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The Anniversary of Kosovo’s Independence: Results and Prospects

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This year marks a decade since Kosovo proclaimed its independence, and that independence has by now become a hard fact. The country has been recognized by 106 UN members (according to Serbian data, or by 114 countries according to Kosovo itself), including 23 EU members (with the exception of Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Slovakia and Romania) and all its regional neighbours (with the exception of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; the latter refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence because of Republika Srpska’s position). Kosovo’s international status was further strengthened by the UN International Court of Justice, which officially recognized the republic’s independence on July 22, 2010. The court’s fairly controversial verdict reads that Kosovo’s declaration of independence does not breach international law. Brussels contributed in the form of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo, which was signed on October 27, 2015 and came into force on April 1, 2016. However, it will take Kosovo a long time to prove that its statehood is tenable.

The new-fangled state is facing the same old structural problems that were caused by the territory’s socioeconomic and sociocultural underdevelopment, rather than by the fact that it was not an independent state. Kosovo’s archaic economy spawns skyrocketing unemployment, mainly among the youth, which in turn nurtures socio-political radicalism, international crime and growing Islamic extremism. Getting rid of Kosovo’s established reputation as a pan-European mafia transit hub for drugs, human trafficking and contraband goods will also require huge efforts. The territory’s reputation will not benefit from the findings of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, which is starting to look in the crimes perpetrated by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1998–1999. Although Serbia, with the backing of Russia and China, has thus far refused to formally recognize Kosovo’s independence, there are many things indicating that this firm stance may not last for long.

Kosovo and Serbia

Serbia has already de facto recognized Kosovo’s independence – under Aleksandr Vucic’s Serbian Progressive Party and Ivica Dacic’s Socialist Party of Serbia, both of which are viewed as nationalist and pro-Russian parties – in accordance with the 2013 Brussels agreement on the normalization of relations. Belgrade transferred the Serb-populated northern portion of Kosovo to Pristina in order to be able to begin negotiations on accession to the European Union. All Serbia received in return from Kosovo was a promise to set up a fairly notional Community of Serb Municipalities, which never materialized.

Belgrade also made significant concessions to Brussels with regard to other aspects of its Balkan policy. Seeing as the Serbian leadership continues to make one self-detrimental compromise after another in the talks with Pristina under the aegis of Brussels, we may assume that Belgrade is prepared to do virtually everything in order to be accepted into the EU. The “intra-Serbian dialogue” on the Kosovo problem initiated by President Vucic and the draft amendments to the Constitution of Serbia (which currently describes Kosovo as part of Serbia) are aimed at dismantling the last remaining legal obstacles to Belgrade’s recognition of Kosovo. No other outcome is to be expected, given that accession to the EU is Belgrade’s declared foreign policy priority, and it is supported by both the ruling parties and the majority of the opposition. For Brussels, a legally binding treaty on the comprehensive normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina is a mandatory condition of Serbia’s accession. In an attempt to further stimulate Vucic to speed up the process, the EU has announced that Serbia might become a member in 2025, provided that Belgrade completes the pre-accession talks and normalizes relations with Kosovo by 2019 at the latest. The Serbian leadership will hardly have the political will and diplomatic skills required to withstand the pressure being applied by Brussels and Washington.

Many rational arguments may be offered in support of the resolution of the Kosovo issue. The preservation of de jure sovereignty over Kosovo will keep Serbia hostage to a frozen conflict in the foreseeable future, leaving it surrounded by active and potential EU and NATO members. Serbia has been unable to recover control over the territory which it effectively lost back in 1999.

At the same time, a rational analysis of the situation indicates that Serbia does not really need such an outcome due to a number of unsolvable demographic, economic and political problems. Should the territory become part of Serbia again, the high birth rate among Kosovo Albanians (a constant source of demographic expansion) would seriously threaten to change Serbia’s ethnic composition, which is something that has already happened in Kosovo itself. Kosovo, which used to be described as the most economically backward and subsidised territory in Yugoslavia, would be too heavy a burden for Serbia’s economy. Indeed, Kosovo was a constant source of ethno-political conflicts in Yugoslavia – under the royal dynasty, then during the Tito regime and finally under Slobodan Milosevic. Given the plethora of internal socioeconomic problems, Serbia does not have the capacity, need or indeed incentive to spend its limited resources on Kosovo. This much was recognized in the proposal made by Serbia during the 2007 talks on the status of Kosovo to grant the region broad autonomy – essentially independence – on the condition that this autonomy would not be enshrined in international law, and that neither Kosovo nor the Kosovo Albanians would be represented in Serbian government institutions.

