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The clean energy transition requires action on electricity demand

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Authors: WEO Energy Analysts Stéphanie Bouckaert, Timothy Goodson and Brent Wanner

As a fundamental rule, electricity supply and demand must be balanced at all times. Traditionally, this has been achieved by adjusting electricity supply to match demand that varies at different times of the day. But this poses a problem as the share of power generation from variable renewables such as wind and solar PV rises. Demand-side response is one of several measures that can help integrate higher shares of variable renewables, including electricity storage, greater interconnection and more flexible power plants.

When the sun is shining and the wind blowing, electricity generation from these sources may exceed demand, leading to the curtailment of otherwise low-cost and carbon-free electricity. Inversely, when the wind doesn’t blow or on cloudy days, power systems may need to rely on flexible yet expensive and carbon-intensive sources of generation. Both of these outcomes are economically and environmentally undesirable.

Demand-side response can significantly reduce such outcomes by shifting and shaping electricity demand to match the availability of renewables-based electricity generation.

Traditionally demand-side response has been confined to large-scale industrial consumers manually shedding demand in times of system stress. But over 75% of the global potential in demand-side response lies in buildings, with space heating, water heating and air conditioning loads contributing the most. The thermal inertia of buildings and hot-water storage allows electricity demand from heating and cooling equipment to be shifted in time to suit the needs of the grid at low cost without compromising user comfort. Loads from appliances such as refrigerators and washing machines can also become demand-side response resources, facilitated by the growing market share of smart appliances.

Expanding demand-side response – beyond manual shedding of large loads – is a relatively recent phenomenon, with Europe and the United States currently leading growth. In several markets consumers can receive payment for various forms of short-duration “fast frequency response” to keep the grid in balance, larger volumes of “load shifting” to respond to changeable weather, or contracts for guaranteed changes to future consumption patterns.

In addition to balancing loads, demand-side response measures can provide benefits to the grid by mitigating congestion in transmission and distribution systems and delaying or avoiding network upgrades, resulting in important savings. Power systems with greater flexibility are also better able to respond to short-term variations in electricity supply or demand that can be created by sudden changes in output from variable renewables-based generators.

The flexibility provided by demand-side response is therefore both a valuable resource facilitating the integration of a high share of variable renewables, and a symbol of the shift away from the traditional paradigm of supply following demand.

Identifying demand-side response potential

Globally, the theoretical potential of demand-side response today is estimated to be nearly 4,000 TWh per year, or more than 15% of total electricity demand (WEO 2017). Based on IEA modelling of electricity consumption profiles by end-use, this potential represents the sum of all loads than can be shifted for every hour of the year.

In the central scenario of the World Energy Outlook 2017, annual demand-side response potential is expected to increase to almost 7,000 TWh by 2040, the buildings sector leads future growth as demand for appliances and electric heating and cooling expands in Asia and Africa. Within developed economies, the electrification of heating and transport are major drivers of future growth. Smart charging of electric vehicles (EVs) uses charging (and discharging) of EV batteries to facilitate balancing of the power grid.

The IEA estimates that by 2040 almost 1 billion households and 11 billion appliances could participate in demand response programmes. While the majority of potential may lie in buildings, this potential can also be the most difficult to tap. This is especially the case in residential buildings, where participating in demand-side response programs may require behaviour change while offering limited economic benefits to households due to the small size of residential loads. As such, aggregation and automation of small scale demand-side response resources is often the most viable path to market for the residential sector.

The demand-side response potential in industry and large commercial buildings can be more accessible, as energy management systems optimize decisions to consume electricity or offer demand-side response services to the market. 

Connectivity as a key enabler

Digital connectivity is the key to expanding demand-side response into new sectors and realising a greater share of its total theoretical potential. By enabling the linking, monitoring, aggregation and control of large numbers of individual pieces of electricity consuming equipment, connectivity allows for matching demand to the needs of the overall system in real time (Digitalization & Energy, 2017). Smart meters, smart appliances, electric vehicles and load management software are therefore central to efforts to increase demand-side response resources.

