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East Asia

Significance of Sino-Vietnam Relations

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Authors: Do Quynh-Anh & Jack Balavadze

It is true that the political institutions in Vietnam are profoundly influenced by China. When China conducted the economic reform in 1978, Vietnam faced with new situations domestically and internationally, also followed the Chinese footsteps by the Innovation or Doimoi in 1986. If during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and China played the important role as the supporters of Vietnam, after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), China became more important and meaningful partner for Vietnam. It is not only the captain of the remaining communist countries, the largest remaining, but also a good example of reform. That is the valuable experience for Vietnam in Doimoi process. Since the normalization of relations in 1991, China and Vietnam have developed a stable relationship on two pillars: First, the regular exchanges between the Communist Party and the governments of the two countries set up to expand cooperation, manage affairs and disagreements and resolve disputes through peaceful negotiation. Second, Vietnam and China join multilateral mechanisms, especially the mechanisms led by ASEAN to implement preventive measures and preventive diplomacy. Based on these two pillars, the political trust and cooperation in various fields between the two countries are reinforced and expanded rapidly.

Given this, when the socialist regime no longer prevails in the world as in the Cold War period, only five communist party-ruled countries left in the world – China, Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba and Laos. The relationship between Vietnam and China became more and more essential. In particular, facing the complex global political situation and incessant integration, the “hostile forces” are always waiting for the chance to fight against socialism and overthrow the communist states. This demands the two parties and two states to come closer together, to deal with all kinds of external attacks. Communist regime could not be considered as the optimal choice, but at the present time, it plays an important role in stabilizing the social order of the both countries, a collapse of each side will be likely to cause the collapse of the other or at least it also causes unstable security and society situation.

Economically, both the Chinese Communist Party Congress XIV (10/1992) and the Vietnamese Communist Party Congress VI (12/1986) declared the goal of “building the market economy-oriented socialist regime”. This explains why Vietnam and China together share the same economic development model with the leading role of the state-owned enterprises. So, the economic cooperation between the two sides has many advantages such as fast procedures, many incentives, advantage of transportation. The economic relations between Vietnam and China in recent years have been carried out in various forms. Besides the traditional forms such as trade, development aid, economic and technical cooperation between the two governments, there is also private economic cooperation which still is small in scale. The exchange of commodities across the land border has been developed extensively. The land border between the two countries is nearly 1,450 km includes 7 provinces of Vietnam and 2 provinces of China.  All of these forms have developed very vibrantly and effectively. Economic relations between Vietnam and China has a “win-win” content. The bilateral trade benefit of the two countries is a truism. China is currently the 8th largest foreign investor in Vietnam and Vietnam is China’s largest trade partner in ASEAN. The economic dependence between the two sides is reflected in each other’s role.

Chinese enterprises have won contracts in major national projects, especially in power projects, infrastructure. For FDI, according to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), for the first 10 months of 2017, the registered capital in total  from China is over 1.8 billion USD, ranking 8th out of 128 countries investing in Vietnam. Until September 2017, China had 1,747 FDI projects with a total investment of more than US $ 11.9 billion invested in Vietnam.

The industries of Vietnam heavily depends on China, most of the basic materials for manufacturing products of Vietnam (fabric, electronic components …) are imported from China. China also has built up a developed auxiliary industry. China is known as the world’s factory currently, with the advantage on fast production, low price, competitive models, plenty of types. Therefore import from China is a reasonable choice, both fast and convenient, creating a larger surplus value while preserving the environment.

In terms of agriculture, China is still the main buyer of most of Vietnam’s raw agricultural products (pepper, fruit, sugar cane, etc.). Vietnam is currently lacking a closed production process as well as output of products. These factors have made China be an indispensable part of the Vietnamese economy, especially in terms of agriculture and industry, with both input and output. It is estimated that if China ends its bilateral economic relations with Vietnam, Vietnam’s GDP will decrease by 10%. Currently, Vietnam is one of the largest export markets for China and the largest trade partner of China in ASEAN. According to Chinese statistics, in the first nine months of 2017, the total value of Chinese exports to Vietnam reached 49.8 billion dollars. China is keeping trade surplus in bilateral trade, so that the annual flow of foreign currencies from Vietnam to China plays a not small role in its budget. China wants to ensure that the flow of capital from the country at the lowest level of cost, through the establishment of AIIB, exchange foreign currency with the aim of “Repositioning the stature of the world’s second largest economy.” In addition, as mentioned above, with the strength of a developed agricultural country rich natural recourses, Vietnam is one of the main supply sources of raw materials at relatively cheap price for China. Moreover, Vietnam is also an important link in the new economic policy set by President Xi Jinping for the B & R initiative with the aim to re-build the “Silk Road legend” which will connect China with Europe. Vietnam obviously should not stand outside because the silk-road passes through the most of ASEAN countries.