It is true, however, that the idea of abandoning a relic of national history, the birthplace of the medieval Serbian state and the site of the historic Battle of Kosovo against the Turks, is extremely unpopular. It encroaches on the legend of Kosovo as enshrined in the country’s folklore, the cornerstone of Serbian mythology. The influential Serbian Orthodox Church is also extremely unhappy with the government’s policy on Kosovo, although there is no unity of opinion within the church itself. Furthermore, history demonstrates that the church leaders are not prepared to enter into an open confrontation with the state. The political forces demanding that Serbia choose Kosovo over the EU are extremely weak and represent a negligent minority in parliament.

International Repercussions

The recognition of Kosovo by a significant number of UN members, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the fundamental documents of the OSCE and the principles declared by the EU with regard to the newly independent post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav states set an international legal precedent that could be applied in other conflict zones [1]. This precedent gives separatists forces in similar situations elsewhere in the world additional incentives, pretexts and legal grounds to either demand the Kosovo scenario or oppose it. The list of EU countries that abstained from recognizing Kosovo indicates these European states wanted to safeguard themselves against similar developments, and not without good reason.

Just as Russia had warned, the first talks about the possibility of Kosovo’s independence elicited a lively response in the “unrecognized” post-Soviet territories of Transnistria, Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For their part, the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development member states (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) were quick to declare that, irrespective of the result of the final Kosovo settlement, it must not set a precedent. The subsequent developments in Georgia and Ukraine proved that Russia had been correct in its predictions.

It would be naive, of course, to expect an automatic domino effect in all the regions in which separatist movements are present. Each separate conflict has its own causes, effects, development dynamics and unique balances of forces. Not a single separatist movement in Western Europe has used Kosovo as a precedent in its cause. The Catalan separatists find the example of Slovenia more fitting, and the Spanish government has been stressing that the Catalan case has nothing in common with Kosovo. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly obvious why Spain did not recognize Catalonia’s independence.

Kosovo might prove a more relevant example and, therefore, a precedent, for Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for the Macedonian proponents of a Greater Albania. Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik periodically threatens Washington and Brussels with a referendum on the republic’s secession from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and cites Kosovo as a precedent for doing so. The National Assembly of Republika Srpska issued the threat twice in 2008, in light of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The threat was never implemented, for obvious reasons. Republika Srpska’s secession is impossible and senseless without the active support of Belgrade, something that will not happen given Serbia’s EU aspirations. For this reason, the latest escalation in such rhetoric was nothing more than a way to increase the popularity of Dodik party’s on the eve of the local elections in Republika Srpska held on October 2, 2016. The results of the election confirmed the effectiveness of the tactic: Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats increased the number of local self-administration bodies under its control by a third. There appears to be no reason to give up on this successful rhetorical tool in the 2018 Bosnian general election. It is also the most effective instrument in the fight against restrictions on Republika Srpska’s rights and the continuing attempts to centralize Bosnia-Herzegovina. Dodik made it clear, however, that a secession referendum is not on the agenda just yet.

It would appear that the political crisis in Macedonia, which lasted for one year, created a very favourable environment for the implementation of the long-standing nationalist idea of a Greater Albania. However, the Albanian leaders in both Albania and Macedonia resisted the temptation to avail of the situation, limiting themselves to strengthening their institutional and political positions in the Macedonian political arena. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama invited the leaders of Macedonia’s Albanian parties to visit Tirana (their positions following the snap parliamentary election held on December 11, 2016 were critical in terms of which of the two rival Macedonian parties would ascend to power). Rama consolidated these forces on a single platform, thus playing a key part in identifying the winning party in the protracted political crisis in Macedonia. Rama’s electoral motives are easy to explain: Albania was readying itself for presidential and parliamentary elections. The Democratic Party, the main rival of the ruling Socialists, had boycotted parliament since February 2017 and is threatening to boycott the elections. They followed through with the threat during the presidential election. In this situation, Rama desperately needed a success story, something that would promote him to the role of the leader of all Albanians. It was only US intervention that forced Albania’s two main parties to strike an agreement on the parliamentary election. Rama’s rhetoric abated somewhat after he won the election and in the run-up to the launch of talks on Albania’s accession to the EU.

