Internet can be considered as one of the greatest achievements of humanity of the last century, which connected the entire world. It created a new space for connections, information and communications, as well as cooperation. Thus, it created also a new platform for conflicts which involved not only individuals but also states. The invention of the twentieth century, the internet, has become another sphere for international relations, and a new space for defensive and offensive policies for regulating and balancing those affairs. The space called cyberspace has become a platform for interactions not only between individuals, but also between states. The interactions on their side were not only developed in a positive manner, but were also transformed into attacks, which pose a real threat to the security of states. Thus, the following questions arise:
Can cyberspace be considered a new sphere for war? Can conflicts and offensive and defensive operations in cyberspace be considered a real war?
The aim of this article is to specify offensive and defensive actions occurring in cyberspace and to explain the differences and similarities between them and the classical approach to war present in other spheres: land, water, air, and space. Despite the overgrowth of offensive interactions in cyberspace and defensive strategies for enriching the cyber arsenal of states, military specialists have concerns over the reality of cyberwars in general. Parallels are drawn to show the similarities and differences between definitions and perceptions of war, and whether concepts from the classical approach can be transferred to describe wars in the cyber sphere. This research puts cyberwars in line with other wars, thus analyzing their peculiarities, whilst Cyberspace is seen as another sphere for war and international relations in addition to the existing spheres of land, water, air, and space
Internet’s Two Sides of the Coin: From Good to Threat
The Internet that we use today, is based on the Transmission Control Protocol or just Internet Protocol commenced in 1973. The network became operational in January 1983. For the first two decades of its existence, it was the preserve of a technological, academic, and research elite. From the early 1990s, it began to percolate into mainstream society and is widely regarded as a General-Purpose Technology (GPT) without which modern society could not function.
Only half a century ago it was difficult to imagine that human interactions would be developed in a manmade sphere, totally virtual and artificial. It must have been impossible to imagine that it would penetrate our lives so closely that it would cover everyday life, from communication and information sharing to purchasing products and regulating temperature at home.
Now internet has connected the entire world breaking the land borders which lined geographically differentiating the places people live. It substituted land borders with digital ones, making it possible to connect the entire world into one sphere.
With the start of the World Wide Web in 1993, the greatest accretion of communication came into existence. Since then, information being secret for a limited groups or organizations that were historically used for military purposes as an intellectual advantage, soon became available for masses.
Moreover, equal access to information for all, one of the ultimate achievements of humanity and one of the supreme advantages of the internet, has started to provide information not only for good will, having also provoked irregular warfare.
These chaotic interactions, which Garnett called “fourth generation warfare” (4GW), through networks would become a wave of social reactions and pressure that would provide an opportunity for an asymmetric warfare. The tendency is obviously dangerous since not only states possess these “digital” weapons but also non-state actors including terrorist networks. Basically, the Internet allows anyone to join digitally and to be a force or power that could have a significant impact on states’ policies.
The sphere were those actions take place with the usage or within the system of information and communication technologies is broadly named cyberspace and the actions that take place in this sphere get their terminology accordingly; cyber-attacks, cyberwar, etc… Though states have various definitions of a cyberspace and with the scope it covers, it is meant to be a non-physical Information and telecommunication technologies environment (ICT).The term cybersecurity has been emerging from the US since the mid-1990s, which later have become widely used in other countries and international organizations such as United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe(CE), BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and many others.
A cyber-attack is not an end in itself, but a powerful means to a wide variety of ends, from propaganda to espionage, from denial of services to the destruction of critical infrastructure.
From the prism of threat, they may cause, cyberattacks can be implemented using methods, such as malicious programs, that can penetrate systems of specific or not specified group of people or entities causing dysfunctions of computer operations, stealing personal information, phishing stealing passwords of the user as well as infecting computer systems to slow down specific processes, etc. In current internet-run infrastructure a single penetration can be fatal for a society and become a threat for a state. A penetration into the command-control system of critical infrastructures, for example, can cut the supply of energy, change the chemical construction of water thus making it poisoned, etc. and the anonymity can stand as an advantage as cyberattacks are still not attributable through international humanitarian law. Moreover, in a cyber conflict, the terrestrial distance between adversaries can be irrelevant so cyber weapon can reach its target much beyond its borders.
The advance of technology made it possible to give room for clashes between States and non-states actors involved in operations in cyberspace. These clashes have become a real threat for international security. As compared with kinetic weapons that are relatively expensive to obtain, as well as possible to detect their origin, malicious programs are available to download or buy and even create if there is a good specialist of it: even a teenager can formulate it.
Therefore, it is becoming nearly impossible to patrol all the purchase and supply chain of the cyber arsenal. Malicious viruses or programs can penetrate various computer systems of public and private usage and cause dysfunctions, changing the primary command-control systems, slowing their base speed of operation and causing very costly problems for state security.
Per media reports, the group which rampaged through and besieged part of Mumbai in November 2008 made use of readily available cellular and satellite phones, as well as overhead imagery from Google Earth, to coordinate and plan their attack.
However, this invention is an issue of arguments among scientist from the prism of war definition.
Theoretical Dilemma of cyberwars and cyber reality
Despite different conflicts occurring in cyberspace between state and non- state actors, state-sponsored operations, and developments in international relations, military specialists argue about the exact definition of cyberspace, whether to evaluate it as real war or not, and as whether to count operations in cyberspace as a real war between parties involved.
Various conflicts in cyberspace including attacks of regular and irregular origin performing symmetric or asymmetric tactic, do not correspond with the classical approach of the war including only some or one or even missing any aspect of the war characterization. Despite of the current actions and bilateral, multilateral etc., agreements signed by states and international organizations, associations on the cybersecurity issues and despite of the threats the world overcomes or will overcome in cyberspace, theorists have certain disbelieves while defining or accepting cyberspace as a new sphere for wars as well as cyberwars as already occurring facts.
The issue is that there had not been a single verifiable case of cyber terrorism nor has there been any human casualty caused by cyber-attacks, giving grounds for disbelief.
Thomas Rid a specialist of war, is among those scientists and experts who see debates about cyber wars exaggerated, moreover, he expresses mistrusts related to cyberspace as a new space for war in a classical approach of war definition. He believes that “Cyber war has never happened in the past, it is not occurring on the present and it is highly unlikely that will disturb the future.”
The fact that computer and internet assisted attacked may penetrate the operating systems of targets stealing data or causing dysfunction of potentiality of operations Rid, however, in this respect differentiates between sabotage operations and direct physical harm.
Rid refers to Carl von Clausewitz, a nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist, who defines war according to three criteria, “First, all acts of war are violent or potentially violent. Second, an act of war is always instrumental: physical violence or the threat of force is a means to compel the enemy to accept the attacker’s will. Finally, to qualify as an act of war, an attack must have political goal or intention.”
