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Forced Population Transfers, Mass Expulsions, and Migration: The Law and its Claw

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Human inception with autochthonic affinities coated in political proclivities harbingered and vouched for exclusivity of ethnicity, race,and religion in every part of the world. But civilizations have been interacting, intermingling andintermixingever since the people have accomplished the art of movements from one place to another by utilizing and developing the transport technologies of all kinds. However, in the contemporary circumstances, humanity is at war per se that pandered to a catena of causes of population movements across the human spectrum. Population transfers, expulsions, and forced migrations that take place in inconsistent conditions and a wide diversity of circumstances at the moment are coordinatedby a convoluted hodge-podge of legal labyrinth comprising the IHRL—International Human Rights Law, IRL— International Refugee Law, IHL—International Humanitarian Law, and IDL—International Development Law.The population transfer is allowed only in rare and restricted circumstances, with the standards of lawful transfer determined by explicit or implicit prohibitions contemplated predominantly in IHRL and IHL.

The Draft Population Transfer Declaration (PTD) defines illegal Population Transfer and the Implantation of Settlers, 1997 annexed to the Final Report of Special Rapporteur Al-Khasawneh, which was acceptedby the UNCHR (UN Commission on Human Rights) and ECOSOC in 1998. The PTDwas drafted by the UNCHR’s Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which was renamed as Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 1999 until its functions and responsibilities were assumed in 2006 by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The Article 3 of the PTD defines “unlawful population transfer” as “a policy or practice having the goal or result of transferring the people into or out of a territory either within or across an international boundary or within into or out of an occupied territorywithout the informed and free consent of such transferred population and any obtaining population.”The focus of this entry is, first, in those circumstances in which expulsions and transfers may be lawful; and, second, upon the preconditions, limitations, and other requirements, including most notably the right to compensation which needs to be satisfied to render such transfers lawful. However, the forced population transfers have been ruminated upon separately.

The Genesis of the Legal Norms

History is replete with instances of population transfer and its devastating effects on communities and individuals. There is no shortage of examples: population transfer and slavery; dispossession of indigenous peoples; population transfers as a result of treaties. Forthree centuries, before the slave trade was legally prohibited in Britain in 1807,  and afterwards, at the international level,by the General Act of the Brussels Conference Relating to the African Slave Trade-1890, the Slavery Convention-1926 and the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practice Similar to Slavery-1956, was banned. The transatlantic slave traders enslaved and transported at least 12 million Africans to the Americas. The American Colonization Society, established in 1816, organized the transportation of free black Americans and manumittedand emancipated the slaves to Liberia, a policy which generated significant debate and which had been disputedat the time by many African-Americans. While deportation for slave labourwas rightly condemned as a war crime at Nuremberg, the failure of the Tokyo Tribunal to condemn the transfer of “Comfort Women” into sexual slavery during World War-II has been justly castigated.It has been highlighted in the Gender-Based Crimes judgment handed down by the non-governmental organization calledWomen’s International War Crimes Tribunal that conducted the Trial of Japan’s Military establishment’s Sexual Slavery in 2001.

Indigenous people have been subject to widespread population transfers. Colonialism and Colonization led to the large-scale dispossession of indigenous peoples. Beginning with the Indian Removal Act, 1830[28 May 1830] whereunder an Exchange of Lands instead of the Indians Residing in any of the States, or Territories, and for Their Removal from the West of the Mississippi Riverwas provided.Consequently, series of statutes in the United States of America provided for the forcible removal of an estimated 100,000 Native Americans to reservations to make way for the settlers. Segregationist practices and policies in South Africa saw the creation of reserves for Africans and eventually led a system of apartheid based on Racial and Religious Discrimination popularly also known as South African Bantustan Policy to the establishment of the much-criticized homelands. Article-II (d) of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973 prohibits, among other things, the creation of separate reserves on racial grounds. However, indigenous people continue to suffer population transfers often as a result of development projects reported by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996 of administrative and development relocations of Canadian aboriginal people.

The population transfers have also been provided for by treaty. Greece and Bulgaria agreed to the consensual exchange of minorities in the 1919 Convention Respecting Reciprocal Emigration. The Convention relating to the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations-1923whereunder compulsory transfer of 1.5 million ethnic Greek population of Turkish nationality, and 400,000 ethnic Turks of Greek citizenshipwas provided. The treaty provided for a commission of representatives from Greece, Turkey, and the Council of the League of Nations to supervise transfers and the payment of compensation. However, controversy ascended over its scope ratione personae.  When the treaty’s compensation provisions proved unworkable, they were replaced by lump sum agreements.

The Legality of Forced Population Transfers

The legality of forced or compulsory population transfer was robustly contested at the time both at and beyond the conference table. Extensive population transfers took place before, during, and after World War-II, including those resulting from some bilateral population transfer treaties between the Reich and, for example, Italy, the Baltics, and the Soviet Union. Typically these deals included an “option clause” although it has been disputedwhether, in practice, consent was freely given. It is more accurate to categorize these events as a forced population transfer, as millions of individuals were in fact forcibly expelled (whether from the German-occupied territory, or within the Soviet Union) in blatant and unprecedented violations of international law.

At the conclusion of World War II, compulsory population transfers continued on a massive scale in Europe by inter-State agreement. A few weeks after the Allies adopted the UN Charter, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the US agreed at the Potsdam Conference-1945 that transfer to Germany of the German population in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland “will have to be undertaken” as per the Article XIII of the Potsdam Protocol and should “be effected in an orderly and humane manner” although in practice it was neither. The legality of the Potsdam Protocol under international law, as well as the subsequent forced population transfer, was stronglycontested at that time.Particularly, Article 7 of the PTD provides that international agreement can not legalize population transfers which violate fundamental human rights norms. Post-World War-II population transfers were not limited to German minorities: the agreement between Hungary and Czechoslovakia to exchange 200,000 Magyars and 200,000 Slovaks in February 1946 represents just one of some bilateral population exchange agreements of the impugned period.

The Potsdam Protocol has been regardedas an attempt to validate expulsions already in progress, as much as an endeavour to regulate future population transfers. Similarly, the Agreement between India and Pakistan on Minorities designated as “New Delhi Accord”-1950 served more like a “formal recognition of a fait accompli of the population transfer of about ten million population of Hindus and Muslims between India and Pakistanin the wake of the partition of the Indian Sub-continent in 1947. As the Preliminary Report observes, while such transfers were in some degree consensual and aimed at avoiding inter-ethnic conflict, they involved “a tragic human rights trade-off.” During the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, numerous resolutions by the UN Security Council (UNSC), including UNSC Resolution 826 (1993) and 859 (1993) called for the reversal of the effects of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia in its post-dissolution stage. However, some commentators criticized the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia, and Herzegovina popularly designated as Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war in 1995, for affirming territorial changes brought about by ethnic cleansing.

With the entrenchment of IHRL in the second half of the 20th century, it is increasingly accepted that population transfers violate a series of human rights guarantees as identified in the judgments of Cyprus v. Turkey delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on May 10, 2001. The Cyprus v. Turkeywas decided by the European Commission of Human Rights on October 04, 1992.The Sub-Commission constituted forthe Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,and its Special Rapporteur studied the population transfer from the early 1990s, and his Final Report was published in 1997. The Final Report had recommended the adoption of a Comprehensive International Instrument on Population Transfer and appended the Model Declaration on Population Transfer to apply in all situations, and to all persons, groups, and authorities under Articles 1 and 2wherein a number of its terms reflect the current customary international law.Moreover, the jurisprudence developed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has also significantly influenced the development of the law on forced population transfer.