The Political Situation in Kosovo

The forced coalition of Kosovan President Hashim Thaci’s Democratic Party of Kosovo and its main rival, Prime Minister Isa Mustafa’s Democratic League of Kosovo, was inconvenient for the former. Pressure from the radical nationalist opposition grew. Major breakthroughs in relations with the EU were looking remote (unlike its neighbours, Kosovo does not yet have EU candidate status, nor does it enjoy visa-free travel to EU countries). Brussels insisted that Pristina adhere to the unpopular commitments it had made to ratify the border delineation treaty with Montenegro that had already been signed, set up the Community of Serb Municipalities and resume the dialogue with Serbia that had been suspended by Kosovo. The upcoming Special Tribunal in Kosovo is an additional irritating factor both for Thaci, who commanded the KLA, and for his former brothers in arms. It was the ideal time for the president to strip the opposition of its monopoly on patriotism and remind everyone who was actually running the country. This required an intricate political manoeuvre: during the vote of no confidence in the government initiated by the opposition on May 10 2017, the pro-government Democratic Party sided with the opposition. The Mustafa cabinet was overthrown and a snap parliamentary election was set. Thaci’s main concern was to configure political power in such a way as to guarantee immunity to former militants who had taken part in conflicts across the former Yugoslavia. This is why the Democratic Party entered the parliamentary campaign in a so-called ‘pistol coalition’ with the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo led by the infamous Ramush Haradinaj and nominated the latter for prime minister. Haradinaj, a former field commander accused by Serbia of war crimes who has been acquitted on two separate occasions by the Hague Tribunal due to lack of evidence (witnesses for the prosecution would either be intimidated into recanting their statements or die under unclear circumstances), and who already served as Prime Minister of Kosovo in 2004–2005, is known for his harsh nationalist statements.

The snap parliamentary election held on June 11, 2017 demonstrated the population’s low confidence in the ruling political elites, and the popularity of bellicose nationalism. The ‘pistol coalition’ won 39 out of the 120 parliamentary seats. For the first time in history, the radically nationalist opposition party Vetevendosje (Self-Determination) came second with 32 seats (against 16 in the previous convocation). The Democratic League of Kosovo, which had led the previous cabinet, won 29 seats. The so-called Serb List of Belgrade-backed candidates got nine out of the 10 seats contested, gaining significant political weight in parliament. The young leader of Self-Determination, who had sided with the Democratic League, was being tipped for premiership, but the situation played out differently in the end. Haradinaj won the sympathies of the New Kosovo Alliance and offered its leader and Kosovo’s biggest businessman, Beghjet Pacolli, the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Serbian government endorsed the Serb List’s support for the ‘pistol coalition’, and other nationalist minorities followed suit. Representatives of the Serb List even made it into the Haradinaj cabinet, despite the fact that mere weeks prior to that, Belgrade had demanded that Kosovo’s new prime minister be extradited as a war criminal. As a result, Kosovo received a fragile coalition majority with 61 seats in parliament and a government that can be ruined by any of the members at any moment. Under pressure from Washington and Brussels (the new prime minister was initially denied visas to the United States (US) and the United Kingdom), Haradinaj gradually began to go back on his hot-headed election campaign promises.

Kosovo and Albania

On January 22, 2014, Kosovo and Albania signed an agreement on cooperation and strategic partnership. The governments of the two countries have been holding regular joint sessions ever since (once each in 2014 and 2015, and two in 2017). The sides have voiced the intention to unite their diplomatic missions in a number of countries “for the sake of economy.” Albania has granted Kosovo Albanians and Serbian Albanians the right to apply for jobs without work permits. In April 2017, the Albanian leaders once again joined efforts to directly blackmail Brussels and Washington: Hashim Thaci and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama were joined by the leader of Albanians in Serbia, Jonuz Musliu, to issue virtually simultaneous statements to the effect that, should the prospect of the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU continue to decline, then the possibility that Albania and Kosovo will merge into an all-Albanian state cannot be ruled out. Rama explained that his country would prefer EU membership to this Greater Albania. Nevertheless, he and other Balkan leaders have repeatedly stated that the EU’s foot-dragging on the accession issue was threatening the region’s stability. This tactic has proved effective in the past, and will certainly be resorted to in the future for the purpose of stimulating European integration processes. Even though politicians actively employ the idea of uniting all Albanians in their election campaigns, and as a way to apply pressure on their Western patrons, they are unlikely to dare implement this scenario without the approval of the US and the EU. It is clear that Washington and Brussels will be against the idea, because in such a case the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be difficult to preserve.

