It all began three months ago to the day, in the Chinese town of Xiamen. During a news conference following the BRICS Summit, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin proposed the use of international peacekeepers under auspices of the United Nations in the east of Ukraine.
The idea was not totally new either: it had been discussed, in a variety of formats, ever since the very first months of the military confrontation in Donbass. However, it was the first time that Russia had officially proposed a peacekeeping initiative at the highest level. The President of the Russian Federation suggested a fairly narrow mandate for potential peacekeepers, yet his initiative took all the parties in the conflict by surprise.
This is no surprise. On the eve of Putin’s statement, official Russian representatives had resolutely rejected the very idea of involving international peacekeepers in the Ukrainian conflict. Moscow’s usual argument was to cite the Minsk agreements, which do not envisage such a possibility. Kiev’s intermittent calls for involving the United Nations or the European Union in the settlement process effectively indicated the desire of the Ukrainian authorities to divest itself of any responsibility for the implementation of these agreements.
The proposal of the President of the Russian Federation gave rise to numerous conjectures as to the Kremlin’s possible motives and intentions.Was Putin’s statement merely a tactical ploy aimed at driving Kiev into a corner? Or had Russia’s position on the Ukrainian changed dramatically? Should the parameters of a possible UN peacekeeping mission outlined by Putin be taken as Moscow’s new red line? Or are they a bargaining chip for the future? Finally, who were Moscow’s proposals primarily addressed to: the Ukrainian leadership? The participants in the Normandy format? Or the Donald Trump administration?
Even now, three months on, the possible answers are being heatedly debated. All the more so as the public discussion of possible ways to resolve the conflict remains extremely emotional and not necessarily constructive. External observers who are not privy to the various informal consultations still know very little about them. Nevertheless, the statements, comments and interviews with the main actors that are available to us give us an approximate idea of the disagreements that have up to now stood in the way of implementing the peacekeeping discussion in practice, as well as an idea of what needs to be done by all stakeholders in order to overcome these differences.
Does Russia (and Ukraine) Want War?
The following arguments are based on the assumption that both Kiev and Moscow want to find a political solution to the Donbass problem. Any political solution would imply that the parties are willing to compromise. If at least one of the parties lacks the desire and readiness required, and is looking at a violent resolution instead, one that would result in the opponent’s unconditional surrender, then it would naturally be senseless to talk about the prospects for an international peacekeeping mission. At best, we might see certain tactical agreements designed to gain time, regroup, accumulate resources and resume political (if not military) pressure on the enemy at the appropriate moment. Another possibility is that the statements made by the parties to the effect that a political solution is the only viable solution are nothing more than propaganda. The presumption that the sides are prepared for a political compromise is certainly open to criticism, but if we do not allow for this possibility we are better off ending this discussion right here and now.
Other assumptions are that Kiev is not currently ready to let Donbass go, and that Moscow is not interested in absorbing the DPR and LPR or in securing the status of “unrecognized states” for them. As is known, many people in Russia doubt the validity of the former solution, and many people in Ukraine question the legitimacy of the latter. It is unlikely that anyone, with the possible exception of the leaders of the two countries, knows for sure what ideas the Russian and Ukrainian governments are currently considering. Nevertheless, official statements from both sides allow us to treat the aforementioned assumptions as being justified and lawful.
The third important assumption is that the four years of conflict have taught both Moscow and Kiev to assess the current situation, and its perception by the opposing side, in a realistic manner. Back in late 2014, some people in Russia thought that Ukraine could disintegrate at any moment, that the mounting economic difficulties would undermine the socio-political foundation of Ukrainian nationalism, and that the West would be either unable or unwilling to keep Kiev’s sinking “comprador” regime afloat. Now, in late 2017, no intelligent person can conceivably entertain such ideas any longer. On the other hand, a widespread idea in Ukraine was that the Russian economy would quickly collapse under the weight of the Western sanctions, that political support for Putin would crumble, and that Russia would soon be facing a new 1991. Today, such a scenario appears to be something taken from a parallel universe, completely unrelated to the actual state of affairs in Russia.
