The discussion of cyber defense strategies is about a variety of issues, among which the most important issue is whether the significance of the potential damage caused by cyber-attacks can justify the use of a complex system to enforce these two types of deterrence. Finding an answer to this question is difficult because the available information is negligible and is often provided by sources whose neutrality is uncertain. In fact, the severity of the dangers of cybercrime (or, in other words, the constant hostile acts affecting information systems globally) cannot be simply determined.
But based on the evidence available, there have been significant cyber-attacks since 2007 (including deep-seated spyware interventions), all of which indicate cybercriminals that are more abusive Malicious actors are placed; while information and communication systems in their everyday activities have a very sensitive place to carry out physical and material operations, store confidential and personal information or exchange information between actors at distances.
In contrast to this wide range of malicious activities, the first issue that comes to be identified is the overall role that cyber oppression can have.
In some circumstances, a state that has used the infrastructure and equipment used to carry out malicious acts is also responsible for the charges and charges. Thus, in countries where there are no judicial authorities to identify and prosecute cybercriminals or cybercriminals, some actions cause them to be identified as responsible or co-sponsors of a cyber-attack. Thus, governments, as well as groups providing hacker refuge services or facilitating their operations in the attack, can be held responsible.
Governments that refuse to cooperate in conducting criminal investigations on their territory are also partly responsible for the attack. In fact, in some cyber-attacks, we find that some malicious acts do not occur without the participation, support, tactical agreement or even lack of corrective / defense measures by governments. Some experts in the field believe that hacking groups that are capable of producing long-term effects with remarkable results apparently benefit from technical assistance from governments; these groups, even if they are not affiliated with the state, are legally endorsed and supported by that government. Relying on this argument, we conclude that governments are the only cyber-sponsors and directors, which justifies coping operations. This argument supports symmetric countermeasures, to justify attacks on infrastructures or sensitive information systems.
However, the lack of a universal convention for cybercrime still makes it difficult to use these arguments. On the other hand, conflicts between national judicial approaches, such as the existence of a law protecting citizens’ digital data, can lead some governments to refrain from cooperating in this area. Finally, I cannot ignore the possibility of first and second type errors:
– Failure to operate equipment, in particular software, may produce results that are comparable to the effects of an attack or a technical or logical disruption. Additionally, some hackers (in coincidence) may be in a situation where they have more effects than they expect or are in their power.
– The development and development of technical equipment can facilitate investigation and investigation of the attack. The ability of governments to intercept the root of the attack, identify operational practices (and, if possible, re-create them), decrypt codes and software used in an attack; and, in parallel, access to human and technical resources (in particular, in Computational Power or Technical Knowledge Areas) is still on the rise. However, along with these technical advances, the power of hacking groups to expand attacks and sabotage is also increasing, but technical and humanitarian privileges are potentially available to governments, and if governments can benefit from these privileges the most effective syntax will make it easy to identify authorities and actors.
It should be kept in mind that defense equipment that provides coping responses against malicious actors should generally be cyber-threats and their effects have been appropriate to the attack, but the answer to some of the invasions should not be the option to remove the asymmetric equipment. The use of physical, financial, or judicial countermeasures must be viewed more than anything else against actors with limited cyber-interests. Paying attention to the features of cyberspace will require us to reorganize our efforts in this regard, in order to pave the way for the emergence of a defense strategy based on credible defensive measures and methods of threat with defensive characteristics.
For this reason, at the executive level, it is better to apply methods that allow the synchronization of all cybercriminal actions and programs of different departments. It should also ensure strategic navigation and the necessary political rule for all defensive and aggressive equipment. This hierarchy should lead to the definition of the rules for the deployment and conditions of the use of cybercrime as well as the coordination of surveillance and alert activities.
Internet of Military Things (IoMT) and the Future of Warfare
The Internet of Military Things (IoMT) is a class of heterogeneously connected devices employed for future warfare. It has wide applications in advanced combat operations and intelligence-oriented warfare. For example, it allows real-time connection among devices, such as between unmanned vehicles and a central command station. Likewise, it would enable a broader warfighting concept interpreted as Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) by the United States (US) military. JADC2 is based on a similar network of sensors that connect all battlefield devices.
