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Scotland – 45 years in the European Union

Alina Toporas

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The possibility of Scotland leaving the UK is looming large the closer we get to March 2019. This comes despite all the immediate defense and prospective EU membership concerns the country is facing. All warnings aside, Scottish PM Nicola Sturgeon seems to believe that ‘no Brexit is preferable to no-deal’ amongst news of a NO DEAL Brexit Minister to take form. In the same vein, a recent poll showed that almost half of Scots said they would leave the Union (with the UK) if a second referendum were to be granted by Westminster. However, even if Theresa May gets compassion for Holyrood, this vote cannot take place before the UK officially exists the EU, which makes for a long wait for those 49% anti-unionists. A word of caution, almost half is not even half which means that predictions cannot possibly make for an accurate portrayal of the feeling/temperature in Scottish rooms, not to mention a conjuring of a post-Brexit scenario.

Nevertheless, the reality remains that we have now officially entered the last full year of the UK – and hence, Scotland – enjoying membership in the EU. Therefore, I found it appropriate to sketch a brief picture of the Scottish-European relations throughout time.

The year of 1295 brought with it the signing of the Auld Alliance, a treaty between Scotland and France through which France became Scotland’s closest ally, both being united by the hatred they carried for the English. From the 1295 until the 1707 Union with England, Scotland enjoyed close relations with a number of European nations, namely Scandinavia, the Low Countries, Ireland, Italy and Poland, having a notable mercantile presence in Copenhagen, Bergen and Danzig.

Fast forward to the 1970s when Europhile UK PM Edward Heath decides to apply for European Economic Community (EEC) membership. While a majority of Scottish MPs did vote against entry in the House of Commons vote, seven Scottish Tory politicians published an analysis named Scotland and Europe: seven viewpoints, supporting entrance into the EEC. After the accession treaty was signed in 1972, four Scots were sent to Brussels to represent the UK, amongst which the noteworthy mentions would be Scottish MP George Thomson, who was one of the founders of the European Regional Development Fund and Lord Mackenzie Stuart who was appointed to the European Court of Justice.

In terms of EEC funding, Scotland has received more than twice the national average per head of population in the form of grants and loans throughout the 70s. The money was routed via the Coal and Steel Community, the European Social Fund, the European Investment Bank and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The funds also helped with the inexorable population decline the Highlands region was suffering from which could not have been easily bypassed. This downward spiral was stopped in its tracks three decades later when the EU transitional support funds came through and helped boost local business and SMEs. Everything from infrastructure, financial services and biotech up to culture, lifestyle and tourism benefited from the transfer of knowledge both ways, namely from local to international markets and vice versa.

In June 1978, on the occasion of the first direct elections to the European Parliament Winnie Ewing from the SNP – who later began contributing to the development of the Erasmus programme-  became the first of Scotland’s ‘appointed’ Members of the European Parliament to win a democratic mandate. With her election, 21 million pounds were given through the ERDF to Scotland. The money was used in the construction of harbours, roads, water infrastructure and sewerage in both the Islands and the Highlands. In 1983, Scotland received another 4.5 million pounds to modernise its fishing fleet and create fish farms. What is more, Scotland benefited from many other types of European grants so that by 1984, Scotland was receiving more than twice the EEC’s average rate of financial assistance. Apart from the fishing industry, EEC funding went into training Scottish workers, into the gastronomy industry of Glasgow (through a 2 million-poundloan for a pie and sausage factory), into modernising airports around Scotland and into art festivals (e.g. Pitlochry Festival Theatre). Research has showed that for every 40 pence Scotland put into European aid, they got 1 pound back.To put it into perspective, in 1983, Scotland has contributed 325 million pounds to the EEC and has received funds worth 410 million pounds.

Secessionist thoughts were wondering through Scottish minds even in the 80s when MSP Jim Sillars published a pamphlet called Moving on and moving up in Europe. This movement only gained traction when in 1988 the SNP’s annual conference was carried under the motto ‘Independence in Europe’ which became SNP’s official policy as well.

A year later, in the 1989 EP elections, Scottish politician David Steel became the first British politician to campaign and deliver a party political broadcast in another European country, in this case, Italy. While he did not become MEP, he did make history through his vicious attacks at Thatcher, calling her a ‘woman out of step with others’.