Looking back, we must admit that both Kiev and Moscow (or, rather, the Ukrainian and Russian people) have demonstrated the steadfastness, resilience and flexibility. And this has come as a surprise to many external observers. You can call this staunchness as stubbornness, or you can blame the insidious government propaganda. However, this does not change the essence of the matter: the Ukrainian and Russian people, with the exception of a handful of dissidents, are prepared to continue to bear the costs associated with the Donbass conflict.
This means that the hopes formerly held in Kiev and Moscow that the situation would resolve itself it quick time, that time was on “their side” and that victory was guaranteed because their cause was just, stood no chance of persisting on either side of the conflict. Neither side is likely to achieve a decisive victory in the foreseeable future. And a protracted crisis will mean the accumulation of long-term problems for both Ukraine and Russia. In this conflict, time is working against both Kiev and Moscow, even though the people of both countries have somehow adapted to living in a situation that would have seemed totally inconceivable only four years ago.
What are Kiev and the West Afraid of?
The three months that have passed since Putin made his proposal have been rich in commentaries, criticisms and counterproposals by the Ukrainian leadership, experts and analysts. The peacekeeping idea provoked an equally vivid reaction in the West. Parts of this reaction lacked a certain coherence and consistency, yet the response itself allows us to draw several conclusions as to what it is about the Russian proposal that does not suit Kiev and its Western partners.
Donbass as a frozen conflict. To begin with, the deployment of peacekeepers exclusively along the demarcation line between the opposing sides could turn Donbass into another “frozen conflict.”  This kind of deployment would recognize the status quo, which, as is illustrated by many conflict situations, including in the former USSR, often plays into the hands of separatists. Kiev cites the examples of Transnistria and Abkhazia, where delimiting the sides did nothing to resolve the respective conflicts but rather consolidated and accelerated the centrifugal processes. This means that a “dividing line” is capable of putting an end to the prospects of Donbass subsequently being integrated into the political, economic and social life of Ukraine.
Legitimizing Russia’s military presence. Kiev believes that if Russian troops are included in the peacekeeping contingent (a matter on which the DPR and LPR authorities insist), Moscow will be able to secure a legitimate military presence in the east of Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations. In addition, Russian peacekeepers cannot be a politically neutral force, given the current state of relations between Moscow and Kiev. In fact, the UN peacekeeping traditions preclude the participation of countries that border the areas where peacekeeping operations are being carried out.
Recognition of the DPR and LPR authorities. Throughout the conflict in the east of Ukraine, Kiev has demonstrated a continuing reluctance to have anything to do with the leadership of the unrecognized DPR and LPR as the second party to the peacekeeping talks, something that Russia has always insisted on in its proposals. Ukraine believes that any direct interaction with the current Donbass leadership on peacekeeping issues would effectively mean the recognition of that leadership as the legitimate representatives of the DPR and LPR population. This is politically unacceptable to Kiev. Kiev believes, therefore, that any peacekeeping talks should be conducted exclusively with Moscow, and that it is for Moscow to make sure that its “stooges” implement the agreements reached.
Easing of Western pressure on Russia. The decision to launch a peacekeeping operation in the east of Ukraine, in any format, could lead to the activation of forces in the West that have always promoted the restoration of cooperation with Moscow, including the lifting or mitigation of the sanctions against Russia. Such a scenario understandably worries the current Ukrainian leadership. In Kiev’s opinion, the very fact that Russia has made proposals on a peacekeeping mission indicates that the Western sanctions are having the desired effect. Therefore, in order to make progress in the resolution of the conflict, the pressure on Moscow needs to be maintained, or perhaps even intensified.
What are Moscow and the DPR/LPR Afraid of?
The past three months have demonstrated Russia’s unwillingness to make any fundamental concessions to Kiev and its Western partners. Moscow objects to Ukraine’s version of international peacekeeping involvement (extending the peacekeeping area to cover all of the DPR and LPR and the state border with Russia; the refusal of Kiev to negotiate with the Donbass leadership; and the rejection of the idea of Russia’s direct involvement in the peacekeeping operation, etc.). The Kremlin’s objections grow even more resolute and uncompromising when transmitted via the leaders of the unrecognized Donetsk and Lugansk republics.
