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Five Reasons Why Russia Fears Iranian Regime Fall

Uran Botobekov

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Search for “Foreign Enemy”

The views of Russia and the USA of the domestic policy developments in Iran, where the public unrest has caused the deaths of more than twenty people and the arrests of about four thousand protesters, is split into two opposite points of view.

The Russian officials have strongly supported the Iranian position that the public unrest has been caused by “foreign enemies” of the Islamic revolution. It should be mentioned that right after the outburst of protests, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei blamed foreign enemies for the unrest, without naming the countries concerned.

It is particularly remarkable that Ali Khamenei, who ordered Telegram and Instagram to be blocked in the country and ordered the partially shut down ofthe internet, is an active user of Twitter and he was the first one to post his reaction to protests on social media. In a post on his Twitter account, Iran’s supreme leader was quoted as saying: “In recent events, enemies of Iran have allied and used the various means they possess, including money, weapons, politics and intelligence services to create troubles for the Islamic Republic. The enemy is always looking for an opportunity and any crevice to infiltrate and strike the Iranian nation.”

Unlike him, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Shamkhani was more specific and blamed the governments of the USA, United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia for interference in the domestic affairs of Iran. While President of Iran Hassan Rouhani has taken things a step further and described Donald Trump as “the enemy of the Iranian nation from head to toe”.

Such a nervous response of the Iranian authorities has been caused by statements made by US President Donald Trump saying that “it’s time for change” in Iran, and by the promise made by Vice President Michael Pence that the US administration would support the participants of protests in Iran. As this analysis shows, instead of looking for internal reasons for public protests and implementing social and economic reforms to improve the living standards of the people, the political elite of Iran is busy searching for foreign enemies, which is typical of authoritarian countries in the world.

In this situation, the Russian official position,which actively supports the theocratic elite of Iran, does not seem strange, sincethe nature of the authoritarian power in both countries is identical. It istypical for authoritarian and autocratic rulers to take repressive actions against protestors – inthis case, against protesting young people, who demand political change, religious liberties and social and economic reforms.

Moscow was the first one to support Teheran’s statement that public protests in Iran have foreign sources. Thus, on January 4, 2018, amid the public protest in Iran, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov in his statement warned the United States against attempts to interfere with the domestic affairs of Iran. According to him, the protests in Iran are domestic affairs of the country. He thinks that the United States is merely using the situation in Iran intentionally to attempt to undermine the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action related to Iran’s nuclear program (JPCOA), which does not do honor to Washington.

The United Russia faction in the State Duma, which is considered the party of President Putin, has demandedthat the UN stop the U.S. provocation against Iran in order to prevent a scenario similar to Libya and Iraq in the country. However, when, on the US initiative on January 5, 2018, the UN Security Council convened for an emergency meeting to discuss the situation in Iran, Russia’s permanent representative Vasily Nebenzya strongly opposed the inclusion of this issue in the agenda. As usual, Russia has quickly found an external enemy represented by the United States.

Russia Fights Tooth and Nail for Iran

Russia defends the theocratic regime of Iran, not only because of the similarity of their authoritarian and paternalisticsystems, but also because of Putin’s objectives of continuing his individual rule and maintaining the status quo. The fall of the theocratic regime in Iran as a result of public protests could have significant impacts on Putin’s regime for several reasons.

First, it’s no secret that Iran and Russia are the guarantors of the Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria.By participation in the military operation in Syria, President Putin has tried to win the recognition of Russia as a global super power. The Middle East has become a testing area where Russia has challenged the United States, so that the power of Moscow is demonstrated to the Western World. Therefore, Putin has used Russian military power to support the government of Bashar Assad, who is considered illegitimate by the United States, Turkey and other NATO members. For the first time in history, Moscow and Washington have been directly involved in military operations in the same state, but on opposite sides of the barricades. The Iranian military of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Tehran-supported Lebanese Shiite group, Hezbollah, are known to secure the victory of Bashar Assad in ground operations, while Russia has waged air bombardments. Iran is the main financial donor of Damascus and spends annually $6bln to support the Syrian government. Therefore, in case of the fall of the Iranian theocratic regime, the Bashar government would not endure for long.Russia would fail to maintain the Syrian regime with only air powerwithout the support of the powerful ground army, which has beenmade possible by the financial support of Iran.Such a change in the Middle East situation would not only smash Putin’s geopolitical ambitions, but would also step up global pressure on Russia regarding the Ukrainian crisis. This could lead to the inglorious escape of the Kremlin-backed armed groups from Lugansk and Donetsk in Ukraine.

