Within the context of traditional theory of international relations humanitarian intervention is referred as “intervention-from-above”, highlighting the “tactics of intervention” by various states, international institutions, government sponsored think tanks and international aid organizations. At the global level, flow of international aid is unidirectional (traditionally flowing from North to South); although, intervention is not only limited to North, but may occur regionally in the South too. Historically, the world has witnessed tensions highlighting “certain drawbacks” in the global legal system particularly within the context of a donor country “crossing humanitarian boundaries, sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention, while purposefully meddling in the regional affairs of the host”, violating every nomenclature of humanitarian assistance and instigating dilemma among probable future host economies.
Today, host countries are forced to question the objectives of donor economies. Many states begin formulating an “after-effect strategy” in case the donor intends to violate, in the light of many least economic developed economies being host, fewer states respond. From the aforementioned arguments, the questions that challenge policy makers of today are: Does humanitarian intervention bring results? Does it truly assist the host economy? If it does, which is the best effective and efficient plan of action?
Policy makers must focus their attention on the “flaws in international law highlighted in the aforementioned arguments”. Furthermore, historically it has been seen that, nations ignore legal guidelines and international laws which does not benefit it while giving jurisprudence to politics than the international laws.
Today, the focus of the article will be on the three traditional pillars of humanitarian intervention, the donor’s “capability” to assist the host, the donors “interests” in providing assistance to the host, and the “after-effects” on the host; in an effort to “effectively” understand and identify factors responsible for recent “negative outcomes” from humanitarian interventions while identifying alternative non-traditional approaches of humanitarian intervention shifting the focus of political thinkers and strategic experts from military theories, while giving special emphasis on the role of non-government development agencies and civil society organizations. Keeping all relevant actors in play, it is literally impossible to predict the success of “traditional grass-root focused ”humanitarian intervention especially when the “much advanced top-down approach” continue to fail.
The quest to identify non-traditional theories of humanitarian intervention, also termed by strategic experts as “bottom to top approach”, will be the focus of this article. It will be safe to say that, such non-traditional approaches, will depend majorly, on intervention policies of humanitarian aid agencies and public works development focussed institutions of non-governmental organizations, development focussed civil society and volunteer groups from the masses, civil rights advocacy groups and organizations advocating for a specific society.
Decoding the myths
Political and Strategic experts have, classified, two types of traditional “humanitarian intervention” theories. The first theory relies on aggressive military intervention to fulfil strategic objectives of the host and is carried under the leadership of one or more host states, or by unanimously approaching the United Nations Security Council and other regional and international institutions.
The first theory comprises of intervention tactics, which could fulfil positive humanitarian objectives of great benefit for the host, however it remains secondary to the intervention objective implemented by the host. For example, repetitive acts of crimes against humanity, horrific abuses by successive regimes could come to an end through an intervention which is designed specifically by the host government. It is important to note that, such intervention is rare, especially considering the “humanitarian” view of this form of intervention, instead their long presence could result in oppression against the masses forcing the host to use all forms of excessive force.
Some historical examples include devastation of Germany during World War II, the Liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, and the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1968. Policy makers must understand that, interventions at such level involves specific military and political goals that starts with “intervention and occupation” for an indefinite time.
In this form of humanitarian intervention, genocide, crimes against humanity and violence induced on local masses are common. Such acts are destitute to walk among the strategic and military objectives of the host. However, in regions where the host intervened without any strategic objectives, for example intervention on Kurdish regions since World War I, and military confrontation against the indigenous tribes of Amazon, excessive violence induced against human life have been categorically side-lined or purposefully ignored.
In the second theory of humanitarian intervention, human rights abuses instigate an “aggressive response”, although without any strategic advantage. If the intervention does takes place, it will be implemented without a “clear sight, objective or commitment” on the host intervening state, the commitment would be largely to challenge the political structure or the authority responsible for carrying such horrific crimes. Strategic and political experts refer this scenario, which remains active in the Middle East today, “the CNN factor”, an aggressive wide scale visual representation of horrors and distress particularly depicting crimes against humanity, stressing the masses of West to force their governments to response, particularly “Americanised” nations.