A majority of highly advanced military units have integrated IoMT into their battlefield operations to enhance their surveillance and response strategies. This concept offers multiple strategic options to militaries. For example, deployment of multiple sensors of IoMT across various domains (air, land, sea, space and cyber) can support data to acquire comprehensive situational awareness and understand the information ecosystem of the battlefield. This will ultimately speed up the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop of decision-making and help in prompt and accurate planning and execution in future warfare.
IoMT can connect not only battlefield devices but also military troops through wearable devices. Under challenging terrains such as mountains, jungle or deserted terrains, wearable devices such as a jacket or a wristband can sense and track troops’ health status, weapon state, atmospheric conditions, relative locations and communicate all such information to the central command. The central command can analyse the tactical data of the soldiers to make decisions, based on incoming real-time information. It is expected that with the advancement of neural networks, wearable devices will also be able to evaluate the physical, psychological and emotional state of Air Force pilot. It is also anticipated that automated battleground devices, such as mechanised snipers would be equipped with IoMT. Such a sniper would have two units, a firing unit and a control unit. A webcam and a sensor would detect movement while the control unit would order fire.
Cloud computing would be essential for the storage of data gathered from multiple sensors of IoMT. A 5G connection would, therefore, be vital for data transfer through high bandwidth and low latency. Likewise, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and data analytics would be crucial for data processing.
The US and China have actively invested in IoMT. The US military has developed an integrated warfighting network that converges and combines all the data from IoMT sensors, radars, and satellites. This data is filtered to pinpoint critical data for successful missions. IoMT solutions have also been used to integrate the Army’s ballistic missile defence system and classified communication networks into one central hub to interact with and engage threats. US defence contractors such as Lockheed Martin, L3Harris and Northrop Grumman have worked on various elements of this integrated battle network.
Similarly, China has also shown great interest in IoMT. The model China has adopted to develop IoMT includes a high level of collaboration between academic and government research organisations, the private sector and defence industrial complexes. Like the US, China has also developed a strategic outline for integrated warfare. The Chinese National Defence White Paper (NDWP 2019) characterised future warfare as ‘Intelligent Warfare.’ A round of cutting-edge IoT technologies would drive the development of an intelligent military and ultimately create a modern military force for the future. This process is expected to be completed by 2035.
The Indian Army is using IoMT for communication purposes. It has been developing an LTE-based mobile communication grid with integrated IoMT sensors to provide a secure and failsafe communication system. This communication system would have layered security for voice, data and video, and protect the network from intrusions and interceptions. This communication system would be provided to formations and units along Pakistan and China’s border. For developing this IoT-based communication grid, the Indian military would choose only Indian vendors and those foreign companies who have registered offices with production, maintain and repair infrastructures in the country.
The IoT ecosystem in Pakistan is nascent as the country lacks the basic infrastructure to produce IoT devices on a large scale. Presently, small start-ups have been engaged in building IoT devices through outsourcing, mainly to China. These start-ups have developed wearable medical devices, smart home appliances, trackers for electric consumption, etc. IoMT devices require a large upfront budget; however, these applications offer long-term benefits. As Pakistan is heavily inclined towards developing its capacity in emerging technologies, IoMT should not be neglected as it could be a force multiplier that facilitates the network of communication and data transmission. Coupled with advancements in the telecom industry and 5G, IoMT can deliver effective and precise military capabilities that would help in tackling any future threat environment.
The Greatest Threats to U.S. National Security: Russia, China, and Iran/Terrorism
In May 2, 2022 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Scott D. Berrier and Director of National Intelligence Avril D. Haines identified China, Russia, and Iran, as well as terrorist organizations, as the greatest threats to U.S. national security. Both China and Russia are nuclear powers and both have significant intelligence, cyber, and information warfare capabilities.
Russia’s threat to the United States includes: direct military conflict, cyber attacks, supporting separatists, threats to freedom of navigation, and territorial expansion. On November 15, a missile blast killed two people in Poland, near the Ukraine border. Russia was the primary suspect. President Joe Biden later told the Poles that the missile was part of a Ukrainian defense system. Whether the missile actually came from Russia directly or was the indirect result of Russian shelling, the incident underscores the danger Russia poses. A perceived attack on a NATO member could cause NATO to invoke Article 5, which states that an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against the entire alliance.