The Current Legal Phantasmagoria

If the international legal policy has changed over time to restrict the legality of population transfer, history offers valuable lessons. Firstly, it regrettably demonstrates the recurrent use of population transfers in State and nation-building. Secondly, it shows the international community’s all-too-frequent de facto acceptance of population transfer or its effects in pursuit of its perception of how the interests of peace are best served. Thirdly, as instances of population transfer demonstrate, the enforcement of law poses considerable challenges. But it is also worth emphasizing the existence of significant new problems, including the question of climatic displacement identified in the UNHCR “Forced Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for States under International Law.” Therefore, the Forced population transfers are, as the Preliminary Report concluded, prima facie unlawful because they violate core norms of IHRL and IHL. A vast pool of human rights instruments prohibit the mass expulsion of nationals and aliens, and the rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) not to be arbitrarily displaced is recognized in the authoritative soft law developed by the UN Secretary-General’s Representative on Internal Displacement adopted as UN ECOSOC “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” in 1998.

As Article 3 of the PTD makes clear, the concept of population transfer encompasses settler infusion such as the implantation of Moroccan, Indonesian, and Chinese settlers into Western Sahara, East Timor, and Tibet respectively. By altering the demographic composition of host populations, settler infusions can jeopardize the exercise of the right to self-determination. In practice settler infusion and expulsion are often related, as is illustrated by the illegal expulsion under the government of late Saddam Hussein of ethnic minorities from oil-rich regions of northern Iraq, accompanied by the resettlement of Arabs in furtherance of a policy of “Arabization.” However, in certain assiduouslydefined circumstances, population transfers may be lawful. Article 3 of the PTD makes the legality of population transfer dependent on the informed consent of host and transferred populations. In areview of Special Rapporteur Al-Khasawneh’s “Progress Report” under Para 25 along with international jurisprudence and international conventions, concludes that this principle of consent has reached the status of a general principle of international law. The transfer is non-consensual where it is forcible, coerced, or induced.  As obtaining informed consent often presents considerable difficulty, the Progress Report rightly emphasizes the need for monitoring mechanisms to ensure officialapproval.

International Human Rights Law

Additionally, population transfers may be lawful in certain situations such as national emergency, public disorder, or environmental crises, but in each case only subject to the fulfillment of conditions for lawful derogation from non-derogable human rights in thestate of emergency. For example, while it follows from the protection of freedom of movement under Article 12 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-1966 (ICCPR), Article 13 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR), and Article 5 of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) that population transfer within a State or across an international border is prohibited, derogations from the right to freedom of movement, to the choice of residence, to leave, and to return are permitted. Such derogations are tightly circumscribed and limited to the public interest and compensation must be awarded as expounded by the “Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report of November 29, 1983,ona section of the Nicaraguan population of Miskito origin and their Human Rights conditions. Similarly, Article 4 of the PTD permits displacement only where either the safety of the transferred population or imperative military reasons demand. In such circumstances, displaced persons should be allowed to return immediately when the conditions rendering their displacement imperatively cease. Transfers must not interfere with minority and indigenous rights of the host population.  Where the purpose or means of population transfer violate norms of jus cogens (peremptorynorms of international law), it is, indeed, prohibited.

Forced Population Transfer & Indigenous Peoples

The Preliminary Report states that population transfer is the primary cause of land loss of the indigenous people as it constitutes a principal factor in the process of ethnocide as discussed at Para 101 of the Report. However, while Article16 (1) of International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989) states that indigenous peoples should not be removed from the lands they inhabit. This fundamental principle is subject to the exception and prerequisites detailed in Article16 (2) of ILO Convention No 169 as follows:Where the relocation of these peoples is considered to be necessary as an exceptional measure, therefore, such kind of relocation shall take place only with their free and informed consent. Where their consent cannot be obtained or ascertained, such relocation shall take place just following appropriate procedures or due process established by the national laws and regulationsincluding public inquiries where necessary, which provide the opportunity for valid representation of the peoples concerned.

If relocation occurs, indigenous peoples are entitled to be compensated for loss or injury as provided under Article 16 (5) of ILO Convention No 169 and they enjoy a right to return “wherever possible” once the reasons for relocation cease to apply [(Art. 16 (3) ILO Convention No 169)]. Where areturn is impossible, indigenous peoples should be provided with comparable alternative lands or, should they prefer, compensation (Art. 16 (4) ILO Convention No 169). These provisions concerning consent and compensation represent international custom (Progress Report Para. 27). Many indigenous groups have disassociated themselves from the convention, in part because of the overly permissive tenor of Article 16 of ILO Convention No 169 favours the State. The convention has also been criticized for failing to acknowledge the importance of the relationship of indigenous peoples to a particular place (Preliminary Report Para. 257). The non-binding Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 13 September 2007, addresses some of these criticisms. Having noted in its Preamble the concern for the historical injustices indigenous people have suffered, among other things through colonization and the dispossession of lands, Article 10 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples subjects relocation of indigenous people to their “free, prior and informed consent” in unqualified terms after “agreement on just and fair compensation” with an option to return where possible.“The Declaration on the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights” further provides that indigenous peoples have a right to redress and reparation for lands that have been taken or used in the past without their consent under Article 28. The Declarationobliges States to provide effective mechanisms to prevent and contain redress for forced population transfer under Article 8 (c) of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples regarding Environment and Indigenous Peoples also.

Population Transfer and Development

Beyond the context of indigenous people’s rights, the legality of population transfers carried out to make way for development projects is not currently subject to specific regulation by international treaties on the progressive development of International Law. However, referring to sources such as the principle of self-determination enshrined in Article 1 of the ICCPR-1966.UN resolutions on the development and human rights and development and the environment, the Preliminary Report authoritatively argues that customary international law already governs these incidences of population transfer (at Paras 300–311). The Final Report concludes that the legality of such population transfers depends on them being non-discriminatory, in the public interest, that they do not deprive people of their means of subsistence, and are subject to the consent of the people to be transferred. Their consent must be procured after dialogue and negotiation with the population’s elected representatives on “terms of equality, fairness,and transparency” (Article 68, Final Report). The transferred people should be provided with monetary compensation as well as equivalent land, housing, occupation, and employment.

Since 1980 the World Bank has responded to international pressure by developing a policy on involuntary resettlement documented by the World Bank Group. Operational Directive 4.30 (1990) was replaced in 2001 by Operational Policy 4.12 on-Involuntary Resettlement, as revised in February 2011. Reports have documented great enforcement difficulties, however, and resettlement has faced popular resistance as recorded on pages 211–212. The transnational coalition against the Narmada river dams contributed to the World Bank withdrawing its funding in 1993. A cross-border campaign, together with a negative World Bank Inspection Panel Report, led the Bank to withdraw its support for the China Western Poverty Reduction Project, which would have involved the settler infusion of around 58,000 Chinese into Tibet.

Population Transfer in Armed Conflict

Apart from voluntary transfers during international armed conflicts, under Article 49 of the 4thGeneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War-1949 provides that during hostilities, temporary evacuation is permissible only where it is necessary for the “security of the population” or where “imperative military reasons do demand.”  Similar arguments are also advanced in situations of International Armed Conflicts and Military Necessity etc. Even then, temporary evacuation is subject to some conditions. Firstly, displacement is not permitted outside the territorial boundaries of the occupied State unless impossible to avoid “for material reasons” (Article 49, Geneva Convention-IV). Secondly, on the cessation of hostilities evacuees should be returned home. Thirdly, occupying powers are obliged to provide “to the greatest practicable extent” proper accommodation for those evacuated, and evacuations should be carried out “in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety,and nutrition.” Fourthly, family members should not be separated, and finally, protecting powers should be informed of all kinds of population transfers.

The transfer of acivilian population by an occupying power of its civilian population into occupied territory is also prohibited. However, there arefew disputes as to whether it constitutes a grave breach of the customary international law?In 2004, the ICJ held in the case of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Territory of Palestine and its Legal Consequences [2004] ICJ Rep. 136 Para 134 popularly called “Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion Case” that the construction of the wall and “its associated régime” violated the rights of the people of the Occupied Territory to freedom of movement, work, an adequate standard of living, education, and healthas well as the Jus Cogens right of self-determination.