Theoretical description of war through centuries might have changed its primary strategies and instruments, while his goal is always the same. Within this respect, it is important to observe this definition on a broad way: Of course, computer warm or virus cannot kill directly a person, like it could have a sword, but it can cut the energy supply of a hospital causing a chain of violence, or it can penetrate the command control of the Airplane system and change the direction of the plane or to cause and a catastrophe.
In contrary to classical approach of war, the reality of cyber war is supported by those who believe that cyber wars have already occurred, are occurring and will, possibly, continue to occur in future, thus cyber strategies must be implemented.
In July 2016, Allies reaffirmed NATO’s defensive mandate and recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea.
Former U.S. President Obama speaking about cybersecurity mentioned:
“America’s economic prosperity, national security, and our individual liberties depend on our commitment to securing cyberspace and maintaining an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet. Our critical infrastructure continues to be at risk from threats in cyberspace, and our economy is harmed by the theft of our intellectual property. Although the threats are serious and they constantly evolve, I believe that if we address them effectively, we can ensure that the Internet remains an engine for economic growth and a platform for the free exchange of ideas”.
Thomas Reed, a former staffer on the US National Security Council argues that Cyber wars are even new. They occurred in past, in Cold War Era, and had devastating results. As an example, he mentions about the first ever cyber-attack- a massive pipeline explosion in the Soviet Union in June 1982, counting as the most violent cyber-attack ever. “According to Reed, a covert US operation used rigged software to engineer a massive explosion in the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline, which connected Siberian natural gas fields to Europe. Reed claims that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) managed to insert malicious code into the software that controlled the pipeline’s pumps and valves. The rigger valves supposedly resulted in an explosion that the US Air Force rated at three kilotons, equivalent to the force of a small nuclear device.”
Although, neither there is a factual evidence of accident being a cyber-attack confirmed or supported by the official U.S, nor there are any Soviet media reports from 1983 also confirming that Reed’s mentioned explosion took place. Though Soviet Union media regularly reported about accidents and pipeline explosions at the time. In case of cyber-attacks, it is not an easy task to investigate fully and in a short period of time. Forensic examination is needed which presupposes experts and conditions for objective examination. Under the condition of Cold war, the parties would hardly agree to do such an investigation which will reveal secrets about their technical capabilities and the real cause of the explosion. Incase Reed’s claims are true, then the massive violence it could have done would theoretically rank cyber weapons among extremely dangerous means and cyber wars would have been defined accordingly.
Another example that speaks about possible cyberattack that will “suit” to the description of war can be considered the 2008th cyberattacks on Georgian most prominent websites, including those of the country’s national bank and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In August 2008, in the period of the military conflict over South Ossetia, Georgian Government blamed the Kremlin, but Russia denied sponsoring the attackers, and later NATO investigation found no conclusive “proof” of who had carried them out. The fact that the “proof” is not found can illustrate two possible judgments: first, the attacker is technically equipped well enough so it is hard to distinguish him, second: the attack was not carried out by a potential suspect. However, the situation can be judged by the following viewpoint: you are innocent unless your guilt is proved. And because the anonymity is a priority in cyber wars, so it is highly efficient especially for states to use it in hybrid war strategies.
In cyberspace the sides, that are involved in the attacks or counterattacks can be distinguished only in two ways: first, by their own wish (which may occur rarely, or even impossible to happen especially when attacks are carried out by States rather than other subjects) or, according to the evidence. The last one is directly connected with the technical capabilities of an attacker as well as technical competences of an attacked side to be able to detect.
According to Oleg Demidov, a Cybersecurity expert at the Russian Centre for Policy studies (PIR Center), the overview of the NATO experts suspecting Russia in attacking Estonian infrastructure in 2007, Georgian government and private sector networks in 2008, and U.S. financial institutions and private companies in 2014 Spring, as not fundamental, because there was no practical evidence of the proof of the attacker, or lack of technical capabilities to be able to define the source of the attacker.
In his contribution “Global Internet Governance and International Security in The Field of ICT Use”, Demidov stresses high possibility and risk of an international conflict between nuclear-weapon states. As he mentioned;
“In the event of lighting-fats cyber-attack that imitates the ‘signature’ of Russian perpetrators (for example, Cyrillic code fragments and other linguistic patters) and targets the infrastructure of NATO countries using servers in Russian territory, there is a risk of NATO military retaliation against Russia. In accordance with NATO doctrine, retaliatory measures may include the use of kinetic weapons and the involvement of all NATO members in a retaliatory strike”.
These two cyber incidents- the Georgian cyber-attacks and Estonian cyberattacks, are regarded by the U.S. and other Western nations as causes for great attention and much reflection.
Estonian cyber incidents were followed by the establishment of cyber strategies for national and system level for EU members and partners.
Particularly, in 2008, a year after the attacks, NATO set up the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn. The military-defense usage of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is one of the main purposes of the center. The center is technically equipped well enough to protect its members by providing technical support and human resource to protect internet infrastructure.
Another well-known and destructive cyber program that processed a worldwide discussion over the reality of cyber wars is the “Operation Olympic Games”, a large operation, that included the “development, testing, and use of malware against specific targets to collect information about the Iranian Nuclear program, as well as to sabotage it and slow it down as much as possible. It included such malware as Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, and Guass (all of them targeting special operation for espionage and sabotage), active in between 2007-2013.The US presidential administration and Israeli secret services have been named as perpetrators.
Ex-head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Seyed Hossein Mousavian, in his “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: memoir confirms Stuxnet as a malicious computer warm developed to target the computer system that control Iran’s huge enrichment plant at Natanz. Moreover, according to Mousavian, Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s Representative to the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) at that time confirmed that Iran was experiencing espionage at its nuclear plants. According to the IAEA, there was a big decrease in the amount of the operating centrifuges caused by the Stuxnet with a vivid decline to more than 100 – from 4920 in May 2009 to 3772 in August 2010. Despite of the Fact that Ahmadinejad mentioned about the problems directly related to the computer software, installed by the spies to slow down centrifuge’s operation, nevertheless, Mousavian does not think that this could have cause a big problem and an obstacle for enriching the centrifuges.
In fact, Stuxnet did affect the nuclear enrichment system, and did make problems for Iran’s nuclear program. The computer worm was operating inside the system for quite a long time unnoticed, slowing down the operational capabilities of both experts and technical equipment. If we note the fact that it successfully slowed down the system’s operation, then we can conclude that operations reached a certain level much later then they could have without the worm Now that sanctions have hit Iran’s economy and forced it to make concessions, we can conclude that the situation would have been different if Stuxnet had not affected Iranian programs; Iran would have finished its program faster, before sanctions could devastate its economy. But since Iran discovered the problem much later and the whole process was slowly altered by the worm, we can see that Stuxnet led to a longer timeframe for enrichment, and subsequently longer terms for sanctions.
The action brought not only psychological damage, as would be named and labeled by Israel and U.S. specialist, but it brought also to economical, technical(human resources as well as technical capabilities) crises.