Donbass massacre scenario. At the heart of Russia’s objections lies the suspicion that an international peacekeeping contingent would not be able to provide sufficient security to the Donbass population, especially given the widespread radical nationalist and revanchist sentiments in Ukrainian society. Moscow points out that the Ukrainian leadership remains incapable of controlling the numerous autonomous armed groups and paramilitary radical political movements that might terrorize the DPR/LPR territories, threaten their political opponents and contribute to the spread of crime in the region. It is possible that this could be followed by new waves of refugees and internally displaced persons from Donbass towards Russia.
Peacekeepers as a pretext for revising the Minsk agreements. The Ukrainian version of a possible peacekeeping operation raises numerous questions in Moscow linked to the future of the Minsk agreements. Russia suspects Kiev of attempting to use the new settlement plan as a pretext for overhauling the Minsk agreements, or even abandoning them outright, particularly those provisions that concern political reform. In addition, should the Ukrainian version be implemented, Moscow would lose all its current influence on the situation, effectively becoming an outside witness to Ukrainian nationalists engaging in a “mopping-up” operation in Donbass. As far as Moscow is concerned, the commitment of Western countries to the Minsk agreements is by no means a sure-fire guarantee that the agreements will be observed by Kiev. 
Moscow’s flexibility resulting in greater pressure on Russia. Whereas the Ukrainian government fears the erosion of the West’s anti-Russian consensus and the weakening of pressure on Moscow, the Russian government has reasons to believe that, should Moscow make any significant concessions with regard to the peacekeepers in Donbass, Kiev and the West (the United States at least) would perceive this as a sign of weakness on the part of Russia and might try to apply greater pressure on Moscow.  If Russia decides to give up Donbass, then Crimea might become the West’s next target.
Wrong time for concessions. As far as we can tell, Moscow does not see Kiev’s latest proposals, which have been supported by the West, as a compromise. Should Russia adopt these proposals, it will be difficult to present this as another foreign political victory (even a formal victory) for the Kremlin to domestic and outside audiences. The presidential election campaign is under way in Russia, and the Kremlin is likely use the foreign policy victories it has earned in the past few years to bolster its chances of winning. This means that any “retreat” on the Ukrainian front would appear ill-timed, to say the least. It could even entail unnecessary political risks. On the other hand, the Kremlin points to the numerous uncertainties that remain in the West, including the domestic political crisis in the United States and German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s inability to form a coalition government. As far as Moscow is concerned, it would be better to postpone serious discussions on the Ukrainian issue until next summer or autumn.
Where is a Compromise to be Found?
As is characteristic of any complex and multifaceted international crisis, the situation in the east of Ukraine represents a tangle of subjective and objective factors, external and internal circumstances, personal ambitions and long-term social trends, specific interests of individual political groups, and banal mistakes caused by the incompetence or incomplete awareness of the parties. This is why solutions to this problem – in the plural, as there is no single solution – should be sought at different levels and on different planes. Listed below are just the most obvious ingredients required for a successful peacekeeping mission in the east of Ukraine.
Agreeing on the current priorities. Even though the diverse tasks facing the peacekeeping mission are absolutely important, the most urgent and important objective is to put an end to the violence, stop the loss of life and ensure the implementation of the first three conditions of the Minsk agreements (a bilateral ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the implementation of monitoring activities). This objective should inform priorities with regard to both the territory where the peacekeeping are forces initially deployed (the demarcation line) and to the initial mandate of these forces (preventing possible violations of the ceasefire agreement, regardless of which side commits the transgression). For Russia, it would be worthwhile to think about expanding the mandate it originally proposed to include not only the protection of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observers, but also the provision of a stable truce. This mandate needs to be consistent with the number of peacekeepers, the weapons in their possession, and their right to use such weapons against those who violate the truce. For its part, Ukraine should not insist on giving the blue helmets any additional functions at this stage. As things progress, the peacekeeping force might be provided with a new, broader mandate.