Second, the economic and political agenda, which has pushed the protests in Iran forward, is very much similar to the agenda of Putin in Russia.Both countries have large-scale corruption. International sanctions have led to the decline of the neoliberal economy in both countries, which has impoverished millions of Russian and Iranian nationals. The majority of the people in both states stand against the use of vast sums of money to wage war abroad. They think that budgetary funds are not used for the people’s needs, but for the satisfaction of geopolitical ambitions of their political leaders. This is demonstrated by the fact that, the main slogans of protesters in Iran have been “NotGaza, not Lebanon – my life for Iran”, “Leave Syria, think about us instead”, “Death to Russia.” The fall of the Iranian regime could intensify the antimilitary mood within Russia. This, in turn, could deprive Putin of the opportunity to wage “hybrid war” in Abkhazia,Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Eastern Ukraine. It must be admitted though, that the Kremlin propaganda machine can still manipulate public opinion and minimize the antimilitary mood.

Third, the fact that the political regime has so far been irremovable, both in Iran and in Russia, has bred discontent among young people. The protesters in Iran have raised political demands along with economic issues, shouting “Death to Khamenei and President Rouhani.” The crushing power of the protesters has been found among the Iranian urban young people,who have been actively protesting against the clerical regime in recent years. Today neither communists nor liberals pose the major threat to Putin’s regime in Russia, rather it’s the fervent young people who don’t fear the repressive machine of the authorities. High school students, university students and young office workers stood in the front of anticorruption protests in 2013-2017 organized by Alexei Navalny. It’s the young people who faced the police baton attacks, which made them even stronger ideologically. Therefore, the fall of the Khamenei regime could give impetus to the Russian young people and the whole civil society that demand political change and the resignation of Putin.

Fourth, the fall of the Ayatollah regime could deprive Russia of one of its key allies in the region. During the last 40 years Moscow has been known for its active use of the confrontation between Tehran and the United States for its own geopolitical interests. Russia, making use of strife between the Sunnis and the Shiites,along with the support of Iran, has managed to strengthen its political and economic presence in the Middle East, which had been lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The overthrow of the regime in Iran would lead to American domination not only in the Greater Middle East, but, as a result,could even open up Central Asia and the Caucasus to American influence, which would not be in the interest of Moscow.

Fifth, the fall of the Iranian regime could lead to a domino effect in the countries which are subject to international economic sanctions. Russia understands well that after the fall of Tehran, Western sanctions would likely be used to weaken its national economy until it returns Crimea and withdraws its “armed volunteers” from the east of Ukraine.

Therefore, Russia fights tooth and nail for Iran and is on the hunt for “foreign enemies” in the mass protests in Tehran.

On the other hand, the open call for regime change in Iran stated by American President Trump, even though it may encourage the protesters, may be counterproductive. It provides the opportunity to the authoritarian rulers of Russia and Iran to claim that the protests have been organized from abroad. Thus, it can be expected Moscow will continue to support Iran and blame the United States for interference in the sovereign state affairs of Iran.

In this situation, the West should consider imposing targeted sanctions against political, military and judicial officials of Iran, who violate the rights and freedom of the protesters. The universities of European countries and the United States should also open more doors for the Iranian youth, who will become conductors of democratic values, freedom of speech and religious tolerance, which would ultimately lead to a change in the theocratic system of government in Iran.

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Battling it out at the UN: Potholes overshadow US-Iran confrontation

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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It’s easy to dismiss Iranian denunciations of the United States and its Middle Eastern allies as part of the Islamic republic’s long-standing rhetoric. The rhetoric makes it equally easy to understand American distrust.

