Authors: WEO Energy Analysts Elie Bellevrat and Kira West
Industrial heat makes up two-thirds of industrial energy demand and almost one-fifth of global energy consumption. It also constitutes most of the direct industrial CO2 emitted each year, as the vast majority of industrial heat originates from fossil-fuel combustion. Yet despite these impressive figures, industrial heat is often missing from energy analyses. That is why this year’s World Energy Outlook takes a deep dive in this important segment of our energy system.
While industrial heat demand – at all temperature levels – grows in the central scenario of the World Energy Outlook 2017, the underlying drivers are different depending on temperature requirements. Low- and medium-temperature heat (below 400 degrees Celsius) accounts for three-quarters of the total growth in heat demand in industry by 2040, driven by less energy-intensive industries.
This is a reversal of historical trends: in the last 25 years, high-temperature heat represented two-thirds of overall heat demand growth, driven by China’s rapid development of heavy industries such as steel and cement. That said, developing Asia continues to drive industrial heat demand growth in our outlook: the growth in low- to medium-temperature needs in this region alone represents about half of the global industrial heat demand increase in use to 2040.
Low-temperature heat use grows in most regions through 2040, except in the European Union and Japan. The outlook for high-temperature heat varies even more across regions, including among developing countries. It decreases in China with the country’s shift to a less energy-intensive development pathway, while it increases in India as the country becomes, by large distance, the main global driver.
As industrial heat demand continues to grow so does its share in energy-related CO2 emissions, accounting for a quarter of global emissions by 2040. Any efforts taken to reduce this global trend face unique challenges. First, industrial heat is often generated on-site, making it more difficult to regulate than a more centralized sector such as large thermal power generation. There is also limited policy focus in this area compared with other sectors.
Second, while heating needs for residential and commercial buildings are fairly standard, industrial heat encompasses a wide variety of temperature levels for diverse processes and end-uses. For instance, cement kilns require high-temperature, while drying or washing applications in the food industry operate at lower temperatures.
Different technology and fuel options are available depending on the required temperature level, but these are often not interchangeable. For example, low-temperature heat from a heat pump cannot be substituted for high-temperature heat from a gas boiler.
Today’s industrial heat demand relies mainly on fossil fuels, biomass and electricity, and only very small shares of renewable resources in certain sectors. Therefore decarbonisation would require a dramatic shift in how industrial heat is generated. Yet this goal is instrumental to following a low-carbon development pathway as defined in the Sustainable Development Scenario, a new global scenario providing an integrated way to achieve three critical policy goals simultaneously: climate stabilisation, cleaner air and universal access to modern energy. The best option for reducing energy use of industrial heat will depend on the specific use and required temperature.
Fuel switching can provide some benefit, for instance substituting gas for coal, but for more ambitious climate targets more transformative solutions are needed. For example, under certain conditions, electrification can be a low-cost and sustainable option – heat pumps can be economical solutions for low- and medium-temperature needs. Electrification may also be possible for specific high-temperature industrial processes, such as electricity-based steel production. However the sustainability of electrification depends on broad decarbonisation of the power sector to actually reduce emissions at the system level.
Direct renewable heat sources such as solar and geothermal can also be economical for applications below 400 degrees Celsius, but they are not easy to integrate in all industrial facilities. Bioenergy can be used for high-temperature heat demand, but is resource-constrained and only economical and sustainable under certain operating conditions and in certain regions.
Industrial heat can be decarbonised through the deployment of carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS). This can include, for instance, technologies to remove CO2 emissions from flue gas before recycling the CO2 in industrial processes, such as for methanol production, or storing it permanently.
Finally, end-use efficiency, through the use of modern equipment, improved insulation or heat recovery, can reduce final demand before the heat is even generated – often, limiting overall heat requirements is the first strategy adopted, before taking actions to decarbonise remaining heat use.