In non-international armed conflicts, displacement is permitted only where it is required for the security of the transferees or imperative military necessity. In this case, Article 17 of the Additional Protocol-II, 1977 to Geneva Conventions-1949 requires that “all possible measures” must be taken to ensure the transferred population is “received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, safety, health, hygiene,and nutrition.” Otherwise, population transfers “for reasons relatingto the conflict” are forbidden. The Final Report calls for the parameters of the concept of “military necessity” to be further developed to prevent abuse advocated at Para. 39. However, the belligerents have “broad powers” to expel enemy nationals during an armed conflict as documented and titled under Civilians Claims: Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23, 27–32 Para. 81 and further Paras 82 and 99; Civilians Claims: Ethiopia’s Claim 5 Para. 121. These powers are not, however, unlimited. Belligerents must ensure the application of humanitarian law,and humanitarian standards, including those contained in Articles 35 and 36 Geneva Convention IV enshrined in the Civilians Claims: Ethiopia’s Claim 5 Para. 122) but “Indiscriminate rounds-ups and expulsions based on ethnicity” are unlawful.

Remedies and Enforcement

Unlawful population transfer gives rise to State responsibility and individual criminal responsibility under Article 9 of the PTD where population transfers occur within the territorial boundaries of a single State, it may be difficult if not impossible to identify a State that is injured and, therefore, entitled to bring a claim under the traditional principles of State responsibility. However, third States may incur duties of non-recognition and non-assistance (the Construction of a Wall and itsLegal Consequences in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Case [Advisory Opinion, Para. 136]. From Britain’s naval interdiction of slave traders in the first part of the 19thcentury through to the use of force by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against Yugoslavia wherein the right of humanitarian intervention to prevent population transfer has been contested in the case popularly known as Legality of the Use of Force Case (Yugoslavia v Spain, Provisional Measures Order).

The right to return is central to restitution in inter-regnum under Article 8 of the PTD. Evidence for its customary international law status can be drawn from some international instruments such as provisions in human rights instruments, e.g. Article 13 (2) of the UDHR, Article 5 of the ICERD, Article 12 (4) of the ICCPR, Article 22 (5) of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, and Article 12 (2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981as well as UN Resolutions, Peace Agreements and Soft Law relating to IDPs (UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998). The Final Report considers that the State of origin is obliged to facilitate return (at Para. 60). The Dayton Peace Agreement made the return of refugees and displaced persons an “important objective of the settlement and resolution of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina”as enunciated in Annexure 7, Article 1 (1) of Dayton Peace Agreement. It provides for refugees and displaced people to return to their “homelands of origin,” leaving the choice of destination to the returnees, and for the return of their property and compensation.

The practice of return has proved problematic with multi-dimensional ramifications as the right has been insufficiently enforced is illustrated by repeated failures to implement UNGA Resolution 194 (III) (1948) concerning the return of Palestinian refugees, and to secure the return of refugees in Cyprus. Likewise, security concerns and delay in resolving property claims have proved formidable obstacles to implementing return provisions in the Dayton Peace Agreement. Moreover, the scope of the right to return, particularly the effect of the passage of time, is unclear. As the Final Report states, “peace is ultimately an act of compromise” as noted at Para 63.Thus, the ECtHR has observed that:

“It cannot be within this Court’s purview in interpreting and applying the provisions of the Convention to execute an unconditional obligation on a Government to get on on the forcible ejection and rehousing of possibly large numbers of people (men, women, and children) even with the aim of justifying the rights of victims of violations of the Convention” (Demopoulos v. Turkey, Para. 116).

Of significant legal contestation is the effect of the Oslo Accords, which do not refer to UNGA Resolution 194 (III) on the right to return of Palestinian refugees. In 2003, the Danish Supreme Court refused to grant a right of return to the Thule tribe who were relocated in 1953 to facilitate the establishment of a US airbase, although it did order the payment of compensation (Hingitaq 53 v Prime Minister’s Office, Danish Supreme Court [28 November 2003] (2004) 98 AJIL 572).Similarly, on a number of occasions the whilst English courts have ruled that Britain’s removal of the Chagos Islanders between 1965 and 1973 to make way for an American Military Base, and the Orders in Council (2004) preventing their return, are illegal (R. [Bancoult] v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [No 2] [2007] EWCA Civ 498). The British government has opposed long-term resettlement, and the House of Lords has subsequently, on appeal, upheld the legality of prerogative orders preventing the unrestricted return of the Chagos Islanders (R [Bancoult] v. Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [No 2] [2008] UKHL 61).

Entitlement to compensation for unlawful population transfer forms part of duty on the part of the responsible State to compensate victims of human rights abuses, which is increasingly gaining recognition in modern international law (Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur Paras 590–603). Such a right is also recognized in specific international instruments, sometimes as a prerequisite to the lawfulness of transfer, but also for loss and injury arising from the transfer (Article 16, ILO Convention No 169; Article 8 of the PTD; Principle 29of UN Guiding Principles, 1998). The Progress Report suggests that in the case of lawful transfer damage should be compensated “as a matter of equity” as per Para137 that analyses the Equity in International Law. There is also judicial recognition of a victim’s right to receive compensation for loss arising out of population transfer as stipulated in the Loizidou Case. This right may require general measures to be taken at the national level according to the Broniowski Case, Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey [ECtHR]). Further, in Demopoulos v. Turkey, the ECtHR dismissed the claims of Greek Cypriots based on the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights(ECHR) under its Article 8 and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, holding that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Immovable Property Commission provided “an accessible and practical framework of redressal in regarding complaints about interference with the property owned by Greek Cypriots adumbrated at Para 127. Amongst the recommendations of the Final Report at Para 74 is the establishment of an International Trust Fund (ITF) for rehabilitation of population transfer survivors. The issue of reparations for the slave trade remains contested which has been shown by discussions taking place during the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban in 2001.

Conclusion

It may aptly be understood that presently many regions in the world mainly Balkans and the Caucasus in Europe, South Asia (Statelessness) and South East Asia  (displaced persons—Rohingya refugees) have been devastated by ethnic and racial conflicts. The global conflicts in Gulf region, Syria, Yemen, Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Lebanon, etc. have triggered massive human displacements, refugee migration and asylum seekers that have been forcing people to flee within their homelands or abroad owing to fear of persecution.The absence of a single global instrument on population transfer leads to overlap, inaccessibility, and disparity in the level of protection available to victims of different forms of population transfer. Some of these problems would be overcome if States were to adopt the Population Transfer Declaration. Given the deleterious consequences of population transfer and the difficulties of enforcing the law on consent, return, and compensation, it might be questioned whether legal provisions still weigh too heavily in favor of States and entities seeking to transfer.

Ph. D., LL.M, Faculty of Legal Studies, South Asian University (SAARC)-New Delhi, Nafees Ahmad is an Indian national who holds a Doctorate (Ph.D.) in International Refugee Law and Human Rights. Author teaches and writes on International Forced Migrations, Climate Change Refugees & Human Displacement Refugee, Policy, Asylum, Durable Solutions and Extradition Issus. He conducted research on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Jammu & Kashmir and North-East Region in India and has worked with several research scholars from US, UK and India and consulted with several research institutions and NGO’s in the area of human displacement and forced migration. He has introduced a new Program called Comparative Constitutional Law of SAARC Nations for LLM along with International Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and International Refugee Law & Forced Migration Studies. He has been serving since 2010 as Senior Visiting Faculty to World Learning (WL)-India under the India-Health and Human Rights Program organized by the World Learning, 1 Kipling Road, Brattleboro VT-05302, USA for Fall & Spring Semesters Batches of US Students by its School for International Training (SIT Study Abroad) in New Delhi-INDIA nafeestarana[at]gmail.com,drnafeesahmad[at]sau.ac.in

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International Law

Human Rights and Democracy have been causalities of the COVID 19 Pandemic

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“Today, we face our own 1945 moment,” the United Nations Secretary General, António Guterres, said as he opened the UN’s 75th General Assembly in September last year.