If the agendas established by policy makers are restricted, and the actors tasked to “bull-work” the humanitarian intervention agendas follow strict discipline and designated guidelines, simultaneously earning the trust of the masses, humanitarian intervention in this platform could bring relief to the socio-economic havoc wretched life of the masses. This initiative has been implemented for the Kurds living in northern Iraq post-Gulf War, in the early years of relief and rehabilitation initiatives in Somalia (before invasion),and deployment of UNPROFOR aid and relief units for the then civil war-stricken masses of Croatia, the then Bosnia. In the aforementioned examples, however, the strategic objectives to eliminate the factors responsible for the crisis were absent, on larger extent, the crisis devastated the lives of millions.
If the state intervening in the crisis receives armed responses that could increase volatility in the region, then the state forces intervening could deploy evasive tactics and steer away from the confrontation. The participation of Washington has been vital with relevance to its extensive experience in humanitarian intervention. During Clinton administration, the US aggressively shifted its policy of “strategic objectives dipped humanitarian intervention” and an example to this “doctrine” was largely visible during the “initial deployment of medical and food aid workers” deployed in Somalia, eliminating the “strategic discourse” while establishing an example of “stringent and self-restraining” regime. The new established theory was a perfect example of “intended humanitarian intervention” of a state, having an edge over responses taken by globally established international institution.
The change in international relations dynamics followed by acute regional, religion/ sectoral “coloured” violent conflicts has resulted into numerous debates on “humanitarian intervention as a viable tool in global politics”. The debate however, failed to separate the two theories of humanitarian intervention aforementioned discussed. This has resulted in “fragmented policies which not only failed but also became a principle factor in fuelling regional conflicts, further deteriorating an already deteriorated situation” leading to discontent and apprehension towards humanitarian intervention, while fuelling rage among the local masses and apprehensive governments towards UN actions. Clearing the “thick air” is not the purpose of this article, but many progressive steps could be taken in an effort to identify alternative theories.
Establishing outcomes from intervention
To begin with, a political tool such as an “intervention”, if introduced as a traditional mechanism in foreign policy, is troublesome even without the presence of “strategic action”, witnessed from the example of US intervention in Vietnam, or Soviet Union intervention of Afghanistan.
Using military superiority and using it to achieve desired political objectives/agendas is increasingly becoming difficult inspite of the “rightist regimes in the West”. The traditional tools of foreign policy (aggressively used by Washington during post-World War II until the end of Cold War) such as “cloak and dagger diplomacy”, “gunboat diplomacy” which elevated Washington’s position as a hegemon, benefitted many US intelligence agencies in holding many economies hostage without any resistance. In the light of globalisation, tradecraft tactics evolved and advanced weaponry, began playing a much larger role.
In 1983 when a single truck exploded inside the barracks of US soldiers, Washington which was already on an edge, withdrew the remaining stationed US forces and shifted the US foreign policy which was focussed on rebuilding and restructuring city of Beirut during post-1982 war. An aggressive President Bush Jrdid not undertake restructuring and rehabilitation initiatives in Iraq, which could have forced Washington to deploy forces in Iraq which could have instigated terror factions in targeting US soldiers. Bush understood the “careful policies implemented by Clinton administration ”particularly the actions taken by Washington in Somalia an example of “self-limiting” the objective to strictly humanitarian intervention. His objectives were very clear, turning Iraq’s fate into Bosnia was all he feared.
Since 1989, the traditional concepts of international relations have evolved. The pragmatic but traditional theories that were applicable in IR are fairly limited. This has largely been a “misconception” among traditional international relations theorists, military and political experts making their expectations uncleared:
a) Even today, traditional theorists continue to believe, that cooperation and coordination among the nations could only be effective within the UN.
b) The aforementioned notion comes from the successful restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty after the deployment of UN forces. The resultant of the conflict created a biased approach on a half-baked truth followed by rhetorical idea that combined security initiatives would be sufficient to mobilise large troops and financial assistance to implement resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council. The traditional theorists failed to acknowledge the presence of Washington’s “hunt for oil” and Israeli’s “security dilemma”. They also failed to foresee the lust for Middle East economies to acquire nuclear weapons.
c) Numerous severe simultaneous humanitarian crisis erupted which resulted in dictatorial regimes and failed states. The continent of Africa witnessed subsequent collapse of imperial regimes while the Central Asia witnessed the collapse of Soviet Union and the then Yugoslavia, which paved the way for ethnic conflicts, civil war and nationalist dictatorial regimes.