Ultimately, widespread deployment of energy efficiency and a least cost mix of these options can point to a more sustainable future for industrial heat. Putting the appropriate regulatory framework in place will be key to ensuring that investments are targeted in a way that makes this future possible.
First published in International Energy Agency
Armenia’s attack against Tovuz is also an attack against Europe’s energy security
The recent escalation of tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this time along the international border in the direction of the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan in the aftermath of an armed attack launched by Armenia on July12–14, 2020,had been brewing for some time before finally boiling over into full-fledged military clashes, the worst in recent years, that caused causalities and destruction on both sides. Azerbaijan lost more than 10 servicemen, including one general and a 76-year-old civilian. There are many reasons why this attack happened in this particular border area (and not along the Line of Contact, as usual) and at this particular time, but in this piece I want specifically to focus on one of them and, in concurrence with other internationally recognized scholars in this field, assert that this attack against Azerbaijan should be considered as an attack against Europe’s energy security and well-being.
To begin, a brief review of the history of recent developments in conflict resolution testifies that, although the year 2019 was relatively incident free along the Line of Contact between the Armed Forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and for the first time in many years mutual visits of journalists took pace, the year was also identified as the “lost year for the conflict settlement” owing to the lack of progress in the negotiations. This absence of progress was accompanied by incendiary rhetoric employed by Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan who, having ascended to power on the back of the many alluring promises of the so-called “Velvet Revolution,” found himself grappling to deliver on those ambitious reform pledges. The harbingers of heightening hostility were seen in Pashinyan’s infamous declaration during the pan-Armenian games held in Khankendi on August 5,2019, when he said that “Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia, and that is all;” as well as his continuous insistence on changing the negotiation format –already established by the relevant decisions of the OSCE –to include representatives of the puppet regime in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region as an independent party to the peace negotiations.
The year 2020 started off with the January meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva, and in April and June two virtual meetings were held because of COVID-19 lockdowns; however, hopes for any positive progress quickly subsided in the wake of other negative developments. The so-called “parliamentary and presidential elections” that were held by Armenia in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan on March31, 2020, were condemned by the international community. These mock elections later culminated in the Shusha provocation,in which the “newly elected president” of the puppet regime in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan was “inaugurated” in Shusha – a city that carries great moral significance for Azerbaijan. The last straw in a hostile build-up was the denial by Pashinyan of Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s comments about a staged, step-by-step solution to the conflict; Pashinyan denied that this was ever the subject of negotiations. The very recent threats by the Armenian Ministry of Defense, which publicly threatened “to occupy new advantageous positions” in Azerbaijan, further testified to the increasingly militaristic mood among Armenia’s upper echelons.
This litany of discouraging events relating to the peace process over the last year and a half in some ways heralded what we witnessed on July12–14, 2020.This attack against Azerbaijan along the international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan reflects the deep frustration of the Pashinyan regime in its inability to bring about the promised changes. Economic problems were heightened by the COVID-19-induced challenge and decreasing foreign assistance, and this was all happening against the backdrop of Azerbaijan’s increasing successes domestically, economically and internationally. Azerbaijan has long been established as an important provider of energy security and sustainable development for Europe through the energy projects that it is implementing together with its international partners. The Baku–Tbilisi–Supsa Western Export (1998) and Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (2005) oil pipelines and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (2006) gas pipeline have enhanced Azerbaijan’s role as an energy producing and exporting country, and the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) is already becoming a reality. This 3500-km-long Corridor comprises four segments – the Shah Deniz-II project, Southern Caucasus Pipeline Extension (SCPX), Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and its final portion, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The Corridor passes through seven countries – Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Italy – with Italy being the final destination receiving Caspian gas. Turkey is already receiving gas via TANAP and is contracted to accept up to 6 billion cubic meters of gas via this pipeline. Europe is expected to receive 10 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas per year, and the first gas has already arrived on Albanian territory. The SGC is scheduled to be fully operational by fall 2020 and TAP is almost complete. Things are progressing uninhibitedly and even the COVID-19 pandemic has been unable topreventthe success of the SGC. This Corridor stands as one of the guarantors of Europe’s energy security by providing diversification of energy sources and routes, even despite Europe’s Green Deal, which also acknowledges the continent’s long-term demand for gas.