Kosovo and the EU

In an attempt to repair its shaky influence in the region, Brussels has been forced to revise its strategy and make EU expansion to the Western Balkans a priority for 2020–2025. Serbia and Montenegro are the primary two candidates. The other contenders, which have been watching their rivals with jealousy, will try to jump the queue. The competition is aimed at making them more loyal to Brussels, enabling the latter to manage the region more efficiently and strengthen regional stability. However, local leaders have realized by now that the threat of destabilization is an effective lever of influence on the EU. This is another reason why Kosovo will remain a weak link in terms of local stability. The pace and timeframe for European integration will be a hot topic in discussions between Brussels and the candidate countries, or between the old and new EU members. We can expect the relatively latent political confrontation to continue, with the candidates trying to persuade Brussels to expedite their accession to the EU, including by way of periodic fits of “non-EU” behaviour, which are particularly characteristic of Albanian politicians in both Kosovo and Albania. That said, the regional elites will remain firm in their commitment to joining the EU, which has sent them a positive signal in its new strategy for the Western Balkans.

The US has no plans to leave the region either. Kosovo still has much to do in order to be accepted into the EU, and there is no point in even guessing at when that might happen. However, the country may get a coveted UN seat much sooner. This would not help solve Kosovo’s fundamental problems, but there are plenty of countries in the world whose tenability is dubious.

First published in our partner RIAC

[1] Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union // Bulletin of the European Communities Commission. 1991. Vol. 24. No. 12, p. 119.

Ph.D. (History), Head of the Department of Ethno-Political Conflict at the Institute of Europe under the Russian Academy of Sciences, RIAC expert

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Rift deepens between US and EU over Iran

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Munich Security Conference 2019: A view of the main conference hall, Image source: MSC / Kuhlmann

Recent days have been witness to two important events: the Middle East Conference in Warsaw (co-hosted by Poland and the US State Department from February 13-14, 2019) and the Munich Conference. Differences between the EU and US over dealing with challenges in the Middle East, especially concerning Iran, were primary during both events.

The Middle East Conference in Warsaw somewhat lacked legitimacy as a number of important individuals were not present. Some of the notable absentees were the EU Foreign Policy Chief, Federica Mogherini, and the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, and Italy. Significantly, on February 14, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met in Sochi, Russia to discuss the latest developments in Syria and how the three countries could work together.

The personalized aspect of Trump’s diplomacy

In addition to the dissonance between the EU and US over handling Iran, the dependence of Trump upon his coterie, as well as his overly-personalized diplomacy, was clearly evident. Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor, Jared Kushner, spoke about the Middle East peace plan at the Warsaw Conference, which Trump will make public, after elections are held in Israel in April 2019. The fact that Netanyahu may form a coalition with religious right-wingers could of course be a major challenge to Trump’s peace plan. But given his style of functioning and excessive dependence upon a few exclusive members within his team who lack diplomatic and political experience, this was somewhat expected.

EU and US differences over Iran

While Israel, the US, and Arabs seem to have identified Iran as the main regional threat, the European Union, while acknowledging the threat emanating from Iran, made it amply clear that it disagreed with the US method for dealing with Iran unilaterally and was against any sort of additional sanctions. US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, even went so far as to state that the goal of stability in the Middle East could only be attained if Iran was ‘confronted’. The EU, unlike the US, is opposed to the US decision to get out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

At the Warsaw Conference, Vice President Mike Pence criticized European Union member countries for trying to circumvent sanctions which were imposed by the US. Pence was referring to the SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle) launched by Germany, France, and Britain which de facto undermine US sanctions against Iran. The US Vice President stated that the SPV would not just embolden Iran but could also have a detrimental impact on US-EU relations.  