The General Assembly was taking place as the COVID 19pandemic, which began as a global health crisis had developed into an economic and social crisis. Now it is also fuelling a crisis for democracy and human rights.   The scenes in Washington D.C in early January providing the perfect background tapestry to exemplify the shaky ground democracy now sits on.

The Secretary General’s speech in particular highlighted one important fact. A major crisis of any kind reveals existing fault lines and often acerbates them. This is true of the COVID 19 pandemic.  The current pandemic is exposing inequalities in societies (we are all in the same storm but not in the same boat); discrimination and xenophobia; and regressions in democracy and human rights.

Currently there is considerable discourse on how the pandemic is negatively impacting on democracy and human rights. Based on the experience of previous crisis these concerns are wholly valid.

The most frequent form of global crises are financial ones (see analysis). Politics usually takes a right turn following financial crises. For example the gains of extreme right-wing parties were particularly pronounced  in a number of countries after the global crises of the 1920s/1930s and after 2008.  Governing too tends to become more difficult after financial crises. Government majorities shrink and parliaments fragment. People take to the streets too. The average number of anti-government demonstrations almost triples, violent riots double and general strikes increase by at least one third.

These crises present clear political opportunity. Vladimir Putin came to power in the 1990s as reformer following the financial crisis in Russia in the 1990s. Recep Erdogan followed a similar trajectory to power in Turkey.

In many cases, these trends tend to taper out as some kind of stability emerges. But not always and a crisis be it health, financial or political have always presented opportunity for malign intentions. Hitler came to power (democratically) by appealing to the middle ground. In 1933 the poorest people in Germany voted for his opponents, the Communist Party and the moderate left-wing Social Democrats. Most of the rest – lower-middle classes, the bourgeoisie, the unorganized workers, the rural masses, and the older traditionalists switched their votes from the mainstream centrist and right-wing parties- backed him.

Hard economic times usually mean hard times for democracy, particularly when it is new and fragile. According to an analysis by Adam Przeworski who charted Democracies between 1950 to 1990, when democracies face a decline in income, they are three times more likely to disappear than when they experience economic growth. While the chance that a democracy will wither is 1 in 135 when incomes grow during any three or more consecutive years. The message is clear. Recessions are bad for democracy.  The economic disorder of the late 1920s and 1930s saw the end for a number of democracies in Europe and Latin America.

We are in that moment now with current threats against the four main pillars of democracy – holding free and fair elections, upholding the rule of law, recognizing the idea of legitimate opposition and protecting the integrity of rights.

global survey (Freedom House) of experts and activists on democracy and human rights, found by more than a fourfold margin they agreed that “overall, the coronavirus outbreak has been a setback for democracy and human rights in my main country of focus.” Some 64 per cent agreed that this negative impact would persist over the next three to five years, suggesting the setback for democracy may well outlast the health crisis.

There is much evidence to support this.

The pandemic is leading to a rapid expansion of executive power around the world. Countries from Hungary, the Philippines to Cambodia have all enacted legislation to deepen emergency powers. Hungary’s “Draft Law on Protecting Against Coronavirus” gives vast powers and although the act had a 90-day sunset clause, the government has already used the powers to make it illegal for transgender individuals to alter their birth records, hardly a public health priority.

Freedom of expression similarly has been restricted in many countries ostensibly to limit disinformation but often with nefarious intent. The Chinese government has censored information about its response and detained journalists who reported on the outbreak. In Thailand, citizens and journalists who criticize the government’s handling of the crisis face imprisonment. In Jordan, the Prime Minister now has the authority to suspend freedom of expression. Health concerns rightly have limited the number of public gatherings but suspicions abound of governments using legislation to limit or squash the right to demonstrate.

The crisis is also accelerating governments’ use of new surveillance technologies. China’s effective response to Covid-19 has increased global demand for its digital public health tools. These tools have been very effective as a public health mechanism but they provide governments with extraordinary abilities to track and monitor citizens. This technology poses a particular risk to fragile democracies and countries in the developing world, where independent institutions are weak.

One thing that fuels anti-democratic forces is the narrative that ‘autocracies’’ do better than democracies. This does not stand up to any rigorous examination. According to “10 rules  of successful Nations” by Ruchir Sharma democracies dominate the list of countries with the steadiest growth. Together, Sweden, France, Belgium and Norway have posted only one year of growth faster that 7% since 1950. However, over that time all four have seen average incomes increase five to six fold.  This is the stabilizing effect of democracy. Every large economy that has seen average income approaching $10,000 is a democracy. China with an average income approaching that number is trying to become a large rich autocracy. It would be the first.

Democracies generally remain the world’s wealthiest societies and the most open to new ideas and opportunities. When people around the world are asked about their preferred political conditions, the principles that underpin democratic societies emerge strongly.

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan speaking in Greece in 2017 noted that Liberal democracy almost died in the 1930s, but liberal democracies eventually defeated Nazism, Fascism and Democracy. It is,he argued, arguably the most successful political system the world has ever seen.

However, a critical appendage to democracy is economic development coupled with social justice. What has consistently plagued the failed and failing democracies over the past decades has been bad governance. One thing that can help are independent institutions such as independent trade unions, organizations representing of business, civil-society organizations, institutions to support a free press, mechanisms to support human and political rights. These are critical countervailing forces, who can speak truth to power.

“Social partnership” the structured dialogue between trade unions and business and employers organizations has shown in 2020 just how invaluable a tool it is. It is doubtful that many of the momentous decisions would have been made without it, certainly not as swiftly or without rancour.  The ability of representative organizations to mobilize the views of the real economy and put together proposals and solutions in hours and days should not be underestimated. It has been a critical tool in this crisis.   The efforts of social partners have provided social ballast to societies, rocked by the voracity and suddenness of the virus.  In all of the chaos, it was reassuring see key parts of society pulling as one.

Independent institutions from civil society, trade unions along with business groups can be critical gatekeepers in protecting democracy. There are many examples, such as the Tunisian ‘quartet’, which received the Nobel peace prize in 2015.

Promoting and protecting these institutions along with the appending rights that underwrite them, such as freedom of association, expression and assembly will increasingly need to be at the forefront of the work of development organizations and the wider UN system in the immediate years to come.

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Aristotle and Alexander: Two Perspectives on Globalization

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Even the Mayor in Gogol’s Inspector General, not being the sharpest tool in the shed, acknowledged that Alexander the Great was a hero, although he cautioned against proving this statement by destroying government property. Indeed, Alexander the Great was the first to attempt the heroic feat of uniting the entire ecumene known to Europeans in BC 334–323. Certainly, history knew great conquerors before Alexander, people who established vast empires, but Alexander laid down, if we may say so, both the material and the ideological and political foundations of a globalization project in classical antiquity. Alexander emerged as a thoroughly cosmopolitan ruler on a global scale.

It is a well-known fact that Alexander was tutored and mentored by Aristotle, the greatest philosopher of classical antiquity, who had a very important influence on shaping the personality of the future Macedonian king and inspired him to achieve great things. According to Plutarch, Alexander said he owed his father his life, and he owed Aristotle the dignity of his life. It is a lesser-known fact that the perspectives of the two visionaries on the specific paths for uniting humanity were not identical, and in the course of time, they began to diverge more and more. The direct and indirect polemics of Alexander and Aristotle did not cease with the death of the Great King. In some manner or other, it continued later as it engaged new participants, and it remains relevant even now. Today, as we are witnessing a clearly emerging crisis of globalization, and as particularist and traditionalist sentiments are gaining traction throughout the world, it would be useful to review this polemic once again.

