Among many topics, cyberspace issues occupy a special place on the current agenda. This relatively new but rapidly expanding dimension of the world economy and politics, social and cultural life is much spoken and argued about in social networks, at expert meetings and scientific conferences, from the international organizations’ pulpits and at diplomatic negotiations tables. It is no accident, after all. We are talking about an unprecedented, complex phenomenon of social life, caused by the rapid and sometimes unpredictable development of information and communication technologies. In addition to the obvious advantages and new opportunities opportunities for all mankind, these technologies, as it turns out, also create a number of serious, yet not fully realized, challenges to international security.
Today world’s leading states view the challenges and security threats related to cybersecurity as one of the most dangerous and unpredictable. Actually, the main danger is unpredictability. Of course, numerous traditional threats to security — such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. — have not lost their relevance. However, with regard to traditional threats, the international community has at least accumulated considerable experience of counteraction, it has developed relevant legal norm and has the necessary political and diplomatic tools to combat them effectively. And, if this fight is not effective enough, it is primarily due to the lack of necessary political will among the world’s leading players. The desired results are only achieved when such a will exists, as, for example, in the case of Iran’s nuclear program.
The situation is quite different with cyberspace. On the one hand, the main sources of threats are seemingly known: organized hacker groups, individual cyber-criminals, “state” hackers, terrorist organizations, etc. On the other hand, there is much less clarity with the objectives of potential attacks, with the possible tactics and strategy of cyber warfare, and with possible consequences of the latter. Modern civilization is a very complex and very fragile organism, and as it develops, the number of vulnerable points does not decrease, it only increases.
The threats coming from cyberspace are often compared today to the threats posed by the presence of nuclear weapons. It is no coincidence that Washington is seriously considering the possibility of a nuclear strike in response to a cyberattack. At the same time, while certain parallels can be suggested, so there are substantial differences as well. Nuclear weapons have always been and are still possessed by a limited number of “selected” powers, and this number is growing, though very slowly, with the active opposition of the entire international community. Cyber weapon is very “democratic” and can be created and used by any state and even non-state actors. Moreover, due to the specifics of this new type of weapon, such non-state actors as transnational corporations, international organizations, public associations, and network structures may have more powerful resources than states.
In addition, nuclear weapons were created and deployed to deter potential adversaries rather than for immediate use. The fear of a global nuclear war presupposed maximum caution and high responsibility of nuclear powers. The situation is different with cyber weapons, — today few people believe that its use creates an immediate threat to all of humanity. Therefore, the temptation to use this weapon might be too great. One should also take into account the fact that in case of use of nuclear weapons, no one would have any doubts as to who exactly started the nuclear war. While cyber weapons are largely anonymous, a cyberattack can be launched from almost anywhere on the planet, and the real cyber aggressor may remain unidentified, and therefore unpunished.
If no measures are taken, cyberspace will increasingly resemble a huge and ever-growing stream of “turbid water” where everyone, including terrorists, can catch their “fish”, avoiding any responsibility for the actions performed. Its usage is not limited to threats to national security; threats from cyberspace affect both private business and every single individual using modern digital technology. In 2016, the global damage from cybercrime exceeded USD 400 billion and continues to grow rapidly. The cumulative effect of such a complex danger has increased sharply and gained new quality, which requires a collective assessment of the situation by the international community.
Like other areas of international relations, global cyberspace requires proper international legal regulation. In particular, there is a need for drafting a universal set of legally binding norms to clarify the content of the respective obligations of states, the procedures for identifying their violations, and determining the subjects of these violations. It is necessary to agree on procedures for the peaceful resolution of cyberspace-related disputes, including the creation of a network of relevant national and multilateral mechanisms. If necessary, supplements to the existing international treaties should be developed, primarily in terms of preventing international conflicts and resolving disputes. In turn, this will require consolidation of the spatial limits of the sovereignty of states in this environment to ensure accountability and sufficient evidence.
Something in this area is already being done. I will refer to the special report prepared by the UN group of experts in 2015, containing norms of behavior of states on the Internet. Experts from 20 countries, including Russia, the United States, and China had been working on the document. Unfortunately, for two and a half years it has not been possible to advance from expert recommendations to legally binding international convention; moreover, the positions of the main players on some of the key issues of cyberspace management tend to diverge, rather than converge.