According to M. Sahakyan, an Armenian researcher.
“…sanctions were hard and maybe they were the main reason why Iran agreed to the Interim agreement. Though Iranian leaders like to mention that sanctions were not problem, but the Iranian economy had been effectively hit hard by these sanctions. Iranian economy mostly declined when EU member states imposed an oil embargo on Iran. China also reduced its average oil import levels from Iran in a disagreement on Iran’s nuclear program. The depreciation of Iranian Rial, reduction of oil exports and shortages of foreign currency created hard social-economic situation in Iran. So sanctions were hard and maybe they were the main reason why Iran agreed to the Interim agreement.”
It is evident that, not directly but indirectly cyber war may influence politics of a specific State. Today cyber-attacks can target political leadership, military systems, and average citizens anywhere in the world, during peacetime or war, with the added benefit of attacker anonymity.
Stuxnet influenced the Iranians’ centrifuges, causing them to overload an intelligence program. This is a new type of and reason for war. While the basic definition of war presupposes physical violence, Stuxnet presupposes a psychological intent. In addition to the technical harm it did, it also influenced the psychology of those who had encountered the undiscovered cyber worm. Regarding the first, undiscovered phase of the computer worm, imagine a specialist working on the program, who faced long-lasting technical problems, becoming filled with doubt towards their personal professional skills and also doubting the capability of Iran in general to develop its program. This is a new approach in the definition of war, as it dramatically shifts the choice of instruments that can cause harm to a State.
From Wars with Swords to Cyber Wars: State Security is Still a Priority
Nevertheless, the war in cyberspace is real, it has happened in the past, it is happening now and it will certainly happen in future.
The classical approach to war sees physical violence carried out by military operations. Cyberwar presupposes physical violence as well as bringing a new, psychological violence, which may cause no less harm. Ideas and things important for state security have changed over the centuries, as have the instruments and measurements of security, but the problem of state security is still a priority. Maybe unexpected ships won’t attack from the sea, but cyber-attacks will come.
In past centuries, population size was an important issue for the state in maintaining its governance. It determined the size of the workforce and the size of the army, and the strength of armies was measured by the quantity of troops.
Centuries ago, a human, a good soldier was to aim to harm the opposing side. To conquer the army was to win the war. Afterwards, the period of weapons and technology began, and would enable opposing sides measure their technical and tactical capabilities to win. At that time, to mobilize technical capabilities was to conquer the army. Due to growing population and technological achievements, in addition to the number of troops, now the amount of military equipment is of much importance. A single-pilot jet may cause greater harm than 1000 troops on the same territory. Nowadays unmanned aircraft can jeopardize enemies’ strategic targets in specific cases even without any physical violence, because in a certain situation to harm a strategical unit even without causing physical violence from neither attaching side nor from the attacked still may have fatal result for the states being attacked.
In current stage, the military parades mostly demonstrating technical capability of a certain state, will alarm a possible harm while attack or attacking. Aside from the traditional military spheres like land, sea, and air (added later),an epoch of adding a new sphere, cyberspace, has begun, in which technical capabilities do no less harm than in a traditional war. One of the ultimate advantage of cyberwars is the anonymity of the attacker, which makes it a reasonable choice for state’s foreign policy.
In addition to the traditionally distinguished types of harm for a state security, cyberwar brings the conception of psychological trauma for the sates making it doubt its capabilities on a certain level. In the case of Stuxnet, the attack was “emotional” and technical.
The definition of the emotional damage through cyberwars was used to describe Russia’s so-called internet interference in 2016. “The New Yorker” expresses viewpoints of national-security officials who believed that those series of cyber hackings were directed to destabilize the conception of democracy in the States.
For many national-security officials, the e-mail hacks were part of a larger, and deeply troubling, picture: Putin’s desire to damage American confidence and to undermine the Western alliances—diplomatic, financial, and military—that have shaped the postwar world.
To technically dysfunction a system just causing a technical harm is a small incident, while targeting CI with technically destabilizing them already has grown into a political scandal.
In turn, cyberattack may cause harm on a specific target without involving other sides especially in case of state sponsored attacks, as it remains undiscovered for a while and the stereotypes and cliché of the traditional war definition will empower the attacker to have “excuses” for the attack. Cyberwars will become more dangerous, if not included and named as war and not struggled as traditional wars.
Cyber Arm race has started
Despite of the distrust and interpretation of cyberwars within the framework of classical approach of war, states are accelerating cyber arms race. This development has several political and strategic implications that pose the need to find specifically political answers. What is often forgotten or neglected is the increasing importance of understanding cyberspace as a political domain and cyber politics is needed more than ever before.
While experts are debating over the exact description and definition of cyberwar, States are enriching their State defensive arsenal with cyber equipment and technical staff for better governance in cyberspace, as well as regulations and doctrines that will define the strategy for the defensive and offensive operations for ICT threat.
In November 2011, the Department of Defense of the U.S. issued a report to Congress confirming, that it was ready to add cyberspace to sea, land, air, and space as the latest domain of warfare – the military would, if necessary, use force to protect the nation from cyberattacks. This statement shape the interactions in cyberspace on the same level with other spheres making them equally important and in case of need, changeable and cooperative.
By this, next to the traditional war spheres: ground, sea, air, space, a new battlefield-the cyberspace is differentiated.
With the technological developments, nearly every aspect of our lives is technically run, so it becomes very sensitive to any cyberattack, since any non-functioning in a technical field may cause human harm, economic harm, and be a serious problem for the entire National security. In this regard, the former Secretary of Homeland Security of the U.S.Jeh Johnson at The White House Cybersecurity Framework Event on February 12, 2014, specifying the seriousness of the cyberattacks on electrical substations specifically, mentioned:
“What the public needs to understand is that today the disruption of a critical public service like an electrical substation need not occur with guns and knives. A cyberattack could cause similar, and in some cases far greater, damage by taking several facilities offline simultaneously, and potentially leaving millions of Americans in the dark”.
The focus was on the electrical substations but it may refer to other sectors too: telecommunication, hospitals, libraries and federal departments courts and prisons. Any entity, that is functioning with technology may be in a real attack risk.
The technological developments of the last century bring the automated industrial control systems as well as most Critical Infrastructure (CI), the list of which may vary from state to state but have similarities, under possible cyber-attack which may be fatal for national defense. The range of facilities on the list of CIsmay include but not limited to nuclear industry, electricity, telecommunication, water supply, transport system on ground, sea and air, governmental buildings and their communication facilities, the financial and banking system, healthcare and defensive facilities etc. In 2017, the USA Department of Homeland security announced about its decision to include also election infrastructures into the list of Critically Important infrastructure for the State.
The cyber- defensive policy of states becomes an urgent issue and States are engaged in implementing special cybersecurity projects on national level to defend the CI of their countries.