A Breakthrough in Greek Thought

For a long time, Greek city-states viewed the idea of the political unification of Hellas as heretical, infeasible and generally absurd. The jealously guarded independence of individual city-states and their mutual cutthroat competition were seen as inherent traits of Greek civilization, the key source of its vitality and evidence of its superiority over adjacent barbaric states. Like the Italian cities of the Renaissance, Greek city-states rivalled each other in terms of the wealth of their citizens, the wisdom of their rulers, and the achievements of their architects, sculptors, orators, philosophers, poets, and playwrights.

Forward winds carried Greek ships like the spores of some fantastic plant along the entire coast of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. These spores produced amazing sprouts: new colonies that easily adapted to any local conditions, successfully cooperated with native tribes, and enriched the common Greek culture. No one saw any point in supplementing this undisputed cultural unity with a political union.

The situation began to change following the Greco-Persian Wars of BC 500–449. On the one hand, these wars led to an unprecedented rise in pan-Greek patriotism. On the other hand, they clearly demonstrated the imperfections of the structure of the Greek world comprised of city-states. Soon after its triumphant victories over Darius the Great and Xerxes, Hellas entered a protracted period of political and military confrontation between Athens and Sparta, fuelled up by generous infusions of Persian gold. The aging and weakening Persia did not want to risk a new invasion, but it artfully pitted Greek cities against each other, supporting the weak and threatening the strong, encouraging conflict and upsetting unions. This inglorious era concluded with the destructive Peloponnesian War (BC 431–404) that forever undermined the power of Athens.

Hence the growing popularity of pan-Hellenistic ideas, that is, ideas of city-states entering political and military unions, prohibiting wars between them, coordinating their foreign and trade policies. The famous Attic rhetorician Isocrates in his famous Panegyricus proposed the most general outline of the pan-Hellenism concept, but Aristotle gave it his trademark completeness and depth.

Pan-Hellenism certainly did not proclaim the task of building a Hellenistic empire based on the Persian model. The very thought of conquering vast lands that was typical of Persian kings or Roman consuls was alien to the worldview of citizens of city-states. By choosing as their model the barbaric Persia that they had repeatedly defeated, the Greeks would have betrayed the very essence of Hellenism. Most likely, they were pondering the creation of what would effectively amount to a classical-era analogue of the European Union based on the pluralism of values and political ideas of its participants, the partial transfer of “city-state” sovereignty to collegiate governance bodies, the voluntary self-restriction of the union’s most powerful members, etc. The unity of Hellas should have been cemented by the presence of a common threat and, as we would say today, by the existential challenge of the barbarian East.

Let us also note that the unification of the Greek world, in Aristotle’s opinion, did not presuppose an alignment of governance systems in individual city-states and did not require the uniformity of values (as is the case in the European Union today). The philosopher was not so much concerned with the specific forms of governance in city-states as he was with their quality, and Aristotle saw the main problem in substituting private interests of rulers for public interests. According to Aristotle, any “true” constitution could, under certain circumstances, degenerate into a “deviant” one: a monarchy could become a tyranny, aristocracy could become oligarchy, democracy could degenerate into ochlocracy (the rule of the mob). Credit where it is due—the Greek philosopher had a much broader view of governance than most contemporary western politicians.

 “The War of Revenge” as a National Idea

The wise and calculating King Philip of Macedon made the right choice when selecting a mentor for his son and heir. Aristotle found a diligent and attentive student in the young Prince Alexander. It should be noted that at that time, as an independent state in the north-eastern periphery of Hellas, Macedon was under a powerful Greek cultural influence and actively participated in the pan-Greek political life. After Archelaus moved the capital from the secluded Aigai to the coastal Pella, the Macedonian court was frequented by eminent Greek thinkers. The great Euripides spent his final years there, and in Pella, he wrote and staged his famous The Bacchae. After the famous Battle of Chaeronea (BC 338), where Alexander’s father Philip the Great clearly demonstrated the superiority of the Macedonian phalanx over any other military formation of Greek hoplites, the king decisively established himself as the hegemon of Hellas.

No matter how open-minded he was, Alexander’s teacher remained primarily a staunch Greek nationalist. In his Politics, Aristotle wrote, “Those who live in cold countries, as the north of Europe, are full of courage, but wanting in understanding and the arts: therefore they are very tenacious of their liberty; but, not being politicians, they cannot reduce their neighbours under their power: but the Asiatics, whose understandings are quick, and who are conversant in the arts, are deficient in courage; and therefore are always conquered and the slaves of others: but the Grecians, placed as it were between these two boundaries, so partake of them both as to be at the same time both courageous and sensible; for which reason Greece continues free, and governed in the best manner possible, and capable of commanding the whole world, could they agree upon one system of policy.”

Aristotle could hardly be called a racist in the way we use this word today. He was willing to acknowledge the indisputable achievements of the creative genius of the Egyptians, Persians, and even Scythians. But the idea of the “Greek exceptionalism” was entrenched in his mind as firmly as the idea of “American exceptionalism” is entrenched in the minds of many contemporary conservative U.S. politicians. Having assessed the outstanding gifts of his student, Aristotle insistently called upon Alexander to promote the political unification of Greece so that the country could become the natural centre of the ecumene.

Aristotle believed that Hellas certainly should not abandon its mission civilisatrice, i.e., its consistent efforts to expand the habitat of the Greek culture, the Hellenic language, political paradigms, and the way of life of the Greek nucleus. He also understood that the complete “Hellenization” of barbaric tribes was impossible due to objective obstacles in the way of such Hellenization. Aristotle believed that the natural territory of the “Greek civilization” did not go beyond the coastal Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Going back to our analogy with the European Union, let us note that, unlike the EU’s strategists in the early 21st century, Aristotle clearly saw the risks and dangers of the uncontrollable expansion of the Hellenistic world into adjacent lands.

Aristotle never doubted the superiority of Greek culture and social structure over all the alternatives known to him. Consequently, he was unlikely to come up with the idea of a global synthesis of values and cultures and even more unlikely to be thoroughly captivated by it. Aristotle apparently did not have a particularly high opinion of Herodotus and was not interested in the history of the non-Greek world, which certainly negatively affected his perception of barbarians. We should also add that Aristotle was a staunch defender of individual rights and the monogamous family and an equally staunch opponent of despotism of any kind on the part of the state. Naturally, like most enlightened Greeks, he never dreamed of a “Hellenistic empire,” he only wanted to see a more harmonious alignment of the interests of independent city-states.

Apparently, at the beginning of his “glorious days,” Alexander followed roughly the same line of thinking as Aristotle. We could debate the degree to which the son of Philip, King of Macedon, and Olympias, the Princess of Epirus in the faraway periphery of Hellas, could be thought of as a “true” Greek, but his attachment to Greek culture cannot be denied. He can be said to have soaked up this culture since birth, and he sensed the great unrealized potential of the Greek world, like the Corsican Napoleon Bonaparte, sensed the unrealized potential of France or the Georgian Joseph Dzhugashvili sensed the potential of Russia. Alexander carried a copy of Homer’s Iliad corrected by Aristotle and known as “The Iliad from the chest” on all his military campaigns and kept it under his pillow.

The idea of a “war of revenge” against Persia was primarily a national idea intended to unite the Greek world and lead it forward. Alexander only partially succeeded in the latter respect: the proud Sparta refused to take part in this tremendous undertaking. Many in Athens, including the implacable Demosthenes, secretly hoped for a crushing defeat of the Macedonian upstart, and up until the death of Darius III, tens of thousands of Greek mercenaries fought for Persia. We could suppose that, initially, Alexander’s motives were quite “Greek”: exacting revenge for the protracted Persian expansion, the feeling of the “Hellenic superiority,” the genetic contempt of a free Hellene for eastern barbarians. The latter feeling was probably particularly acute with the Macedonian king, since his political opponents frequently accused him of being of barbarian origins.

However, further down the road, Greek heritage became but one building block of a global empire in Alexander’s vision of a new global world. It was the most valuable and important one, true, but it was not the only one. The King quickly outgrew his own initial plans and his teacher’s paradigms: instead of a consistent Greek nationalist, he became the first cosmopolitan universalist of classical antiquity.