Starting with the entrance in the new decade, the entrance of the European Union into Scotland became gained just as much significance. Between the 1990 and 1992, Ian Lang – the Secretary of State for Scotland –made his political life’s missions to emphasize the role of Scotland into the ‘Europe of the regions’. He underscored the part Scotland Europa plays in promoting Scotland’s business across EU bodies and focused attention on the European Central Support Unit’s Scottish office. In December 1992, the European Summit took place in Edinburgh, also named the ‘Athens of the North’. The Summit was hugely successful and truly memorable having played the part of putting the Community back together and put us all back on the track for recovery’ according to PM Sir John Major. Apart from the Scottish Chamber Orchestra playing ‘Ode to the Joy’, a 25.000-strong march through Edinburgh also took place during EU’s leaders’ meeting at Holyrood Palace. Alex Salmond, SNP leader at the time and future Scottish PM, had seen the manifestations as ‘a chance to tell the world that the solution to the Scottish question is independence in Europe’.

Later on, Scotland directly benefited from the creation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) which included five Scottish members directly nominated by Scotland’s main political parties. Not long after, on June 1999, three Labour MEPs and two Conservative MEPs were elected. Back in Scotland, a European Parliament office was established in Edinburgh as one of the six regional offices of the EU. Its first head, Dermot Scott, believed that ‘the more closely the two parliaments work together, the better Scottish interests will be represented in Europe’. Edinburgh, alongside Glasgow, also became part of the Eurocities network and could ‘twin’ themselves with cities across the EU.

With the creation of the single market, 61% of Scottish exports went into the EU, while Scotland was an exporter on branded personal computers (35%), banking machines (65%), workstations (80%) and electronic notebooks (51%). These Scottish exports increased to the point whereScottish Development International created an office in Dusseldorf. The European Elected Members Information and Liaison Exchange (EMILE) forum was later established by future Minister Jack McConnell where Scotland’s 8 MEPs, members of the CoR and the European Committee met twice a year. A Scottish European Green Energy Centre (SEGEC) aimed at exploiting Scotland’s potential on the European energy market was also established.

Regardless of the 2008 financial crash which affected the EU budget just as much as the United States, various projects from Scotland continued to be beneficiaries of the 2007-2013 structural funds. These funds have in the past supported the construction of the Fife’s Ferrytoll park and ride scheme and the Falkirk Wheel. Apart from the Structural Fund programme, many Scottish students continued to benefit from Erasmus placements (e.g. 1243 Scots in 2010-2011), while Scottish universities have managed to attract a great deal of investment used for the purposes of research.

In conclusion (and potentially in contrast to the tone of the article), it is important to note, as mirrored in the beginning of this article, that ‘the EU is founded on the treaties which apply only to Member States who have agreed and ratified them. If part of the territory of a Member State woukd cease to become part of that state because it were to become a new independent state, the treaties would no longer apply to that territory’. In other words, this newly independent state would become a third country in relation to the EU. This segment of EU law is particularly noteworthy as talks of further devolution to the point of independence keep the headlines in Scotland. Nevertheless, no matter the outcome, Scotland has very much laid its path towards a central role in the EU.

The numbers are taken from the Scotsman, the Aberdeen Press and Journal and the booklet Scotland: 40 years in the European Union.

Alina Toporas is a recent Master of Science graduate in Global Crime, Justice and Security at the University of Edinburgh Law School. She has previously worked for the European Commission Representation in Scotland, the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA), the Romanian Embassy in Croatia and Hagar International (the Vietnamese branch). She is currently serving as a Communications Assistant of the British Embassy in Romania. Her research interests are mainly targeted at the EU-UK cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) post-Brexit. Alina is also the author of various pieces on transnational crimes (namely, human trafficking and illicit trade) with a geographical focus on South-East Asia.

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The Aegean Dilemma: Turkish-Greek Complexity Challenging European Solidarity

Alexandros-Ioannis Papamatthaiou

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On the 12th of February2018, a Turkish coast guard patrol rammed into a Greek patrol boat near the Imia islands (Kardak in Turkish). The pair of uninhabited islands has been a source of dispute between Greece and Turkey since a military crisis in 1996, which almost resulted in war. The collision has been the climax of a number of Turkish violations on Greek territorial waters and airspace, which have damaged Greek-Turkish relations and escalated the tensions between the two countries. In this article I argue that Turkey’s geopolitical advantages over the US and the EU embolden it to pursue an ambitious foreign policy in the Aegean Sea, while its toxic domestic politics necessitates that it must do so. This combination creates a ticking time bomb for crisis in the Aegean Sea.It is time for the EU to act.

Turkey’s control of refugee flows has EU hands tied

The Syrian crisis has increased Turkish power over European nations that receive the greatest part of refugee flows. Currently, over 2.5 million Syrian refugees reside in Turkey. Turkish officials have threatened to force an influx of Syrian refugees into Europe, a situation that would destabilize already complex tensions within European states and further the far-right political crisis of Europe. The potentiality of this development provides Turkey with a favorable bargaining position over many Western European governments, which are interested in actively averting extremist actions against immigrant populations in order to prevent sectarian divide.

