Since the implementation of the JCPOA in January of 2016, and throughout the current period of accelerating investment by foreign enterprises in Iran, many participants have taken for granted that in the event of a “Snapback” or the reimposition of UN, U.S. and EU sanctions under the provisions of the JCPOA, foreigners must perforce exit all investments in Iran and Iran’s major industries would be relegated to the shadows as an unlawful destination for foreign capital.
The operative assumption has been that any such reimposition of sanctions under a Snapback scenario would make it “impossible” for such foreign participants to maintain, lawfully, their investments in the various projects within Iran, investment they have made a huge effort to structure and uphold in the still-new era of significantly relaxed sanctions. In fact, the very idea of the impossibility of maintaining significant investments in Iran under such sanctions has become something of a fixation. To the dismay of Iranian partners in various ventures, their foreign partners tend to focus on securing their own interests, rights, and recompense under a Snapback. An efficient exit strategy is often sought.
In reality, those who are here on the ground in Iran know that, regardless of the whims of the American President or the vicissitudes of foreign capital flows, the continued development and renovation of Iran’s domestic economy, both in terms of absolute production, as well as in terms of sophistication, efficiency, and integration, will continue apace, and therefore, the wiser among the stewards of foreign investment in Iran understand that it is as much a question of ensuring business continuity for their Iranian-Foreign joint venture projects despite changing international sanctions regimes, which have been imposed by the West against Iran for decades.
As a result, the most basic and fundamental considerations for any prospective foreign project participant and its Iranian partner become:
1. How the foreign participant can, through appropriately drafted “Impossibility Clause(s)”, remain invested in the Iranian venture for as long as possible under the threat of renewed or reimposed sanctions, and without incurring unacceptable risk.
2. How the foreign participant can contractually envision the broadest range of adverse sanctions scenarios through a single and efficient impossibility mechanism.
3. How the foreign participant can provide for a gradual approach to any putative withdrawal procedure, as opposed to the simplistic solution of outright termination upon Snapback after a period of suspension.
4. How the foreign participant can, in the event of the extinguishment of impossibility, subsequent relaxation or obtained exemption of sanctions, reasonably provide for the right, or at least the option, for itself to reenter an investment project which it may have exited because of Snapback.
The legal thought process underpinning successful solutions which industry practitioners may be likely to embrace is beyond the scope of this article, but the conceptual summary can be a useful guide for all of us as we come to grips with what can be made possible by “Impossibility Clauses”.
1. Remaining invested, minimizing risk: Of course, it is true that for many projects, a direct investment by the foreign participant though its stake in an Iranian joint venture entity may be the most straightforward means of effecting the transfer of capital that allows the foreign party to have a stake in a project. It also allows for the simplest mechanism by which a foreign party may apply for and successfully obtain an investment license in accordance with the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act.
Nonetheless, such a direct investment may, particularly in the case of European entities which also do business in U.S. jurisdictions or in jurisdictions which have significant links with the U.S. financial system, provide little or no cushion under even the most benign reimposition of any form of secondary sanctions. This is because the direct investment leaves the foreign party little room to maneuver by way of restructuring or otherwise allocating its participatory interest in the project as sanctions change.
For this reason, a more effective solution could include the formation of a foreign special purpose vehicle to act for the project entity. In the case of a joint venture, an SPV incorporated in a jurisdiction less likely to be adversely affected by reimposition of sanctions would allow for a more flexible platform to facilitate intelligent solutions such as exit and re-entry options, trustee or agency relationships, and contingent sale-repurchase strategies to prepare for the worst outcome of a sanctions scenario which may force a foreign party to exit Iranian investment.
2.Knowing unknowns, counting uncountables: Even now, with the most recently issued ultimatum by the American President declaring that the end of the JCPOA as we know it is nigh (to be either amended or abrogated, if Mr. Trump is to be believed), there exists a wide variety of circumstances involving the reimposition of sanctions, ranging from those that would make the maintenance of an interest in a project by a foreign party merely inconvenient to those which would make maintaining such an interest lawfully untenable. These may range from largely toothless, otherwise symbolic targeted secondary sanctions which apply only to the entities of specific countries, as we have continued to see since Trump’s October 2017 decertification, or those which may apply only to certain economic sectors or types of goods or projects, to those which render further financial flows in support of such a project functionally impracticable. Most challenging of all would be the failure of the UN to continue to waive the imposition of sanctions against Iran.