A Student Who Went Beyond His Teacher

Most likely, we will never learn when exactly Alexander began to move away from Aristotle’s orthodox paradigms. When the iron hand of the Macedonian king united the crumbling Greek world, his teacher could only be happy for his student, even as he would chastise him for his excesses and his unreasonable cruelty—especially for razing the rebellious Thebes and selling all its inhabitants into slavery (although formally, the decision to destroy the splendid city was made not by the King of Macedon himself, but by his Boeotian allies). When the “war of revenge” against Darius started, the teacher would also be pleased with his student: on the whole, the great design proceeded according to Aristotle’s plan.

Most likely, the King of Macedon wanted his teacher to join him in his march east. Aristotle, however, preferred to remain in Athens and sent his nephew Callisthenes to accompany Alexander. Callisthenes became the first chronicler of Alexander’s empire. The dramatic fate of this outstanding, although apparently extremely vain and difficult person is the best characteristic of the way Alexander changed as his tremendous enterprise was coming to fruition.

Gradually, the new lord of Asia was drifting away from his teacher’s designs. Apparently, the “point of no return” was passed when, following the first victories at Granicus (BC 334) and at Issus (BC 333), Alexander rejected Darius III’s suggestion that they amicably divide the Persian Empire along the Euphrates with its western part being transferred to Alexander. If the interests of the King of Macedon had been confined to the Mediterranean, he would have done well to accept this generous offer without hesitation. While his father, Philip the Great, posited the immediate goal of taking Asia Minor away from Persians, Alexander was offered Syria, Phoenicia and Egypt to boot. What could be a better conclusion for a “war of revenge”?

Such an end to the war would have been a well-deserved triumph of the King of Macedon. Alexander could have returned to Pella and become the single ruler of the entire Eastern Mediterranean. He could have imposed his terms on the Greek League of Corinth. In this situation, Darius himself would have been Alexander’s junior, rather than senior, partner. Aristotle would have certainly approved of such a resolution. However, for the future lord of the world, confining himself to the Mediterranean would have meant abandoning his historical mission. He blankly refused Darius’s proposal, did not listen to his advisors, and marched further East—towards Persia, Bactria, Sogdia and India.

Even during his Egyptian campaign (BC 332), Alexander demonstrated a clear intention to achieve at least a harmonious co-existence of Greek and Egyptian cultures. At most, he wanted to bring about a fruitful synthesis of the two cultural traditions. In Egypt, he demonstrated not merely religious tolerance, but a willingness to adopt local gods into a new universalist pantheon of the future empire. The King of Macedon assumed the title of Egyptian Pharaoh and proclaimed himself the son of Amun. His proclivity towards syncretism was subsequently manifested in all his campaigns, including his campaign to India. Curiously, Alexander entrusted the principal positions in the government of the new province not to his faithful, yet somewhat simple-minded Macedonians, but to the experienced Egyptians and shrewd Greeks. This is a characteristic manifestation of the king’s typical meritocracy. Finally, at the shores of the western channel of the Nile delta, he founded the city of Alexandria, which would soon become perhaps the most vivid symbol of ancient globalization, a sort of a Singapore of classical antiquity.

Then came the historic Battle of Gaugamela (BC 331) that put an end to the dispute between Alexander and Darius III over the dominion of Asia. Then came the triumphant entrance of the Macedonian army into Babylon and Susa, the Persepolis fire, which was probably deliberately set on Alexander’s orders (BC 330), and the official end of the “war of revenge.” Henceforth, the new king of Asia was not the destroyer of Persia, but its liberator, not an implacable foe of the Achaemenid Empire, but its legitimate heir. Alexander finally shook off the remnants of Aristotelian pan-Hellenism and pressed forward to new, heretofore unknown frontiers.

Every year, Alexander lost something of what we would today call his Macedonian, Greek or broadly Mediterranean identity. Even for the centre of his empire (the traditional concept of “capital” is hardly applicable to Alexander’s state), he chose Babylon, and not some Hellenistic city on the Mediterranean coast. After landing on the eastern coast of the Hellespont, he would never come back to Europe—not to Greece and certainly not to Macedon.

Eastern Despotism or Enlightened Ecumenism?

The many Greek critics of Alexander reproached the king for yielding to the temptation of becoming an eastern despot, thereby discarding both the austere ways of his Macedonian ancestors and the sophistication of the Hellenic culture for the sake of the eastern luxury and the pomp of Persian customs. Were such rebukes justified? Certainly, eastern luxury exerted its corrupting influence on Alexander, although, as far as we can say, despite his generous gifts to his inner circle and his liking for great feasts, he remained generally indifferent to material wealth throughout his life. More likely, he would be vulnerable to the flowery eastern flattery, just as he would be, though, to the sophisticated praise lavished on him by his Greek coterie.

In any case, Alexander appears to be primarily motivated not by human weakness, but by his desire to make humanity happy through a synthesis of East and West, Greek and Persian (as well as Egyptian, Bactrian, Indian and other) cultures. Hence mass marriages and his own marriage to the Bactrian princess Roxana. Hence his desire to encourage migration flows between the most far-flung regions of his steadily growing empire. Hence his willingness to create a truly universal pantheon. Hence his “meritocratic” staffing policies. At some point, the king ceased to be both a Macedonian and a Hellene and became a man of the world, or, rather, an “overman of the world.” While Aristotle could understand and even welcome Alexander’s forsaking of his Macedonian identity, his forsaking of his Hellenic identity automatically transformed Alexander into an implacable opponent of the philosopher.

This is what Plutarch, who was favourably disposed towards Alexander, said: he “did not, as Aristotle advised him, rule the Grecians like a moderate prince and insult over the barbarians like an absolute tyrant; nor did he take particular care of the first as his friends and domestics, and scorn the latter as mere brutes and vegetables; which would have filled his empire with fugitive incendiaries and perfidious tumults. But believing himself sent from Heaven as the common moderator and arbiter of all nations, and subduing those by force whom he could not associate to himself by fair offers, he labored thus, that he might bring all regions, far and near, under the same dominion. And then, as in a festival goblet, mixing lives, manners, customs, wedlock, all together, he ordained that everyone should take the whole habitable world for his country, of which his camp and army should be the chief metropolis and garrison; that his friends and kindred should be the good and virtuous, and that the vicious only should be accounted foreigners. Nor would he that Greeks and barbarians should be distinguished by long garments, targets, scimitars, or turbans; but that the Grecians should be known by their virtue and courage, and the barbarians by their vices and their cowardice; and that their habit, their diet, their marriage and custom of converse, should be everywhere the same, engaged and blended together by the ties of blood and pledges of offspring.”

Back in his day, King Philip offered Greek cities the kind of relations where there would be no victors or vanquished, first and last, leaders and followers. Alexander offered the same to Persians and other conquered peoples. Clearly, both the father and the son saw themselves as supreme arbiters and guarantors of such a union. However, while the father set himself the task of uniting Hellas (and here he was quite at one with Aristotle), the son dreamed of uniting humanity, and in such a union, Greek civilization could at best claim to be primus inter pares. Individual people would inevitably pay for this union by abandoning their individual freedom: certainly in the name of a great goal.

The king never spared himself, and it would have been strange to expect him to be willing to spare others. It would be fair to say that Alexander’s conquests resulted not so much in liberating the defeated as they did in enslaving the victors. Both the former and the latter were to become assistants to the king, obedient conduits of his divine will. And this applied not only to the top military and political elite of the empire, but also to the thousands and even tens of thousands of Greeks and Macedonians whom Alexander left to man the remote garrisons at the edge of the ecumene with little chance of going back home.