Moscow has repeatedly accused the U.S. and NATO of wanting to destroy Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, 13 countries have been admitted to NATO: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (1999); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (2004); Albania and Croatia (2009); and, in 2017, Montenegro. Consequently, Russia has been focused on maintaining its influence and control in former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, Belarus, and the Central Asian states.
Defeating the U.S. or breaking from a U.S.-led world order was a primary goal of the USSR and has carried over to modern Russia. Opposing Europe and the U.K. are secondary objectives, seen as a proxy for defiance against the U.S. One of the concerns of the Department of Defense is that Putin often uses threats, including the threat of nuclear war, to get what he wants. If his threats continue to go unheeded, there is the danger that he will finally act, launching a strike, to show that he is serious.
Since the fall of the USSR, there have been numerous opportunities for cooperation between the U.S., E.U. NATO, and Russia, including participation in joint military exercises and peacekeeping operations. Tensions, however, run deep, complicating attempts at relationship-building. In 1999, Russian and NATO forces nearly engaged in a firefight at Pristina Airport, at the end of the Kosovo War. In 2004, Russia accused the U.S. of supporting the revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, and raised objections when the Bush administration positioned U.S. ballistic missile defense systems (BMD) in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia then positioned its own missiles in Kaliningrad, the former East Prussia. In 2008, Russia opposed Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia. In August 2008, Russia blamed the U.S for supporting Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in a war against separatist South Ossetia. At one point, Georgian and Russian forces exchanged fire.
In 2014, NATO canceled all attempts to cooperate with Russia, in response to the invasion of the Crimea. Four years later, Russia attempted to assassinate Sergei Skripal, a British citizen living in the U.K.
The current invasion of Ukraine is making cooperation between the West and Russia less likely, while increasing the chance of war.
Ukraine became independent in 1991, shortly after the collapse of the USSR. In 2004, Viktor Yanukovich, a pro-Russian candidate, won a general election, which was presumed to have been rigged. In 2014, Russia backed separatists in the Donbas region, sparking off a conflict in which
an estimated 15,000 people died before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In 2019, pro-European candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy was elected president of Ukraine, and the country began its pivot back to the West. In 2021, Zelenskyy asked President Biden to support Ukraine in joining NATO.
In December 2021, Russia began deploying troops close to its border with Ukraine. At the peak, 190,000 Russian soldiers were threatening Ukraine. Putin demanded that the U.S. remove its weapons from Eastern Europe. In response, the U.S. sent 3,000 troops to Poland and Romania. In February 2022, Russian-backed paramilitaries seized parts of Ukraine’s Donbas region. Shortly after, Putin recognized the region’s independence. Three days later, on February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Since the invasion began, the U.S., NATO and the E.U have been supporting the Ukrainian military with weapons, money, and intelligence.
Smaller nations, particularly in Southeastern Europe, are worried about being gobbled up, should Russia continue its expansion. Apart from the threat to U.S. interests in continental Western Europe, there is also the threat of Russia’s expansion into the Arctic, positioning submarines and missiles, which could potentially threaten shipping and freedom of navigation in the North Sea, as well as possible attacks on Canada, Alaska, and Scandinavia. Most recently, Finland and Sweden have been given permission to join NATO.
China seeks to surpass the U.S. militarily, economically, technologically, and in terms of global influence. The FBI identifies China as the greatest threat to the U.S. in terms of information warfare. China coopts U.S persons, politicians, academics, and businesspeople, to support legislation which is favorable to Chinese Communist Party. Beijing’s stated goal is to become the world’s number-one superpower, a goal they are slowly achieving through predatory lending to developing countries, systematic theft of intellectual property, as well as hacking and other cybercrimes.
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin identifies China as the single greatest threat to the United States. While he also considers Russia a threat, he pointed out that China, unlike Russia, has the stated goal to remake the world order in their own image and that China has the economic and military capability to do so. The Department of Defense reported that, in China and Russia, the U.S. now faces two hostile nuclear powers.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has vowed to capture Taiwan, and has declared that China has the right to use force to do so. If he launches an invasion, given the ambiguity of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, it is unclear if Washington would go to war. President Biden, however, has publicly stated, on several occasions, that the U.S. would defend the island nation. Japan also identifies an attack on Taiwan as an attack on Japan, because a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invasion of Taiwan is sure to violate Japanese air and sea space. If Japan is forced to defend itself, the U.S. is treaty-bound to join the fight. Consequently, Taiwan is the single most likely flashpoint for a war between the U.S. and China.