In addition, the waning desire of the Turkish administration to join the EU has removed any leverage the EU had over Turkey. In the past, Turkey has been willing to engage in bilateral talks with Greece over territorial disputes, mainly in an effort to withdraw Greece’s veto over its potential membership in the EU. However, Brexit and the emergence of anti-European movements in founding members like France and Italy, has caused Turkish officials to have second thoughts about the prospect of joining a union on the verge of collapse, according to reports. This development has reduced the bargaining advantage Greece previously enjoyed.

The US is unlikely to react in the event of a crisis

Since the time of the Cold War, American policymakers have viewed Turkey as a key ally against the Soviet Union and now Russia. The proximity of Turkey to Southern Russian cities favors the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons, while, most significantly, the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits create a double chokepoint that checks Russian maritime activity from the warm ports of the Black Sea. This means that in the case of conflict, if Turkey cooperates, Russia’s supply lines from the south could be shut down.

The location of Turkey, north of the Levant, gives Turkish leaders influence in Middle East matters as well and the ability to affect the political situation in both Syria and Iraq. The proximity of Turkey to the Syrian conflict allows it to intervene militarily as it did through Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in January. Turkey also holds a large portion of the Tigris and Euphrates river basins, which hydrate the majority of agricultural land in Syria and Iraq. In the past, Turkey has used its control over these river flows as a bargaining tool to curb Kurdish militant activity along its borders with the two countries.These geopolitical facts give Turkey a unique advantage in influencing politics in the Middle East, both directly through military operations and indirectly through river flows.

Turkey’s capacity to contain the Russian navy in a time of a crisis, its ability to directly get involved in the Syrian war, and its influence on the prosperity of Iraq, gives influence over key American strategic objectives: namely, keeping Russia under control, maintaining peace in the Middle East, and ensuring the stability of oil outflows. Despite the status of both Greece and Turkey as members of NATO, the US is unlikely to risk bringing Turkey and Russia closer diplomatically and tempting Turkey to intervene more often in the Middle East.

How are Turkish domestic politics exacerbating the conflict?

Turkey’s militarism is informed by the institutional friction between Turkish politicians and the Turkish army. Since the death of Ataturk, the Turkish army has assigned itself the role of the protector of Ataturk’s ideals. Frequent army intervention in Turkish politics through coups has made politicians apprehensive of the army and ready to externalize the army’s domestic pressure into international operations. After the coup attempt of 2016, President Erdogan has become increasingly determined to preoccupy the army with military operations and maintain stability domestically, as he concentrates power through institutional change and purges political and intellectual dissidents. Turkey’s leaders have also been empowered by public support. The Turkish public has a deep historical understanding of the Turkish identity, the memory of the Greek invasion of 1919, and the unfairness of the Treaty of Lausanne. President Erdogan’s popularity after the failed coup attempt of 2016 has enabled him to empower these conservative opinions and silence opposing Euro-friendly voices in Turkey.

Greek leadership has also done its part to worsen the tensions. The Greek Minister of Defense, Panos Kammenos, leader of the nationalist minority party in Greece’s coalition government, has been vocal on Greece’s expansion of territorial waters, mainly as a feat to maintain his party’s share of the vote. Historical tensions between the two countries, as well as President Erdogan’s public and institutional empowerment and Greece’s current diplomatically inept administration have fueled Turkish nationalist sentiment against Greece, counterbalancing against public support for European integration, and emboldening Turkey’s aggressions in the Aegean.

What are the objectives of Turkey?

Turkish perceptions and expectations of European and American passivity embolden Turkey to act in calculated aggression according to its favorable estimation of the balance of power. Turkey’s primary goals are to increase its claim on maritime territory that may contain potential oil reserves in the Aegean Sea and to hinder Greek efforts to expand territorial waters according to proposed international law [1]. These objectives constitute a reversal of the Treaty of Lausanne, which gave Greece control of the entire Aegean archipelago, and essentially landlocked the Turkish western coast. In a highly complex domestic climate, if Turkish policymakers judge that tensions have risen enough to even minimally justify translation of rhetoric into action, then Turkey is likely to annex the Imia-Kardak islands in a symbolic statement of intent, or even to potentially claim control over Kastelorizo, which would extend Turkey’s continental shelf into the southeast Mediterranean Sea.

Why should the EU care? What can be done?