Aristotle, who was observing Alexander’s activities from faraway Athens, could not have liked this. Perhaps he could have forgiven his student for inevitably restricting the freedoms of his subjects, but he could never forgive him for abandoning pan-Hellenism. The consistent implementation of Alexander’s grand plan would inexorably lead to Aristotle’s beloved Hellas dissolving within an entirely new, universal global civilization. Even in purely demographic terms, the mass movement of the most ambitious, energetic and promising young people from Europe to Asia “in search of luck and rank” threatened long-term negative consequences for the development of Greece, which would be doomed to depopulation and a wretched existence on the outskirts of the empire.

Additionally, the endless territorial expansion of the Greek culture inevitably resulted in its simplification and vulgarization—from the universalization of the classical Greek language and its transformation into the imperial “koine” to the degeneration of the classical Greek architecture. Even a cursory comparison between the huge and luxuriant Hellenistic buildings in the East and the best architecture of “the High Classical period” in Greece convincingly shows that size does not always matter. Alexander, like many despotic rulers before and after him, succumbed to the temptations of gigantomastia and approved colossal and often tasteless projects. This trend in construction was continued by the Diadochi, who succeeded Alexander.

Aristotle, of course, kept a keen eye on his student’s movements. Aristotle may have been far away, but his nephew Callisthenes kept a detailed record of Alexander’s campaigns and, taking advantage of his position close to the king, never missed an opportunity to remind him of the exalted ideals of pan-Hellenism. Callisthenes’s escapades led first to mutual bitterness and then an outright disagreement. Alexander’s first chronicler initially fell into disfavour and then found himself in chains. He did not come back from the Indian campaign—he either died of some disease, or was killed on Alexander’s orders.

We could only guess at Aristotle’s reaction to the lavish collective wedding Alexander held in Susa for his Macedonian comrades-in-arms and the daughters of the Iranian nobility. This ceremony went against the philosopher’s basic convictions concerning the cultural incompatibility of the Greeks and the Persians, a person’s right to their own choice, and the monogamous family (many Macedonian veterans had wives and children back home). In this particular instance, Alexander acted not as an enlightened ruler, but as a detached stock-breeder experimenting with a new human breed for his empire.

The Greek philosopher must have been even more horrified by the events that took place in Opis, when, after a mutiny of his Macedonian veterans, Alexander said he was ready to disband his old Macedonian army. Having transferred military command to his former enemies, he ordered a new army to be assembled from the people of the East, including a phalanx, a cavalry, and even a squad of royal guards. Of course, the Macedonians were forced to beg the king for forgiveness, but his willingness to entrust his fate and the fate of his state to Asians would have made any pan-Hellenist shudder.

Aristotle had enough common sense not to quarrel with the almighty king. Historians state that he even accepted Alexander’s highly generous gift of 800 talents for his studies. However, the ideological differences between the teacher and the student were too apparent to be hidden. When Alexander died, Aristotle was among the people suspected of having poisoned the Great King. The accusations levelled against the philosopher remained unproven and did not have any serious consequences for him. But it is quite possible that when Aristotle learned of his student’s death, he breathed a sigh of relief. Maybe humanity, at least its Greek part, was ready for Aristotle’s philosophy, but humanity, and particularly its Greek part, was clearly not ready to implement Alexander’s political programme.

Particularism Strikes Back?

It’s hard to say how world history would have developed had Alexander lived a long life. He would probably have annexed Arabia without much difficulty and within a very short time. Preparations for the campaign had almost been completed. He would probably have set his sights on the Western Mediterranean, where Syracuse, Carthage, and Rome would hardly be able to stop the victorious march of the great commander and where his conquests would likely have prevented the destructive Punic Wars in the future. Sometime later, Alexander would have probably set his sights on the East again and continued the unfinished conquest of India, he would have also explored the basin of the Indian Ocean that had always beckoned him. We cannot rule out the possibility of Alexander, in his thirst for global domination, reaching the western borders of China, which was at that time riven by non-stop internecine conflicts of the Warring States period.

One thing is clear: regardless of the geographical priority of his future campaigns, Alexander would have never gone back to the ideas of pan-Hellenism and Aristotle’s philosophy. He would have continued to build and strengthen his cosmopolitan empire, mix peoples and ethnicities, found new cities, and strengthen trade routes. We can suppose that the genius of the great king would have manifested itself in his state-building just as vividly as it had been manifested in his many victorious battles. However, fate dictated that Alexander spend most of his supernatural creative energy on destroying the old instead of building the new.

The great conqueror died at the age of 33 without completing many of his undertakings and without cementing the foundations of his universalist empire. The forces of particularism gradually began to overpower the ideas of universalism. Less than 20 years after Alexander’s death, the great empire collapsed into independent states locked in a fierce confrontation with each other. It is worth noting that the great empire eroded fastest in its eastern outskirts—India, Bactria and Sogdia. The centre of the post-imperial political activity was clearly shifting westwards, from the heart of Asia to the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt became the principal areas of Greek colonization and the main centres of Hellenism in Asia.

To some degree, we can say that Aristotle ultimately vanquished Alexander. Or, in other words, Philip of Macedon vanquished his great son. The boundary between East and West was not eliminated, but shifted from the Aegean Sea to the Euphrates. The Hellenistic states of the Ptolemaic dynasty (Egypt) and the Seleucid Empire (Syria) succeeded where Greece failed: they overcame the local polis particularism. European immigrants moving to Alexandria or Antioch no longer thought of themselves as Athenians, Spartans, or Macedonians: they were all Hellenes sharing a common culture and historical tradition. However, neither the Seleucid Empire nor the Ptolemaic dynasty succeeded in harmoniously melding western immigrants and eastern residents in the same “melting pot”: in all states of the Diadochi, Hellenes formed the privileged class of people engaged in governance or commerce who mixed little with the native population.

However, Aristotle’s plans for Greece itself did not materialize either. The city-states never formed any kind of a European Union of classical antiquity. Their political strife and military conflicts continued, and Greece itself became a venue for confrontations between larger Hellenic states. One hundred years after Alexander’s death, the Roman Empire started to meddle in Greek affairs with increasing impudence, and in another 50 years (BC 146), the Roman province of Achaea was established in the territory of Greece.

Naturally, the influence that Alexander’s project exerted on the ancient world was not limited to the emergence or decline of specific states. Elements of Hellenism as a way of life and a cultural phenomenon became firmly entrenched throughout the vast spaces of Europe, Asia and Africa, that is, beyond the Hellenistic states themselves. The boundaries of the ecumene were gradually pushed back, new trade routes appeared, and commercial cities flourished. The baton of globalization was taken up by Roman consuls and then by the Roman emperors, who put many of Alexander’s unrealized plans into practice.

However, even imperial Rome, with its blatant cosmopolitanism and its colossal geographic scale, remained mostly a Western empire at the peak of its powers. The Roman eagles were not destined to reach the cities of India and the deserts of Central Asia. Emperor Trajan’s annexation of Southern Mesopotamia and Assyria (115 AD) proved very short-lived: just a few years later, his successor Hadrian was forced to abandon these conquests. For years, the Euphrates served as the border separating Western and Eastern civilizations. A stable synthesis between East and West ultimately failed to materialize even within the Roman Empire: centrifugal forces had the upper hand, and eventually, historical trajectories of Rome and Constantinople diverged for good. The emergence and geographical expansion of Islam ultimately locked in the boundary between the East and the West.

Arbitrary Historical Analogies

History develops in a spiral. In some sense, the global situation today is similar to the situation in the ancient world shortly after the death of Alexander the Great. On the one hand, we see many signs that globalization is in crisis: international trade, foreign direct investment, international migrations, etc., are falling. The importance of national sovereignty and national identity is emphasized everywhere, political forces advocating traditional values and the traditional way of life are growing in influence. Globalization priorities are being replaced with regionalization priorities. Ambitious long-term imperial plans are giving way to situational and highly pragmatic plans that are geared mostly toward domestic audiences instead of the world in general. As far as we can tell, deglobalization trends have gained major traction and will not be reversed in the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, it would be wrong to say that “globalization is over.” The world is getting smaller. Technological progress makes global communication easier and reduces the costs of implementing geographically distributed projects. The burden of common problems puts increasing pressure on all countries—problems ranging from the growing shortage of resources to accelerating climate change. The fact that the first wave of globalization of the late 20th to the early 21st century broke down does not necessarily mean that humanity will not have to face a second wave or that there is no need to prepare for it.