Overcoming phantom fears. Some of the concerns of the two parties seem to be far-fetched. And that is putting it mildly. It is, for example, fairly difficult to believe that, under the current circumstances, any NATO member – no matter how much Kiev pleads – would be prepared to commit significant military contingents for a peacekeeping operation in Donbass, certainly not before they have obtained sufficient security guarantees from the DNR and LNR. Furthermore, the existing UN procedures for setting up and managing peacekeeping forces exclude even the theoretical possibility of a single country (including Russia and the United States) or group of countries (including NATO) unilaterally controlling the progress of a peacekeeping operation. There appears to be nothing preventing the peacekeeping force from comprising representatives of countries trusted both by Kiev and Moscow; everything would depend on the political will of the two sides and their readiness to make balanced compromises.
Taking prior experience into account. Existing peacekeeping experience does not support the idea that negotiating with unrecognized entities within a given territory serves as the first step towards the international recognition of those entities. For example, the United Nations has been coordinating its peacekeeping activities in Cyprus with the government of Northern Cyprus for decades, ever since Turkey invaded the island in the summer of 1974, even though the territorial entity is not recognized by anyone except Turkey. A similar situation arose in the course of numerous attempts by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and then the OSCE, to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh issue: the presence of Nagorno-Karabakh representatives at the negotiating table since 1992 has not, and will not, lead to the recognition of the territory as a legitimate subject of international law. There is no doubt that, should the sides agree on this and demonstrate a degree of flexibility and creativeness, a similar formula could be devised for Donbass.
Sharing the responsibility for the peacekeeping mission. Observing Ukraine’s demands to the letter – that Russia take no part in the peacekeeping operation and that negotiations with the Donbass authorities do not take place – would raise the logical question of who is to act as the guarantor of uninterrupted peacekeeping work in Donbass. Is Kiev prepared to bear sole responsibility for inevitable incidents, outbreaks of violence and attacks on the peacekeepers? It appears that at this point in time, Ukraine’s interests would best be served by the active involvement of both Moscow and the Donbass authorities in the settlement process. The particularities of such involvement, however, are quite a different matter. The existing experience of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine should be carefully studied again, as should the experience of practical interaction between the OSCE monitoring mission and the Donbass authorities. As for Russia, its strategic role should be to define the mandate of the peacekeeping operation within the framework of the UN Security Council, as well as planning and monitoring that operation. Speaking of Russian peacekeepers in Donbass, some form of presence, however symbolic, would be an additional guarantee that all the parties to the conflict will fulfil the terms of the peacekeeping agreement.
Considering the dynamic side to the agreement. Many of the disagreements between Moscow and Kiev would appear less fundamental if the mandate, area of deployment and the timeframe of the possible peacekeeping mission were viewed as dynamic, rather than static, values. In other words, the mission should be perceived as a set of successive stages, with the objectives of each subsequent stage defined by the preceding stage’s achievements. For example, it would be correct to expect the peacekeeping mission’s deployment area to expand gradually (all the way to the border between Russia and Ukraine), its potential to grow over time and its functions to gradually transition from the initial objectives (ensuring the cessation of hostilities) to more complex matters (including, for example, technical assistance with the organization of local elections). Both Kiev and the West fear that Moscow will retain the right to block the transition to the next stage if it is not satisfied with the current results of the peacekeeping mission. However, Russia would reserve such a right irrespective of how the UN peacekeepers are used. Also, peacekeeping missions eventually acquire their own dynamics and inertia; politically, it is always more difficult to block the continuation of a successful mission than prevent the launch of a new one.
Synchronizing the peacekeeping mission with the implementation of the Minsk agreements. There exists the opinion that, since the Normandy format has reached an impasse and the focus of the current Donbass settlement consultations has shifted to the “shuttle diplomacy” exercised by Kurt Volker’s successor as the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine, the future UN peacekeeping mission should eventually replace the “outdated” mechanisms and procedures envisaged by the Minsk agreements. It appears that, rather than becoming an alternative to the Minsk agreements, the mission should represent an additional instrument for their implementation. Such an instrument is not provided for in the text of the Minsk agreements, but it does not contradict the spirit of the document in any way. Having assisted the parties to the conflict in the implementation of the first three clauses of the agreements, the peacekeeping mission could move on to deal with the other clauses, including the distribution of humanitarian assistance, the disarmament of illegal groups, the enforcement of law and order, etc. The timeline of the Minsk agreements would certainly need to be revised accordingly to reflect the progress of the peacekeeping mission.