But as President J. Trump and Hassan Rouhani, his Iranian counterpart, gear up for two days of diplomatic sabre rattling at the United Nations in advance of next month’s imposition of a second round of harsh US sanctions, both men risk fuelling a conflict that could escalate out of hand.

Both are scheduled to address the UN general assembly on Tuesday and Mr. Trump is slated to chair a meeting on Wednesday of the Security Council expected to focus on Iran.

Adding to the likely drama at the UN, European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, speaking alongside Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, snubbed Mr. Trump, by announcing the creation of a payment system that would allow oil companies and businesses to continue trading with Iran despite US sanctions.

The risk of escalation is enhanced by the fact that Messrs. Trump and Rouhani are sending mixed messages.

Mr. Trump’s administration insists that its confrontational approach is designed to alter Iranian behaviour and curb its policies, not topple its regime.

Yet, the administration stepped up its engagement with exile groups associated with the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, a controversial Saudi-backed organization that calls for the violent overthrow of the government in Tehran and enjoys support among current and former Western officials, as Messrs. Trump and Rouhani battle it out at the UN.

John Bolton, who has repeatedly advocated regime change before becoming Mr. Trump’s national security advisor, is scheduled to give a keynote address at the United Against Nuclear Iran’s (UANI) annual summit during the UN assembly. So is Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, another hardliner on Iran.

Mr. Pompeo and Mr, Bolton, who has spoken in the past at events related to the Mujahedeen, had so far since coming to office refrained from addressing gatherings associated with opposition groups.

The administration left that to Mr. Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, who last weekend told the Iran Uprising Summit organized by the Organization of Iranian-American Communities, a Washington-based group associated with the Mujahedeen and attended by the exile’s leader, Maryam Rajavi, that US. sanctions were causing economic pain and could lead to a “successful revolution” in Iran.

“I don’t know when we’re going to overthrow them. It could be in a few days, months, a couple of years. But it’s going to happen,” Mr. Giuliani, said speaking on the day of an attack on a military march in the southern Iranian city of Ahvaz that killed 25 people and wounded at least 70 others.

Messrs. Bolton, Pompeo and Giuliani’s hardline stems from US suspicions rooted in anti-American and anti-Western attitudes that are grafted in the Islamic republic’s DNA and produced the 444-day occupation in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. They are reinforced by the humiliation of a failed US military operation to rescue 66 Americans held hostages during the occupation.

Iranian rhetoric; bombastic threats against Israel; denial of the Holocaust, support for anti-American insurgents in Iraq, the brutal regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi rebels in Yemen and Hamas in the Gaza Strip; propagation of religiously inspired republican government as an alternative to conservative monarchy in the Gulf; and degrees of duplicity regarding its nuclear program, reaffirm America’s suspicion.

Iran’s seemingly mirror image of the United States traces its roots further back to the 1953 US-supported overthrow of the nationalist government of prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh and his replacement by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi whom Washington staunchly supported till his fall in 1979.

Iranian concerns were reinforced by American backing of Iraq in the 1980s Gulf war, US support for Kurdish and Baloch insurgents, the broad spectrum of support of former and serving US officials for the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, unequivocal Saudi signals of support for ethnic strife as a strategy to destabilize Iran, and Mr. Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear program despite confirmation of its adherence to the accord.

Responses by the US and its Gulf allies as well as a series of statements by militant Iranian Arab groups, including the Ahvaz Resistance Movement, suspected of being responsible for this weekend’s attack, have only deepened Iranian distrust.

Those statements included one by the Arab Liberation Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz effusively praising Saudi Arabia on its national day that the kingdom celebrated a day after the attack.

Yadollah Javani, the deputy commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, the target of the attack, vowed revenge for what he termed years of conspiracies against the Iranian revolution by its enemies.

Mr. Javani was referring to past US attempts to destabilize Iran and a four-decade long global Saudi campaign that included backing of Iraq in the Gulf war during the 1980s and an estimated $100 billion investment in support of anti-Iranian, anti-Shiite ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim groups.