Differences at Munich Conference

The differences between the US and EU over Iran were also visible at the Munich Conference. While Angela Merkel disagreed with Washington’s approach to the Nuclear Deal, she agreed on the threat emanating from Iran, but was unequivocal about her commitment to the JCPOA. While commenting on the importance of the Nuclear Agreement, the German Chancellor said:

“Do we help our common cause…of containing the damaging or difficult development of Iran, by withdrawing from the one remaining agreement? Or do we help it more by keeping the small anchor we have in order maybe to exert pressure in other areas?”

But it was at the Munich Conference that the US Vice President clearly flagged Iran as the biggest security threat to the Middle East. Pence accused Iran of ‘fueling conflict’ in Syria and Yemen, and of continuously backing Hezbollah and Hamas.

GCC Countries at the Warsaw Conference

It is not just the US and Israel, but even representatives of GCC Countries took a firm stand against Iran. A video leaked by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu revealed this.

Bahraini Foreign Minister Khaled bin Ahmed Khalifa stated that it was not the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict but the threat from Iran which posed the gravest threat in the Middle East.  Like some of the other delegates present at the Warsaw Conference, the Bahraini Foreign Minister accused Iran of providing logistical and financial support to militant groups in the region. Similarly, another clip showed the Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Adel Al Jubeir, saying that Iran was assisting and abetting terrorist organisations by providing them with ballistic missiles.

Iran was quick to dismiss the Middle East Conference in Warsaw and questioned not just its legitimacy but also the desired outcome. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated that the conference produced an ‘empty result’.

US allies and their close ties with Iran

First, the US cannot overlook the business interests of its partners not just in Europe, but also in Asia, such as Japan, Korea, and India. India is not just dependent upon Iran for oil, but has significantly invested in development of the Chabahar Port. This will be its new modern gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. New Delhi in fact took over operations of the Chabahar Port in December 2018. On December 24, 2018 a meeting – the Chabahar Trilateral Agreement — was held and representatives from Afghanistan, Iran, and India jointly inaugurated the office of the India Ports Global Chabahar Free Zone (IPGCFZ).

The recent terror attacks in Iran as well as India have paved the way for New Delhi and Tehran to find common ground against terror emanating from Pakistan. On February 14, 2019, over 40 of India’s paramilitary personnel were killed in Pulawama (Kashmir) when a suicide bomber attacked a convoy of Central Reserve Police Personnel (CRPF). The attack is one of the worst in recent years. The terror group Jaish-E-Muhammad claimed responsibility. On February 13, 2019, 27 members of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards were killed in a suicide attack in the Sistan-Baluchistan province which shares a border with Pakistan. Iran stated the attack was carried out by a Pakistani national with the support of the Pakistani state.

In the aftermath, the Indian Foreign Minister, Sushma Swaraj, met with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Aragchchi en route to Bulgaria. In a tweet the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister stated that both sides had decided to strengthen cooperation to counter terrorism, remarking that ‘enough is enough’. This partnership is likely to evolve further. In fact, many strategic commentators in India are pitching for an India-Afghanistan-Iran security trilateral agreement to deal with terrorism.

Conclusion

 So far, Trump’s Middle Eastern Policy has focused on Iran and his approach suits both Saudi Arabia and Israel but it is opposed by a number of significant US allies. As a result of the recent terror attack in Pulwama, geopolitical developments within South Asia are extremely important. Thus, the US and GCC countries need to keep a close watch on developments in South Asia and how India-Pakistan ties pan out over the next few weeks. If Iran strengthens ties with India, and given the fact that it already has Russian support, achieving its isolation will be tough for America. New Delhi may have no option but to enhance links with Tehran given its own national security interests in the region. Trump needs to be more pragmatic towards Iran and should think of an approach acceptable to all, and not just the small cabal within his Cabinet that view the region from an anti-modern perspective.

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Montenegrin political earthquake

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In mid-January, across Montenegro, one video clip caused a real political storm. For the first time it was seen how a businessman close to the government gives 97,000 euros to Slavoljub Stijepovic, former mayor of capital Podgorica and senior official of the rulling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), to fund the election campaign. It all happened ahead of the parliamentary elections in 2016. Dusko Knezevic, chairman of the Montenegro-based Atlas Group, meanwhile suspected of money laundering and other financial malversations, explained that this was just one in series of multi-million donations to the DPS of President Milo Djukanovic, during which time the DPS has never been out of power. This video clip was the first concreate confirmation of something that has long been an open secret in Montenegro.