Up to the present time, Vietnam and China have had a long-time trade relationship so any changes will make the two sides face the risk of crisis, causes the losses for the both sides. On the prospect of Sino-Vietnamese relations, despite there are many disagreements such as the South China Sea issue but it is not the whole Sino-Vietnamese relations. The leaders of the two countries will not, because of this issue, ruin the good relations between two sides. They will continue to work together to promote bilateral friendly cooperation. At present, China and Vietnam have agreed to build the relations on the basis of common interests and mutual benefit. The two parties have been working together to implement and abide by the international conventions such as the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (COC), with the aim of restraining conflicts and disagreements in the South China Sea and the region which will create a platform for the development of the relations of the two countries.

In addition, at present time, with the goal of becoming a leading power in the international arena, China still needs a stable environment domestically and internationally to continue to strengthen its capabilities, stable alliances, relationships with other regional. They all are best measures for China in order to build a better position on the way of rise.

In summary, in the present context, the important premise for the stable and healthy development of China-Vietnam relations in long-term is to implement effectively the agreements reached between the two sides, handle the disagreements, reinforcement of mutual trust, promotion of cooperation for the benefit of each side, public diplomatic promotion of friendship between the peoples of two countries.

*Do Quynh-anh is a PhD student from Vietnam, and Jack Balavadze is MA student from Georgia. Both are studying in Jilin University, China

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East Asia

Standing up to China: Czech mayor sets a high bar

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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A Czech mayor’s refusal to endorse Beijing’s One China policy potentially sets a high bar as Western powers grapple with how to respond to allegations of excessive use of violence by police against Hong Kong protesters and the implications of leaked documents detailing a brutal crackdown in China’s north-western province of Xinjiang.

Prague mayor Zdenek Hrib rejected a sister city agreement between the Czech capital and Beijing in late October because it included a clause endorsing the One China policy, which implicitly recognizes China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, as well as Hong Kong and Tibet.

Mr. Hrib argued that the agreement was a cultural arrangement and not designed to address foreign policy issues that were the prerogative of the national government.

The mayor’s stance has since taken on added significance against the backdrop of US President Donald J. Trump’s signing of legislation that allows for the sanctioning of Hong Kong officials, embarrassing Communist party leaks that document repression in Xinjiang, the election of a new Sri Lankan government that intends to adopt a tougher policy towards China, and simmering anti-Chinese sentiment in Central Asia and beyond.

Mr. Hrib’s rejection was in fact a reflection of anti-Chinese sentiment in the Czech Republic as well as opposition to the pro-China policy adopted by Czech president Milos Zeman.

To be sure, Mr. Hrib, a 38-year old medical doctor who interned in Taiwan, was shouldering little political or economic risk given Czech public anger at China’s failure to fulfil promises of significant investment in the country.

On the contrary, Mr. Hrib, since becoming mayor in mid-2018, appears to have made it his pastime to put Mr. Zeman on the spot by poking a finger at China.

Mr. Hrib visited Taiwan in the first six months of his mayorship, flew the Tibetan flag over Prague’s city hall, and rejected a request by the Chinese ambassador at a meeting with foreign diplomats to send Taiwanese representatives out of the room.

Beijing’s cancellation of a tour of China by the Prague Philharmonic Orchestra in response to Mr. Hrib’s provocations forced Mr. Zeman to describe the Chinese retaliation as “excessive” and his  foreign minister, Tomas Petricek, to declare that “diplomacy is not conducted with threats.”

Perhaps more importantly, M. Hrib was taking a stand based on principles and values rather than interests. In doing so, he was challenging the new normal of world leaders flagrantly ignoring international law to operate on the principle of might is right.

“Our conscience is not for sale,” said Michaela Krausova, a leading member of the governing Pirate Party of the Prague city council. Ms. Krausova and Mr. Hrib’s party was founded to shake up Czech politics with its insistence on the safeguarding of civil liberties and political accountability and transparency.

While couched in terms of principle, Mr. Hrib’s stand strokes with newly installed Sri Lankan president Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s intention to wrest back control from China of the island’s strategic Hambantota port that serves key shipping lanes between Europe and Asia.