Such critical infrastructure, vital for Europe’s energy security, passes close to the border area that includes the Tovuz district attacked by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia on July12–14. Armenia is the only country in the South Caucasus that is isolated from these regional energy projects owing to its policy of expansion and occupation. It is thus the only country that does not have anything to losefrom creating chaos and destruction around this critical energy infrastructure. Jealousy and the feeling of self-imposed isolation from all regional cooperation initiatives have no doubt increased Armenia’s hostility toward these energy projects. Further vivid evidence of Armenia’s belligerence against Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure was provided by its threat to attack the Mingachevir Dam, a civilian infrastructure project that is also a vital component of Azerbaijan’s largest hydroelectric power plant. Hydroelectric power comprises the largest component in Azerbaijan’s renewable energy potential, today standing at around 17–18%ofthe overall energy balance of the country. It is not difficult to imagine the magnitude of civilian causalities in case such a destruction materializes.
By conducting this act of aggression against Azerbaijan along the international border in the direction of Tovuz, Armenia wanted firstly, to divert attention from its own internal problems. Secondly, the regime desired to disguise its failures on the international front, especially recently when Azerbaijan initiated the summoning of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly related to COVID-19,convened on July 10, that was supported by more than 130 members of the UN. Thirdly, Armenia wanted to drag in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) against Azerbaijan by invoking Article 4, which states: “… if one of the States Parties is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, then this will be considered as aggression against all States Parties to this Treaty…”.Fourthly, and the central thesis of this article, Armenia intended to target critical energy infrastructure implemented by Azerbaijan and its international partners, thereby jeopardizing the energy security of not only the neighboring region, but also of the greater European continent. The aforementioned existing oil and gas infrastructure aside, the SGC is set to be fully operational by fall 2020, and this multibillion-dollar megaproject offers economic, social and many other benefits to all participating countries involved in the construction and implementation of this project. Any damage to this critical infrastructure would deal a heavy blow to the current and future sustainable development of Europe.
Europe must therefore be vigilant regarding such provocations. International actors, including the European Union,OSCE Minsk Group, United Nations, United States, and the Russian Federation, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, given what is at stake,including this time the crucial energy infrastructure, had Armenia’sattack not been proportionately parried by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, the statement made by the European Union about this recent military attack could have contained stronger language beyond just “…urging both sides to stop the armed confrontation, refrain from action and rhetoric that provoke tension, and undertake immediate measures to prevent further escalation… .” Naming and shaming the aggressor appropriately is indispensable in this situation. As Mr. Hikmat Hajiyev, Head of Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration and Adviser to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Foreign Affairs, also noted: “the EU should distinguish between the aggressor and the subject of aggression.”
In the 21st century, the international community should not tolerate such flagrant violations of international law; disrespect of UN Security Council resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884) and other relevant international documents calling for an end to the occupation of Azerbaijani territories; and the feeling of impunity in instigating an attack against a sovereign state, a neighbor, and a crucial player in the realization of critical energy infrastructure projects key to Europe’s own energy security. Azerbaijan has long put up with such aggression and the occupation of its internationally recognized territories in Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent districts, and has opted for negotiations toward a peaceful solution of the conflict. Yet the aggressor cannot be allowed to continue its attacks against other parts of Azerbaijan– this time Tovuz –thereby jeopardizing not only the latter, but also energy security and sustainable development of the greater European continent just because such provocations seem to offer an escape from the regime’s domestic and external problems. Such practices should be condemned in the strongest possible terms. This should be done not only for the sake of Azerbaijan and regional security in the South Caucasus, but in the name of Europe’s own energy security and well-being.
