Authors: Mohammad Ghaderi & Javad Heiran-Nia
In accord with Barry Buzan’s understanding of Regional Security Complex, the Persian Gulf region is itself a security complex made up of friendship and enmity between nation states, communities, and individuals. The friendships and enmity range from deeply historical to current economic, social, cultural, religious, and even personal matters. The role of Iran among Arabs, for example, exhibits such complexity, and is not analyzable simply in terms of the distribution of power. Iran-Arab relations includes border disputes, attachments of persons with a same or similar tribal identity or ideological attitudes, positive or negative communications between Arab and non-Arab or Shiite and Sunni Muslims.
In fact, there is a kind of mutual dependency in the security complex of the Persian Gulf like other regions. But security competition is negative in the Iran – Iraq and Saudi Arabia triangle. In such a complex, the small states like Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and Bahrain have very limited influence on the structure of this complex. Their security almost depends on the bigger regional power’s pattern and could be defined as a threat against a great power under conditions when alliances are formed with the greater powers.
The security pattern of the Persian Gulf has been worsened in its present condition because of presence of the foreign powers. The security pattern of any region is affected by the security pattern of powers. Competition between the great powers tends to increase the existing regional competitions in the security pattern of the Persian Gulf.
Some experts of the Persian Gulf affairs including Kenneth Polak believe that Arab states of the Persian Gulf have passed significant steps in order to develop some of their capabilities during the last decade. For example, they have extended their relations with the USA and the other western militaristic powers to create their armies.
But the existence of a sum – zero game and the adoption of political realism approach has created the mind set that empowerment of any one these states will create potential threat against others in this security complex. This issue has created some kind of security dilemma in the region.
Even we can say that the dominant realist logic among Persian Gulf states is a kind of offensive realism in which the states are following their purpose of achieving to maximum power to fulfil their maximum security. It means, even defensive realist logic in which states don’t adopt offensive approach and react in condition of feeling threat, this reaction also usually is in the level of balance and preventing the source of threat and is not dominant on the behavior of the Persian Gulf states.
Now, the level of security has been decreased because of the increase in militaristic power the Persian Gulf States. In such condition, there is the probability of war between Iran with Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia against UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. So, how could we design a kind of security framework which could prevent war in short term and will lead to establish regional coordination in the region for long term? In fact, dialogue between the states of the region and passing into some level that fulfils the security of the region by the Persian Gulf states and non-intervention. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared Iran’s will to end the current crisis and challenges of the region on June 13 during his news conference in Oslo. He emphasized on significance of having dialogue and finding needed solutions to resolve the current regional challenges and issues. Zarif emphasized on having a comprehensive sustainable mechanism for consultation, negotiation and resolving challenges as the maximum significant issue in the region and declared this fact that idea of just negotiating on the current issue between the neighbors is not enough. The Iranian FM pointed to Helsinki Agreement (1975) as an instance for such sustainable agreement. According to Zarif, Helsinki Agreement was succeed to decrease amount of existing challenges and disagreement between the sides on the era of cold war.
In fact, he talked about a security framework that could be able to ensure the regional security for long-term. But how could such mechanism be created? To answers this question, it is necessary to take a look at the existing security mechanisms in the region. Many of these mechanisms like GCC which was created following Iran – Iraq war on 1981 were not successful in long term. Because it could not perform a militaristic alliance by ink of a common defensive treaty between the members. We can point to the current challenges between Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Qatar and the disability of GCC and its manifest to resolve the happened challenges between the members.
ASEAN is another pattern for coordination between the Persian Gulf states. But we have to consider this fact that the mentioned treaty has not been successful in achievement of development in security issues. One of the reasons on this issues backs to existing demographic heterogeneity among the members of this union. In the other hand, this organization has focused on economic issue since 1976 and Bali conference.
OSCE is another recommended pattern to use in Persian Gulf region. We have to mind that the focus of this pattern also is on state security and the external threat against it.
In the other hand this model is inattentive to internal changes and human security or political changes while according to the Arab Sprit issues and consequences, the Arab states just could talk about a comprehensive security framework if they focus on the issue of Human Security.
One of the other patterns for security framework of the Persian Gulf is CESE. This model is a useful and suitable one for security coordination between the Persian Gulf states.
In fact, the Helsinki Treaty (1975) led to establish of CESE and then, OSCE in its next stage. Helsinki Treaty was the beginner for a process of gathering NATO and Warsaw member states beside of non-aligned European states in one place in order to talk about their worries without any precondition.