All of this means that mounting hostility between the United States and Iran is muddied as much by fact as by perception – a combustible mix that is easily exploitable by parties on both sides of the divide seeking to raise the ante.

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Attack in Iran raises spectre of a potentially far larger conflagration

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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An attack on a military parade in the southern Iranian city of Ahwaz is likely to prompt Iranian retaliation against opposition groups at home and abroad. It also deepens Iranian fears that the United States. Saudi Arabia and others may seek to destabilize the country by instigating unrest among its ethnic minorities.

With competing claims of responsibility by the Islamic State and the Ahvaz National Resistance for the attack that killed 29 people and wounded 70 others in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, which borders on Iraq and is home to Iran’s ethnic Arab community, it is hard to determine with certainty the affiliation of the four perpetrators, all of whom were killed in the incident.

Statements by Iranian officials, however, accusing the United States and its allies, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel, suggest that they see the Ahvaz group rather than the Islamic State as responsible for the incident, the worst since the Islamic State attacked the Iranian parliament and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Tehran in 2017.

Iran’s summoning, in the wake of the attack, of the ambassadors of Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark, countries from which Iranian opposition groups operate, comes at an awkward moment for Tehran.

It complicates Iranian efforts to ensure that European measures effectively neutralize potentially crippling US sanctions that are being imposed as a result of the US withdrawal in May from the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear program.

Ahvaz-related violence last year spilled on to the street of The Hague when unidentified gunmen killed Ahwazi activist Ahmad Mola Nissi. Mr. Nissi was shot dead days before he was scheduled to launch a Saudi-funded television station staffed with Saudi-trained personnel that would target Khuzestan, according to Ahvazi activists.

This week, a group of exile Iranian academics and political activists, led by The Hague-based social scientist Damon Golriz, announced the creation of a group that intends to campaign for a liberal democracy in Iran under the auspices of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the ousted Shah of Iran who lives in the United States.

While Iran appears to be targeting exile groups in the wake of the Ahvaz attack, Iran itself has witnessed in recent years stepped up activity by various insurgent groups amid indications of Saudi support, leading to repeated clashes and interception of Kurdish, Baloch and other ethnic insurgents.

Last month, Azeri and Iranian Arab protests erupted in soccer stadiums while the country’s Revolutionary Guards Corps reported clashes with Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish insurgents.

State-run television warned at the time in a primetime broadcast that foreign agents could turn legitimate protests stemming from domestic anger at the government’s mismanagement of the economy and corruption into “incendiary calls for regime change” by inciting violence that would provoke a crackdown by security forces and give the United States fodder to tackle Iran.

The People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran or Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK), a controversial exiled opposition group that enjoys the support of serving and former Western officials, including some in the Trump administration, as well as prominent Saudis such as Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former Saudi intelligence chief, who is believed to be close to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has taken credit for a number of the protests in Khuzestan.

The incidents fit an emerging pattern, prompting suggestions that if a Gulf-backed group was responsible for this weekend’s attack, it may have been designed to provoke a more direct confrontation between Iran and the United States.

“If the terrorist attack in Ahvaz was part of a larger Saudi and UAE escalation in Iran, their goal is likely to goad Iran to retaliate and then use Tehran’s reaction to spark a larger war and force the US to enter since Riyadh and Abu Dhabi likely cannot take on Iran militarily alone… If so, the terrorist attack is as much about trapping Iran into war as it is to trap the US into a war of choice,” said Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council.

Iran appears with its response to the Ahvaz attack to be saying that its fears of US and Saudi destabilization efforts are becoming reality. The Iranian view is not wholly unfounded.

Speaking in a private capacity on the same day as the attack in Ahvaz, US President Donald J. Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, declared that US. sanctions were causing economic pain that could lead to a “successful revolution” in Iran.

“I don’t know when we’re going to overthrow them. It could be in a few days, months, a couple of years. But it’s going to happen,” Mr. Giuliani told an audience gathered in New York for an Iran Uprising Summit organized by the Organization of Iranian-American Communities, a Washington-based group associated with the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq.