Many states, for instance the U.S., Russia, China, Germany, UK, France etc. are enriching their cyber arsenals and developing cyber security system for defensive operations for their countries. Not only states are engaged in national mechanisms but they also are involved in developing global cooperative platforms for better and clean cyber environment of the World. Specifically, it would be interesting to mention U.S. Russia, China cyber triangle and their input of cyberspace as a significant priority for a State development and Security. The countries are involved in various discussions and cooperation agreements to maintain cooperation and peace in cyberspace globally. Despite of ideological differences in cyberspace and the attitudes of maintaining the policy for it, however these three cyber powers found a common ground for mutual understanding and possible fundamental cooperation. United Nations (UN) Governmental Group of Experts is one of the examples of that which is currently the only platform that has united the U.S. Russia, and China with commonly acceptable norms and suggestions. Since the scope of interests in cyberspace includes all groupings of society including governmental and federal entities private and public sectors as well as common citizens on a national level, private supra-powers regulation beyond borders and being responsible for larger audiences, there is an urgent need to focus on cooperation and establishment of fundamental rights in cyberspace as well as mechanism to establish security in this sphere.
Can a cyber-attack pose a serious threat to national security?
With the clear majority of undergone, ongoing and possible cyberattacks and with the current defensive strategy of the states, the cyberwar is nothing than a real threat for states’ national security as well as private sector. It enflames not only regular warfare which can cause as much harm as it is assumed to have by traditional approach of the war, it may also provoke irregular warfare with the privilege of the equal information access and anonymity. The technological invention of twentieth century may considered to be a disaster along with such scientific invention as atomic energy. It may give a good, but it may harm severely.
The difficulty of cyberwar falls also on the lack of common norms and definitions as well as specifically composed legislation equally acceptable for all states for peaceful and collaborative regulations of problematic issues on this field.
I do believe that cooperation on this issue is of great importance. Joint legislation, understanding and definition of conceptual ideas, common cooperative grounds will bring to a better and secure life, eliminating or declining the possibility of occurring private or non-state organizational subjects to be involved in irregular warfare destabilizing the peaceful cooperation of states and people on internet sphere for a good and productive will. The classical approach of war definition should be able to include a new sphere of violence before a certain violence occurs rather than defining right after it occurs, as mostly happens in historical approach. Aside from the traditional military spheres like land, sea, and air (added later),an epoch of adding a new sphere, cyberspace, has begun, in which technical capabilities do no less harm than in a traditional war.
Cybersecurity is an urgent, necessary strategy, which will lead to a secure sphere for cooperation, free and secure access to and sharing of information, and, due to its technical capabilities, to a more comfortable and economically developed way of life.
While Cybersecurity is an issue for the whole world, strategies for the development of cybersecurity may vary from state to state, in some cases occurring a national level, while in others limited to certain federal entities.
I believe that Cyberspace is very much like the environment; it is a digital environment, and just as a virus that penetrates a certain country is spread worldwide if not stopped, so is a computer virus. Just as pollution in one part of the world pollutes air or water that we all share, a cyberattack may cause a global problem. Networking, sharing information, and a global security approach are musts for a safe and productive global cyber environment and maintenance of all roads for better digital development for the sake of humanity.
(*) This essay adapted from the article Cyberspace – A Manmade Sphere for Wars, (21-st Century, N.1, 2017, pp.42-58). Used by permission. All rights reserved.
How Putin’s Russia is Exploiting Jihadists Against pro-Navalny Protesters?
Who is Putin’s terrorist: Navalny or Jihadist?
Russia’s strongman Vladimir Putin is considering using old tactics to stem the growing wave of nationwide protests in support of his fiercest critic, popular opposition leader Alexei Navalny. This tactic was developed in the late 90s by the KGB ideologists and successfully applied in order to bring to power Vladimir Putin, who is ruling the country with an iron hand longer than all his Soviet predecessors except Joseph Stalin. The tactical skills of the Putin’s policy architects were aiming to frighten Russian citizens by Islamist terrorism and Chechen separatism and unite patriotic and nationalist forces around a new leader capable of challenging the West.
Thus, when the nationwide protests in support of Navalny from Yakutia to Kaliningrad became the most serious challenge, the Kremlin began to trumpet the threat of Islamist extremists and international terrorists. This time, the Putin regime is intimidating protesters with impending terrorist attacks of Central Asian and Caucasian jihadists and their Syrian parent organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
On the eve of the next nationwide protests on February 14, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Investigative Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russia warned of the inadmissibility of calls to participate in an unsanctioned rally. Russian state news agencies RIA Novosti and TASS have disseminated information that the most powerful Sunni militant faction of HTS in northern Syria is preparing a series of lone-wolf attacks during the upcoming mass street protests of Navalny’s supporters in various Russian cities. In doing so, however, the pro-Kremlin media cited its undisclosed law enforcement sources and ultimately spread merely conspiracy theories.
According to anonymous sources of Russian security services, HTS-backed Uzbek Jihadi battalion Katibat Tawhid wal Jihad(KTJ), Chechen militant groups Ajnad al-Kavkaz (AK) and Jaysh al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar (JMA) are planning to carry out explosions and attack protesters. To achieve these purposes, terrorist groups allegedly recruited Russian citizens and Central Asian migrants, who expect their leaders’ commands.
The Putin regime faced the most serious challenge when anti-government protests took place across the Russia in support Navalny in recent weeks. As is known, in mid-January, Navalny returned to the country after recovering from a chemical Novichok poisoning that nearly took his life and was immediately detained and later jailed for alleged parole violations. The robust Putin regime first demonstrated its grave alarm when tens of thousands pro-Navalny protesters demanded his resignation in more than 100 cities and towns, chanting Putin as a ‘thief’. Police detained more than 11,000 people at what they say were unsanctioned protests that the Moscow condemned as illegal and dangerous.
Alexei Navalny’s political creativity and tactical skill inspired Russian liberal youth weary with the corruption-plagued political order presided over by Putin. Fierce clashes between protesters and riot police during the mass rallies indicate that a new generation is not afraid of arrests and the repressive state machine. And to stop the pace of marathon confrontation with the opposition, Putin resorted to his long-standing KGB tactics, intimidating society with possible terrorist attacks and explosions by Islamists.
Will Uzbek and Chechen Jihadists hit pro-Navalny Protesters?
But the fact is, it’s not the first time Putin’s Russia has intimidated society with possible terror attacks by Islamist terrorists and Chechen separatists to achieve political goals. During the transition of power from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin at the end of the second millennium, Kremlin ideologists successfully tested anti-Islamist tactics to overcome the challenges of the political opposition. The ideologists of Putin’s election campaign created his image as a decisive and strong leader, the one who can defeat Islamist terrorism, Chechen separatism and preserve the integrity of Great Russia. His image as the only savior of the Russian Empire was accompanied by radio and television spots and news about the atrocities of Chechen militants and their beheading of Russian soldiers.