OSCE which was created on the base of respect to sovereignty, non-use of force, respect to the political borders and territorial integrity, peaceful resolving challenges and non-intervention in each other internal affairs prepared this ability for the member states to seat around a table and talk about their security concerns to each other.
We have to mention that the idea of hegemonic security by a power (domestic or foreign) under the goal of having control and ordering a region has been proposed since the era of colonialism in the region and also the modern idea of collective security between the independent states of the region is a new subject which has been appeared in the political literature of the region.
The Persian Gulf region needs architecture of a comprehensive and extensive order by non-participation of the infra-regional powers in such order. Also the security structure of such security order has to be based on the cooperation of all member states of the region.
That’s why decision making in mega scale in security coordination has to be attended. If we supposed to take the pattern of CSCE, it is necessary to hold some meetings with security agenda and all sides can declare their security, threat concerns and recommend their solutions to decrease such threats. All the sides could create special committees to negotiate with each other on the probable solutions. Finally, some actions have to be performed by one side or all, to build confidence symmetric or non-symmetric. The member states could use these committees to resolve their differences and decrease of challenges or crisis. In the final stage, when they could achieve mutual confidences between the members, then could ink memorandums relating arm control. This helps security and settlement in the region fundamentally.
The consequence of this action could ends to creation of a temporary or permanent organization which puts clear or by case agendas in their program.
In this framework, members have to achieve this concept that no issue or problem is resolvable by war, and nobody is allowed to interfere in the other one’s domestic affairs. The mentioned security framework has to be based on Barry Buzan’s “security complex” model and its concerns has to be focused on the security issues of the Persian Gulf and the members are not allowed to use this mechanism for the non-related security issues to the Persian Gulf.
The mentioned framework has to be inclusive consisting Iran, Iraq and the GCC member states. It is clear that any other framework which separate one or some of these states has not been successful. The experience of Damascus Declaration (6+2 Treaty) and GCC have demonstrated this fact that achievement of a comprehensive security framework in the Persian Gulf is just possible if all the member states in this region accept it. It is very idealistic view that we ask all US regional allies in the region to stop their security and militaristic relations with Washington. This issue will be right just building confidence is enough and there has to be no regional threat.
Having a similar pattern like CSCE in the Persian Gulf is not a threat but such designation will be a great way for having a safe Persian gulf if all the sides accept it.
This order has to call war illegitimate – like Karl Deutsch’s “Pluralistic Security Community” theory which contains various state with ruling governments but no one use war in its relations and there is no place even for probable war in their relations.
There is some hope that dialogue between the states in the region will develop to a level that fulfils the security of the region by the Persian Gulf states and secures the non-intervention of foreign powers. In his news conference on June 13 in Oslo, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared Iran’s will to end the current crisis and challenge the region. He emphasized the significance of having dialogue and finding needed solutions to resolve the current regional challenges and issues. Zarif emphasized that having a comprehensive sustainable mechanism for consultation, negotiation and resolving challenges as the maximum significant issue in the region and declared this fact that idea of just negotiating on the current issue between the neighbors is not enough. The Iranian FM pointed to the Helsinki Agreement (1975) as an instance for such sustainable agreement. According to Zarif, the Helsinki Agreement has succeeded to decrease amount of existing challenges and disagreement between the sides on the era of cold war.
* Mohammad Ghaderi, Editor-in-Chief of Tehran Times newspaper
The Greek-Turkish Standoff: A New Source of Instability in the Eastern Mediterranean
Since 2011, Eastern Mediterranean affairs have mainly been marked by instability due to the civil wars in Libya and Syria. Recently, a new source of tensions further perplexes the situation—the Greek-Turkish standoff. Currently, Athens and Ankara disagree over sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. Specifically, they both claim rights in maritime zones which have not yet been delimited. The nature of the problem is not new, dating back to November 1973. What is new is the breadth of maritime zones the two sides disagree upon. The attention has shifted towards the Eastern Mediterranean in the last ten years, while it had only focused on the Aegean Sea before energy discoveries were made in the Levantine Basin in 2009.