d) It was by now evident that, cost-efficient intervention will not be effective and even an objective focussed intervention will not bear desired results fearing which no political leadership was willing to accept the high cost of collateral damage during uninsured even in the name of “vital national interests.” Reinforced by poor political leadership in intervened states and their failure to adhere or implement any concrete domestic policy along with subsequent challenges to domestic security, decision makers “waited and watched”.
e) In colonial dominated regions particularly Africa, Latin America and Caribbean and South Asia, the concept of“ humanitarian intervention” represented the interest of traditional colonial forces in the region, paving a way to regain dominate the lost territories, particularly those with significant Muslim population. This “delusion” idea was further fuelled by the West’s retention of oil in the Gulf but refraining from taking any action against “systematic killing, ethnic cleansing” of Muslims in Serbia. Furthermore, the use of technology in the urban setting especially in the regions of Mogadishu to hunt warlord Aidid, reinforced their idea.
Strategy or Politics?
Bringing the focus back on political leadership, Bosnia was “political fore-play” which backfired. Argued by ethics professors even today, the reluctance to interfere, even after witnessing the horrors in war, mass killings, rape, gender-based violence and genocide reminding the days of World War II gripped Europe, the world has been reminded of another holocaust. It is nothing less than a betrayal to the lives of people who took a pledge “Never Again”, the pledge was disrespected by the ugly truths of international political world. When thousands of leftists were brutally murdered in Singapore, the West particularly Washington compensated the loss of lives with the fear of communist controlled Singapore. When Indonesia invaded East Timor, dismantling all trumps (sovereignty, national and territorial integrity and right to existence) of international relations, instigating a policy on mass rape, murder, extensive killing and genocide which resulted in the deaths of over half of the then population, intervention in all forms remain absent.
Perhaps evidently, inspite of genocide carried by communist regime on large scale in Cambodia, forced the West not to intervene (presence and support of China)in the Vietnam invasion of Cambodia which resulted in the end of Khmer Rouge. Policy makers must understand that, the decisions under taken by the West form a pattern: strategic objectives outweigh even the harshest and deplorable humanitarian crisis.
The aforementioned statements points towards the fact that, there is an imminent need to re-evaluate and reassess humanitarian intervention policy. Today, the masses will not accept the decision to “fight someone else’s war” irrespective of deplorable circumstances. This could come as a relief for many rightist political leadership, but it practically “chokes” the nation’s policy for humanitarian intervention.
A failed political leadership to blame?
It is important to note that, the political leadership reluctance highlights the “inadequate importance” given to the segment of humanitarian intervention in international diplomacy coupled with the “saga of failure” of global powers and international established institutions failures in the past. Coupled with the failure of political will and leadership, identifying “strategic interests” and formulating a strategy resulted in some of the worst humanitarian crisis in Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda. The larger responsible segment of this failure goes to liberal “appeasing” foreign policy coupled with strategic interests and domestic security preferences. Historically, Washington was pushed to take a leading role and pulled by its own masses particularly when the “stakes were too high” overseas. This “tendency” continues to thrive within power nations which is evident from the on-going Rohingya crisis in South Asia.
The fundamental issue with humanitarian intervention lies largely on “intervention” aspect rather than “humanitarian” support, the larger perception remains the same “internal violence being the only factor capable of changing the dynamics of the domestic policy of a state”. Policy makers must note that, if the nation undertakes the responsibility of providing“ clean water, food, medicine, temporary shelter for refugees and internal displaced conflict-ridden masses” limiting the action to strictly humanitarian, then nations should not consider it an “intervention” even if the host country has not acknowledged or given a formal consent. If the intervening state intents to meddle with the host state’s internal issues particularly in times of internal conflict or civil war, then the intervening state will fail even if its intentions are “humanity centred”.
It is imperative for policy makers to identify or formulate strategies of “humanitarian intervention” without instigating further violence, fuelling crimes against humanity, genocide, factors leading to further deterioration of the host state.
