it is so.

 This system operates only with a non-industrialized State that is scarcely widespread in the territory. Otherwise, the problem is that of capitalism in rural areas to generate the surplus of urban and industrial investments.

 Even in the Second Volume of “Capital”, Marx’s model is essentially this one.

 It is precisely on the agricultural issue that the stability and success of many Communist regimes isdefined and, not surprisingly, the first of Zhou’s and later Deng’s Four Modernizations was precisely that of agriculture.

 The topic characterized all Party’s organizations, but it was in late December 1978 that the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee decided to decentralize the economy – another factor strongly different from the Leninist tradition – and even to liberalize it, in addition to a process of ideological revision, namely Gaige Kaifang that roughly means “reform and opening”.

 That was also related to the request for opening international trade based on the criterion of “mutual benefit” and equality between the various countries.

 Hence, also from the ideological viewpoint, Deng became the Supreme Leader of the Party – as well as of the State apparatus – and announced the Open Door policy.

 An extremely important fact was also the separation of the Bank of China from the People’s Bank of China, so as to serve as single State body for foreign exchanges.

 That was the start of the “Long March” towards the Four Modernizations, with an unusually united Party, and currently towards “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” , as well as – at geopolitical level -President Xi Jinping’s New Silk Road.

 In January 1980, the “four freedoms” – of work, people, goods and capital – were abolished.

 The new planning needed to manage all aspects of productive forces.

  That was explained by a covert war of the Chinese economy against the penetration of foreign capital and joint ventures, which in fact were immediately regulated by specific legislation enacted the previous year.

 The great British operation of economic control over the South-Chinese coasts was resumed from Hong Kong, but the Chinese government eliminated the possibility of such an action by Great Britain (and by the USA, at least partly).

 Hence the Party’s unity had to be reflected in a new context and, to some extents, in the whole society, so as to prevent the liberalized Chinese economy from taking the Party and Socialism away. A new rationale for the CPC’s Leninist unity.

 The new Act on contract law was enacted in March 1981, and in 1982 also the new civil procedure law was enacted, which became effective on October 1, 1982.

 In September 1983, at the 12th CPC Congress, there were three groups within the Party: the nostalgic Maoists, a small and narrow majority for Deng Xiaoping; the Orthodox group that still wanted a nationally planned economy, as in USSR -hence probably the heirs to Lin Biao; finally the real reformists.

 Deng won with a clear, but not overwhelming majority.

 Hence, everyone was waiting for the Four Modernizations to fail, so as to go back to the old routine of the Plan.

 As also happened in the USSR, it was often fully imaginary compared to the actual reality of the things done and produced.

 It was in 1983, however, that the Third Front strategy was implemented, i.e. Mao’s directive – drawn up as early as 1962 – according to which the national strategic industries had to be moved from the coasts – militarily and politically difficult to defend – to the internal areas. Without said Mao’s directive, the New Silk Road could not be understood even currently.

Hence 14 open coastal cities that were declared so in 1984, but with a new law on profits that served as mainstay of Modernizations: companies were asked to pay a certain share of profits to the government, but they could withhold some profits if they matched and exceeded the requirements of the contract with the State.

 In 1985 a new regulation also involved government bonds. The seventh Five-Year Plan began, underlining a “scale” approach, in which the coastal areas – gradually freed from traditional strategic companies – were driving the economic development, which later spread like wildfire even in the internal areas.

 It was the Hong Kong model that Deng Xiaoping’s executives copied and adapted.

 For a short lapse of time, Chinese analysts and Party planners also looked to the Singapore model, with the (single) Party of Lee Kuan Yew.

 It isby no mere coincidence that Shenzen was close to the former British colony, and often the Chinese attracted and favoured the companies of the British area towards the new Chinese coastal areas also characterized by free-market economy.

 Advanced and high-tech services in coastal areas, and lower value-added, but still inevitable, productions in internal regions.

 A new dualism, where rural overpopulation had to be gradually absorbed by inland strategic companies.

 A double geopolitical status of inland areas which, in many cases, is repeated also in the current Belt and Road Initiative.

 In 1986, the “open-ended” contracts for the manpower working in State-owned companies came to an end.

 In October 1987,the 13th CPC Congress was held, in which – for the first time – there was talk about the “commodity economy”, i.e. a two-tier mechanism, in which the market is matched and also “corrected” by the old national planning.

 A sort of re-edition, for internal use, of the formula “one country, two systems” implemented by China with the agreements for Macao and Hong Kong.

 In 1988, however, the 7thNational People’s Congress officially legitimized the private initiative (not the mere ownership) and enabled private individuals to buy State-owned companies.

 The term “People’s ownership” was also deleted, while individuals and groups, even non-Chinese ones, could buy land with a system similar to that of the British real estate leasing.

 Profits, wherever made, had to be reinvested in the company that originated them, before requesting any financing from the People’s Bank.