Capitalizing on demand-side response potential also requires appropriate price signals and regulatory frameworks to incentivize participation. Retail tariff structures such as time-of-use pricing or real-time pricing can deliver the necessary price signals to consumers, while enabling aggregators and other demand-side resources to participate in wholesale energy, capacity and ancillary services markets can create the necessary environment to stimulate investment.

Demand-side resources active in markets today represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the total potential. Digitalisation presents an opportunity to unlock this enormous potential and significantly enhance grid flexibility. As prices for digital technologies continue to fall and electricity consuming equipment is increasingly connected and controllable, expansion of demand-side response becomes technically feasible and economically attractive.

Electricity consumers benefit from reduced electricity bills by providing demand response services, but even larger savings are realised on a system level. Digitally enabled demand response is often a more cost-effective and climate-friendly measure facilitating the integration of variable renewables than building new power plants or electricity storage. Rapid expansion will act as a key accelerator for the clean energy transition. Moving forward, government policy will need to provide clear rules and a long-term vision for increasing demand-side response resources.

First published in International Energy Agency

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Seeing Japan – Indonesia Collaboration in Energy Transition Cooperation

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Holding the G7 presidency, Japan is increasingly active in establishing relations with several countries. One of them is Indonesia. The relations that have existed so far between Indonesia and Japan are widely visible on the surface. One of them is in the energy transition sector. Indonesia is in need of a large investment to achieve net zero emissions in 2060. An investment of more than 500 million US dollars is needed to make this happen. This is indicated by the great effort to reduce energy that uses fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) in people’s lives. Including efforts from Japan to cooperate with Indonesia or vice versa in achieving net zero emissions.

Abundant Natural Resources: A Privilege for Indonesia

The abundance of natural resources owned by Indonesia is an important point for the continuation of cooperation between Japan and Indonesia. Natural resources such as hydrogen, geothermal are important values ​​to be further developed into renewable energy. This is a breath of fresh air for Indonesia, which is trying to achieve net zero emissions by 2060.

 Replacing fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas to renewable energy requires extra effort, Indonesia which is rich in energy resources requires a lot of money in terms of exploration of natural resources. renewable energy resources, such as hydrogen, geothermal. renewable in Indonesia. One of them is through a funding scheme through the Asian Zero Emission Community (AZEC). Through this funding, Japan, which is known to be very generous in helping developing countries in terms of energy, is expected to be able to bring change to the renewable energy transition in a country rich in energy resources, Indonesia. This transition certainly requires a short and gradual process.

State Electricity Company of Indonesia abbreviated as PLN, states that dependence on new coal will decrease in 2030. This is due to the presence of power plants from renewable energies such as geothermal, solar, hydrogen and nuclear and wind (Kompas, 2023).

Japan’s Investment to Indonesia

 Indonesia, with all its abundance of energy resources, is considered capable of developing an energy transition. The development of electricity from geothermal, water and biomass are the main sector. This was conveyed by the Government of Japan through Deputy for International Affairs, Ministry of Economy and Industrial Development of Japan Izuru Kobayashi. He stated that his party was ready to assist Indonesia in achieving net zero emissions in 2060 with an environmentally friendly funding and technology assistance scheme.

The above was also supported by another Japanese party, namely from Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC). Quoting from IJ Global, SMBC has financial assistance to Asia Pacific countries for clean energy projects through Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group of US$1.5 billion, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group of US$1.2 billion, and Mizuho Financial Group of US$1.2 billion. 1 billion US dollars. In Indonesia alone, as of September 2022, SMBC had invested US$221 million.

Various forms of support by Japan as donors and companions for Indonesia to develop renewable energy should be appreciated. According to the author opinion, this is a challenge for the Government of Indonesia and all of stakeholders inside, to create an investment environment that is safe, good and useful for Indonesia’s future. The use of fossil fuels such as coal for power generation needs to be slowly substituted using renewable energy. The Jokowi administration’s policy of subsidizing electric vehicles for the public can be an entry point for the continuation of Indonesia-Japan collaboration in realizing the energy transition.