According to the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, published in February 2022, “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qa‘ida, and Iran and its militant allies, will take advantage of weak governance to continue to plot terrorist attacks against U.S. persons and interests, including to varying degrees in the United States, and exacerbate instability in regions such as Africa and the Middle East.”
While Russia is dominating headlines with the Ukraine invasion and China’s economic, political, and military expansion is monitored by the media, as well as national security and military intelligence agencies, Iran and Iran-sponsored terrorism remains the third-largest challenge, according to the U.S. intelligence community. Iran’s threat to the U.S. and U.S. interests in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East include direct missile attacks, cyber attacks, assassinations, and sponsorship of terrorist organization and proxy forces, as well as the increasing danger posed by Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.
Iran projects its own power in the Middle East and North Africa, eroding U.S. influence. In particular, Iran threatens U.S. military and civilians in the region, Israel, and U.S. oil-trade partner Saudi Arabia. Although the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has been fraught with difficulties, Saudi Arabia is crucial to U.S. interests, because they are an important oil trade partner, a weapons trade partner, and they offer support for the internationalization of the U.S. dollar. Additionally, U.S. forces use Saudi Arabia as a base of operations to counter other threats in the region, such as Iran. As important as Saudi Arabia is to U.S. operations, they are not exactly a reliable ally. In October, OPEC, which is led by Saudi Arabia, refused a U.S. request to raise production volumes. Many in the U.S. Congress advised the president to stop providing Saudi Arabia with weapons, which would leave the kingdom vulnerable to an Iranian attack.
Saudi Arabia, which shares intelligence with the United States, warned in November 2022 of possible Iranian attacks on targets inside of the Saudi territory. Iran was also blamed for missile attacks on Saudi refineries in 2019. Iran backs Shia forces in Iraq, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, and Lebanon, which fight proxy wars against Western countries and Sunnis in the region. Iran supports terrorist groups, including Hammas, as well as Lebanese Hizballah, Shia militias in Iraq, the Huthis in Yemen, and provides direct support to the regime in Syria. Through their support of the Syrian government, Iran and Russia together are indirectly responsible for the deaths of over 400,000 Syrians.
Iran often engages in provocative actions against U.S. Navy vessels in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Over the past three years, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence has been responsible for cyber attacks, including attacks on Israeli water infrastructure in 2020, the Boston Children’s Hospital in 2021, and Albania’s government in 2022.
In September, Iran captured two U.S. Navy drones. In 2020, Iran launched missile attacks on Iraqi bases hosting U.S. forces. In August 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice formally charged a member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Shahram Poursafi, with attempting to pay for the assassination of former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton and of a second individual, who authorities believe was former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
Iran has also sold drones to Russia which are now being deployed in Ukraine. U.S. authorities believe that the August shipment of Mohajer-6 and Shahed-series drones to Moscow is the first of many planned transfers of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of various types to Russia. In October, Iran agreed to sell Russia surface-to-surface missiles, as well as more drones.
With over 3,000 missiles, Iran has the world’s largest arsenal of conventionally armed ballistic missiles, many of which are precision-guided, with ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers. And this does not include Iran’s growing supply of land-attack cruise missiles. While Iran does not possess nuclear capabilities yet, many of these missiles are capable of carrying a nuclear payload. For this reason, watchdog agencies keep a close eye on Iran’s nuclear development programs. In August 2022, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami threatened that there were “hundreds of thousands of missiles” pointed at Israel.
The threat from Iran has increased since anti-government protests started in September 2022. The government has reacted violently to the protests, killing at least 130 protesters. In October 2022, the country’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, publicly blamed the protests on the U.S. and Israel.