Palestine Plays Regional Power Politics with Proposed Energy Deal
When Faed Mustafa, Palestine’s ambassador in Ankara, expressed interest in June in negotiating with Turkey an agreement on the delineation of maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean and cooperating on the exploitation of natural resources, he was repositioning Palestine in the larger struggle for regional dominance and the future of his state.
“We also have rights in the Mediterranean. Palestine has shares in oil and gas located in the eastern Mediterranean. We are ready to cooperate in these areas and sign a deal,” Mr. Mustafa said.
Mr. Mustafa did not spell it out, but Palestine would bring the Gaza Marine gas deposit, 36 kilometers off the Gazan coast, to the table. Discovered in 1999, the field, believed to have reserves of 31 billion cubic meters, remains unexplored as a result of multiple armed Israeli-Palestinian clashes, Israeli obstruction, and repeated changes in the consortium that would have ultimately exploited the field.
Palestine’s efforts to hook up with Turkey, at a time when relations with Israel have all but broken down, coincide with stepped up Israeli attempts to stymie Turkish inroads in Palestine paved by support for activists in Jerusalem and funding of historic and cultural facilities, in the wake of US President Donald J. Trump’s 2018 recognition of the city as Israel’s capital.
The Palestinian move also is a ploy to counter several steps taken by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to confront Turkey in Jerusalem and the eastern Mediterranean, facilitate a US plan to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that endorses annexation, and influence the succession of ailing 84-year old Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed last week in a speech celebrating the change of status of Istanbul’s Hagia Sofia – originally built as a Greek Orthodox church in 537 AD, then renovated into a mosque before becoming a museum by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in 1935 – to a mosque once again this month, that it would be “the harbinger of the liberation of the Al-Aqsa mosque.”
Al-Aqsa on the Harm-e-Sharif or Temple Mount in Jerusalem is Islam’s third holiest shrine. Backed by Israel, Saudi Arabia has sought to muscle its way into the Jordanian-controlled endowment that administers the Harm-e-Sharif.
A Palestine hook-up with Turkey could complicate Palestinian membership of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, dubbed the OPEC of Mediterranean gas, that also includes Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Jordan. France has applied for membership in the Cairo-based grouping while the United States is seeking observer status.
Founded in January and backed by the UAE, the Forum is virulently opposed to Turkish attempts to redraw the maritime boundaries in the region on the back of an agreement with Libya. Turkey refused to join the Forum.
While it is unlikely that the Gaza field will be operational any time soon, production would reduce Palestinian dependence on Israel. Palestinian officials said early this year that they were discussing with Israel an extension of Israeli pipelines to send gas from Israeli gas fields to Palestine but that the talks, contrary to Israeli assertions, did not include development of the Gaza field.
In a twist of irony, Qatar, the UAE’s nemesis, would support a pipeline agreement by guaranteeing Palestinian payments for the gas. The Israeli pipeline along a 40-kilometer route adjacent to the Gaza border with three pumping stations would enable Gaza to operate a 400 MW power plant in a region that has, at the best of times, an energy supply of 15 hours a day.
The status of the talks remains unclear given an apparent delay of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation plans amid international condemnation and US insistence that the Israeli leader postpone his move that had been scheduled for July 1.
Qatar reportedly threatened to cut off millions of dollars in aid to Gaza, provided in coordination with the Israeli government, if the Jewish state pressed ahead with annexation.
In June, Israel approved the transfer of US$50 million from Qatar to Gaza in a bid to dial back mounting tension with militants in the Strip that could spark renewed military confrontation as both Israel and Palestine struggle to get a grip on the coronavirus.
Some Palestinian analysts see the pipeline deal as an attempt by the Palestine Authority (PA) to enhance its influence in Gaza and undermine Hamas – its Islamist rival that controls the Strip – by a significant contribution to a surge in the power supply and a dramatic reduction of the cost of electricity. The risk, these analysts say, is that the pipeline would increase Palestinian dependence on Israel.
Economist Nasr Abdel Karim argued that Israel would only allow enhanced flows of gas, including from the Gaza field, if it leads to an even deeper split between the territory and the West Bank.