Thus, a single mechanism to classify sanctions in some way as materially adverse changes and evaluate consequences seems a more pragmatic solution than contemplating what may constitute an “impossibility” event, and including it under grounds for termination.
Under a scenario in which the foreign party has made appropriate structuring preparations as suggested, the determining exit remedies depends on compliance with mandatory applicable laws of the project vehicle’s jurisdiction. To put it another way, the most straightforward test of whether the foreign party may have to adjust, or exit from its participation, comes down to whether it can fulfill project obligations while abiding by all applicable regulations that may apply to it. Beyond such a litmus test, imagining or prognosticating about the myriad complexities of a possible Snapback scenario may be fruitless and contractually inefficient.
3.Avoiding the black-and-white trap: Of course, a foreign project participant can easily avail itself of the opportunity to stipulate that under any kind of scenario of project impracticability caused by sanctions, certain or envisioned, termination shall be the one and only prescribed remedy.
But this is likely to disadvantage the foreign party in the context of negotiations over comprehensive project terms with its Iranian counterparty, and it may limit the scope of the project work itself and fail to allow for a more complex investment structure which cannot survive the threat of termination overnight due to a “Snapback” of one kind or another.
Aside from termination, and its precursor remedy, suspension, there should also be the possibility to contemplate a variety of concepts including assignment, agency and delegation, in order to benefit from the vagaries of sanctions regulations and their exemptions. In some cases, project obligations which would be in violation of sanctions for some foreign entities may not be so for others. As has been shown by the agreements between foreign export credit agencies (“ECA”s) such as EKF, BPI and Invitalia, developments at an international level, especially where adequate sovereign support and sufficiently ringfenced banking facilities exist, are being contemplated to facilitate the kind of continuity required for the decades-long projects now underway in Iran. In addition to these ECAs, other parties such as quasi-sovereign corporations, particularly those from less dollarized jurisdictions, can play a role as fallback transferees of the exiting foreigner’s project interest or shares under Snapback. Moreover, it should always be noted that under even the most negative circumstances, the potential for a foreign party to obtain a waiver does exist and can be specified for the benefit of all parties.
4.Saving face, weighing options: Although some foreign entities have a checkered past derived from cutting and running under the threat of or the actual imposition of sanctions against Iran, time has shown that many of the same foreign parties which were forced, or chose, to exit their project ventures are the first ones to have returned since the JCPOA. Such is the compelling nature of Iran as a destination for foreign capital.
Iranian parties to a project know both this history itself and its implications. Foreign participants may wish to keep close to the exits, but foreign companies that have been victimized by their own government’s whims regarding sanctions, and the slippage inherent in exiting and reentering, cannot be understated.
For this reason, foreign project partners may choose to consider the solution of exit and entry “options” for themselves under adverse sanction scenarios, and thus it is important for all parties involved to understand what an “option” precisely means, and how to value such an option.
In financial speak, an option is defined as the right but not the obligation to sell (or buy) an asset in a fixed quantity at a fixed price on (or before) a fixed date in time. In the case in question, the asset is the participatory interest of the foreign party in the Iranian project, and the date is that point in time at when the parties to a project agree that the foreign party must leave due to sanctions (or is able to re-enter due to easing of sanctions).
However, it is not obvious immediately what the fixed price should be for foreign project interest at the time of exit or re-entry, and, most importantly, what may be overlooked is the tremendous value that such an option has. In finance, the greater the underlying uncertainty about an asset, the more valuable any option on that uncertain asset is. Similarly, the longer the life of an option on an asset, the more valuable that option is. In the context of long term investments, any option to exit (or re-enter) should be linked with a significant premium (that is, the worth of the option), and the contract parties should ensure that they successfully negotiate an appropriately fair value for the flexibility the options offer. As an illustrative example, the alternative to any exit put option for the foreign party is a fire-sale in the face of illiquid conditions for its share interest under the menace of reimposed international sanctions, or more problematic still, the inability to exit its share interest altogether, which an option is supposed to protect against.