Mr. Giuliani is together with John Bolton, Mr. Trump’s national security advisor, a long-standing supporter of the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq that calls for the violent overthrow of the Iranian regime.

Mr. Bolton, last year before assuming office, drafted at the request of Mr. Trump’s then strategic advisor, Steve Bannon, a plan that envisioned US support “for the democratic Iranian opposition,” “Kurdish national aspirations in Iran, Iraq and Syria,” and assistance for Iranian Arabs in Khuzestan and Baloch in the Pakistani province of Balochistan and Iran’s neighbouring Sistan and Balochistan province.

The Trump administration has officially shied away from formally endorsing the goal of toppling the regime in Tehran. Mr. Bolton, since becoming national security advisor, has insisted that US policy was to put “unprecedented pressure” on Iran to change its behaviour”, not its regime.

Messrs. Bolton and Giuliani’s inclination towards regime change is, however, shared by several US allies in the Middle East, and circumstantial evidence suggests that their views may be seeping into US policy moves without it being officially acknowledged.

Moreover, Saudi support for confrontation with Iran precedes Mr. Trump’s coming to office but has intensified since, in part as a result of King Salman’s ascendance to the Saudi throne in 2015 and the rise of his son, Prince Mohammed.

Already a decade ago, Saudi Arabia’s then King Abdullah urged the United States to “cut off the head of the snake” by launching military strikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear program.

Writing in 2012 in Asharq Al Awsat, a Saudi newspaper, Amal Al-Hazzani, an academic, asserted in an op-ed entitled “The oppressed Arab district of al-Ahwaz“ that Khuzestan “is an Arab territory… Its Arab residents have been facing continual repression ever since the Persian state assumed control of the region in 1925… It is imperative that the Arabs take up the al-Ahwaz cause, at least from the humanitarian perspective.”

More recently, Prince Mohammed vowed that “we won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran.”

Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a prominent UAE scholar, who is believed to be close to Emirati Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, played into Iranian assertions of Gulf involvement in this weekend’s attack by tweeting that it wasn’t a terrorist incident.

Mr. Abdulla suggested that “moving the battle to the Iranian side is a declared option” and that the number of such attacks “will increase during the next phase”.

A Saudi think tank, believed to be backed by Prince Mohammed last year called in a study for Saudi support for a low-level Baloch insurgency in Iran. Prince Mohammed vowed around the same time that “we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran, not in Saudi Arabia.”

Pakistani militants have claimed that Saudi Arabia has stepped up funding of militant madrassas or religious seminaries in Balochistan that allegedly serve as havens for anti-Iranian fighters.

The head of the US State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs, Steven Fagin, met in Washington in June with Mustafa Hijri, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), before assuming his new post as counsel general in Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The KDPI has recently stepped up its attacks in Iranian Kurdistan, killing nine people weeks before Mr. Hijri’s meeting with Mr. Fagin. Other Kurdish groups have reported similar attacks. Several Iranian Kurdish groups are discussing ways to coordinate efforts to confront the Iranian regime.

Similarly, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) last year appointed a seasoned covert operations officer as head of its Iran operations.

Said Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Khalid bin Salman, Prince Mohammed’s brother: President “Trump makes clear that we will not approach Iran with the sort of appeasement policies that failed so miserably to halt Nazi Germany’s rise to power, or avert the costliest war ever waged.”

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Turkey’s Great Game in Syria

Ahmet S. Yayla, Ph.D.

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With ISIS on the run in the desert of South Syria, Al Qaeda’s affiliated jihadists in Idlib brace for the final assault by the combined forces of the Syrian Army, the Russian air force and the Iranian proxies. The president of Turkey, who fancies that he could be the new Caliph himself, implores the United States to join in the quashing of Bashar Al-Assad “before he kills again.” While there are some common of interests between Washington and Ankara, the United States gains nothing by assisting Erdogan’s Syrian gambit, because the cure he would bring could be worse than the disease. On the other hand, the President’s call five months ago to pull out of Syria altogether would be risky.