Sometimes one can hear an opinion that in the current conditions of tough confrontation between Russia and the United States there is no expectation of the common understanding of cyberspace issues. Though it is possible to put the question in a different way: is it realistic to expect an improvement in relations between Moscow and Washington without agreeing on such an acute and sensitive topic as the rules of the game in cyberspace? In a sense, it is the escalation that has arisen between our countries in connection with the U.S. accusing Russia of “interference in the political process” via the Internet, which creates additional incentives for dialogue; recalling that half a century ago balancing on the brink of war in the course of the Caribbean crisis was necessary to launch the process of cessation of nuclear tests in three environments, the nonproliferation of WMD, and control over strategic weapons. Let us hope that today the awareness of the scale of the threat and the possible global consequences of a large-scale Russia–US confrontation in cyberspace will allow us to move to practical cooperation between Moscow and Washington in this extremely important for all mankind area.
Of course, bilateral Russia–US negotiations, important as they are, do not solve global issues of cyberspace governance. This is the task for the entire international community — big and small countries, private business and civil society institutions. And the special responsibility falls on the permanent members of the UN Security Council, especially on the threesome of the United States, Russia, and China, as the leading States in cyberspace. There is no doubt that joint leadership in such a pressing issue would help to build confidence between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, and the growth of predictability in international affairs at large, that would be in the interest of all other members of the international community. Nor would there be any harm in bilateral agreements, though in the current circumstances, they can be viewed by other players as certain “separate transactions” at someone else’s expense. There is a significant potential in multilateral agreements achieved within the framework of BRICS, SCO, and other organizations of this type.
If the governments throughout the world are not ready to include the issue of cyberspace governance among their priorities, then the initiative should be taken by civil society, experts, and the business community, all those who value peace on our planet and who can make a specific contribution in the common cause. Logically, this topic will be discussed at the regular session of Munich Security Conference in February this year. It is clearly waiting to be on the agenda of other similar forums. There is no time to lose.
First published in our partner RIAC
Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety and Security
Wyn Bowen and Matthew Cottee discuss in their research entitled “Nuclear Security Briefing Book” that nuclear terrorism involves the acquisition and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon from a state arsenal. The world has not experienced any act of nuclear terrorism but terrorists expressed their desires to gain nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has observed many incidents of lost, theft and unauthorized control of nuclear material. The increased use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes has intensified the threat that terrorist can target these places for acquiring nuclear materials. They cannot build a nuclear weapon because production of a nuclear weapon would require a technological infrastructure. Thus, it is the most difficult task that is nearly impossible because the required infrastructure and technological skills are very high which even a strong terrorist group could not bear easily, but they can build a dirty bomb.
A dirty bomb is not like a nuclear bomb. A nuclear bomb spreads radiation over hundreds of square miles while nuclear bomb could cause destruction only over a few square miles. A dirty bomb would not kill any more people than an ordinary bomb but it would create psychological terror. There is no viable security system for the prevention of nuclear terrorism, but the only possible solution is that there should be a stringent nuclear security system which can halt terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials.
The UN Security Council and the IAEA introduced multilateral nuclear security initiatives. Pakistan actively contributed in all international nuclear security efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. For example, United States President Barak Obama introduced the process of Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)in 2009 to mitigate the threat of nuclear terrorism. The objective of NSS was to secure the material throughout the world in four years.
Pakistan welcomed it and not only made commitments in NSS but also fulfilled it. Pakistan also established a Centre of Excellence (COEs) on nuclear security and hosted workshops on nuclear security. In addition to all this, Pakistan is a signatory of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and affirms its strong support to the resolution. It has submitted regular reports to 1540 Committee which explain various measures taken by Pakistan on radiological security and control of sensitive materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) transfer. Pakistan is the first country which submitted a report to the UN establishing the fact that it is fulfilling its responsibilities. Pakistan ratified Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 2016. It is also the member of Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). It can be rightly inferred that Pakistan is not only contributing in all the international nuclear security instruments but has also taken multiple effective measures at the national level.