Meanwhile, there is a conspiracy theory in Russian political circles that the powerful FSB orchestrated apartment bombings in the Russian cities of Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk in 1999 to boost Putin’s approval rating aiming to ensure his victory in the presidential elections. As a result of these “terrorist attacks”, 307 people were killed, more than 1,700 people were injured. Russian officials concluded that there was a “Chechen trail” in the bombings, but no proof of their involvement was adduced. Many still doubt the results of the investigation and consider Putin to be the culprit of this tragedy.
That’s when Putin uttered his famous phrase: “We will pursue the [Islamist] terrorists everywhere. If they are in an airport, we’ll kill them there. If we catch them in the toilet, we’ll exterminate them in the toilet.” Many still believe that the apartment bombings and the FSB’s tactic against Islamist extremists catapulted Putin into the presidency. Putin soon launched a second war in Chechnya and emerged victorious in the intra-Kremlin struggle. His ratings soared. He met with huge approval in a society weary from the economic collapse, corruption and crime of the Yeltsin era.
Usually people prefer to keep quiet about this tragedy. Russian political figures Sergei Yushenkov, Yuri Shchekochikhin, Anna Politkovskaya, Alexander Litvinenko, and Boris Berezovsky worked to unravel the mystery of apartment bombings. But all of them were brutally murdered under mysterious circumstances. Ultimately, the Kremlin’s tactics to combat Islamist terrorists not only helped to rocket Putin to the political Olympus, but also increased Islamophobia, nationalism and chauvinism in Russian society.
Today, even 22 years after Putin came to power, the Kremlin’s ideologists have begun to intimidate Russia’s liberal society with likely Islamist terrorist attacks again as the nationwide protests seriously threaten his regime. This illustrates the regime exhaustion and the lack of confidence in face of the strategic sophistication of Navalny’s team.
So far, neither HTS, nor Central Asian and North Caucasian Salafi-Jihadi groups have officially responded to the FSB on the plotting of terrorist attacks in Russian cities during opposition rallies. However, in encrypted Telegram chats, Uzbek and Chechen jihadists actively discussed the “leak information”.
Thus, one of the KTJ’s followers on Telegram under the name Al Hijrat said in Uzbek: “Kafir Putin frightens his people with the just sword of Allah.But the people of the blessed land of Sham know that he himself is the main terrorist. Russian infidels and Putin’s Nusayri puppy (Alawites regime of Bashar al-Assad) bomb Greater Idlib to destroy Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah. Executioners will have to hold a harsh response before the Almighty for their crimes.”
A pro-Jihadi chat “Inspire” in Telegram wrote in Russian: “the information about the impending attacks by Ajnad al-Kavkaz is fake. The authorities are trying to hold Russia’s awakening people from mass protests against Putin’s criminal group. To intimidate civilians, the Russian siloviki (FSB) can and are ready to commit terrorist acts, blaming HTS for this, which are not interested in what is happening there in Russia. The Putinists have a lot of experience in killing their own citizens and blowing up their houses.” In this message, Chechen militants indirectly protect HTS from accusations by pro-Kremlin media on impending terrorist attacks in Russian cities during opposition protests. This is no coincidence, since Ajnad al Kavkaz is known for its close ties with HTS.
On Telegram channel, some Russian-speaking jihadists from the post-Soviet space mocked at the ‘leaked information’, some expressed their anger against the “Russian occupants” in Sham, some advised protesters to be vigilant before the FSB provocation. A pro-Jihadi chat Icharkhoin Telegram recommended Muslims of Caucasus be ready for new repressions of Russian infidels and local Murtad (apostate), because after the bombings of houses in Volgodonsk, Putin started the 2-Chechen war and took away the independence of Ichkeria. The Telegram chat “Muhajireen” says that the Kremlin is preparing for a harsh suppression of the mass protests.
It is not the first time the Russian authorities have accused Central Asian and North Caucasian Jihadi networks of organizing terrorist act. On April 3, 2017, the Russian FSB blamed KTJ for the bombing on a subway train in St. Petersburg that killed 16 people and injured 67 others. On October 15, 2020, the FSB once again accused the Uzbek KTJ militants of preparing subversive and terrorist acts in Russian cities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ufa, Maikop and Volgograd. In a statement, the intelligence services claimed that during the counter-terrorist operation, they prevented explosions and eliminated two members of KTJ. Then FSB distributed photos and videos of firearms, ammunition, IED’s chemical components, and religious literature seized during the operation.
On October 16, 2020, KTJ in its statement denied the Russian authorities’ accusation in these attacks. The Uzbek militant group stated that “according the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s policy, our activities are limited to the territory of Sham, and we do not conduct jihadi acts outside of it.” Further, KTJ assured via its Telegram channel that it “does not have its cells in Russia and is not involved in organizing terrorist acts there.”
Jihadi factor of Russian democracy
The Russian authorities often make thunderous statements about plotting terrorist attacks by “international terrorist groups” and how siloviki (FSB) successfully prevented its. This time, trumpeting about terrorist plots by HTS and its foreign subsidiaries during mass protests in various Russian cities, Moscow hoped to hit two birds with one stone. First, the Kremlin hopes that alarm on terrorist attacks could become a cold shower for Navalny’s supporters, as a result of which the activity of protesters will subside and the scale of the rallies will decrease. Second, by accusing HTS of plotting terrorist attacks, Russia is trying to justify its bloody bombing in northern Syria before the international community.
However, experts on jihadism and political Islam were skeptical about accusations of HTS for plotting terrorist attacks in Russia.HTS, Syria’s most powerful rebel group, is trying to implement a new strategy to transform itself from a global jihadist outlook into a local “moderate national liberation movement”. Today its new agenda is entirely dedicated to Syria and the Syrian local Sunni community. Within this new strategy, HTS severely restricted external attacks by its subsidiaries – Central Asian and North Caucasian Salafi-Jihadi groups –KTJ, AK and JMA. Consequently, HTS, which holds the last major rebel bastion in Idlib province and backs the local Salvation Government, is focused only on the internal Syrian jihad than organizing external terrorist attacks.
HTS emir Abu Mohammed al-Julani is well aware that any terrorist attacks in Russia could place his group among the global terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda, from which he decisively disavowed. HTS pursues a pragmatic approach to the political context, and its external attacks outside of Syria could undermine its fragile legacy, which Julani has achieved with great difficulty.
According to the new strategy, HTS has excluded Central Asian and local hardliners from its ranks. Those jihadists who did not want to submit to its new policy, such as former KTJ emir Abu Saloh al-Uzbeki and HTS Shura Council member Abu Malek al-Talli, were arrested or taken out of the Syrian jihad zone. Given the ability of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to pressure Russian-speaking militant groups to abandon its global jihadist ambitions, it can be concluded that the Russian FSB’s accusation against HTS raises many questions.