Absent a foreign investor’s legal immunity to the whims of the UN, OFAC, or other authorities, there is no perfect panacea for fool proofing long-term Iranian projects against the kind of uncertainty which the spectre of sanctions create. But although this threat, to a certain extent, has forestalled the growth in Iran’s industry and economy despite the strengthening of Iran’s relationships with the international community, it is now apparent, moreso than ever before, that foreign parties can be expected to take an increasingly pragmatic approach in efforts to remain engaged with their Iranian projects for as long as possible. They can effectively do so by allowing for the most flexible and broad classification of sanctions-related termination risks, by specifying a menu of contractually stipulated responses to reimposed sanctions (in conjunction with intelligent and pre-emptive project structuring) and by exchanging due consideration with the Iranian party for the invaluable options which allow them to remain confident that they can, if absolutely necessary, exit the project and someday re-enter, at a fair price.
Thus, it seems that the operative watchword for all foreign investors in Iran is continuity: continuity of the progression towards innovation, development and growth, and continuity of the participation of foreign interests in that process, bolstered by intelligent structuring solutions, both legal and financial, for dealing with the complicated reality of international economic sanctions. With a measure of foresight, and a functional, flexible contractual framework, all participants in long-term, large-scale project joint ventures can move closer to the ideal of mitigating most, if not all, of the adverse consequences of sanctions regulations on investment decisions and risk management.
First published in our partner Tehran Times
Are We Heading Toward Another Lost Decade for Latin America?
According to World Bank data, between 2000 and 2019, average annual growth in the Latin American and Caribbean region was 1.6%. That level of growth is clearly unacceptable both if we compare it with growth in other regions – East Asia (4.8%), Europe and Central Asia (1.9%), the Middle East (2.9%), South (6.5%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (3.5%) – as well as if we put it in per capita terms, where the rate would be 0.56%, insufficient to rapidly improve living standards for the population.
It should come as no surprise then that the decade ended with protests in several Latin American countries, especially if we view these protests as an expression of the discontent with an economy that does not grow fast enough to satisfy society’s demands and expectations and with an inequality gap that remains too high, although it has decreased over the past decade (this region has the highest level of regional inequality in the world).
Thus, it appears that the reasons behind the unrest largely remain. If this situation is not addressed, there is risk that nothing will change and the next decade will be equally challenging in the region. We have already experienced the first year of that future. Governments of the region need to make urgent, serious efforts to implement an agenda of inclusive growth. It is time to leave behind the cycle of disillusionment and simply building on the many conquests of the past to now respond to the needs of our societies, which are raising the bar with their demands. Recognizing this as a priority is the first step in transforming what seems like a challenge today into an opportunity for progress.
The region’s sluggish growth has different causes, both internal and external. Analyzing them is crucial. The World Bank has just presented its Global Economic Prospects (GEP) report, a semi-annual flagship publication analyzing the global economic situation, including economic growth estimates for 2019 and the outlook for 2020. The GEP can be taken as a thermometer that measures the health of the economy at the local, regional and global levels. Reviewing global trends can help put the economic situation of Latin America in context. Today that context is telling us that, for now, the cold snap will continue.
According to the GEP, the global situation remains fragile. Annual global growth for 2019 (2.4%) is the lowest since the 2008-2009 financial and economic crisis. While economic growth in 2020 is expected to improve (2.5%), this recovery will be modest. Anemic international trade and investment and a slowdown in productivity explain this fragility, among other reasons.
Latin American Winter
How does this global scenario affect the region? In the Latin American context, economic growth also cooled in 2019. Excluding Venezuela – where the economy contracted by an estimated 35% – the region grew just 0.8% last year as a result of weak investment and private consumption.