UN at 75: The Necessity of Having a Stronger & More Effective United Nations
October 24, 2020, marks the 75th anniversary of the United Nations. In this context, this article investigates the necessity of having a stronger UN for the benefits of the world’s people. In fact, if one looks at the past, the UN came up in 1945 in response to the Second World War for a more stable, secured, and peaceful world. And the UN has been successful to a larger extent to that goals and objectives, many argue. Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General for instance, wrote that ‘The United Nations, with their rules and institutions, are at the heart of the international system. They encourage States to prevent or settle disputes peacefully. The United Nations speaks for the voiceless, feeds the hungry, protects the displaced, combats organized crime and terrorism, and fights disease across the globe’ (Annan 2015).
If one looks at the history, after the Second World War, there are not so many wars on a large scale or conflicts except some bilateral Wars like Vietnam War or Iraq invasion in Kuwait or US invasion in Afghanistan or Iraq or Syrian crisis or Rohingya crisis. One can claim that the present world is more stable and peaceful than the world before the Second World War. Against this backdrop, Ramesh Thakur rightly observes, ‘On balance, the world has been a better and safer place with the UN than would have been the case without it (Thakur 2009:2). And it will not be wrong to claim that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is playing a crucial role in this regard, focusing both on ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues. Hard security issues ranges from nuclear threat to international terrorism and soft security issues include human security issues to human rights to international criminal justice and international sanctions (For details see, Thakur, 2009).
The UN is not only concerned about international peace and security but also concerned about economic and social issues. There are several UN organizations e.g. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP) or the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) which is involved in socio-economic issues that impact millions of people globally.
First, one can look at the role of the UN General Assembly to understand the necessity of having a more robust UN. It is the core organ of the UN. It is the only organ in which all the member countries are represented all of the time. The role of the UN includes to pass resolutions and to create subsidiary agencies to deal with particular issues (Barkin 2006: 58). UN General Assembly works as a forum where the world’s states meet and discuss the pressing global problems. In this context, Eleanor Albert, Leo Schwartz, and Alexandra Abell write that ‘Since its inception seventy-one years ago, the United Nations General Assembly has been a forum for lofty declarations, sometimes audacious rhetoric, and rigorous debate over the world’s most vexing issues, from poverty and development to peace and security’ (Albert et al. 2016). However, in September 2015, the Assembly agreed on a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals, contained in the outcome document of the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda (resolution 70/1). Notably, the implementation of SDG goals will have broader implications for the world’s people.
In addition, the Assembly may also take action in cases of a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression, when the Security Council has failed to act owing to the negative vote of a permanent member. In such instances, according to its “Uniting for Peace” resolution of 3 November 1950, the Assembly may consider the matter immediately and recommend to its Members collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Second, one should also look at the role of the Security Council to make the case of having a stronger United Nations. The UN Security Council is the most powerful security-related organization in contemporary world politics. As the Charter of the United Nations says: ‘the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24). The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of the settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security’
In contemporary world politics, the UN Security Council is the most potent security-related organization because it is the only recognized and legitimate international organ which deals with international peace and security. In this regard, Justin Morris and Nicholas J. Wheeler claim that ‘The United Nations Security Council is at the heart of the world’s collective security system’ (Morris and Wheeler 2007: 214). The UNSC play role by passing Resolutions regarding maintaining international peace and security, determining threats to peace and security and finally undertaking peacekeeping operations.
Decisions made by the Security Council are known as the Security Council resolutions. Examples of Security Council resolutions include Resolution 794 (1992), which authorized military intervention in Somalia on humanitarian ground, or the resolution 1325 (2000), which called on states to recognize the role of women in peace, and security and post-conflict situations. In the UN Security Council Working method Handbook, it is noted that the UNSC has adopted over 2,000 resolutions relating to conflict and post-conflict situations around the globe. Another report, titled Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council noted that between 2008 and 2009, the Security Council adopted 35 out of 65 resolutions in 2008 (53.8 %), and 22 out of 47 resolutions in 2009 under Chapter VII (46. 8 %) concerning threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. The report also notes about several UN resolutions authorizing United Nations peacekeeping missions. In connection with the mission deployed in the Central African Republic and Chad, the Council approved the deployment of a United Nations military component for the first time in 2009 to follow up operations by the European Union in Chad and Central African Republic (EUFORChad/CAR). The Council continued to authorize enforcement action for United Nations peacekeeping missions in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Darfur/Sudan (UNAMID), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Sudan (UNMIS). This increased number of UNSC Resolutions dealing with international peace and security reinforces its legitimacy and power as a security organization.