Ten days after the release of the video Djukanovic confirmed that Knezevic was a donor, but not in the figures stated by Knezevic. The Prosecution Office needed three days to make a statement after Knezevic’s video, which shocked most of the public. Also, it was shocking how the Prosecution Office led the investigation. Thus, after the audio recording as part of the affair Atlas, the former Vice Governor of the Central Bank Velibor Milosevic was arrested expressly, because of the suspicion of being part of a criminal organization, for whose boss is marked Dusko Knezevic. Milosevic was detained for up to 30 days, due to possible influence on witnesses. On the other hand, the video from the beginning of the story was not a sufficient reason to treat Slavoljub Stijepovic in the same way. He was interviewed only 20 days after the appearance of the video, as a citizen. Unlike Velibor Milosevic, who was detained by the prosecutor with handcuffs and in front of television cameras, Stijepovic had the privilege to come to the Prosecutor’s office through the premises of the Ministry of Justice and to come out unnoticed.

The Prosecution Office decided to suspect Stijepovic for the criminal offense of Money Laundering by helping, but Prosecution Office in his case, as in the case of Velibor Milosevic, did not see a threat to the influence of witnesses or the need for detention. According to some media reports, Stijepovic took the guilty upon himself, which is why the Prosecution assessed that there was no need for the hearing of Milo Djukanovic, president of Democratric Party of Socialists and Montenegro. Stijepovic also reportedly told the Prosecution Office the names of DPS activists from the Zeta region who received money. More than 20 were heard in the Prosecutor’s Office, no detention was ordered.

Reaction

On the same day when he was charged with a criminal offense, Stijepovic  came to the session of the Presidency of the Democratic Party of Socialists, where “traditional centers of destruction”, media and other circles, were blamed for current affair, aimed at destabilizing the country. Milo Djukanovic, according to a tried-and-tested model, tried to show that behind this affair are centers of power from Russia. So his media machine was trying to show that Dusko Knezevic is in Moscow and that he work at the orders of the Russian intelligence services. However, it soon became clear that Dusko Knezevic is in London. In an interview with Al Jazeera Balkans in London, Dusko Knezevic presented new accusations against Milo Djukanovic. Dusko Knezevic stated that he has a lot of videos that shows how he personally gives money to Djukanovic. He keeps these videos for the finals of the affair, when he says, will completely reveal the criminal octopus of Milo Djukanovic.

This criminal affair encouraged people to action. Soon protests were organized. The first protests were held on February 2. The protest was organized by a group of citizens who claimed that they started “civil struggle” against the regime in Montenegro, and that behind them stands no organization. With whistles and sirens, the demonstrators scandalized the “Street of Freedom”, “Rise Up, People”, “We Want Justice”, after which they left 97 envelopes in front of the building of the Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office, on which they wrote “1,000 Euros” on the one hand, and on the other some of the long-standing unsolved affairs that the Prosecution should solve. On Saturday, February 16th, second large gathering was held in the capital of Montenegro, where the demands to the Protesters Office were presented. From the protest gathering, held under the slogan “97,000 Resist”, urgent and irrevocable resignations were sought from the president of the state and the government, Milo Djukanovic and Dusko Markovic, Supreme State Prosecutor (VDT) Ivica Stankovic, Special State Prosecutor (SDT) Milivoje Katnic and Director of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (ASK) Sreten Radonjic. Since Dusko Knezevic has said that there is a part that is not corrupt in the Democratic Party of Socialists, the protestants decisively denied that. The current events with the new affair of Milo Djukanovic were also used by Albanians from the United States. A truck with the inscription “Meet the Montenegrin president – a man of organized crime in the year 2015” was parked near the White House, the Congress, the State Department, the Montenegrin and the EU Embassy in Washington. On the truck also stood the message “Stop the discrimination of Albanians in Montenegro”.