The slowdown was quite consistent both because it affected most Latin American countries and because it occurred in nearly all economic sectors. Currently, we expect growth to reach 1.8%. Clearly, this growth rate will not help close the per capita income gap between Latin American countries and more advanced nations. Once again, there is a fear that if history is not rewritten, it will repeat itself within the decade.
It is well known that moderate growth limits economic opportunities for the population. If this occurs, we must be aware of the risks given the social tensions in several countries in 2019.
But we also know that the ongoing issues of Latin America go well beyond those of economic growth. They are associated with structural problems that must be resolved, such as persistent inequality or the need to build the necessary consensus to support growth and social inclusion in government policies, based on a long-term vision.
We are talking about reforms that contribute to improving the business climate to attract private investment, which in Latin America is strikingly low.
And we are talking about improving governance to help enhance legal security.
These reforms are not easy for several reasons. Often, the business climate suffers because many established firms fail to see the positive side of implementing reforms that facilitate the market entry of new firms, which may threaten their dominant position. In the field of education, besides the need to persevere for many years to have a positive impact, implementing the economic policy of the reforms to improve education quality is exceedingly difficult. Additionally, we cannot ignore the problems that even the most reformist government will encounter when addressing deficient governance issues.
We could look at these deficits as elements of an inalterable reality and the seeds of future disappointments – or we could view them as the starting point for an in-depth discussion to forge the necessary agreements.
I choose this last option. I believe that the challenge of achieving broad consensus on government policy, with the involvement of all sectors of our societies, in an open, participatory dialogue in which all voices are heard, offers us the opportunity today to make social pacts that are the bases for more robust, inclusive growth in our region.
It is not an easy task, for sure. That dialogue must involve politicians, members of the business community, workers, civil society organizations and the many other sectors of our societies. Yet there is no other possible path if we want to avoid looking back in 10 years and being horrified by our wasted efforts. The discontent of the region’s societies in recent months is a call to action. We should capitalize on this opportunity to ensure that the recurring history of disillusionment does not repeat itself in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Source: World Bank/ El País
Principal Trends in the Development of Eurasian Integration
The development of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2019 was once again marked by deepening integration and the expansion of global trade and economic relations. Emerging trends include the improved quality of integration and the shaping of the Union as a pragmatic and responsible partner involved in international relations as an independent actor.
The EAEU is improving its institutions and mechanisms for regulating trade and economic cooperation, reducing the number of barriers to ensure the complete freedom of movement of goods, services, labour resources and capital within the single customs space of the member states.
The following regulatory instruments have been amended and improved in 2019:
-electronic customs declarations have been put into use; these declarations are connected to the unified information platforms currently being developed in all EAEU states;
-the procedure for offsetting customs duties using a system of advance payments has been modified (it will significantly speed up paperwork flow and reduce customs clearance times);
-the rules for calculating and collecting compensatory and anti-dumping duties have been streamlined;
-the terms and powers of state agencies have been specified; the areas of influence and regulatory control of the Eurasian Economic Commission (hereinafter the EEC) have been expanded in matters relating to the supervision and implementation of the EAEU anti-monopoly rules both on cross-border markets and throughout the EAEU in general;
-international treaties have been amended in the part pertaining to the distribution of customs duties collected between the treasuries of the member states (the following ratio has been stipulated: Armenia – 1.22 per cent; Belarus – 4.86 per cent; Kazakhstan – 6.955 per cent; Kyrgyzstan – 1.9 per cent; Russia – 85.065 per cent).
Emphasizing the “Digital” Aspect
In 2019, the EAEU actively developed and improved the digital agenda in various segments of the common market. Projects for implementing a digitalization programme have been developed and approved. The programme stipulates the procedure for implementing digitalization projects through the consolidated efforts of all EAEU members.
In particular, in order to simplify the paperwork flow, speed up customs proceedings, and make it easier to do business in the Union, the EAEU adopted the decision to streamline the rules and functioning of the “one window” system. For all the members of the EAEU market, this could serve as a platform for an electronic information exchange system for all EAEU market participants regardless of their country of origin, as well as a venue for interacting with the licensing and regulatory system.