In an environment of European reluctance and American rejection of involvement, the clock is ticking before the Turkish administration could make bolder moves. The crucial coming election could be the catalyst in materializing Turkish threats over the annexation of disputed territory. In the ever-increasing tense domestic politics of Turkey, political rivals try to outdo each other on anti-Greek rhetoric, resulting in heightened public expectations of conflict. Under the current circumstances, if Turkey escalates the conflict, then the EU stands to lose in all possible scenarios. If the EU intervenes, then Turkey may retaliate with the release of Syrian refugees into the continent, which will increase the influence of the far-right and break the EU from within. If the EU fails to act, then trust in its institutional power will wane, discouraging potential members from joining and increasing the separatist sentiments inside member countries.

The Aegean Dispute sheds light into the most important institutional anomaly of the EU: the absence of political unification to support economic integration.The European experiment has been successful in integrating economic activity within the continent. However, it now teeters with an unstable equilibrium, between further integration and outright demise. The Aegean dispute offers both a challenge and an opportunity for Europe: EU policymakers must look into ways of integrating security strategy, through cooperation agreements, security guarantees and investment into border control, while also moving towards an integrated and centrally-organized immigration plan for Europe. Tighter border security in the Balkan Peninsula will stop Turkey’s use of refugee flows as a bargaining chip and also appease nationalist sentiment in European countries, while security agreements will halt Turkish aspirations in the Aegean Sea and improve public trust in the EU’s institutional power. If the EU wants to remain relevant far into the future across the greater European continent, then it must start behaving as boldly and strategically as Turkey has over the past several years. If it doesn’t it will simply be outmaneuvered and, potentially, replaced as a major political voice in the global community.

[1] Wolff  Heintschel von Heinegg Der Ägäis-Konflikt: Die Abgrenzung des Festlandsockels zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei und das Problem der Inseln im Seevölkerrecht. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1989)

 

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Catalonia would have been facing severe problems had it broke away from Spain

Bahauddin Foizee

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Catalan independence referendum, held in late-2017, had thrown Spain and Catalonia into severe political crisis and has created uncertainly for the foreign investors inside Catalonia.

What fate would the Catalans have embraced had Catalonia broke away from Spain after referendum?

Catalans from all walks of life would have suffered severe problems had the pro-independence camp got what they wished for in the referendum.

Here’s some food for thought for the Catalans who voted in the referendum and who didn’t, and for the ones who had been a keen spectator from Europe and elsewhere.

State Structures

Inception of an independent state requires the setting up of the essential state structures, including central bank, tax authority, judicial system, social security, a diplomatic service, a central bank and even an army.

Though most of these state structures/elements are available to Catalonia as an Spanish state/province, there are obvious concerns whether these elements are self-sufficient and mature enough to take the responsibilities of a newly born state.

Chaos

Had Catalonia become a sovereign state, a greater political uncertainty would have arose. There would be political chaos between the ones who opted for independence and the ones who didn’t.

The ones who sought to remain with Spain, or atleast didn’t actively support pro-independence campaigns, could have ended up facing rage and infuriated gestures from the opposite camp immediately after independence (had it been achieved).

Debt, currency, exodus of businesses

Moreover, Catalans would then have to assume a significant part of Spain’s debt. They would have to find a currency other than the Euro, as Spain would veto Catalan membership in the Euro Zone.

Without a confirmed currency in the market and with political uncertainty, there would have been a likely evacuation of multinational and Spanish companies from Catalonia to other parts in Spain. Already some multinational and Spanish companies either left or declared to leave Catalonia immediately after last independence referendum.

Access to EU market

If the membership to the European Union (EU) was delayed after Catalonia’s independence, Catalan products would have lost the privilege of unrestricted access to the EU market.

This newly independent state would have lost the leverages of entering into the EU member states’ markets as a free trade zone – a leverage its commercial products enjoy now as Spanish products.

Duties on Catalan goods and services would have been imposed not only by Spain, but also by other EU member states. Moreover, in times of economic disasters, Catalonia could not have called upon the help of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European Central Bank (ECB).

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What Do We Need To Know About Brexit: What Is Happening Now?

Anosh Samuel

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European Union is a political and economic partnership of 28 European countries. The idea came up soon after the World War 2 that countries which trade together are less likely to get into a war with each other and consequently their economic growth is also fostered. EU has its own parliament and defined rules of the environment, consumer rights, transport, and common currency “EURO” used by 19 of the member states.

There had been no mechanism for any country to exit EU. However, article 50 of the Treaty on European Union introduced a procedure for any member state to leave or exit the EU. It was enacted by Treaty of Lisbon, which holds the signatures of all EU countries and it became a law in 2009. In this Treaty there are five short passages stating that;a) any member state can decide to leave the EU, b)the leaving country shall notify the EU of its plans and intentions, c) there are two years to reach an agreement except if member states unanimously decide to extend this period, d) the withdrawing member cannot participate in discussion of European Council, and lastly e) a request of rejoining the EU will be entertained with subject to the article 49.