In conclusion, the Russian authorities alert about Islamists terrorist attacks during pro-Navalny protests is aimed at an internal audience and pursues exclusively domestic political goals. And these goals are clear as plain as the nose on the face. Using these methods, the Kremlin wants to stop the turbulent development of mass protests and divert the attention of people from the Navalny factor. If they succeed, the authorities will take time out to gather strength for the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2021.But if the wave of protests grows ever stronger and threatens Putin’s regime, then a repetition of the 1999 scenario is quite possible. As then, radical Islamism and terrorism can become a starting point for strengthening authoritarianism in Russia.
Corona pandemic: Realism limitation in solving 21st century security threats
Today, most serious threats of the 21st century are not ones we can protect ourselves by using armies or advanced weapons. Indeed, the popularity of extreme-right politics, unilateralism based on nationalism and COVID-19 are threatening the world’s post-war security architecture.
The state-based unilateralism and the trends of national response to the 21st century’s biggest security threat trigger lack of coordination, diplomatic divisions, and incoherent global answer to COVID-19. Hence, as we face the biggest challenge of the contemporary century today, we need to rethink the very nature of our comprehension of national security threats. By doing so, we need a different approach to facing security threats.
With the Corona pandemic as a security threat, one of the foundational international relations theories, the realism, has been revealed to be far limited in terms of its explanatory power than it declares. The argument is that realism has a valid logic and reasons for confidence since answers to the pandemic have confirmed the supremacy of sovereign states, the grounds for the state’s power competition. Nevertheless, the pandemic also presents realism’s weaknesses as a source for successful policy answer to this security challenge. In other words, realism is better at defining risks and threats than suggesting solutions. Put simply, realism’s explanatory power lies in diagnosis rather than treatment or prevention. To make this clear, one insight the theory emphasizes is the representation of states as the fundamental actors in world politics.
As the coronavirus hit, states shifted quickly to close or tighten international borders, controlled movement within their borders. However, while much independent national action is understandable from a realism’s point of view, it’s insufficient. Unilateralism and state-based measures, such as border controls did not spare states from the pandemic, and unilateral measures risk ending up in national economic and social crisis.
To fight the Corona pandemic most efficiently, policymakers will have to shift to other theoretical traditions to overcome this security threat. They will depend more and more on greater international openness, trust and cooperation. Hence, while from the realism’s view, unilateral and state-based actions may serve national interest to fight the pandemic “within the national borders”, the pandemic is a global security threat and thus remains unsolved so long as other states and non-state actors have not done the same and states move on unilaterally.
Solving global crises and security threats such as a pandemic, similar to world economic or other security crises cannot be solved based on the realist considerations of zero-sum competitive logic. Instead, transnational security threats, such as Coronavirus, is unmasking the limitations of individual states actions in the global system. Thus, while realism does an excellent job of “diagnosing the problem”, it does not offer solutions to that problem.
Considering the necessity of worldwide medical items and actions, coordinated and offered by international organizations and non-state actors, the uncoordinated state-based actions result in an ineffective solution to this security crisis. The perspective this article aims to offer is that given the limitations of realism, we need more faith in international transboundary cooperation based on mutual trust, especially trust vis-a-vis international institutions. However, neither the United Nations nor the World Health Organization (WHO) nor any other non-state actor can overcome the Coronavirus on its own; nor non-state actors such as international institutions are alternatives to national states in international relations.
Instead, they are an instrument of foreign policy and statecraft and states need to rely on them, incorporating them in finding solutions to global security threats. According to constitutionalists, Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “States are indeed self-interested, but cooperation is often in their interest and institutions help to facilitate that cooperation.”
From our partner Tehran Times
The Media System Within and Beyond the West: Australian, Russian and Chinese Media
This article takes Australian, Russian and Chinese media as three examples to differentiate media systems and elucidate their political or economic context to understand media systems globally. Arguably, the concept of media systems “does not possess a normative or even generally accepted definition“, mainly because the notion is posited on existing publications and empirical research rather than normative theory. More precisely, “this is so for two reasons: firstly—because of the term’s content specificity; secondly—because it is dynamic and variable in time and therefore difficult to precisely define“.
Drawing on the current research of advanced capitalist democracies in Western Europe and North America, Hallin and Mancini propose “there are two main elements of the conceptual framework of Comparing Media Systems (setting aside political-social system variables): the set of four “dimensions” of comparison, and the typology of three models that summarizes what we see as the distinctive patterns of media system development among our 18 cases”. Furthermore, they clarify the four major dimensions that can be compared in different media systems: “first, the development of media markets, with particular emphasis on the strong or weak development of a mass circulation press; second political parallelism; that is, the degree and nature of the links between the media and political parties or, more broadly, the extent to which the media system reflects the major political divisions in society; third, the development of journalistic professionalism; and fourth, the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system”.
Drawing on the four dimensions, Hallin and Mancini summarize three modules from Western Europe and North America: “the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, the North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model,
and the North Atlantic or Liberal Model”, which will be elaborated on by the next tables.
Table 1 Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model
|Country Examples||France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain|
|Newspaper Industry||Low newspaper circulation; elite politically oriented press|
|Political Parallelism||High political parallelism; external pluralism, commentary-oriented journalism; parliamentary or government model of broadcast governance—politics-over-broadcasting systems|
|Professionalization||Weaker professionalization; instrumentalization|
|Role of the State in Media System||Strong state intervention; press subsidies in France and Italy; periods of censorship; “savage deregulation” (except France)|
Table 2 North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model
|Country Examples||Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland|
|Newspaper Industry||High newspaper circulation; early development of mass-circulation press|
|Political Parallelism||External pluralism, especially in the national press; historically strong party press; a shift toward neutral commercial <p>press; the politics-in-broadcasting system with substantial autonomy|
|Professionalization||Strong professionalization; institutionalized self-regulation|
|Role of the State in Media System||Strong state intervention but with protection for press freedom; press subsidies, robust in Scandinavia; strong public-service broadcasting|
Table 3 North Atlantic or Liberal Model
|Country Examples||Britain, the United States, Canada, Ireland|
|Newspaper Industry||Medium newspaper circulation; early development of mass circulation commercial press|
|Political Parallelism||Neutral commercial press; information-oriented journalism; internal pluralism (but external pluralism in Britain); professional model of broadcast governance—formally autonomous system|
|Professionalization||Strong professionalization; noninstitutionalized self-regulation|
|Role of the State in Media System||A market dominated (except strong public broadcasting in Britain, Ireland)|
Source: created by the author of this thesis and based on Hallin and Mancini.
Furthermore, it is unfeasible to simply apply the conceptual framework to other countries without appropriate modification. In fact, the “four dimensions” and “three models” are just perfect types, only loosely matched by the media systems of different countries. The ultimate purpose is not to classify individual media systems but to identify the “characteristic patterns of relationship between system characteristics“. Consequently, these inherent patterns of media systems offer “a theoretical synthesis and a framework for comparative research on the media and political systems“.