Hambantota became a symbol of what some critics have charged is Chinese debt trap diplomacy after Sri Lanka was forced to hand over the port to China in 2017 on a 99-year lease because the government was unable to repay loans taken to build it.

“I believe that the Sri Lankan government must have control of all strategically important projects like Hambantota. The next generation will curse our generation for giving away precious assets otherwise,” Mr. Rajapaksa said.

Fears of a debt trap coupled with the crackdown on Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, which targets not only Uighurs, but also groups that trace their roots to Central Asian countries, have fuelled anti-Chinese sentiment in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.

“Given that China is likely to continue to expand its presence, further irritating local publics, the temptation of opposition groups to exploit such anger will only grow. If that happens…the anti-Chinese demonstrations that have taken place to date will be only the prelude to a situation that could easily spiral out of control, ethnicizing politics in these countries still further,” said Central Asia scholar Paul Goble.

Beyond Xinjiang, anti-Chinese sentiment in Central Asia is fuelled by some of the same drivers that inform Czech attitudes towards China.

The shared drivers include unfulfilled promises, idle incomplete Chinese-funded infrastructure projects, widespread corruption associated with Chinese funding, and the influx of Chinese labour and materials at the expense of the local work force and manufacturers.

Beyond Xinjiang, Central Asians worry about potential debt traps. The Washington-based Center for Global Development listed last year two Central Asian nations, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as risking China-related “debt distress.”

Warned China and Central Asia scholar Ayjaz Wani: “Chinese principles in Central Asia are hegemonic. China has always interacted with Central Asian states without regarding their cultural identities, but according to its own vested interests… However, the ongoing anti-China sentiments may be coming to a tipping point.

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Old wine in new bottles: Chinese containment policy in South Asia

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A lot of discussion in international relations scholarship is concentrated upon how US maximizing its security presence in the Asia-Pacific region. It is trying to contain, growing Chinese Influence to protect its national interest.It was described by former US President Barack Obama as a pivot Asia policy. But in the case of South Asia, United States is strengthening its ties with India to boost it as a force to contain Chinese emerging influence. It was termed by John J Mearsheimer as buck-passing in which a world superpower will give power and authority to another state to try to contain the influence of an emerging world hegemon. The Indo-US nuclear deal and former President Barack Obama’s remarks about the inclusion of India inthe United Nations Security council demonstrates that the United States is helping India to rise as the regional hegemon. India considers itself as an important actor at international level.It is increasing its political clout internationally but in South Asia, it can face a new kind of isolation. This is evident from the three recent events that occurred in a span of only 10 days in the first half of October

On 07th October Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan visited China with high-level delegation. He met there with Chinese President Xi Jinping and other important officials, it was his third visit to China since he came into power. During the meeting, both leaders, Imran Khan and Xi Jinping, discussed strengthening bilateral relations which are already at a higher level in terms of military and economic partnership. China is already working on a project to invest more than $50 billion under the name of China Pakistan Economic corridor let alone the cooperation on strategic and political issues. During the course of the visit, officials from both sides discussed Free Trade agreement which will be helpful in solving the problem of trade deficit for Pakistan. Total trade volume between China and Pakistan is around $15 billion in which Chinese export to Pakistan is of 13 billion. This Free Trade Agreement will open up about 90% of the Chinese market to Pakistan and will reduce trade deficit. During his meeting with Imran Khan, Xi Jinping accepted Kashmir as a disputed region and asked both parties to solve it through peaceful means.

All this happened just a few days before the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India.Although both countries have made some progress on economy-related issues, no concrete efforts have been made to solve more radical issues like Indo-China border dispute in the northern Himalayan region. However more astonishing for India was that Xi Jinping visited Nepal after India. Nepal is a landlocked country crammed between two South Asia giants India and China. India is present on three sides of Nepal and considers it as its backyard. Both countries did have very solid relations and 60% of total Nepalese trade is done with India. In 2015 when Nepal adopted new constitution, relations between both countries soured. Although it was the internal matter of Nepal, India put an unofficial blockade for Nepal, which stopped all the supplies including food and medicine. Blockade continued for more than two months and it created a severe crisis because Nepal was already damaged by a strong earthquake in early 2015 in which more than 9000 people died. This blocked proved decisive in changing behavior of Nepalese leadership though they were complaining of Indian hegemonic role for many years. Nepal turned toward China for their needs. China also responded in a very positive way. Besides reconstructing earthquake effected areas, China also provided 1.03 million liters of fuel. In 2017 Nepal signed China’s Belt and Road initiative and pledged to construct a railway line which will connect China with Nepal directly. This initiated a new beginning in China-Nepal relations.