The critical question that comes into the forefront is how much UNSC can implement its mandates neutrally or independently in terms of maintaining world peace and security. The critiques bring the example of Iraq war (2003) where UNSC ‘faces a crisis of legitimacy because of its inability to constrain the unilaterally inclined hegemonic United States.’ (Morris and Wheeler 2007:214). Another critical question is the role of UNSC in resolving the long-standing Syrian crisis or the Rohingya refugee crisis.
It is undeniable the fact that UNSC cannot function with its full potentialities due to the challenges and limitations it faces because ‘in their pursuit of raisons d’état, states use whatever institutions are available to serve their interests’ (Weiss 2003: 151). And here comes the politics in the Security Council which is highly manifested in the past. Against this backdrop, Weiss correctly observes, ‘the politics of the UN system- not only the principal organs of UN like Security Council or General Assembly is highly politicized but even ‘technical’ organizations, for instance, World Health Organization or the Universal Postal Union continue to reflect the global division between the so-called wealthy, industrialized North and the less advantaged, developing South’ (Weiss 2009: 271).
It is, therefore, states and particularly the P5 want to use the Security Council as a means to uphold its interest. Gareth Evans rightly points out ‘for most of its history the Security Council has been a prisoner of great power manoeuvring…’ (Evans 2009:Xi). Hence, using veto by the P5 remains a significant challenge for the UNSC to work in its fullest potentials. In the recent case of the Rohingya refugee crisis, the UNSC is unable to take adequate measures due to veto power used by China and Russia. However, the UNSC is responsible for maintaining world peace and security.
The bottomline is that there is no alternative to having a stronger and more effective UN because it is the only hope for millions of people around the world. The UN is an inevitable international organization in this turbulent world despite its criticism or limitations.Thus, it becomes essential for the P5 nations to think about the broader benefits of the world’s people instead of their narrowly defined interest in the case of using veto power. And the world also needs to acknowledge that the UN reform has been a reality to ensure the neutrality and objectivity of the United Nations for a more peaceful, stable, secured world.
The United Nations and the Neglected Conflict of Kashmir
The principle of ‘right of self-determination’ and its applicability to the 72-year-old Kashmir conflict needs to be considered during the 75th session of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly that is taking place between October 8 to November 10, 2020 at its headquarters in New York. The Committee will discuss and deliberate the issues related to international conflicts and decolonization. What I do hope to offer is an unstarry-eyed view of the fate of self-determination in Kashmir; and, the indispensability of convincing the United Nations that international peace and security would be strengthened, not weakened, by resolving the Kashmir conflict to the satisfaction of all parties concerned..
The self-determination of peoples is a basic principle of the United Nation Charter, which has been reaffirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and applied countless times to the settlement of international disputes.
The concept seems to be as old as Government itself and was the basis of French and American revolutions. In 1916, President Wilson stated that self-determination is not a mere phrase. He said that it is an imperative principle of action and included it in the famous 14-point charter. This gave a prominence to the principle. Self-determination as conceived by Wilson was an imprecise amalgamation of several strands of thought, some long associated in his mind with the notion of “self-determination,” others hatched as a result or wartime developments, but all imbued with a general spirit of democracy.
Self- determination is a principle that has been developed in philosophic thought and practice for the last several hundred years. It is an idea that has caused people throughout the world to rise up and shed the chains of oppressive governments at great risk.
Finally, in 1945 the establishment of the UN gave a new dimension to the principle of self-determination. It was made one of the objectives, which the UN would seek to achieve, along with equal rights of all nations. Article 1.2 of the Charter of the Untied Nations reads: “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”
From 1952 onwards, the General Assembly of the UN adopted a series of resolutions proclaiming the right to self-determination. The two most important of these are resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. Resolution 1514 was seen almost exclusively as part of process of decolonization. 1514 is entitled: Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.”
International Court of Justice considered the several resolutions on decolonization process and noted: “The subsequent development of International Law in regard to non-self governing territories as enshrined in the Charter of the UN made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them.” This opinion establishes the self-determination as the basic principle for the process of de-colonization.