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The Maneuvering Of Gas Commodities As Securitization Of Russia’s Geopolitical Position

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Authors: Luky Yusgiantoro and Tri Bagus Prabowo

In 2012, the Yakutia-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas pipeline project was redeveloped under The Power of Siberia (News Ykt, 2012). Putin legalized Gazprom (contractors: Gazprom Transgaz Tomsk). The idea named “Power of Siberia” represents the power of gas pipelines to shape and influence Russia’s geopolitical and geoeconomic situation. A new identity will be launched, conveying the Yakutia-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas pipeline and gaining international prominence. The Power of Siberia project is an integrated form of GTS (Gas Transmission System) that will bring the Irkutsk gas region in the fertile eastern part of Russia to the Far East and China. The pipeline location is located in the “Far East,” incredibly close to the border with China, and generally in the Asia-Pacific region. Initially, this gas pipeline was built to facilitate gas trade with China and reduce China’s dependence on coal (Pipeline Journal, 2022). What is the value of this project for both countries to become global concerns?

Furthermore, they have the ability or range to carry gas communications for approximately 4000 km. Due to its geographical proximity and shared economic interests, China is Russia’s most progressive partner in terms of a multifaceted regional and international strategy. Russia and China are known as close partners. The aftermath of Russia’s political alliance was to regain global power, status, and influence lost after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, which was the driving force behind the end of the Cold War (Oualaalou, 2021 ). Russia has articulated a vision of rebuilding its global reputation using energy, military might, intelligence, and diplomacy. Russia wants to play a crucial role in the global multipolar system because the West rejects Russia’s vision for a new geopolitical order. They saw many important events related to Russia’s moves in the international order, including its response to the actions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to try to dominate the nations of the world. The former Soviet Union (East), the failures in the Middle East, the annexation of Crimea, and one of Moscow’s recent invasions of Ukraine mark the military as a turning point in Russian geopolitical politics, especially during the Putin era. Russia has three strategic initiative points, including the ability to deploy and interconnect the means (intelligence, diplomacy, military, cyber, and energy) to gain influence and extend Russia’s global footprint. There is.

Moreover, the Fallacies and Western Ties strategy contradicts America First foreign policy tenets (unipolar) and impulsive decisions as a security threat. Russia wants to maintain its lack of regional interests in certain Baltic states (those still under Russian control) and the Balkans (Cooley, 2017). The Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, and Serbia) have been the cornerstones of great power rivalry for centuries. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the EU (European Union) used the momentum of Yugoslavia’s dissolution in the 1990s to integrate the Balkans as geopolitical hotspots on the Western Front (European Policy). War analysts say the ongoing Ukraine conflict is a way for Russia to raise its stakes in the Balkans and reassert its regional influence (McBride, 2022). 

In 2020, natural gas will still be the world’s third-largest primary energy requirement for the global community. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2019, demand for natural gas increased by 5.3% to 4 trillion cubic meters (TCM) in 2021 (BP, 2022). In 2021, Russia’s total natural gas production will be 701.7 billion cubic meters, the second largest globally, contributing to the strong demand in the global energy market. Russia is essential in the natural gas market (Sonnichsen, 2022). The climate crisis is the most obvious obstacle in the global gas market model. It originates from burning carbon with materials derived from fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal. However, natural gas is acceptable during the energy transition as it burns the least carbon dioxide (CO2) and pollutants of these three substances (EIA, 2022). It is easier than supplying a gas infrastructure that does not provide infrastructure. Operationally, it is optimal. Talks about climate protection, the climate crisis, and the energy transition are being shaped by Western countries as a way of highlighting Europe’s dependence on gas from Russia, which is geographically accessible and still has gas in other gas reserves. The decision to stop sourcing natural gas from Russia continues to cause European controversy. The pipeline network actively built between Russia and Europe is an essential aspect of why this relationship is used as a tool for Russia to apply pressure—on territorial Europe. Europe uses a climate scenario, and Russia uses a gas-dependent scenario. Efficiency and effectiveness will not be achieved if Europe suddenly has to look for other reserves or switch entirely to this energy mix. Then, with Russia’s eloquence in exploiting the situation and the status quo, natural gas pipelines were used as a form of Russian energy diplomacy to dominate its (European) neighbors. Recognizing that the Western natural gas market is no longer preconditioned, moving target consumers to the Asia-Pacific region is one of the most effective energy plans for Russia’s fossil fuel expansion.