 The Special Economic Zones, modelled again on the Hong Kong system, became five.

 Hence innovation on the coasts and strategic companies in the central regions – mainly public ones, which still remained almost completely public.

 In April 1989, Jiang Zemin rose to power.

 Student demonstrations also began in Tiananmen Square, where, year after year, the various anti-regime organizations gathered: Falun Gong, the networks of many illegal parties, unrecognized union organizations and many “spontaneous” groups.

 And some old “Red Guards”.

 Zhao Ziyang, the Party leader already defenestrated by Jiang Zemin, was in fact at the centre of “spontaneous” organizations.

 The various Autonomous Federations of Workers -spread by location and not by industry – were legally created.

 Gorbachev’s visit took place in May 1989.

  That was the key moment of a long series of doctrinal, practical, cultural and historical differences that – from the very beginning – divided the two great Eastern heirs to the Marxist-Leninist Third International.

 What really mattered to the Chinese leadership was that the Russian crisis did not overwhelm the Chinese Communists: that was the meaning of the declaration signed by Gorbachev, which regarded the “peaceful coexistence” of the two Communist regimes.

 The leader of the Soviet Party was made fun of – not even so elegantly – not because he had reformed the Soviet economic system – in a way, however, that the Chinese deemed wrong – but for one reason only: he had relinquished the Party’s role in the reformist process, which the CPSU had to lead and guide for China, from the very beginning.

An “economicist” mistake, as the CPC’s ideologues said – yet another proof of the Marxist roughness of the “Northern enemy”, as Deng Xiaoping called Russia.

 Sarcastic sniggers on the lips of Chinese leaders. Then Gorbachev explained again his perestrojka and glas’nost, but the Chinese leaders, whose power was based on Party’s bayonets, kept on not taking him seriously.

 Days before the arrival of the Soviet leader, at least one million people had gathered in Tiananmen Square.

 The problems that the Chinese leadership had to solve in a short lapse of time were radical: the “hard” wing that was previously a minority prevailed and managed to convince Jiang Zemin.

 The Party and its authority – the basis of any transformation, even the most radical one – were re-established without much talk. It was impossible to think about a heir to the “Long March” that dissolved the Party within “society”.

 On May 19, the CPC decided to follow the hard line and the military forces reached the areas near the Square, from the outskirts of Beijing.

 Few hours later, the Square was completely cleared, but that was done the hard way.

 Shortly afterwards, at the 4th CPC Plenum, Jiang Zemin –  also following the experience of Tiananmen Square – returned to one of his old theories and developed the “Three Represents” model, i.e. the idea that the CPC’s power was based on its “vast representation” of the Chinese productive forces, of the cultural and technological avant-gardes and of the wide strata of population.

 In other words, the Chinese society – and its economy, in particular – was reformed by bringing the elites together, part of whom were in Tiananmen Square, but also the large crowds still organized by the Party.

 A Confucian middle way that was particularly successful.

 Hence, Zhao Ziyang definitively lost the game within the Party that, however, was also inside the Tiananmen Square insurgency.

 Once the crisis was over, Deng Xiaoping left also the last very strong power in Jiang’s hands: the leadership of the Central Military Commission.

 Shortly afterwards – and there was nothing more symbolic than that event – the Stock Exchange of Shanghai reopened. A reopening that had been expected since the 1930s.

 Later also the Shenzhen Securities Exchange opened. In both of them, any securities – including those issued by the State – were traded, but there was only one deep logic: to acquire productive capital to generate strong and self-sustained development of the coasts and of the high value-added industries that had to compete on the world free market, without granting protection and aid that would go to the detriment of the deep productive structures of the internal regions.

 In 1992, Deng’s journey to Southern borders had a clear route, although the CPC’s leadership had always had some doubts about the “free economic zones”. The core of the issue was that the GDP had to be increased in the lapse of time between the 1990s and the beginning of the Third Millennium.

  It had to be rapidly increased from 6% to 10%.

 Without that “quantitative” assessment – just to use the old Communist jargon – there could be no “qualitative” transformation of Chinese society.

 Everything had to be done soon – well, but soon. That was the characteristic of Deng Xiaoping’s years – extraordinary years, in some respects.

 In a short lapse of time, the Party developed the concepts of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” and of “market Socialism”, which are so important also in President Xi Jinping’s current policy line.

 There were also other changes that, in a few years, led to the current Socialism with Chinese characteristics, as advocated by President Xi Jinping. However, everything could be done from a legal view point began in those years.

 The transformation process of the Chinese economy is long, powerful and complex, but – unlike what is often said in the West – it is never a mere market mechanism or a naive adaptation of the Party or the State to the absolute Western rules of globalization.

 As early as the 1990s, China has decided to govern market globalization and not just being a part of it. It wants to lead the process so as to be – now that the end of the century about which Deng thought has long been over – the axis of globalization and the centre of the new global hegemonies.

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