The principle of self-determination in modern times can be defined as the right of peoples to determine their own political status and pursue their own economic, social and cultural policies. Self-determination in its literal meaning or at a terminological level also implies the right [of a people] to express itself to organize in whatever way it wants. A people must be free to express their will without interference or threat of interference from a controlling authority. This includes alien domination, foreign occupation and colonial rule.
Although, the applicability of the principle of the self-determination to the specific case of Jammu and Kashmir has been explicitly recognized by the United Nations. It was upheld equally by India and Pakistan when the Kashmir dispute was brought before the Security Council. Since, on the establishment of India and Pakistan as sovereign states, Jammu and Kashmir was not part of the territory of either, the two countries entered into an agreement to allow its people to exercise their right of self-determination under impartial auspices and in conditions free from coercion from either side. The agreement is embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, explicitly accepted by both Governments. It is binding on both Governments and no allegation of non-performance of any of its provisions by either side can render it inoperative.
It is apparent from the record of the Security Council that India articulated the principle, accepted the practical shape the Security Council gave to it and freely participated in negotiations regarding the modalities involved. However, when developments inside Jammu & Kashmir made her doubt her chances of winning the plebiscite, she changed her stand and pleaded that she was no longer bound by the agreement. Of course, she deployed ample arguments to justify the somersault. But even though the arguments were of a legal or quasi-legal nature, she rejected a reference to the World Court to pronounce on their merits. This is how the dispute became frozen with calamitous consequences for Kashmir most of all, with heavy cost for Pakistan and with none too happy results for India itself.
By all customary moral and legal yardsticks, 23 million Kashmiris from both sides of the Ceasefire Line (CFL) enjoy a right to self-determination. Kashmir’s legal history entitles it to self-determination from Indian domination every bit as much as Eritrea’s historical independence entitled it to self-determination from Ethiopian domination.
India’s gruesome human rights violations in Kashmir also militate in favor of self-determination every bit as much as Yugoslavia’s human rights violations and ethnic cleansing created a right to self-determination in Bosnia and Kosovo. Kashmir’s history of social and religious tranquility further bolsters its claim to self-determination every bit as much as East Timor’s history of domestic peace before Indonesia’s annexation in 1975 entitled it to self-determination in 1999.
If law and morality are overwhelmingly on the side of Kashmiri self-determination, then why has that quest been thwarted for 72 years? The answer is self-evident: the military might of India. India is too militarily powerful, including a nuclear arsenal, and too economically mesmerizing to expect the United States, the United Nations, NATO, or the European Union to intervene. The United States is reluctant to exert moral suasion or pressure to prod India because it covets more India’s alluring economic markets and collaboration in fighting global terrorism. Further, the size and wealth of the Indian lobby in the United States dwarfs the corresponding lobbies supporting Kashmir.
The world powers need to understand that there is no way the dispute can be settled once and for all except in harmony with the people’s will, and there is no way the people’s will can be ascertained except through an impartial vote. Secondly, there are no insuperable obstacles to the setting up of a plebiscite administration in Kashmir under the aegis of the United Nations. The world organization has proved its ability, even in the most forbidding circumstances, to institute an electoral process under its supervision and control and with the help of a neutral peace‑keeping force. The striking example of this is Namibia, which was peacefully brought to independence after seven decades of occupation and control by South Africa; East Timor and Southern Sudan, which got independence only through the intervention of the United Nations. Thirdly, as Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative, envisaged seven decades ago, the plebiscite can be so regionalized that none of the different zones of the state will be forced to accept an outcome contrary to its wishes.
In conclusion, a sincere and serious effort towards a just settlement of the Kashmir dispute must squarely deal with the realities of the situation and fully respond to the people’s rights involved in it. Indeed, any process that ignores the wishes of the people of Kashmir and is designed to sidetrack the United Nations will not only prove to be an exercise in futility but can also cause incalculable human and political damage.
UN anniversary’s gloomy takeaways
On its 75th anniversary and amid the global COVID-19 pandemic, the United Nations has for the first time convened world leaders mainly in an online format to seek action and solutions for a world in crisis.
The UNO’s predecessor, the League of Nations, wrapped up its work with the outbreak of World War 2, but the further the start of the present United Nations slides back in history, the more skeptical assessments of its performance are being heard today. How come?