Greek-Turkish relations were relatively calm from 1999 until 2016. In 2002, Athens and Ankara launched the so-called “exploratory talks,” a format to exchange views on thorny issues informally. The 60th round of bilateral exploratory talks took place in March 2016 and was the last until now. After 2016, cooperation between Greece and Turkey continued—for example, on the management of the refugee crisis—but the latter employed a different foreign policy approach. Seeing the EU door almost closed and having to deal with the post-coup domestic priorities, President Tayyip Erdogan sought to strengthen his country’s regional role. He placed more emphasis on national security issues and was not hesitant to forge closer ties with Russia and China. He has lacked predictability in international affairs.
Eastern Mediterranean waters could not but come to Turkey’s interest when hydrocarbons were discovered in the Basin. Cyprus followed Israel in proceeding to explore and exploit some reservoirs, such as the Aphrodite field, in close collaboration with some international energy companies. Like any other sovereign country in the world with resources, it had the right to develop them. The Republic of Cyprus had already entered the EU in 2004, but the island remained divided after the Turkish military invasion of 1974. From the very beginning, Turkey disagreed with the practices of the Cypriot government and acted to protect, in its view, the Turkish Cypriot community. Such actions became bolder in 2018. Turkish vessels began researching and drilling in Cypriot waters, although the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus is grounded on international law. The reaction of both the EU and the U.S. was very mild. As a result, Turkish ships uninterruptedly continue their operations as of today. Having been disappointed with the EU’s stance, on September 21, 2020, Cyprus decided not to sign the list of European sanctions against Belarus unless Brussels moves to impose sanctions on Turkey over its violation of Cypriot sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean.
August 2020 saw Turkey expand the same policy in regard to Cypriot waters, particularly maritime zones south of the island of Kastellorizo. The Turkish government sent the “Oruc Reis” ship to conduct research in disputed waters, according to the terminology of the American administration. It was accompanied by frigates causing Greece’s similar reaction. The research lasted for more than four weeks. On September 21, Ankara did not renew the relevant NAVTEX fueling speculation about its motivations. While maintenance reasons are officially presented as the main reason for the return of “Orus Reis” to the Antalya port, the decision is generally seen as a sign to diffuse tensions in view of the EU-Turkey summit of September 24–25, where the possibility of sanctions is likely to de discussed. Nonetheless, Turkey has declared the vessel could soon continue its mission.
The crisis is far from over. External mediators, namely Germany and the U.S., call for dialogue. Other partners such as Russia, China, France and the UK also advocate for a diplomatic solution. In principle, dialogue remains the only way forward. However, Greece and Turkey have completely different agendas. Turkey opts for negotiations without preconditions on a variety of themes. Experience from history—when the Aegean Sea was the epicentre of attention—shows Ankara is aware that international law would hardly favour its position, should talks only be concentrated on the delimitation of the continental shelf. The Turkish government endeavours to boost its argumentation by publicly talking about the geographic position of Kastellorizo, yet steadily combines other demands along with the proposed arrangement of maritime zones. Greece suspiciously sees this tactic.
Another reason for pessimism is that Turkey complements its position about future dialogue with Greece with some proposals on the island of Cyprus. Specifically, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has talked about the establishment of an equitable revenue sharing mechanism and other schemes with the participation of all parties, including the Turkish Cypriots. Whether the two themes, Greek-Turkish relations and the rights of Turkish Cypriot and perhaps a revival of talks on the Cyprus Question are to be linked, will be seen. As a matter of principle, Athens and Nicosia do not accept the participation of the Turkish Cypriot administration in any negotiations or meetings. And they both see the Cyprus Question as an international and European problem. Having said that, Greece and Cyprus raise provocative Turkish actions in the Eastern Mediterranean at the EU level, whereas Turkey prefers direct negotiations on outstanding issues. Despite this alignment, Athens does not negotiate on behalf of Nicosia.
So, where are we? NATO “deconfliction” talks are continuing and Germany is pushing both Greece and Turkey to engage themselves in new exploratory talks. The most delicate part of the task is not to talk about the need for dialogue but to make dialogue a success before a new military crisis occurs. Russia has also offered to mediate if asked, as the problem is an area of concern for the American administration and NATO first. From a Greek perspective, good ties between Russia and Turkey are a thorn in Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s initiative to mediate. Of course, this can also be a blessing in disguise. Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis decided to publicize his interest in holding a telephone conversation with President Vladimir Putin at the end of July, while important meetings between Greek and Russian officials took place in recent days. Foreign Ministers Dendias and Lavrov regularly talk to each other. Greece strives to achieve balance between its clear foreign policy choices and the difficult but possible rewarming of ties with Russia, acknowledging the rising role of the latter in the South.