Keeping the pan-European perspective in mind. There is undoubtedly a bilateral causal link between the current crisis involving Ukraine and the more general problems related to European (or Euro–Atlantic) security. For as long as the Ukrainian crisis remains unresolved, the European security system cannot become indivisible; nor will it be possible to overcome the new east division of the continent. At the same time, the Ukrainian crisis cannot be resolved completely all efforts are focused on it alone, outside the context of solving broader European problems. Restoring peace in Donbass, normalizing Russia–Ukraine relations and finding new approaches to European security in general need to be viewed as parallel objectives, not consecutive ones. It will take many years, if not decades, to solve these problems. However, the launch of a UN peacekeeping operation in Donbass could become a pivotal event in European politics, one that would result in a negative trend being replaced by a positive one. We are left to hope that this shift will take place in 2018. The longer the current crisis lasts, the harder it will be to emerge from it.
First published in our partner RIAC
[i] “First, I believe the presence of UN peacekeepers or, should I say, of those people who would ensure the security of the OSCE mission, to be fairly appropriate. I see nothing wrong in this; on the contrary, I believe this would help resolve the situation in the southeast of Ukraine. Of course, we are talking exclusively about ensuring the security of the OSCE officers. Second, these forces need to be stationed exclusively along the demarcation line and nowhere else. Third, the decision is to be made only after the sides have disengaged and withdrawn heavy equipment. No decision can be made without direct contact with the leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics.” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55535).
[ii] Ukraine’s first official detailed response to Putin was Petro Poroshenko’s address to the UN Security Council on September 20, 2017, which proposed a comprehensive UN peacekeeping operation across the entire territory of the DPR/LPR, including the stretch of the Ukraine–Russia border that is currently not controlled by Kiev (https://www.unian.net/politics/2145861-poroshenko-obratilsya-k-sovbezu-oon-o-razvertyivanii-mirotvortsev-na-donbasse-video.html).
[iii] We can cite, for instance, the following statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin: “We have absolutely no use of a frozen conflict here, simply because this is something that Russia needs by definition. The entire logic of Russia’s actions boils down to attempting to influence us and destabilize use via the occupied Donbass, via this Russian colony in Donbass. This is why even this schizophrenic Russian proposal to protect the OSCE by means of peacekeepers (read: protect from Russia itself, because nobody else can influence them there) also contributes to nothing more than the freezing of the conflict. The same can be said of placing peacekeepers exclusively along the contact line, which is nothing more than the creation of a new frontier.” (https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-polytics/2312434-klimkin-nazvav-rosijsku-rezoluciu-po-mirotvorcam-sizofrenicnou.html).
[iv] Following his meeting with U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker in Belgrade on November 13, 2017, Russian Presidential Aide Vladislav Surkov stated that, out of the 29 proposals made by the United States, Russia had only been able to concede to three, those which generally reiterated the inviolability of the Minsk agreements (https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2017/11/14_a_10985108.shtml).
[v] As Putin told the Valdai Club conference in October, “Closing the border between Russia and the unrecognized republics would result in a situation akin to Srebrenica. A massacre will follow there. We cannot, and never will, allow that.” (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882).
[vi] There are grounds for such concerns. Consider, for example, the recent statement made by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Arsen Avakov (https://rian.com.ua/politics/20171128/1029853624.html).
[vii] Moscow refers in particular to the events that took place in Kiev on February 21, 2014, when a number of European officials facilitated an agreement between President Viktor Yanukovych and the Ukrainian political opposition on a transition period that was subsequently breached by the opposition at the West’s “connivance” (http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882).[viii] When Jon Huntsman Jr., the new Ambassador of the United States to Russia, conditioned the lifting of the U.S. sanctions on progress in Donbass (https://topspb.tv/programs/stories/466132/), the general reaction from Russian politicians and experts was extremely sceptical. The overwhelming majority of commentators believed that the sanctions were there to stay and that, no matter what Moscow did, the decision of the United State Congress was irreversible, regardless of the Trump administration’s desires.