Idlib, Home to some three million people, half of whom are the displaced people running away from Assad’s atrocities, has also been an uncertain sanctuary for former Salafist-jihadi fighters, who may number  30,000 according to the US military. The UN special envoy for Syria estimates there are around 10,000 al-Qaeda affiliated fighters in Idlib, most of whom under the control of Hay’atTahrir al-Sham, (HTS), al-Qaeda’s latest rebranding, which hold nearly 60 percent of the city. The rest of Idlib is controlled by Turkey-backed militias. Turkey has a dog in this fight; the Western coalition does not.

Armies of four major players in the area vie for territory: Syria, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Ankara agreed to help create de-escalation zones and 12 observation posts to protect civilians during the Astana peace talks in January 2017.

The battle for Idlib has differing objectives for the four armies on the field.

For Syria, the Idlib offensive allows al-Assad to kill thousands of Sunni rebels with barrel bombs, Russian airstrikesand Iranian militias, all with an unforgettable exclamation point. Brutal, yes, but it’s a strategy that has worked in the area for 5,000 years.

For Russia, driving on Idlib will be the final blow against the rebels and the guarantee of Russia’s permanent military bases in Tartus and Latakia.

For Iran, conquering Idlib would remove the last major obstacle to the Shia land bridge from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. Iran wants to extend its influence in the region and have uninterrupted access to Lebanon to boost Hezbollah’s power and its supply chain.

For Turkey and Erdogan, the Idlib strategy is complicated. It is estimated that an assault would drive more than 700,000 people toward the Turkish border. But Turkey, with more than 3 million refugees already and a spiraling financial crisis, won’t accept another humanitarian flood, according to Turkey’s foreign minister. Additionally, Turkey has been investing in northern Syria to extend its influence including in Idlib by providing humanitarian aid via NGO’s such as the IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation), opening schools, and sending teachers and imams to establish a favorable Turkish sphere of influence for long-term investment; therefore, Turkey fears to lose the ground it already controls.

Since January 2017 Erdogan anticipated that he could trust Russia and Iran and have a military presence in the region per the Astana agreement. According to Erdogan, Turkish military presence would thwart a Syrian offense against Idlib. He also wanted to extend Turkish control of northern Syria along the Turkish border, including the cities of al-Bab and Afrin, in an effort to block a Kurdish-controlled corridor along the same border. On both counts, Erdogan miscalculated.

Erdogan has been playing a dangerous game both at home and abroad. He closely but surely distanced Turkey from the West; particularly the U.S. Under his control, Turkey has become an authoritarian state, jailing thousands of people on false charges. Among the victims are hundreds of journalists, including several Western reporters and an American Christian pastor.

The fact is, Turkey no longer behaves as a U.S. ally. Under Erdogan, Turkey allowed more than 40,000 foreign fighters to pass through her borders to join Salafist Jihadi terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq from 2013 to 2016. Though Turkey may be an enemy of Assad, the Erdogan regime has been a silent partner with Russia and Iran.

Erdogan’s disdain for the United States also stems from a New York federal court case involving the Iranian embargo. Turkish Halkbank and gold trader Reza Zarrab, under the orders of Erdogan, helped Iran to circumvent the American embargo banning the sale of Iranian oil and transferring millions of dollars to Iran and its proxies. Turkey’s president likely thought the Trump Administration would kill the Zarrab case.

Realizing his ill-intended policies and demands were not being met by the Trump Administration, Erdogan decided to play the Russia card. Turkey, a NATO member nation, recently purchased Russian s-400 missile systems amid US protests and will install these weapons systems in 2019.

The U.S. should set its priorities in the region based on international and humanitarian values and to eradicate the conflict in the long run by promoting the protection of the civilians first. U.S. military assets in Syria should stay put for four reasons. First, to act as a deterrent to al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons and other atrocities. Second, to frustrate Turkish expansion and control of Syria’s northern border. Third, to control Iranian ambitions in the region. Fourth, to assist the local allies to prevent the re-emergence of Islamic State 2.0.

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