From our partner RIAC
Why the “Coronavirus Ceasefire” Never Happened
Six months ago, when COVID-19 had just moved beyond the borders of China and embarked upon its triumphant march across Europe and North America, politicians and foreign affairs experts started discussing what will happen after the virus is vanquished. The debate that ensued balanced the fears and concerns of pessimists with the hopes and expectations of optimists, with the latter believing that the pandemic and the global recession that followed would inevitably force humankind to put its differences aside and finally unite in the face of common challenges.
Six months later, we can say without any doubt that, unfortunately, the optimists were wrong. The pandemic did not bring about the changes in world politics they had been hoping for, even with the ensuing recession making things worse. And we are unlikely to see any such changes in the near future. Sadly, COVID-19 did not turn out to be a cure-all for regional conflicts, arms races, the geopolitical competition and the countless ailments of humankind today.
These persisting ailments are more than evident in relations between Russia and the West. No positive steps have been made in the past six months in any of the areas where the positions of the two sides differ significantly, be it the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the unrest in Syria, the political instability in Venezuela or the war in Libya. The fate of the New START and the nuclear nonproliferation regime remains unclear. Moscow continues to be the target of new economic and political sanctions. Russia and the West are locked in an intense information war. There are no signs of a “coronavirus ceasefire,” let alone a full-fledged peace agreement, on the horizon.
Of course, Moscow has placed the blame for the lack of progress squarely on the shoulders of its western partners. While this may indeed be true in many respects, we must admit that the Kremlin has hardly been overflowing with ideas and proposals over the past six months. Even if Moscow did want to reverse the current negative trends in global politics, it has not taken any steps on its own to do so. Nor has it proposed any large-scale international projects, or even tried to temper its usual foreign policy rhetoric and propaganda.
On the contrary, the various troubles that have befallen Russia in the “coronavirus era” – from the public unrest in Belarus to the unfortunate poisoning of Alexei Navalny – are explained away as the malicious intrigues of Russia’s geopolitical opponents. For all intents and purposes, the Kremlin is in the same position now, in September 2020, that it was in back in March. The chances of another “reset” or at least a “timeout” in relations have disappeared completely, if they ever existed in the first place.
So, why did the “coronavirus ceasefire” never happen? Without absolving the West of its share of responsibility, let us try to outline the obstacles that Russia has put in the way of progress.
First, in an environment of unprecedented shocks and cataclysms, there is always the hope that your opponent will eventually suffer more as a result than you will. Many in Russia see the 2020 crisis as the final damning indictment of the West and even an inglorious end to the market economy and political liberalism in general.
The recent statement by Aide to the President of the Russian Federation Maxim Oreshkin that Russia is poised to become one of the top five economies in the world this year is particularly noteworthy. Not because the country is experiencing rapid economic growth, but because the German economy is set to fall further than the Russian economy. If you are certain that time is on your side and that you will emerge from the crisis in better shape than your opponents, then the incentives to work towards some kind of agreement hic et nunc are, of course, reduced.
Second, the current Russian leadership is convinced that any unilateral steps on its part, any shifts in Moscow’s foreign policy, will be perceived in the West as a sign of weakness. And this will open the door for increased pressure on Moscow. Not that this logic is entirely unfounded, as history has shown. But it is precisely this logic that prevents Russian leaders from admitting their past foreign policy mistakes and miscalculations, no matter how obvious they may have been. This, in turn, makes it extremely difficult to change the current foreign policy and develop alternative routes for the future. In fact, what we are seeing is a game to preserve the status quo, in the hope that history will ultimately be on Moscow’s side, rather than that of its opponents (see the first point).
Third, six and a half years after the crisis in Ukraine broke out, we are essentially left with a frozen conflict. Turning the large and unwieldy state machine around, rewiring the somewhat heavy-handed state propaganda machine, and changing the policies that determine the everyday actions of the army of “deep state” officials is tantamount to changing the trajectory of a supertanker carrying a load of hundreds of thousands of tonnes. It is perhaps even more difficult, however, to change the opinion that has taken shape in Russian society in recent years about the modern world and Russia’s place in it. Just because the Russian people are tired of foreign politics, this does not mean that they will enthusiastically support an updated version of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking” of the second half of the 1980s or the ideological principles of Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev’s foreign policy of the early 1990s.