The EAEU also adopted the Concept of Cross-Border Information Interaction, which lays down the legal framework for the exchange of information among EAEU market participants and can be used as a platform for the development of the information services market in the future.
The digital agenda programme also extends to the real sector of the economy, which is provided for by the project for industrial cooperation, sub-contracting and technology transfer. The project entails developing a system of e-contracts between industrial enterprises. The advisory body, the Industrial Policy Council, has been tasked with managing the implementation of this project.
Single Sectoral Markets
2019 saw the adoption of the Concept for the Creation of a Common Financial Market of the Eurasian Economic Union, which entails free mutual access to national markets for banking and insurance institutions (regulating the process of streamlining and aligning the rules and mechanism for issuing licenses and their mutual recognition). The Concept will boost competition on the banking services and insurance markets, expand the range of available financial services, and stimulate investment and capital mobility.
The complexity and scale of reforms necessary to create common banking, insurance and securities markets require a lengthy preparatory period in order to coordinate, streamline and aligning macroeconomic criteria, standardize indicators to ensure the stability of the financial and insurance sectors, as well as the legislative framework, by 2025. A transitional model of the common financial market will subsequently be launched.
Energy is Key
The transitional model of the EAEU common energy market has been launched. An important detail in the concepts of energy market integration is the fact that, when negotiations on the Union Treaty were in progress, the objective of creating a single common market for all types of energy sources was abolished in favour of creating the common market format (CEM) as a target objective for the integration of the energy sector.
The EAEU CEM entails free pricing on energy and energy transmission using the following mechanisms: long-term contracts between independent companies use agreed prices set with due account of the equilibrium price of the common market that has been written into contracts, and exchanges operate with free pricing.
Trade is organized with the use of an e-system for swap contracts, forwards and futures, and with the use of the Single Information System (SIS) accessible for all wholesale market participants. However, only authorized organizations are authorized to conclude long-term transactions and determine the volumes of surplus energy offered for bidding.
Before launching the gas market, the upper and lower price limits for surplus electricity and service tariffs are to be regulated within internal prices. This means that the “freedom” of pricing for energy and services is from the very outset established in accordance with the terms and conditions and within the limits of the manufacturing, resource, technical and technological potential of national natural monopolies, and the common market only adjusts pricing depending on the current supply and demand at a specific moment in time.
This is a transitional format for the functioning of the EAEU CEM, and it fits perfectly into the integrational model of cross-border trade cooperation, which entails achieving the objectives set for the common market by increasing trade volumes and ensuring equal access to the services and infrastructure of national monopolists.
Consequently, the development of Eurasian integration made it possible to preserve the growth of the positive influence that integration has on the stability of the macroeconomic situation in member states and on the degree of macroeconomic convergence in the EAEU in 2019. As a result of applying the single customs tariff of the Customs Code of the EAEU and expanding the list of technical regulations implemented by all states, conditions on the commodities markets are becoming streamlined at a rapid pace, and equal competition conditions are being created for all actors on the EAEU common market. These developments make it possible to stem the drop in growth rates that were predicted for the global market at the beginning of 2019.
Streamlining the rules governing trade in goods and services on the common EAEU market in 2019 made it possible to ensure a smaller drop in mutual trade in monetary terms within the Union compared to the decline in foreign trade with third countries. The decrease in bilateral trade in January–September 2019 was 1.3 per cent, compared to the 2018 trade decline of 2.5 per cent with third countries.
Armenia (6.4 per cent) and Belarus (3.5 per cent) demonstrated positive growth in mutual trade, while the other states demonstrated a decrease in trade turnover of approximately 3 per cent on average. As in previous years, minerals (26 per cent of the total mutual trade in the EAEU), machinery, equipment and vehicles (20 per cent, with Russia and Belarus remaining the principal suppliers), agricultural raw materials (15 per cent), metals and metal goods (13 per cent), and chemicals (12 per cent) remained the principal drivers of growth.