Pakistan created National Command Authority (NCA) to manage and safeguard nuclear assets and related infrastructures. The Strategic Plan Division (SPD) is playing a very important role in managing Pakistan’s nuclear assets by collaborating with all strategic organizations. Establishment of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA)in 2001 is another development in this regard. The PNRA works under the IAEA advisory group on nuclear security and it is constantly improving and re-evaluating nuclear security architecture. National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS) was established under PNRA in 2014. Pakistan has also adopted the Export Control Act to strengthen its nuclear export control system. It deals with the rules and regulations for nuclear export and licensing. The SPD has also formulated a standard functioning procedure to regulate the conduct of strategic organizations. Christopher Clary discusses in his research “Thinking about Pakistan’s Nuclear Security in Peacetime” that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals are equipped with Permissive Action Links (PALs) for its stringent security. According to Pakistan’s former nuclear scientist Samar Mubarakmand, every Pakistani nuclear arsenal is now fitted with a code-lock device which needs a proper code to enable the arsenal to explode.
Nonetheless the nuclear terrorism is a global concern and reality because terrorist organizations can target civilian nuclear facility in order to steal nuclear material. The best way to eradicate the root of nuclear terrorism is to have a stringent nuclear security system.
Western media and outsiders often propagate that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals can go into the wrong hands i.e. terrorists, but they do not highlight the efforts of Pakistan in nuclear security at the national and international level. The fact is that Pakistan has contributed more in international nuclear security efforts than India and it has stringent nuclear security system in place.
India’s Probable Move toward Space Weaponization
The term Space Weaponization tends to raise alarm as it implies deployment of weapons in the outer space or on heavenly bodies like Sun and Moon or sending weapon from earth to the outer space to destroy satellite capabilities of other states. Thus, space weaponization refers to the actions taken by a state to use outer space as an actual battlefield.
Space militarization on the other hand is a rather less offensive term which stands for utilization of space for intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance missions through satellites to support forces on ground in the battle field. Space militarization is already in practice by many states. In South Asia, India is utilizing its upper hand in space technology for space militarization. However, recent concern in this regard is India’s attempts to weaponize space, which offers a bleak situation for regional peace and stability. Moreover, if India went further with this ambitiousness when Pakistan is also sending its own satellites in space, security situation will only deteriorate due to existing security dilemma between both regional counterparts.
Threats of space weaponization arise from the Indian side owing to its rapid developments in Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMDs) and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). Both of these technologies, BMDs and ICBMs, hand in hand, could be used to destroy space based assets. In theory, after slight changes in algorithms, BMDs are capable of detecting, tracking and homing in on a satellite and ICBM could be used to target the satellites for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
Many international scholars agree on the point that BMD systems have not yet acquired sophistication to give hundred percent results in destroying all the incoming ballistic missile, but they sure have the capability to work as anti-satellite systems. The reason behind the BMD being an effective anti-sat system is that it is easier to locate, track and target the satellites because they are not convoyed with decoys unlike missiles which create confusions for the locating and tracking systems.
India possesses both of the above-mentioned technologies and its Defense Research and Development Organization has shown the intention to build anti-satellite weaponry. In 2012, India’s then head of DRDO categorically said that India needs an arsenal in its system that could track the movement of enemy’s satellite before destroying it, thus what India is aiming at is the credible deterrence capability.
One thing that comes in lime light after analyzing the statement is that India is in fact aiming for weaponizing the space. With the recent launch of its indigenous satellites through its own launch vehicle not only for domestic use but also for commercial use, India is becoming confident enough in its capabilities of space program. This confidence is also making India more ambitious in space program. It is true that treaties regarding outer space only stop states from putting weapons of mass destruction in outer space. But, destruction of satellites will create debris in outer space that could cause destruction for other satellites in the outer space.