Historically, the Diadochi were the losers because they borrowed Aristotle and Alexander’s most obvious and least productive ideas. They took Aristotle’s political particularism and pan-Hellenistic nationalism, and Alexander’s despotic and highly centralized style of governance. And even though most of Alexander’s comrades-in-arms were remarkable people, neither Seleucus, nor Ptolemy, nor Perdiccas, nor Antigonus, nor Eumenes could measure up to the King in terms of his personality and his inexhaustible energy. Therefore, the Hellenistic states of the Eastern Mediterranean were internally unstable and ultimately fell to Rome or Parthia.

Solving the task that humanity has faced for over 2000 years requires approaches that would be diametrically opposite to those chosen by the Diadochi. How can we combine the most revolutionary and complicated elements of the globalization programmes of the two great figures of classical antiquity? How can we combine Alexander’s global universalism and noble idealism with Aristotle’s rational democracy and political pluralism? Solving this historical task would usher in radically new development directions for our world.

From our partner RIAC

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International Law

Stacked Odds: A UN Report on Modern Slavery

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photo: UN Women/Ryan Brown

On the occasion of International Girl Child Day, the United Nations (UN) came up a report ‘Stacked Odds’ based on Modern Slavery. For the term Modern Slavery or contemporary form of slavery, there is no specific universal definition, rather it is used as an umbrella term covering practices such as forced labour, debt bondage, forced marriage, and human trafficking. It is considered as a situation of exploitation that a person cannot refuse or leave because of threats, violence, coercion, deception, and/or use of power as defined by UN.

 According to the Stacked Odds report, one in every 130 females globally is living in modern slavery. It means countries are still nowhere near the rate of change needed to meet the goal of ending slavery by 2030 as highlighted in Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The global estimates were studied and reported by Walk Free which is an international human right group focussed on eradication of modern slavery in all its forms and the two UN agencies- the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) which are considered as powerful advocacy tools to deal with slavery.

Among all the victims of modern slavery, women and girls accounts for nearly three quarters (71 per cent). Females outnumber males as victims of modern slavery in four of the five world regions. They account for 73% of victims in the Asia and Pacific, 71% in Africa, 71% in Europe and Central Asia, and 63% in America. The Stacked odds report also highlighted that 99 percent of the victims of forced sexual exploitation are women. And 84 percent of all victims of forced marriage and 58 percent of all victims of forced labour are also women. 

As oppose to men, women are more vulnerable to modern slavery due to various factors:

  • Women are considered as a disadvantaged section of the society and face various socio-economic problems like poverty, lack of access to education and less opportunities in the political field. 
  • In many countries, laws can exacerbate, rather than protecting from modern slavery. They prevent women from inheriting land and assets, conferring citizenship on their children, traveling freely and working without their husband’s permission.
  • Women are underrepresented at all the levels of political leadership. On an average, just 25 percent of people in national parliaments in 2020 are female. 
  • When it comes to workforce, women are paid less than men for the same amount of work and this gender discrimination financially penalises women.
  • Normalisation of gender-based violence also increases female’s vulnerability to modern slavery.

Various factors which are responsible for the modern slavery are as follows:

  • Absence of rule of law: Slavery become prevalent in the society where there is no enforcement of law. It is often abetted by police and other authorities. Without adequate enforcement of laws and strengthening of legal frameworks, human traffickers operate with impunity. 
  • Poverty: About 765 million people worldwide live in extreme poverty, making less than $1.90 per day. Those in destitute conditions have limited means to support their families. In the absence of alternatives, many people take risks which are lured by sham offers of better futures.
  • Marginalized Groups: Certain groups face discrimination which includes, ethnic and religious minorities, women and children, and migrants and refugees are prone to enslavement.
  • War and Conflict: War brings a kind of instability that can expose besieged communities to forced labour networks.
  • Natural Disasters: Extreme weather, as well as resulting pandemics, can ravage a country’s physical infrastructure, displace communities and increase the desperation of already marginalised groups.
  • State-imposed forced labour: It includes citizens recruitment by their state authorities to participate in agricultural or construction work for purposes of economic development, young military conscripts forced to perform work that is not of military nature, or prisoners forced to work against their will.

Modern Slavery in India

According to the Global Slavery Indexed report released by Walk Free, 8 million people are facing modern slavery in India. At the same time 6.10 out of 1000 are estimated proportion of population living in modern slavery and 55.49 people out of 100 are vulnerable to modern slavery.

The National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) indicate that there were 8,132 reported cases of human trafficking across India. Most of the victims were trafficked for forced labour and prostitution. There have been many cases of contract violations and exploitation of India’s migrants living in the Gulf countries which have led people to become modern slaves. There are also reported cases of abductions and coercion of children by the Left-Wing Extremists to join Bal Dasta units which train children in front-line operations, and as couriers and informants against national security forces. 

In order to do away with modern slavery, India has criminalized most forms of modern slavery, including trafficking, slavery, forced labour, and child sexual exploitation in its Penal Code. For example- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,2012. But currently, there is no legislation criminalizing use of children in armed conflict. There are various schemes like Ujjawala which is a comprehensive scheme for prevention of trafficking and rescue, rehabilitation and re-integration of victims of Trafficking and Commercial sexual exploitation and Swadhar initiated by the Ministry of Women and Child Development in order to provide shelter and rehabilitation services for rescued women. The Central Sector Scheme for Rehabilitation of Bonded labourers was adopted by India in 2016 to recognise the needs of different groups trapped in bounded labour and provide cash compensation. The Indian Government also ratified two core ILO conventions in 2017, namely No. 138 on Minimum age to Employment and No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour.

Steps need to be taken to eradicate Modern Slavery at global level:

The report says, ‘At its core, the fight against modern slavery is about ensuring the most basic of human rights- freedom’. In order to ameliorate modern slavery, there is a need to strengthen criminal justice. It should be ensured that no child is born stateless by strengthening legal safeguards and ensuring birth registration. Laws and policies that prevent or make it difficult for workers to leave abusive employers without risk of loss of visa and deportation of security deposits must be addressed. There is a current need to overturn laws and policies that strip women of their rights or exacerbate their vulnerability to sexual violence and exploitation. States should improve coordination and accountability among national agencies by developing evidence-based national action plans and establishing national referral mechanisms involving civil society law enforcement agencies and other groups. Cross-border collaboration and data sharing should be improved to tackle modern slavery. Nation-states should improve support for modern slavery victims and survivors by providing regular, systematic training for all frontline service providers. Government should work with communities and civil society to create avenues for reporting crimes, improving access to protection and support services and changing the social norms around widow cleansing, witchcraft accusations and other harmful practices. 

Whereas, the UN report suggested six points to nation states that should be included in action plan to prevent the exploitation of women and girls:

  • Government should criminalise all forms of modern slavery through bringing reforms in the laws.
  • Girls Education should be on priority list.
  • Steps needs to betaken by the state governments to abolish child labour.
  • Socio-cultural norms such as male preference, restriction on freedom of movement of girls, lack of control over financial assets and other harmful societal practices must be challenged.
  • There is also a need to amend certain laws and policies like inheritance rights, land ownership laws and the Kafala system.
  • The governments should acknowledge the clear link between gender and risk of modern slavery in their gender and development programming and budgets.

In the words of Grace Forrest, the co-founder of the Walk Free anti-slavery organization, ‘there are more people living in slavery today than any other time in human history’. Therefore, the nation-states should take immediate steps to eradicate contemporary forms of slavery to make this world a better place for living.

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