Conclusion

Montenegro, which is, a NATO member since July 2017 and a candidate for EU membership, is often accused of not doing enough to tackle organized crime and corruption. EU has demanded more concrete results in the fight against corruption at a high political level as one of the main conditions for its making progress towards joining the EU. The entire rule of Milo Djukanovic is marked by affairs, but what this sets out is the fact that Dusko Knezevic is an insider, a man who took part in many important tasks. In addition to his testimonies, Dusko Knezevic also presents video recordings as well as documents. What many analysts spoke and warned about long time ago, now is documented. This affair also clearly demonstrated that all institutions in Montenegro are under the control of Milo Djukanovic. Initially, the scandalous silence of the Prosecution Office after the outbreak of the affair, the subsequent refusal to execute detention measures for Stijepovic, but above all the absence of a hearing of Djukanovic despite the unquestionable evidence of his involvement in illegal work, is in favor of the long-held thesis that these institutions are an integral part of the regime. Judicial institutions do not even try to show that they are independent. There is no doubt that the affair initiated by Montenegrin businessman Dusko Knezevic seriously shaken Milo Djukanovic and his party. It is still early to predict how the affair will culminate because all the evidence Knezevic announces has not yet been published. However, this is clear indication that the West has decided to significantly weak Djukanovic. An attempt by the media machine of Mila Djukanovic to connect Dusko Knezevic with Russian intelligence services, is not accepted in the West. Dusko Knezevic clearly shows that he is doing all the attacks on Djukanovic from London, where he currently lives. The fact that some political parties that are close to the Western Embassies support street protests, which was not the case before, speaks enough. One of the reasons why Milo Djukanovic has been ruling for almost three decades is complete obedience to the West. However, Djukanovic did all the tasks that the West needed, the separation of Montenegro from Serbia, the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, and finally the violent entry of Montenegro into NATO. Now with his biography, which is full of affairs, he is only a burden to the West. In any case, this affair will either take Djukanovic out of power or send him a clear message that it is time for political retirement.

First published in our partner International Affairs

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German Poll Shows Germans Stunningly Anti-U.S.-Government

Eric Zuesse

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On February 8th, the NATO-supporting Atlantik-Bruecke, or Atlantic Bridge, issued their poll, “Vertrauen in der Krise” or “Trust During the Crisis”, and it finds, from scientifically sampling 2,500 Germans, that there is very little trust or confidence in U.S. leadership, and that there is less dis-trust both of Russian and of Chinese leadership than of American.

Atlantic Bridge was founded by NATO and the Council on Foreign Relations in 1952 in order to make Germans hostile toward the Soviet Union, and favorable toward the United States. It was the prototype for America’s Atlantic Council, which became founded in 1961 — the same year as Eisenhower’s Farewell Address warning against the rise of the “military-industrial complex.” It was created in order to propagandize for higher U.S. military spending to strengthen NATO. When the Cold War ended on the Russian side in 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of communism and the end of the Warsaw Pact military alliance that had been set up by the U.S.S.R. in 1955 to defend the communist bloc against NATO, U.S. President George Herbert Walker Bush secretly instructed America’s European vassal nations on the night of 24 February 1990 to continue secretly the war against Russia and any nation that isn’t hostile against Russia, and so NATO has swallowed up all of the Warsaw Pact nations, right up to Russia’s borders, and is now trying to merge into NATO a former part of the Soviet Union itself, Ukraine, after a U.S. coup in Ukraine in February 2014 installed a racist-fascist, ideologically nazi, anti-Russian regime at Russia’s doorstep.

Here are the new German poll’s main findings:

More than four-fifths of the respondents (84.6 percent) rate the German-American relationship as negative or very negative. Only 10.4 percent find it very positive or rather positive. A clear majority (57.6 percent) argues for a greater distance between Germany and the United States. Only 13.1 percent want a closer approach; 26 percent want to keep the current arrangement. …

Almost half of respondents (42.3 percent) consider China a better partner for Germany than the US. Conversely, only 23.1 percent believe that the US is a more reliable partner than China. …

[Concerning Germany’s current foreign policies,] only 18.6 percent see a positive impact, 34 percent a negative. …

Asked about the currently most dangerous global trouble spots, only 1.9 percent of the respondents named the expansion of the Russian zone of influence. The growing influence of China is seen by 2.2 percent as the biggest threat. …

Neoconservatives (that is to say, supporters of expanding the U.S. empire) are quoted as being alarmed by these findings:

Professor Burkhard Schwenker, Chairman, Roland Berger Advisory Council, Head of the Atlantic Bridge Working Group Foreign and Security Policy and Vice-Chairman: “In view of the great loss of confidence in the United States, we must engage more than ever in our discussions with and about America. and across the Atlantic, at all levels. That’s why the Atlantic Bridge is increasingly devoting itself to this exchange.”