The Institute for Science and International Security monitors the threat posed to the U.S. from Iran. As of October 2022, the institute ranked the Iran threat as “high danger,” 130 out of a possible 180. The assessment is conducted across six dimensions, each of which is assigned a score of 0 to 30 points. Hostile actions scored 22 out of 30; hostile rhetoric, 28; lack of transparency in compliance with nuclear inspections, 17; nuclear breakout, 30; sensitive nuclear capabilities, 17; and beyond breakout, converting highly enriched uranium into nuclear weapons, scored 16. The institute concluded that Iran’s recent hostile actions and deeds, as well as speculation that they are closing in on nuclear weapons technology, have increased the threat level.
Rostec State Corporation Promoting Development, Manufacturing and Exporting Military High-Tech Products
The Rostec State Corporation was established 15 years ago. Workers and foremen, researchers, engineers, designers and test operators, and all personnel of Rostec enterprises, on this important occasion.
There are thousands of people – highly qualified, unique specialists, some of them are one of a kind, of very different profiles who give their efforts, energy and talent to contribute to the industrial progress of our country and are directly engaged in resolving crucial state tasks in a number of priority high-tech areas.
These include aircraft building, automobile industry, radio electronics, engineering, chemistry, medicine, new materials and, of course, strengthening Russia’s defence capabilities since a significant share of the state defence order goes to Rostec enterprises, the largest corporation in the military-industrial sector.
The tangible results it achieves must continue to be among the corporation’s unquestionable priorities. It was established for this reason and generally to ensure, consolidate, preserve and thus guarantee the development of our technological, industrial and innovative potential.
The days when the corporation was being established and the way it proceeded underscore today that the decision of forming such an industrial powerhouse, a flagship of the Russian economy, and concentration of financial and managerial resources have fully justified themselves.
Yet we must keep moving forward, set new tasks and give proper responses to the most complicated challenges in defence and security, and global technological competition.
The key priority today, the number one task is to do everything possible to meet the needs of our Armed Forces, and crucially, the units and detachments engaged in the special military operation.
Production must be stepped up as well as deliveries of all required products; the state target tasks must be executed precisely, with high quality, and strictly on schedule. We spoke about this repeatedly, including yesterday at a meeting of the Russian Government Coordination Council.
Let me reiterate, we will promptly take any decisions to support our enterprises. Meanwhile, there are not doubtful about the people working there. Plants in Moscow, St Petersburg, the Urals, Siberia, the Far East and in dozens of the country’s regions are operating at maximum capacity working in several shifts.
Incidentally, under the current conditions, this definitely gives an unparalleled boost to the development of high-tech production, not just in the defence industry but also in related civilian sectors. Indeed, the people are working at full tilt following the example of our ancestors and great traditions of our gun-makers who proved with their work that Russian weapons are the weapons of victory.
The labour teams for this work, for such dedication, for their patriotic commitment to do everything for the defence of Russia, for enhancing its sovereignty so that our heroes, who are now fighting on the frontlines or are being trained in training camps, get all they need.
The heads of the enterprises must take additional measures of social support for the personnel and their families. This concerns, among other things, special incentives and bonus payments to the best specialists and workers.
The experience we have been getting during the special operation and countering modern Western weapons is very valuable and should be used to raise the quality, reliability and military characteristics of some of our weapons and Russian military goods.
In this context, close interaction of Rostec and all respective enterprises, design bureaus, corporations and scientific centres with Defence Ministry specialists is also important.
In addition, internal competition should be organised and encouraged – the domestic Russian competition between enterprises. Serial production must be launched of the best kinds of military equipment based on those which are now being used in the hostilities, which work and confirm their specifications.
Since its inception, Rostec was responsible for the design, production and export of high-tech products, both military and non-military. The work in major promising areas which ensure Russia’s technological sovereignty, must not only be continued but also intensified.
We obviously expect notable breakthrough results from Rostec in such areas as microelectronics and electronic components, aircraft building, equipment for 5G communication networks, and overall, in selecting, implementing and promoting Russian high-tech solutions in all areas which matter to our economy, determine modern living standards and remove dependency on imports.
We have everything in our hands for that: excellent, unique world-class scientific schools, innovative and ambitious groups of researchers and inventors, a powerful industrial base, qualified workers and a talented, strong and well-motivated youth.
A hefty part of this huge intellectual and manufacturing potential of the country is concentrated within the Rostec State Corporation management system. I firmly believe your results and new achievement will match the colossal scale of the strategic tasks for the country’s development.
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