Fourth, the balance of power between the agencies involved in the development and practical implementation of Russia’s foreign policy has changed significantly in recent years. The role of the security forces has been growing in all its aspects since at least the beginning of 2014. Conversely, the role of diplomats, as well as that of the technocrats in the economic structures of the Russian government, has been dwindling with each passing year. It is the security forces that are the main “stakeholders” in Donbass, Syria, Libya and even Belarus today. It would be fair to say that they have had a controlling interest in Russia’s foreign policy. The oft-quoted words of Emperor Alexander III that Russia has only two allies, its army and its navy, perfectly reflect the shift that has taken place in the balance of powers between these agencies. We should add that this shift was largely welcomed and even supported by a significant part of Russian society (see the third point). Of course, the siloviki are, due to the specifics of their work, less inclined to compromise, concessions and basic human empathy than diplomats, economists and technocrats.
All these factors preventing the conceptual renewal of Russia’s foreign policy can equally be applied to its geopolitical opponents. Politicians in the West are also hoping that time is on their side, that Moscow will emerge from the crisis weaker and more vulnerable, and thus more malleable than it was before. They also believe that any unilateral steps, any demonstration of flexibility in relations with the Kremlin, will be met with an even tougher and more aggressive policy. Negative ideas about Russia have also taken root in the minds of people in the West, and foreign policy is being “militarized” there just as much as it is in Russia.
Thus, neither the coronavirus nor the economic recession will automatically lead to a détente, let alone a reset in relations between Russia and the West. We are, in fact, moving in the opposite direction, once again running the risk of an uncontrolled confrontation. However, this unfortunate situation is no reason to give up on the possibility of signing new agreements, even if COVID-19 will no longer be in our corner moving forward.
From our partner RIAC
India’s strategies short of war against a hostile China
Since India’s independence several peace and border cooperation agreements were signed between the India and China. Prominent among them was the Panchsheel Agreement signed in 1954. A majority of the agreements were signed between 1993 and 2013. Recently genuine efforts were made by PM Narendra Modi by engaging Xi Jinping at the Wuhan and Chennai summits. But China is nowhere near to settling the border dispute despite various agreements and talks at the military and civilian levels.
After the 1962 war peace was largely maintained on the Indo China border. During the Mao and Deng era consensus building was the norm in the communist party. XiJinping appointed himself as chairman of the communist party for life. Today power is centralized with XiJinping and his cabal. Through Doklam and Galwan incidents Xi Jinpinghas disowned the peaceful principles laid down by his predecessors. China’s strategy is to keep India engaged in South Asia as it doesn’t want India to emerge as a super power. After solving a crisis on the border China will create another crisis. Beijing has declining interest in the niceties of diplomacy. Under Xi Jinping China has become more hostile.
China has been infringing on India’s sovereignty through salami tactics by changing the status quo and attempting to own the border territory. At Galwan on Xi Jinping’s birthday the PLA demonstrated hooliganism by assaulting Indian border positions. China violated the 1996 and 2005 bilateral agreements which states that both armies should not carry weapons within 1.24 miles on either side of the border. India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar mentioned that the standoff situation with China in Galwan Valley of eastern Ladakh is “surely the most serious situation after 1962.”China is constructing infrastructure, increasing forces and deploying weapon systems on the border.
Options for India
India led by PM Narendra Modi has implemented a realist foreign policy and a muscular military policy.India ended the age of strategic restraint by launching special operations and air strikes in Pakistan. Since the Galwan incident India has increased the military, diplomatic and economic deterrence against China. India is constructing military infrastructure and deploying weapon systems like SU 30 MKI and T 90 tanks in Ladakh. India banned a total of 224 Chinese apps, barred Chinese companies from government contracts and is on the verge of banning Huawei. Other measures include excluding Chinese companies from private Indian telecommunications networks. Chinese mobile manufacturers can be banned from selling goods in India.
India should offer a grand strategy to China. India has a plethora of options short of war. Future talks should involve an integrated strategy to solve all the bilateral issues and not just an isolated resolution of a localized border incident. All instruments of military and economic power and coercive diplomacy should be on the table.
China expects other nations to follow bilateral agreements and international treaties while it conveniently violates them. India should abrogate the Panscheel agreement given China’s intransigence and hostility. China claims 35,000 square miles of territory in India’s northeast, including the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. China occupies 15,000 square miles of India’s territory in the Aksai Chin Plateau in the Himalayas. India’s primary objective is to take back territories like Aksai Chin. While the secondary issue is the resolution of the border issue and China’s support to Pakistan. India can leverage the contemporary geopolitical climate to settle all issues. India can target China’s soft underbelly characterized by issues like Taiwan, Xinjiang and the economy. China raises the Kashmir issue at international organizations. As a countervailing measure India can raise Xinjiang at international organizations and conferences.