“Israel will not allow the Palestinians to benefit from the gas field for economic and political reasons. Israel might allow this in one case — if this plan is part of a bigger project to develop Gaza’s economy so that it splits from the PA and the West Bank,” Mr. Abdel Karim said.
Author’s note: An initial version of this story was first published in Inside Arabia
Dangerous attack on Europe’s energy security
Analysis of the causes of the recent military confrontation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border reveals an interesting panorama. No such sharp military confrontation or casualties were reported along the border of these two South Caucasus countries during the 30-year-long Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Until July 12 this year, the main place of military confrontation between the two countries was Nagorno-Karabakh and 7 adjacent regions, which are recognized by international law as the territory of Azerbaijan and occupied by the Armenian Armed Forces. The last such sharp military confrontation between two countries took place in April 2016 and is engraved in history as a four-day April war.Since then, there has been no such confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan with using of heavy artillery and air force.
This time the clash took place in the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan, 300 kilometers from Nagorno-Karabakh.According to the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry, starting from noon on July 12, Armenian Armed Forces violated the ceasefire in the Tovuz region of the Azerbaijani-Armenian border and fired on civilian and military positions using artillery. As a result, 12 Azerbaijani servicemen and 1 civilian were killed. The attack was prevented only after retaliatory strikes, but the ceasefire along the border has not yet been fully restored. The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (USA, Russia, France) which mediate in the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the European Union, as well as the international community call for a ceasefire. However, the possibility of resuming the ceasefire soon is not yet on the horizon.
In this case, one of the main points that raises the question is why the fighting took place not in the direction of Nagorno-Karabakh, but on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The point is that the region where is situated the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan, attacked by the Armenian Armed Forces, ihas a strategic importance. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which carries crude oil to Europe, the South Caucasus Pipeline, which is the beginning point of the Southern Gas Corridor, including the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to Italy, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which laid the foundation for the revitalization of the Silk Road pass from Tovuz region also. The military provocations in Tovuz not only destabilize the region, but also hinder the operation of these important projects, which provide access to alternative energy sources for Europe.
Elshad Nasirov, Vice President for Investments and Marketing of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), also voices interesting views on this issue: “In my opinion, it is not accidental that Armenia launched a military operation against Azerbaijan three months before the start of Azerbaijani gas supplies to Europe. Military operations are realised on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, not in Nagorno-Karabakh, which is recognized by all international organizations and countries as the territory of Azerbaijan. All the infrastructure that brings Azerbaijan’s energy resources to Western countries and the world market is located in this region. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Southern Gas Corridor, Baku-Supsa pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, Baku-Tbilisi highway pass through the direct view and proximity of the place where the Armenian military operations began. I invite our colleagues from Washington, Europe and elsewhere to think about how sensitive the Ganja Corridor and the Trans-Caspian region are and how to ensure the military and physical security of Europe’s energy security corridor”.
At present, European countries are among the main consumers of Azerbaijani oil. Italy is Azerbaijan’s main trading partner in the sale of this oil on world markets. In the autumn of this year, Europe will also start consuming Azerbaijani gas. For this purpose, a 3,500-kilometer-long Southern Gas Corridor pipeline is being built and is nearing completion. Its last ring, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline to the Italian shores of the Adriatic Sea, is 97 percent completed. TAP is the European section of the Southern Gas Corridor, enhancing Europe’s energy security and contributing to decarbonisation and the diversification of gas supplies.
In October 2020, the pipeline will start transporting Azerbaijani gas to Europe. Thus, Europe will start importing natural gas from a completely new source. The attack on Azerbaijan’s Tovuz region shortly before this important event is also considered an attack on Europe’s energy security. Azerbaijan believes that one of the main goals of Armenia’s latest provocations is to destabilize the region and hinder the operating of these important projects, which will allow Europe to access alternative energy sources and new markets.