Plebiscite In Uk

There have been 11 plebiscites held in the UK since 1973 and majority of them are linked to the devaluation. In 1975, first ever plebiscite was demonstrated in the United Kingdom, but that was subjected tothe continued membership of European Union. Now,a referendum took place on June 23rd, 2016 regarding the membership of UK in European Union, when UK voted to leave EU. It was named as BREXIT, but what does the term BREXIT actually mean? To answer this, it is a shorthand axiom of UK leaving the EU by merging two terms Britain and Exit. Alike, the Greek exit from the eurozone in 2012-2015 was dubbed as GREXIT. Let’s get to know the referendum breakdown across the UK: England voted to leave EU by 54pc and 46pc; Wales also voted for Brexit by 53pc in favor and 47pc against. However, in Northern Ireland 56pc of citizens backed staying in EU, the same thing happened in Scotland as turn out was 62pc.Since then, Theresa May, a former home secretary took over the prime minister office after David Cameroon resigned from the premiership.

Economy Of UK Since Brexit Vote

The senior parliamentarians and David Cameroon envisaged an immediate economic crisis if UK voted to leave EU. The value of pound slumped very next day after referendum but it regained its losses real soon. Immediate predictions of catastrophe were proven wrong as the economy of UK grew by 1.6% in 2016. It was near to Germany’s 1.9pc amongst leading G7 industrialized nations. The growth rate remained stagnant in 2017. According to Office for National Statistics figures, an increase in inflation was observed after June 2016 but it eased to stand at 2.5pc. Unemployment has fallen to nearly a forty-year low of 4.3pc.

Hard And Soft Brexit Means

The terms ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ are used during debates on account of UK exit from European Union. Generally, they give a notion of the proximity ofUK’s relations with EU post-Brexit, but there is no such definition of these terms. Soft Brexit is interpreted as acceptance of free movement of people in a single market. Whereas on contrary to this, hard Brexit contains no compromise of UK with respect to the free movement of people even if destined to leave single market. The question prompt up here is that what is Single Market?

The Single Market of European Union allows the free movement of money, services, and goods within the EU, as it is a single nation. People are allowed to land a job or set up their own business within EU zone. A common law-making is needed to certify that commodities are manufactured with same standards and enforce rules to certify a standard level. The idea of the single market was proposed to create employment opportunities, boost trade, and lower the prices. The advocates of the Single Market view it as an achievement. Great Britain already had a membership of free trade area in Europe prior to joining “common market.”Free trade area is not a single market since member states do nor amalgamate their economies but member states can trade without paying duties.

Theresa May’s Stance On Brexit

Since the referendum campaign Theresa May was against the Brexit but later she said it is what our people wish for, with her key comment “Brexit means Brexit.”A process to leave EU then triggered on March 29, 2017, while plans for Transition Period have been outlined by her after Brexit in a speech in Italy. She surprised everyone by calling an election on June 8, 2017, and opined that she wants to strengthen her hands in Brexit talks with leaders of Europe.

Transition Period

The transitional period is the time span after March 29th, 2019¬¬¬ to December 31st, 2020, to permit businesses and everything in place for the moment when new rules between EU and UK will begin after post-Brexit. The features and particulars to develop new relationship would also be hammered out.EU wants to endure the free movement during the transition period. The United Kingdom will be pulling out of its own trade deals.

Negotiations

Brexit negotiations officially have begun on June 19, 2017. The first tasks in EU summits were to get an agreement after Brexit on the rights of EU and UK expatriates. They were to decide a figure that the UK will have to pay to while leaving so-called ‘Divorce Bill.’ A breakthrough deal in Brexit talks reached on December 8 and now the UK and EU have shifted to discuss the permanent post-Brexit relationship.

What Is Happening Now And How Long It Will Take For Britain To Exit EU

Despite few political factions striving to halt the happening of Brexit. The government of the UK and main political party in opposition stood in favor of Brexit. They are centering their eyes mainly on a post-Brexit relationship with EU. The UK’s scheduled time for leaving the EU is on March 29, 2019, at 11 pm UK time. The EU and UK have conditionally consented on three issues so-called “divorce issues”, how much United Kingdom owes the EU, what happens to citizens of European Union residing in the United Kingdom and vice versa, and lastly, what happens to the border of Northern Ireland. Such discussions will lead to smoother future affairs and implementation of negotiated deals after Brexit.

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