Siberia’s first electricity will cost 770 billion rubles, and the investment in gas production will cost 430 billion rubles. The 1,400 mm natural gas pipeline capacity will increase to 61 billion cubic meters (2.2 trillion cubic feet) of natural gas annually. The pipeline lets the world see natural gas as one of the fossil fuels and does not pollute the air with the carbon and other substances of the climate crisis. , through the capital Beijing and down to Shanghai. According to state media, the intermediate phase will go online in December 2020, with the final southern section expected to start delivering gas in 2025 (Cheng, 2022). Through this agreement, Russia aims to extend its power beyond Mongolia into Siberia 2 in 2030 (IEA, 2022). Conditions for Europe to get 40% of natural gas from Russian pipelines. Germany, in particular, sources about half of its natural gas from Russia (Baldwin, 2022).  Despite international media reports of embargoes and sanctions, the crisis has hit Europe hard. Europe must adapt its economic policies to politically justified policies and coordinate them with each other. However, this is a geopolitical struggle, and we must ensure that the country retains its absolute superiority. Russia chooses to invest in and plan for natural gas markets in regions that require or depend on natural gas in the energy sector, i.e., Asia-Pacific via China. China, influencing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plan, is reshaping the geoeconomic position of Russia’s Siberia 1 and Siberia 2 power markets (Lukin, 2021). “Geopolitics is all about leverage” is one of Thomas Friedman’s influential geopolitical maxims. If a country cannot expand its influence, it remains a loser. Nevertheless, Russia is far from this analogy, as mentioned earlier. Russia continues to secure its geopolitical position. It is the embodiment of growing confidence in the reliability of natural gas. Russia still wants to become a major player in natural gas.

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Remapping the EU’s Energy Partners to Ensure Energy Security and Diversification

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Energy security has been a buzz word in Brussels for a few decades but since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, followed by sanctions, Russian gas cut-off and physical destruction of North Stream pipelines, forecasts on strained EU energy production due to drought, the stakes have gotten much higher. This was confirmed on March 10th by a joint statement by the US President Joe Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, reiterating both parties’ determination to “build clean energy economies and industrial bases”, including clean hydrogen and continue to work together “to advance energy security and sustainability in Europe by diversifying sources, lowering energy consumption, and reducing Europe’s dependence on fossil fuels”.

Last week, the EU energy chief Kadri Simson encouraged all Member States and all companies to “stop buying Russian LNG, and not to sign any new gas contracts with Russia. The EU has pledged to quit Russian fossil fuels by 2027 and replaced around two-thirds of Russian gas last year.

In this context, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), delivering Azerbaijani gas through (Trans-Anatolian Pipeline) TANAP and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to the EU, plays a key role in current diversification efforts. The EU increased gas imports via pipelines from Azerbaijan from 8.1 bcm to 11.4 bcm last year. Only two years after its completion, the expansion of the Corridor seems to be likely as the EU and Azerbaijan stroke a deal in July 2021 to double the volume of gas delivery to 20 bcm by 2027 in addition to plans to tap into Azerbaijan’s renewables potential, such as offshore wind and green hydrogen. While encouraging Azerbaijan’s accession to the Global Methane Pledge, the deal aims at collecting natural gas that would otherwise be vented, flared, or released into the atmosphere.