The EEC estimates that the dynamics of mutual trade in comparable prices (calculated using the physical volume of supplies index) demonstrate stable trade volumes, remaining at the 2018 level, and a drop in prices of 1.5 times, which led to a decrease in the cost indicator of mutual trade volumes. Consequently, the Eurasian integration factor retains its positive effects and can be bolstered by stepping up integration processes.
The potential of expanding trade cooperation can be realized by expanding the circle of partners in the preferential regime of economic cooperation. In 2019, the EAEU continued its work to develop international cooperation. One example of this is the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the People’s Republic of China, which went into force in 2019. Cooperation agreements were signed with Serbia and Singapore, memorandums on cooperation were signed with Indonesia, and a partnership declaration was signed with the Pacific Alliance. In addition, negotiations were launched on agreeing on the terms and conditions of partnership agreements based on previously signed memorandums of cooperation with the African Union, Bangladesh, Argentina, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the Global Medical Device Nomenclature Agency.
The EAEU’s activity in the international arena is testimony to its great development.
From our partner RIAC
WEF 2020: A Blank Check on Climate Change Costs
At the WEF Davos 2020, is there already a blank check issued from stakeholder capitalists to Greta Thunberg to go and fix global climate damages? If not, too bad…just relax full payment may be coming.
First some facts; big and small governments have no money, big businesses have no money, what disappears in heavenly bushes of the paradise-accounting always stays there. The world is basically broke to fix this monumental problem; broke it’s mentally and crushed morally, broke is also the global populace, exhausted and restless, unless their survival on sustenance, equality and social justice not addressed at much faster rate over populism mobs may appear.
The Blank Check: Enters the five million small medium businesses of the world; a super economic force to reckon with on platform economy.
In broader strokes, as a simple example, The United States Business Administration, the SBA has some 13 million small medium size enterprises as members. Now imagine, if five million of such enterprises, already doing USD$2-5 million in annual turnover were placed on national mobilization of entrepreneurialism to boost special skills on innovative excellence to produce exportable quality. Now imagine if each one added only one-million in additional revenue to their current operations what will happen, basic math. Five million small enterprises times one million new revenue each equals 5,000,000 x 1,000,000 = 1,000,000,000,000 or one trillion.
Now imagine, if there were 25 million such enterprises scattered across the world, each adding two million dollars as a base per year that will be 50 trillion dollars… or 10 five times the revenue of the world’s five largest and most powerful technology companies. This is a wake-up call to exhausted economies. These operations are less new funding dependant they are execution hungry and deployment starved.
There are some 100 million SME in such mix around the world; if mobilized on national entrepreneurial platforms would have enough strength to help and fix local community issues, as entrepreneurs by their DNA are cause centric and will take care of such global climate issues, unlike short term shareholders on money schemes. The lack of discussion on SME revival are main reason, such silence proves lack of vision and global-age knowledge on entrepreneurial transformation and most importantly about global consumption and how to create real value creation. The spotlight on hedge funded value manipulations take all the attention and systematically the entrepreneurial talent of SME suppressed for not being glamorous enough on talk shows over earth shattering robotic technologies.
Fact: The world can easily absorb unlimited exportable ideas in unlimited vertical markets. Fact: The well-designed innovative ideas are worthy of such quadrupled volumes. Fact: The entrepreneurial and dormant talents of a nation are capable of such tasks. Fact: The new global age skills, knowledge and execution are now the missing links
The world is changing fast; this is no longer a cliché, now a serious warning: You can always tryout a change and start with some 500 small and medium enterprises in your own local region on national mobilization of entrepreneurialism protocols and measure the impact of innovative excellence on the local grassroots prosperity. Currently there are already 11,000 Chamber of Commerce in the world with combined membership of 45 million, somewhere here in lack of digital platforms are 25 million enterprises eager and ready to boost their revenues by million each. The art and science of global showcasing of its members with global bounce is a solid start on export strategy. Bold and open debates will streamline the fears of missing skills at the top to tackle such large scale deployments.
The rest is easy
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