China has been militarily and diplomatically supporting Pakistan against India. Pakistan is a rentier and a broken state that sponsors terrorism. India can establish bilateral relations with Taiwan thus superseding China’s reunification sensitivities. China has territorial disputes with 18 countries including Taiwan and Japan. India can hedge against China by establishing strategic partnerships with US, Australia, Japanand Vietnam.
An overwhelming military is a deterrence for China’s belligerent foreign and military policy. The 1990Gulf War demonstrated the capabilities of high technology weapon systems. As compared to China’s rudimentary weapons systems India has inducted 4th and 5th generation weapons like the SU 30 MKI, AH 64 Apache and T 90 tanks. The deterrence capacity of fighter aircrafts is reduced as they cannot target China’s coastlines due to their restricted range. Full deterrence can be achieved by ICBMs and nuclear powered submarines. With these weapons India can target centers of gravity like Shanghai and Shenzhen.
China is not a signatory to arms limitations treaties like Start I and Start II. China continues to expand its nuclear weapons stockpile and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) like DF 21 and DF-26B which are banned by the INF Treaty. India is a law abiding stable democracy in an unstable region with two hostile nations on its flanks. US and Russia can relax the arms control mechanism considering India’s’ impeccable record on peace and non proliferation. This will allow India to buy Russian weapon systems like Zircon and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Topol and Bulava ICBMs and Yasen and Borey class SSBN submarines. While US can sell SSBN submarines and C4ISR gathering platforms like RC 135 and RQ 4 Global Hawk.
China remains a security threat for Asia. As China foments instability the APAC region from South Asia to South China Sea remains volatile. The Quad can be expanded to include Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea and Indonesia and multinational naval exercises can conducted in the South China Sea.
The enemy of my enemy is my friend. China fought small wars with India, Vietnam and Soviet Union. Vietnam defeated the PLA at Lang Son in 1979 with advanced weapon systems and guerilla warfare. India can increase militarily cooperation with Vietnam. China attacked the Soviet Union on the Ussuri river leading to heavy PLA casualties. Historically relations between Russia and India have been close. As a result of the Indo Soviet Friendship Treaty China did not support Pakistan during the 1971 war. India can enhance its military and diplomatic ties with Russia to the next level.
Strategic partnership with US
Its time for a partnership between the world’s largest and the world’s biggest democracies. India and the US have a common objective to preserve peace, maintain stability and enhance security in Asia. India’s reiteration at leaders’ level and international forums that both countries see each other as allies for stability in the APAC region is not enough. India has to go beyond the clichés of the need for closer ties.
Due to the China threat the US is shifting its military from Europe and Middle East to the APAC region.US and India can establish an Asian equivalent of NATO as China’s destructive policy frameworks and threatening postures remain a strategic threat. India should enhance and deepen cooperation with the US intelligence community in the fields of MASINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, TECHINT and CYBINT. Both countries can form an alliance of democracies. If China militarily or economically targets one of the member country then the alliance can retaliate under a framework similar to Article 5 of NATO. Thus power will be distributed in the APAC region instead of being concentrated with China. A scorpion strategy will ensure that China does not harass its neighbors. The strategy involves a military pincer movement by India from the west and US from the East against a hostile China. India can conduct joint military exercises with the US in Ladakh. China cannot challenge Japan and Taiwan due to the US security agreements with these countries.
The world has entered the age of instability and uncertainty. The 21st century is characterized by hybrid warfare through military and coercive diplomacy. South Asia is not a friendly neighborhood where peaceful overtures lead to harmonious relations. China is a threat to India even in the context of a friendly relationship. Diplomatic niceties have no place in India’s relations with China. India can impose costs on China which can be more than the benefits offered by normalizing relations. The application of measures short of war without engaging the PLA will reap benefits. India can fulfill its national security requirements and global responsibilities through a grand strategy.
A policy of engagement and deterrence is crucial against an antagonistic China. While India attempts to develop cooperative ties with China it will need to continue to enhance and implement its military and coercive diplomatic strategies. China does not represent a direct military threat to India but at the same time one cannot deny that challenges remain.
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