With the opening of the interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB), at least 11.6 bcm of gas is expected to be delivered from Azerbaijan to the EU this year. The IGB has been dubbed as a game-changer for the EU’s energy security, especially as it enabled supplies to Bulgaria and Romania. A Memorandum of Understanding on gas supplies between Azerbaijan and Hungary was also signed this year, which shows that more interconnectors will be needed in the EU if TANAP would be expanded from 16 to 32 bcm and TAP from 10 to 20 bcm.

Moreover, investments will be needed to increase gas production in existing and new gas fields (Shah Deniz, Azeri Chiraq Guneshli, Absheron, Shafaq-Asiman, Umid-Babek, etc.), especially considering growing energy demand in Azerbaijan and its neighbours. Since the Russia-Ukraine war, 10 European countries turned to Azerbaijan to increase existing supplies or to secure new supplies. To meet such growing demands, Azerbaijan is poised to increase cooperation with neighbouring states, such as Turkmenistan, which is home to 50 trillion cubic metres of gas reserves – the world’s 4th largest reserves.

Following the Azerbaijani-Turkmen decision to jointly develop the formerly disputed Dostluq gas field, a trilateral swap deal between Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, and the 2018 Convention on the status of the Caspian Sea by all the littoral states; Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey stated that they were looking “to form a coordinated and multi-option system for delivering energy resources to global markets” on December 14th last year.

These developments could be harbingers of a new Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP), a 180-mile under-sea pipeline that could be integrated into the SGC. Labelled as an EU Project of Common Interest, which could also be eligible for funding under the 2019 US European Energy Security and Diversification Act, this strategic under-sea pipeline project could bring an end to the EU’s energy crisis by securing a cheap source of natural gas, whose price is independent of LNG prices while counterbalancing Chinese, Russian and Iranian influence in Central Asia and beyond. On the other hand, Azerbaijan began the transit of oil from Kazakhstan this year in addition to Turkmenistan, which highlights the potential to use the Middle Corridor for hydrocarbons.

During the 9th Southern Gas Corridor Advisory Council Ministerial Meeting and 1st Green Energy Advisory Council Ministerial Meeting in Baku in February, EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson stated “Azerbaijan can potentially become the exporter of renewables and hydrogen to the EU”. At the end of last year Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary agreed to establish a green corridor to supply the EU with around four gigawatts of electricity generated by windfarms in Azerbaijan with the support of the European Commission.

Over the last several months, Azerbaijan signed documents that will provide investments to create 22 gigawatts of renewable sources of energy, both onshore and offshore. In April 2021, the World Bank started funding the offshore wind development in Azerbaijan, which has a potential of 157 GW. In addition to the Caspian Sea, which ranks second in world for its wind energy potential, Azerbaijan has an estimated 27GW in wind and solar power onshore.The current construction of wind and solar plants in Alat (230 MW), Khizi and Absheron (240 MW) and Jabrayil (240 MW) as well as new investment plans, including in Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, are expected to further boost renewables production in the Caspian state all by living up to its vast green potential. While the country, with a population of 10 million, accounts for only 0.15% of total global greenhouse gas emissions, it defines green growth as a key priority for 2030. The EU supports the implementation of Baku’s Paris Agreement commitments through the EU4Climate initiative.

The Russia-Ukraine war may create a window opportunity for the EU to engage in concrete actions rather than high-flying buzzwords, pushing the bloc to do more strategic and visionary planning regarding future projects linked to its energy security, such as TCGP, and finally diversify away from Russian energy sources for good. Azerbaijan has proved to be a stable partner in these challenging times, which manifested the vulnerability of certain EU states against Russian economic and political pressure due to Gazprom’s immense infiltration of their gas markets for the past several decades. Now it’s the time to play fair game by a new playbook and to remap the European energy partners while investing in a stable, predictable, affordable, and sustainable energy future for the EU.

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