The Australian media system as an outlier in the Liberal Model
Hallin and Mancini illustrate that Australia should be another example of the Liberal Model. It is because firstly, the “Liberal Model is the broadest, attempting to bridge the trans-Atlantic gulf that regularly emerges in the comparative literature“. Secondly, Australia has historical connections with the UK and the US regarding “early democratization and highly professionalized information-based journalism“. This association has led to strong characteristics of Anglo-American conventions in the Australian media structure, with the quintessence of a dual media system. The binary design has combined the UK-style PSBs (public service broadcasters) such as ABC and SBS (Special Broadcasting Service) with the “US-style commercial networks“. Thirdly, Australia is famous for one of the highest commercial media ownership concentration rates globally, particularly in the newspaper area.
However, the Australian media system does not offer the quintessence of the Liberal Model. Jones and Pusey apply the Liberal Model to the Australian media system and identify four remarkable discrepancies. More precisely, compared to the Liberal Model, Australia has “historically late professionalization of journalism; comparatively low levels of education of journalists; low per capita investment in PSBs; poor regulation for accuracy and impartiality of commercial broadcast journalism; and slow development of relevant bourgeois liberal institutional conventions and rational-legal authority, e.g., formal recognition of freedom of the press”.
Furthermore, Jones and Pusey contend that Australia has several similar features with the Polarized Pluralist Model, especially in clientelism. Based on the definition of Hallin and Mancini, “clientelism tends to be associated with instrumentalization of both public and private media. In the case of public media, appointments tend to be made more based on political loyalty than purely professional criteria”. More concretely, Jones and Pusey outline the following examples to indicate the similarities of the Australian media system with the Polarized Pluralist Model: “the widely accepted recognition that appointments to the ABC Board have been more often than not party-political; the infamous ‘Murdoch amendments’ by the Fraser government to broadcasting legislation in the late 1970s to facilitate Murdoch’s concentration of television ownership; and the long history of proprietorial intervention in the political world”.
Thus, to this extent, there is a certain degree of political parallelism in the Australian media system. However, the Australian one does not match the Polarized Pluralist Model in some key areas. More precisely”, Australia does not have a highly polarized political culture and a strong tradition of mass-circulation party newspapers“. Therefore, it is arguable to perceive the Australian media system as an outlier of the Liberal Model, which can be shown in the following figure:
Figure 1 Relation of individual cases to the three models
Source: derived from Jones and Pusey.
Beyond the West: the unique Russian and Chinese media model
Although the Australian media system is an outlier in the Liberal Model, it still belongs to the typology and scope of the three models, posited on the empirical reality of Western Europe and North America. However, bringing the Russian and Chinese media models into this global comparative apparatus involves two distinct and peculiar systems into the Western-centric framework. Thus, the three models’ classification cannot apply to Russia and China’s two unique systems. Nevertheless, the four dimensions of comparison as a tool for analyzing systemic characteristics still work. However, they are not perfect and need to be modified in the application, as mentioned before.
The Russian media system as a statist commercialized model
After the disintegration of the USSR, Russia took a series of measures to adopt elements of the Western media apparatus, such as “abolition of censorship, freedom of press concepts and related legislation, privatization of media, a shift to more objective reporting, and increasing control by journalists and editorial boards over news production“. However, arguing that the Russian media have been westernized only shows “a poor understanding of” the legacy of the Soviet Union and the “complexity and dissimilarities of the post-Soviet society“, ignoring the most influential factor in the Russian media system: the state. Arguably, the interplay between the state and media has defined the essence and main features of the Russian media system. Historically and culturally, “in Russian public communications, relations between the state and a citizen have involved a clear subordination of the individual to a social power that has always been associated in the Russian context with the state“.
Thus, even though the Polarized Pluralist Model is the most similar of the three models to the Russian one, the Russian media system is still far from the Mediterranean apparatus. The Russian state’s role has exceedingly overshadowed that of the Mediterranean states, suggesting that they cannot be classified as the same type. Ivanitsky differs the Russian media system from the Polarized Pluralist Model in that “it is the state which defined the particular journalism modes such as Court journalism, Imperial journalism, Communist Party journalism in Russian history. Currently, while liberating the media’s economic activity, the state is not ready to relax the control over the content”.
This overwhelming influence of the state also reflects in Russian political parallelism. Although new political parties have appeared after the formation of the Russian Federation, Oates argues that “rather than encouraging the growth and the development of a range of political parties, media outlets in Russia have worked at supporting relatively narrow groups of elites”, part of which have been formed due to the privatization. These elites, combining old political and new emerging business elites, “became key players in the media scene“. More concretely, they created “a particularly Russian form of political parallelism” by using “political media as traditional instruments of political elite management“. Besides, due to the dominant role of the state in Russia, “media, particularly television, have been used to subvert the development of a pluralistic party system“.
Furthermore, in terms of the media industry, the influence of the state is also ubiquitous. Ivanitsky believes the state “has produced practically unsolvable tension for the media themselves trying to function both as commercial enterprises and as institutions of the society”, even though Russia has achieved rapid development in its advertising and media market. Hypothetically, these tensions between the media and the state are supposed to be the “decentralized market competition as a vital antidote to political despotism“. However, Vartanovaargues that “the aims of the state converged with those of the advertising industry, and commercially determined content became both a means of increasing depoliticization and instrumentalization of political communication, and of stimulating consumption”. From another angle, de Smaele believes that the Western influence on Russian media has only been limited to market demand, with the lack of Western notions such as “independent Fourth Estate”.
As for Russia’s professionalization, “journalism as a profession had a rather late start” with a strong censorship history, thus resulting in a self-censorship tradition until now. Another factor contributing to the self-censorship is that “formally declared freedom and autonomy of media professionals came into conflict with the efforts of the new owners”, deeply connected to the state and political elites, “to use these new professional values to further their own interests” rather than the public interests and social responsibility. Thus, to notch economic successes and avoid potential political risks, Russian journalists have become increasingly market-driven and apathetic to politics. Due to the different “professional identity“, Russian journalists have a dissimilar “literary style and attitude to facts and opinions“, which has restrained them from integration into Western journalism.
However, this statist media policy does not mean there is no freedom regarding the Russian media system’s political news. Admittedly, the state has strong influences on “television channels with national distribution“, which has been regarded as “the main source of information about Russia and the world“. By comparison, the pressure of the state has become weak and even non-existent in some less disseminated areas such as the television channel “REN-TV“, the radio station “Ekho Moskvy“, and the newspapers “Novaya Gazeta“, “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” and “Kommersant“, as well as almost the whole of the internet.
Therefore, it is possible to say that the duality of authoritarian attitudes to mass media and journalism—a statist media policy deeply rooted in the framework of state influence on media combined with the growing market-driven economy—has become the most crucial characteristic of the Russian media system“. To this extent, the Russian media system can be described as a statist commercialized model.