There is another dangerous reason for Armenia’s bombing of the border areas densely populated by the Azerbaijani population. The another aim of the provocation and tension in the direction of Tovuz region of the state border between the two countries is to involve third parties to the conflict.We are talking about Russia and member countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Azerbaijan’s Ambassador to Russia Polad Bulbuloglu says in this regard: “There is no doubt, this was done to involve the CSTO member countries and, first of all, Russia into the conflict. Because it’s clear that Azerbaijan has bilateral partnership relations, including economic ones with all members of the CSTO. The local task is to raise the CSTO, primarily Russia, the global task is to create another hotbed of tension along the perimeter of Russia, which would create certain concerns”.
Assistant to Azerbaijan’s President, Head of Foreign Policy Affairs Department of the Presidential Administration Hikmat Hajiyev agrees üith this opinion. He says Armenia seeks to involve military-political organizations, member of which it is, into the Karabakh conflict, through military provocations, and avoid responsibility for occupation and aggression against Azerbaijan.
However, Armenia’s efforts in this direction did not yield results.Even though Head Secretary of the organization initially said it would hold an emergency meeting on the issue, but later postponed it indefinitely period.However, Armenia still does not give up its attempts to involve Russia and the organization in the conflict. In this case, Turkey the member of NATO openly supports Azerbaijan. In this context Armenia is trying to confront NATO and Russia in the Caucasus by exaggerating the Turkish factor. But this time, Russia is cautious.
Nevertheless, it is important to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as soon as possible within the framework of international law in order to prevent the dangerous development of events. It should be reminded that, four resolutions of the UN Security Council demanding unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian troops from the occupied territories.Armenia in 1990 years aggressively occupied the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the adjacent seven districts of Azerbaijan. The conflict between the two South Caucasus countries began in 1988 when Armenia made territorial claims against Azerbaijan and as a result of the ensuing war, Armenian armed forces occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijan. Over a million Azerbaijanis living in these territories were subjected to ethnic cleansing and were expelled from their homes.The 1994 ceasefire agreement was followed by peace negotiations. But Aprel war in 2016 and border clash in July of this year shows the conflict may ignite in any time on military ground.
China’s new strategic positioning
While China is “narrowing” its production lines at national or international levels, a very important signal is the new relationship...
Five things you should know about disposable masks and plastic pollution
The fight against plastic pollution is being hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, as the use of disposable masks, gloves and...
The long-term threat of Armenian nationalism
According to the paradigm of realpolitik, states have no permanent friends or enemies- only interests can be permanent. This thought...
ADB Finances Largest Private Gas Power Plant to Improve Access to Energy in Bangladesh
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has signed a $200 million financing package with Reliance Bangladesh LNG and Power Limited (RBLPL)...
South Africa: COVID-19 pandemic raises the urgency of structural reforms
South Africa responded swiftly to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the sharp drop in activity adds to long-standing challenges and raises...
Commission concludes talks to secure future coronavirus vaccine for Europeans
The European Commission has concluded exploratory talks with a pharmaceutical company to purchase a potential vaccine against COVID-19. The envisaged...
WTO Fundamental to Economic Recovery and Sustainable and Inclusive Growth
Asia-Pacific business leaders from the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), meeting virtually this week, called on the region’s Trade Ministers...
Intelligence3 days ago
Understanding the Balochistan Liberation Army: An Analysis of Emerging Trends
Americas2 days ago
India and Brazil Are Now the Global Worst Coronavirus Nations
Eastern Europe2 days ago
The Treasure Map to the Forgotten Epoch of the Iravan Khanate
Middle East3 days ago
Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum: Crucial Decisions in Difficult Times
Southeast Asia2 days ago
ASEAN in the Emerging Indo-Pacific
Green Planet3 days ago
Tiger Conservation in South and Southeast Asia and The Indian Experience
Americas2 days ago
US hegemony in crisis, rise of China & Middle Power Coalition
Intelligence3 days ago
Cyber ASAT-Capabilities and South Asia