The United Nations Organization was created by the victorious nations shortly after the end of the Second World War, but the idea of creating a new international organization tasked with maintaining global peace and security was actually floated by members of the anti-Hitler coalition even before the war was over. During their August 14, 1941 meeting at the British naval station Argentia (Newfoundland), US President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill inked the Atlantic Charter, which defined the two countries’ goals in the war against Nazi Germany, and outlined the first sketches of the post-war world order. The Soviet Union joined the declaration on September 24 of that same year. On January 1, 1942, representatives of 26 Allied countries endorsed the Atlantic Charter and signed the United Nations Declaration. Welcomed as the idea of creating a new organization was by everyone, however, there still were numerous disagreements regarding its tasks, goals and powers.
At a conference held in Moscow on October 19-30, 1943, the foreign ministers of the USSR, the US and Great Britain (Vyacheslav Molotov, Cordell Hull and Anthony Eden), signed the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security (it was also signed by China’s ambassador to the USSR Fu Bingchang), where the parties pledged to fast-track the creation of an international organization to maintain peace and security. The final agreement on the creation of the United Nations Organization was reached in March 1945 during the Yalta Conference by the leaders of the three Allied Powers – Josef Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill.
It was established that the UN would be based on the principle of unanimity of the great powers – permanent members of the Security Council with a veto right. Harry Truman, who succeeded Franklin Roosevelt, who died in April 1945, was openly critical of the agreement, but during a conference in San Francisco, where Soviet and US representatives locked horns over a number of issues pertaining to the UN Charter, the Soviet position prevailed. The sides eventually reached a compromise whereby the UN General Assembly could discuss any issues, but did not have the right to take decisions binding on the UN member states.
On June 26, 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco to sign the UN Charter. On October 24, 1945, the Soviet Union became the 29th state to have submitted the instrument of ratification, thus securing the necessary number of votes for the Charter’s entry into force. Since 1948, October 24 has been marked as United Nations Day.
The status of the United Nations Organization, paid for by tens of millions of lives perished in World War II, went unquestioned for quite some time, ensuring for more than half a century peace in Europe and a relatively predictable situation globally. Over time, however, even the most durable world order is bound to be put to a test.
At the turn of the 1990s, the bipolar system of international relations and the Cold War were replaced by a new world order based on the political and economic predominance of the United States and its closest allies. By historical standards, however, this period proved pretty short-lived since the world is too complicated to unconditionally kowtow to the principles of the Washington Consensus. By the close of the 20th century and the start of the 21st, new centers of power and integration projects began to emerge, initiated by countries in Eurasia and Latin America.
Serious doubts about the reliability of the existing system of international security appeared already in 1999 with NATO’s enlargement to the east to incorporate Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic – the first such process since the end of WW2. In that very same year, the forces of the North Atlantic Alliance, sidestepping the UN Security Council, launched bombing raids against Yugoslavia, thus throwing in question the entire system of post-war treaties. Since then, almost every US-initiated military operation in the world has been conducted illegitimately and classified by the UN Security Council as an act of aggression and condemned by both Russia and China, which insist that any use of force in international relations, be it political, economic or military, should come exclusively as a result of consensus of all members of the Security Council.
The veto right by a permanent member of the Security Council to block any decision, even if it is approved by all other members, remains the backbone of the entire system of international security. Everyone understands this, but not everyone is ready to come to terms with it.
The UN’s presence in the world after the end of the inter-bloc confrontation has significantly increased with its mandate transcending military aspects and now including humanitarian and social issues.
However, the world is facing the growing threat of numerous conflicts flaring up that can’t be resolved without a consensual decision by the key UN member states which, in turn, has proved to be extremely hard to achieve. It’s not just about the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, as even the content of international documents is being disputed now. Who would possibly object to the need to combat the activities of terrorist and extremist organizations? And still, practice shows that the term “terrorism” carries a different meaning for European countries and, for example, those in the Middle East. As a result, UN Security Council resolutions on the settlement of contemporary conflicts in this region are actually ignored. Civil wars in Libya and Syria, as well as the extremely difficult situation in Iraq, caused to a large extent by the interference of the United States and its allies, as well as by the activities of network extremists, have added to the decades-long Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Adding to this is the rising threat posed by drug and cyber terrorism.