Ukraine Lies About 2022 Russian Attack to Hide Dying Economy
Yesterday, Ukraine’s president Zelensky speaking to the Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service said “We have learned to contain external threats. It is time to launch an offensive to secure our national interests. We are united in wanting our territory returned immediately”.
Beginning the day after Joe Biden’s inauguration, Ukraine has been complaining of Russia’s troop buildup of over 90,000 men on its border. According to Ukraine’s Zelensky, Russia was prepared to attack at any moment.
In response to this, Ukraine mobilized over ½ its army or over 170,000 troops to the frontline with all the heavy weapons at its disposal accompanying them.
This force was a supposed counter to the Russian invasion army, which again, was just over the border.
In reality, the Russian army staged planned war games near the city of Yelnya, 160 miles (257 kilometers) from the Ukrainian border. You read that right, the Russian army was160 miles away from the Ukrainian border even though every major western publication made it sound like they were already in Kiev.
For the average modern army, that means over a day’s travel just to get to the Ukrainian border. Then another 4-5 hours travel on top of that to where the Ukrainian army is. So much for a surprise attack.
So what is it that Ukraine’s President Zelensky finds so threatening about Russia?
Ukraine’s President Zelensky told visiting US Senators in early June that the country’s military defense against Russia and the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline are inextricably intertwined.
Once the project is completed, Ukraine will be deprived of the funds required to fund defense spending and defend Europe’s eastern border.
“Nord Stream 2 will cut Ukraine off from gas supplies, which will cost us at least USD 3 billion per year.”
Zelensky, always the joker, wants Russia to pay $3 billion per year so he personally can defend Europe from Russia who is paying him.
What a great story. He’s confusing screenwriting fantasy with diplomacy again.
“We won’t be able to pay for the Ukrainian army,” Zelensky observed.
In reality, Ukraine has about one month’s worth of diesel if Kiev ignores Ukraine’s responsibility to its own people to provide a safety net or at least access to necessities like bread or shelter in below-zero weather that’s on its way next month by heavily subsidizing gas and electric costs.
The only thing the government in Kiev is concerned about is losing the $3 billion in transit fees from the country they accuse of attacking them.
Zelensky’s government went as far as demanding fees from Germany and Russia when Nordstream II took over the transit game.
Zelensky’s Ukraine is shuffling Europe, NATO, and the US closer and closer to the line where one mistake in diplomacy, one stupid move by any of Ukraine’s infamous Neanderthal nationalist volunteers, and bang!
The next headline reads- Oops! Thousands dead in Ukraine as the war spreads to Europe.
Joe “Brandon” and club RINO are sleepwalking America right into this level of catastrophe by coddling his pet kleptocracy who’s already stolen billions of US dollars meant as aid.
And why? Why oh-why indeed.
Ukraine is using the supposed Russian attack to renegotiate its unsolvable gas situation.
It’s either this or tells Ukrainians; Oops! We screwed the pooch guys! You’re gonna freeze because we can’t afford gas.
Russia won’t invade because then Russia will be responsible for providing a total civil safety net including gas and electricity for Ukrainian people who otherwise can’t afford it.
Ukraine’s economy is dying. Russia doesn’t plan to foot the bill.
According to Oleg Popenko, the head of the Union of Consumers of Utilities (UCU), high gas costs will prevent most small and medium-sized firms from operating and will force them to close.
According to him, small business owners will be unable to “pull” the payment of 7,000 hryvnias (22,000 rubles) for heating.
As a result, we can anticipate a reduction in the activities of hairdressing salons, bakers, dry cleaners, dental offices, and so on.
They will either have to include the higher-priced communal unit in the pricing of their services, or they will have to close.
All types of businesses, from small dry cleaners to big agricultural holdings, use gas to some extent.
The only ones who benefit from the price increase are Ukrainian gas-producing businesses, which are now raising the price for their users’ dozens of times, resulting in massive profits.