When Xi Jinping arrived at Katmandu, China by this time was thelargest foreign direct investor in Nepal.It was the first visit by any Chinese president in the last 23 years.During the course of his visit, 18 agreements were signed between Nepal and China, including a railway link between China and Nepal.

These three important tours in less than ten days present the new geopolitical reality of the region. Although the Chinese president visited India but this visit was sandwiched between Imran Khan’s visit to China and Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal. Pakistan is an arch-rival of India in South Asia and Nepal which historically remained in the Indian sphere of influence,  is slowly slipping away from it.it clearly demonstrates containment policy by China in which China is progressively growing its influence in South Asian states. The Story does not end with Pakistan and Nepal but other South Asian states like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka now also have very strong ties with China.it represents in a new normal situation in which South Asian region is no longer dominated by India. Though India is showing to the world that it is solely protecting peace and stability in the region but reality has changed In fact South Asian states consider it as dominating power evident from its relation with Pakistan and blockade of Nepal. With growing Chinese influence in South Asia containment of India is now very much a reality.

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East Asia

How Australia is becoming China’s Australia

Sisir Devkota

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If it were not for China, Australia’s population inroad scheme would take a serious hit. Out of more than 0.7 million international students, more than 30% Chinese are pursuing degrees in universities. Australia lives along the values of  the Western culture, but when it comes to its economy, rather dishonourably; it has had to lean towards the East. Chinese consumerism compensates for a healthy Australian economy and while it stands stronger on its democratic values, Australia, now faces a paradoxical relationship with the Asian hegemon. For instance, it is quietly ignoring the protests in Hong Kong. During recent elections, the Australian Prime Minister was mocked on WeChat; his funny nuances were subject to ridicule in the Chinese social media.

Now, Australia is facing the task. It is fighting a battle to save its identity against a consumer band, governed by communist policies. China’s message is clear; an interference of any sort is not welcome, else the consequences are going to be economical. Emancipated Chinese students in Australia have been protesting against the government backlash in Hong Kong. Resultantly, back home in China, apartments were raided and their parents taught the lesson of conformity. A lesson of nationalism that has blossomed outside its territories. Australia is swallowing up the hypocrisy. On its own land, it cannot protect the values of freedom and democracy.

Wang LiQiang or as he would like to be known as “William”, took to the Australian authorities for his involvement in spying activities. In his own admission, William was conducting intelligence operations and most significantly, assassinations on Australian soil. William is only one among high profile spies that have been operating in Australia. Ironically, his testament sufficiently reflects the Australian attitude towards Chinese interference, which has essentially been negligent and non-conversational. Notably, William’s particular mention about operating a system of political donation will nevertheless disturb Australian administrators. They will realize that it is only about time when China will explicitly begin to reassert its influence. The police did not find Wang Li Qiang; instead, he volunteered to surrender. Especially, coming from a senior Chinese operative, the message could not be clearer.

On the outset, China and Australia maintain a well-documented “good relationship”. However, administrative hierarchies in Canberra are also accused of implying a very positive attitude towards presenting and defending bilateral ties. As much as economic interests have motivated the Australian behaviour of non-acceptance, politicians do not shy away from painting an over simplified picture of Chinese problems that are realistically, complex in nature. As Prime Minister Scott Morrison handled the allegations of a Chinese backed ring that was trying to plot a spy in the parliament; the government has tried too hard to overlook the obvious. Mr. Morrison urged his citizens to not draw anxious conclusions, instead; he suggested that Australia would need to be vigilant from the threats that it faced more broadly. The substitutability of discourse that is apparent in Australian politics, marks a rather gifted trade-off for China and its actions. Andrew Hastie, parliamentary head of intelligence and security, claimed that such incidents did not surprise him. As more evidences would suggest, Chinese interference was knocking at the doors.

In terms of China, there are two faces of Australian political rhetoric. One that is motivated by the larger interests in the administrative chairs of governance, overlooking the infiltration for personal benefits. Secondly, the critiques emanating from opposition politicians and the likes of intelligence chiefs, for instance ASIO’s former Directorate General, Duncan Lewis, warned that China would take over Australia in a matter of time. Elsewhere in the borders of the communist giant, two Australian MP’s were denied travel entry, citing largely undetermined reasons. With a population of merely 25 million inhabitants, 1.8 million Chinese students have migrated to Australia for education. The dragon is marching towards the continent, in a first, the troops are ready on site.

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