The Chinese media system as a state-dominated model
If there is still a likelihood to compare the Russian media system with the Mediterranean Model due to a certain extent of similarities, “bringing the Chinese media system into a worldwide comparative project is to bring one of the most dissimilar systems into the non-Western empirical reality“. Furthermore, if the role above of the state in the Russian media system can be portrayed as “strong influence”, the Chinese state’s position or the sole ruling party CPC in its media apparatus should be regarded as dominant. As mentioned, regarding the political news, Russians still enjoy some freedom in less influential media. In contrast, there is no autonomy in the Chinese press, with the omnipresent regulative measures such as media censorship and the internet Great Firewall in China. Thus, considering the state’s special role, the Chinese media system is far beyond the intervention framework in the West.
In fact, despite Deng Xiaoping’s reform, the Chinese media system of the post-Mao period has still applied the “different versions of Marxism and socialism” to “build socialism with Chinese characteristics” by “providing moral guidance to the population and engineering economic development and social change“. One of the most important reasons that may clarify this “guidance”, namely, strong and resilient media control, is the media ownership in China. It is undeniable that the post-Mao economic reforms have expanded the private capital to some areas that had been commanded by the Chinese government or state-owned enterprises for decades. However, Zhao argues that “in the media sector, although the Chinese state has not only drastically curtailed its role in subsidizing media operations but has also targeted the media and cultural sector as new sites of profit-making and capitalistic development, the state continues to restrict private capital, let alone the privatizing of existing media outlets”.
In fact, the Chinese state has opened the door to private and even foreign capital participation in “the media’s entertainment function” such as the film industry with the intention of profit-making. However, this profit-making entertainment also needs to be filtered by the ideological orientation of the state. More importantly, “the production and distribution of news and informational content” and the “ownership of news media outlets” have remained “monopolized by the state“. Furthermore, this monopoly also results in the fact that the state has appointed major media agencies’ leadership.
Despite the state’s overwhelming control, the Chinese media market has boomed for years since the economic reform of Deng Xiaoping, attributable to the power of marketization. For instance, in 2004, there were 6,580 daily newspapers published worldwide, and the number of daily newspapers published in China ranked first in the world, accounting for 14.5% of the global daily newspapers. However, the commercialization of the Chinese media industry has not surmounted the ideological control of the state. The media market has constituted “two distinct and yet institutionally intertwined press sectors or subsystems“. The first press sector is market-based as the film above industry, while the second is “the party organ sector“, which combines the duality of the political instrument and profit-making. This is because “most state media outlets no longer receive large government subsidies and have largely to depend on commercial advertising“. Nevertheless, rather than causing tensions, the dual roles the party organ sector plays have adopted and contained the marketization within the current political control by the statist implementation of “licensing system and the sponsor unit system“. Consequently, these two systems have guaranteed the predominance of the state over the commercialization and marketization.
As for the political parallelism, the state-dominated Chinese media system has top-level political instrumentalization, indicating “all the features of a quintessential party-press parallelism“. Almost all the media content should and, in practice, have revolved around the official ideology and slogan of the state. This is pertinent to another aspect of four dimensions, based on the theory and standard of Hallin and Mancini: the utterly low professionalization in Chinese journalism, where journalists have to successfully balance the “market forces and the party-press system” to obtain financial benefits and political security. Furthermore, Pan and Lu argue that Chinese journalists “do not fit their practices into the universal model of professionalism”, but “utilize and appropriate diverse and often conflicting ideas of journalism through their improvised and situated practices”, leading to the “truncated and fragmented in Chinese journalism”. Also, unlike the Western conception of relative objectivity in journalism, Hackett and Zhao create a term “regime of objectivity” to describe how Chinese journalists portray information on the precondition of conforming to the state ideology.
Therefore, due to its restricted commercialization and dominated state, Chan summarizes the Chinese media industry’s development as commercialization without independence. Drawing on the above, the Chinese media system can be described as a state-dominated model.
- Chan, Joseph Man. “Commercialization without Independence: Trends and Tensions of Media Development in China”. In China Review 1993, edited by Joseph Cheng Yu-shek and Maurice Brosseau, 25.1 – 25.21. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1993.
- de Smaele, Hedwig. “The Applicability of Western Media Models on the Russian Media System”. European Journal of Communication 14, no. 2 (1999): 173-89. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323199014002002.
- Dunn, John A. “Lottizzazione Russian Style: Russia’s Two-Tier Media System”. Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 9 (2014): 1425-51. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2014.956441.
- Hackett, Robert A., and Yuezhi Zhao. Sustaining Democracy? Journalism and the Politics of Objectivity. Edited by Yuezhi Zhao. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Higher Education, 2000.
- Hallin, Daniel C., and Paolo Mancini. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics. Communic
- ation, Society and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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- Hu, Zhengrong, Peixi Xu, and Deqiang Ji. “China: Media and Power in Four Historical Stages”. In Mapping Brics Media, edited by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Daya Kishan Thussu, 166-80. London ;: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015.
- Ivanitsky, Valerij. “Mass Media Market in Post-Soviet Russia [Рынок Сми В Постсоветской России]”. Bulletin of Moscow University, no. 6. (2009): 114–31. Retrieved from http://www.ffl.msu.ru/en/research/bulletin-of-moscow-university/.
- Jones, Paul K., and Michael Pusey. “Political Communication and ‘Media System’: The Australian Canary”. Media, Culture & Society 32, no. 3 (2010): 451-71. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443709361172.
- Keane, John. The Media and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Polity in association with Basil Blackwell, 1991.
- Oates, Sarah. Television, Democracy, and Elections in Russia. Basees/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies. Abingdon, Oxon, England: Routledge, 2006.
- Pan, Zhongdang, and Ye Lu. “Localizing Professionalism: Discursive Practices in China’s Media Reforms”. In Chinese Media, Global Context, edited by
- Chin-Chuan Lee, 210-31: RoutledgeCurzon Taylor & Francis Group, 2003.
- Sonczyk, Wieslaw “Media System: Scope—Structure—Definition”. Media Studies 3, no. 38. (2009). Retrieved from http://mediastudies.eu/.
- Sosnovskaya, Anna. Social Portrait and Identity of Today’s Journalist: St. Petersburg-a Case Study. (Södertörn Academic Studies: 2000). https://bibl.sh.se/skriftserier/hogskolans_skriftserier/Russian_reports/diva2_16051.aspx.
- Tiffen, Rodney. How Australia Compares. Edited by Ross Gittins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Vartanova, Elena. “The Russian Media Model in the Context of Post-Soviet Dynamics”. In Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World, edited by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, 119-42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Wang, Guoqing. “China Newspaper Annual Development Report [中国报业年度发展报告]”. People’s Daily, August 5 2005. http://www.people.com.cn/.
- Zhao, Yuezhi. “Understanding China’s Media System in a World Historical Context”. In Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World, edited by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, 143-74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Zhou, Shuhua. “China: Media System”. In, edited by W. Donsbach2015.
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