With the situation being as it is, the United Nations is facing a growing wave of criticism. The organization has been criticized before – in 1993 the UN mission in Somalia fell though, and in 1994, the UN failed to prevent genocide in Rwanda, stop hostilities in Congo and the civil war in the Balkans, which led to an armed intervention by NATO. The actions by representatives of the UN and organizations it helped create in the Middle East often lack their declared impartiality.
While during the Cold War era decision-making mechanisms in the international arena were based on the decisions by the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of 1945, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and a raft of arms control treaties, after the period of confrontation ended, so did the period of transparent “rules of the game” in world politics. Moreover, many non-state actors have emerged and now wield serious financial and political influence. Nevertheless, the UN remains the only organization that prevents the existing structure of global security from falling apart in the extremely difficult circumstances of this day and age.
There have been growing demands to bring the UN and its Security Council in line with modern-day realities. During the 75 years of the organization’s existence, the number of its member states has increased from 50 to 193, as have the shortcomings of many of its agencies. Many criticize the UN’s peacekeeping operations as haphazard, extremely selective and prone to double standards. The organization has been repeatedly called out for being in a financial crisis. Many developing countries (states of the “global South”) are trying to limit the veto power enjoyed by the permanent members of the Security Council and are demanding more equitable geographical representation in the Council. Developed countries such as Germany, Japan, Brazil and India also seek the status of permanent members of the UN Security Council. They propose to expand the Council to 25 members, with two permanent seats reserved for Asia and Africa and one each for Latin America and Western Europe.
In 2017, US President Donald Trump came up with a plan to reform the UN, proposing, among other things, to optimize the organization’s expenses and get more return for every dollar invested in it. Well, by the efficiency of the UN’s work Trump apparently means decisions that would serve America’s best interests.
Washington’s tactic regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear program is very indicative here. In 2015, Iran and the 5 + 1 group of states (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France, as well as Germany) signed the so-called Iran nuclear deal, according to which Tehran refused to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions. However, in 2018, Washington pulled out of the accord and announced new sanctions against the Islamic Republic. On August 20, 2020, the United States sent a letter to the UN Security Council announcing the launch of the so-called sanctions snapback process whereby any signatory to the 2015 deal could re-impose sanctions against Iran if it found that Tehran was not fulfilling its obligations under the agreement. The idea was simple: it was enough to submit a request to the UN Security Council to launch the snapback mechanism to force the Security Council to raise the issue of continued implementation of the entire Iranian nuclear deal. The Americans would then use their veto power and the document would simply cease to exist. This didn’t happen though as all other permanent members of the Security Council ignored the US request. Therefore, following the necessary 30-day pause, on September 21, the US imposed unilateral sanctions against Tehran. A paradoxical situation ensued: de jure, no sanctions exist for most countries, but de facto, Washington feels free to punish anyone who dares to violate these “nonexistent” restrictions and continues to cooperate with Tehran pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2231.
The majority of the permanent members of the Security Council want to more or less keep in place the UN’s current decision-making mechanisms, which give them obvious privileges while simultaneously allowing them to solve the main task the UN was originally created for, i.e. the prevention of major wars between great powers. Besides, no comprehensive reform of the organization appears likely since there are no criteria all member countries would agree with. Therefore, despite all the critical barbs, the organization will continue in its classical form, at least for now. Meanwhile, the world finds itself in a state of complete uncertainty caught between the remaining fragments of a failed attempt to build a unipolar system and institutions inherited from the second half of the 20th century.
Russia’s position on the UN reform remains fairly balanced. Moscow believes that changes should not affect two key provisions – the approval of the proposed plan by the overwhelming majority of the participating countries, and the preservation of the Security Council’s prerogatives, including the right of veto.
Russia stands for the development of the UN’s peacekeeping potential, which it believes is not fully in line with the tasks currently facing the organization, and for wider cross-border social and humanitarian cooperation necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The way out of the socio-economic crisis caused by this epidemic will be long and extremely difficult, therefore it is imperative to stop dividing countries into “us” and “them,” and start developing all the necessary mechanisms of cooperation. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov outlined these priorities in his speech at the 75th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly on behalf of the CSTO member states.
“The fate of the United Nations is in the hands of its member states. Just like in 1945, we need to cast aside our differences and come together for the sake of delivering on common objectives, based on equitable dialogue and mutual respect for one another’s interests. The UN offers all the necessary conditions to this effect,” Lavrov emphasized.
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