Dr. David Deißner, Managing Director of Atlantik-Brücke, adds: “The current dissonances and the mood in Germany show that the common values and interests between the transatlantic partners have to be discussed openly, without fear of controversy.” …

Dr. Michael Werz, Senior Fellow, [U.S. Democratic Party] Center for American Progress, Member of the Board of Atlantik-Brücke, commented: “Germans must leave the comfort of neutrality behind and, despite all legitimate criticism of the current US administration [since he propagandizes for Democratic Party billionaires instead of for Republican Party billionaires who donate to the current U.S. President], not of anti American resentment, make clear the dangers posed by the authoritarian systems in Russia and China.”…

Dr. Norbert Röttgen MdB (CDU / CSU), Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag, Member of the Board of Atlantik-Brücke: “The survey shows that we need to convince the citizens of the strategic needs of a German engagement in a radically changing world. Without the backing of the population, foreign policy can not be pursued.”

Clearly, this poll’s stark findings shocked these propagandists for increased German purchases of weaponry from firms such as Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics.

This poll shows that today’s German Government does not represent the German public — at least not on these central issues of German foreign and national-security policies. One may say the same thing about the U.S.: that its Government does not represent its public (on practically everything, actually).

The continuing ability of the U.S. regime to justify its many foreign invasions and coups as being humanitarian instead of what they always have been, which is raw grabs for extending the U.S. empire, is severely jeopardized when the approval of U.S. leadership declines among the publics in the lands that are ruled by aristocracies that (like Germany) are allied with and subordinate to America’s aristocracy — the 585 U.S. billionaires. This is especially  the case in Germany, which is currently occupied by thirty-two thousand U.S. troops.

On 2 July 2018, the U.S. ‘Defense’ Department’s newspaper, Stars and Stripes, headlined “Former Army Europe boss: Pulling US troops from Germany would be a big win for Russia”, as if Russia instead of America were doing “regime change” everywhere it can, and it opened: “A large military drawdown in Germany would be a ‘colossal mistake,’ says the former top Army commander in Europe about a possible scaling back of the U.S. presence on the Continent, at a time when Russia has become more assertive.” The article went on to say:

There are now about 32,000 permanently stationed American troops in Germany, which hosted the majority of the 300,000 troops stationed in Europe during the Cold War.

The Washington Post reported on Friday that the Pentagon is analyzing the cost and effects of returning some or all troops in Germany to the U.S. and possibly sending some to Poland instead. The review began after President Donald Trump, who is at odds with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on a range of issues, expressed interest in withdrawing U.S. forces.

So, the question naturally arises as to whether the German public support the U.S. President regarding this matter. The present writer has web-searched the combination “Rückzug der US-Truppen aus Deutschland” and “umfrage” (or “withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany” and “poll”) and failed to find any polling of Germans on that question. For some reason, this question — which should have been repeatedly and heavily and constantly polled among the German public — isn’t showing up as having been polled, at all, ever. What could possibly explain that mysterious situation? Why wasn’t the question included in the Atlantik Bruecke’s latest poll? Could it be that Germany’s master, the U.S. regime, simply hasn’t permitted that question to be polled in Germany? Or is there an alternative hypothesis that’s likelier? If so, what would that possibly be? Perhaps the people in power know already — or fear too much — that the German people want the American occupation of their country to end.

Here are two relevant headlines from the recent past:“‘Russia should be in G7, whether you like it or not’ – Trump says on way to summit” and, “G7 leaders urge Russia to stop undermining democracies”.

And here is the reality that all of the attendees at the G7 contradict and that is denied by the entire U.S.-NATO ‘argument’ — denied by their argument against Russia, and for the U.S. and its allies. They all simply hide this fundamental reality. But perhaps the German people are somehow coming finally to recognize that they’ve been deceived for a long time and need now to replace their current leaders (just as Americans do, and just as the people in all countries that are allied with the U.S. aristocracy do).

The extent of the lying on this has exceeded almost anyone’s expectations, but maybe the German people are coming, somehow, to recognize this ugly fact.

Have you read any of this in the mainstream press? It’s all news, but did you learn of it there? If not, why not?

Author’s note: first posted at strategic-culture.org

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