On top of it all the reality cannot be ignored that both Pakistan and India cannot turn every other arena into battlefield. Rivalry between both states has already turned glaciers and ocean into war zones, resultantly affecting the natural habitat of the region. By going for ballistic missile defences and intercontinental ballistic missiles India has not only developed missile technology but also has made significant contribution in anti-sat weaponry, which is alarming, as due to security dilemma, Pakistan will now be ever more compelled to develop capabilities for the security of its satellites. So far both states are confined till space militarization to enhance the capabilities of their forces, but if that force multiplier in space goes under threat, Pakistan will resort to capability to counter Indian aggression in space as well, which will be the classic action-reaction paradigm. Thus, it is pertinent that India as front runner in space technology develop policy of restrain to control the new arms race in the region which has potential to change the skies and space as we know them.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy: Impact on Strategic Stability in South Asia
Most significant incident happened when India tested its nuclear device on18 May, 1974.After India’s nuclear test, Pakistan obtained the nuclear technology, expertise and pursued a nuclear program to counter India which has more conventional force than Pakistan. Pakistan obtained nuclear program because of India, it has not done anything independently but followed India. Pakistan just wanted to secure its borders and deter Indian aggression. It was not and is not interested in any arms race in the region. It is not signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT). Pakistan has not signed NPT and CTBT because India has not signed it. Since acquiring the nuclear weapons, it has rejected to declare No First Use (NFU) in case of war to counter India’s conventional supremacy.
The basic purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter any aggression against its territorial integrity. Riffat Hussain while discussing Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine argues that it cannot disobey the policy of NFU due to Indian superiority in conventional force and it makes India enable to fight conventional war with full impunity. Pakistan’s nuclear posture is based on minimum credible nuclear deterrence which means that its nuclear weapons have no other role except to counter the aggression from its adversary. It is evident that Pakistan’s nuclear program is Indiacentric.. Owing to the Indian superiority in conventional forces Pakistan nuclear weapons balance the conventional force power percentage between the two states. In November 1999, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar stated that ‘more is unnecessary while little is enough’.
The National Command Authority (NCA), comprising the Employment Control Committee, Development Control Committee and Strategic Plans Division, is the center point of all decision-making regarding the nuclear issue.According to the security experts first use option involves many serious challenges because it needs robust military intelligence and very effective early warning system. However, Pakistan’s nuclear establishment is concerned about nuclear security of weapons for which it has laid out stringent nuclear security system. Pakistan made a rational decision by conducting five nuclear tests in 1998 to restore the strategic stability in South Asia, otherwise it was not able to counter the threat of India’s superior conventional force.
The NCA of Pakistan (nuclear program policy making body) announced on September 9, 2015 the nation’s resolve to maintain a full spectrum deterrence capability in line with the dictates of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ to deter all forms of aggression, adhering to the policy of avoiding an arms race.”It was the response of Indian offensive Cold Start Doctrine which is about the movement of Indian military forces closer to Pakistan’s border with all vehicles. Pakistan wants to maintain strategic stability in the region and its seeks conflict resolution and peace, but India’s hawkish policies towards Pakistan force it to take more steps to secure its border. Pakistan’s nuclear establishment is very vigorously implementing rational countermeasures to respond to India’s aggression by transforming its nuclear doctrine. It has developed tactical nuclear weapons (short range nuclear missiles) that can be used in the battle field.
Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said in 2013 that Pakistan would continue to obey the policy of minimum credible nuclear deterrence to avoid the arms race in the region. However, it would not remain unaware of the changing security situation in the region and would maintain the capability of full spectrum nuclear deterrence to counter any aggression in the region. Dr. Zafar Jaspal argues in his research that Full credible deterrence does not imply it is a quantitative change in Pakistan’s minimum credible nuclear deterrence, but it is a qualitative response to emerging challenges posed in the region. This proves that Islamabad is not interested in the arms race in the region, but India’s constant military buildup forces Pakistan to convert its nuclear doctrine from minimum to full credible nuclear deterrence.
India’s offensive policies alarm the strategic stability of the region and international community considers that Pakistan’s transformation in nuclear policies would be risky for international security. They have recommended a few suggestions to Pakistan’s nuclear policy making body, but the NCA rejected those mainly because Pakistan is confronting dangerous threats from India and its offensive policies such as the cold start doctrine. Hence no suggestion conflicting with this purpose is acceptable to Pakistan. This is to be made clear at the all national, regional and international platforms that Pakistan is striving hard to maintain the strategic stability while India is only contributing toward instigating the regional arms race.
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