In a recent interview, former President’s Office head Andriy Bogdan forecast a total economic collapse by February of next year.
“Here we still have December – this is the pre-New Year’s, joyous month, when everyone spends money, and somehow with hope:” We’ll pluck something out of the egg-box and live.”
However, this will not be the case in January and February.
“We will dismiss people, our industry will grow, our budget revenues will fall, and our economy will boom based on the price of gas and electricity,” Bogdan added.
“With a further rise in gas prices, the chemical industry and the production of fertilizers are at risk of dying altogether, predicts energy expert Valentin Zemlyansky.
“Industry will die. I am not kidding. The impact of energy prices on the business situation is an inertial process. The business will not close immediately, it will happen in stages. The beginning will be in March 2022, we will see the peak by May-June,”the expert says. Zemlyansky also emphasizes that this happens with a favorable market environment – mineral fertilizers are in demand, they are actively purchased by India, Pakistan, and China, but Ukrainian enterprises cannot afford their production. This was confirmed by the recent suspension of the specialized work of the Odessa Port Plant.
Thus, Ukrainian exporters are squeezed out of world markets. Many of Ukraine’s neighbors that produce similar products (for example, nitrogen fertilizers) receive gas at fixed low prices. In Turkey, for example, the government regulates gas prices for such businesses. It will also be difficult to sell the products that have risen in price on the domestic market due to the falling purchasing power.
Economic analyst Igor Deysan also warns that an increase in fertilizer prices will lead to the abandonment of sowing of many crops and an increase in the price of agricultural products, especially wheat in the 2022-2023 season.
“The cost of gas is largely carried over to the cost of wheat and other crops. If gas prices remain high for a long time, the rise in gas prices can make a significant contribution to the price of wheat,” the expert predicts.
Farmers still need to dry the harvested wheat crop, which also implies significant gas consumption. The next in the cycle of its processing are millers and bakers, who are also going bankrupt due to high gas prices.”
The breadbasket of Europe is empty. Ukraine hasn’t seen this scarcity since the 1932-33 famine they are constantly enshrining. The difference between then and now is this time the government is responsible for all of it.
Bakeries will close down because Ukraine oversold wheat to Turkey and its stocks are empty. Now, the breadbasket nation needs to purchase flour from Turkey.
Even if the grain was there, the gas needed to furnish the bakeries, cities, businesses, homes, hospitals, and government buildings with heat and electricity is not.
Deputy from the “Opposition Platform – For Life” Yuriy Boyko said on the air the other day that high gas prices are ruining bakeries. “I came to a bakery in the Kiev region. A modern enterprise. The bakery today pays for gas seven times more than a year ago. And for electricity twice. And energy carriers play a very significant role in the cost of bread, about 20%. That is, in reality, already today they are forced to either increase the cost of bread, or there will be no bread, ”the deputy said.
The short-term gas forecast for Ukraine looks bleak even though Ukraine has the second-largest proven gas reserves in Europe right behind Russia.
Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, now the leader of the Batkivshchyna party, stated on the Nash TV station on December 22 that Ukraine could furnish itself with gas in three years, but only under particular conditions.
Earlier, the politician said that Ukraine should not wait to purchase Russian gas supplies until the end of the heating season, because there is nowhere else to get it.
According to Tymoshenko, “To enhance gas production in Ukraine, the president’s will is required first and foremost because this should become a strategic and critical program for the development of the state’s energy sector.”
Today, there is no such political will. “Licenses are dispersed on the right and left,” she explained.
Secondly, according to Tymoshenko, non-budget banking investment resources must be directed to Ukrgazvydobuvannya, which also needs to be licensed for all explored deposits. In this case, the ex-prime minister is sure that Ukraine will provide its own gas in 3 years.
Gas firms promise to reinvest revenues in increased production and modernization, but in the meantime, all other industries and small businesses can relocate across the world.
The Association of Gas Production Companies (AGKU) vehemently rejected proposals to impose state regulation of Ukrainian gas pricing in October, citing the fact that it would “inflict a blow on Ukraine’s image in the world arena and severely harm the European Union.” integration processes”.
Only those Ukrainian oligarchs’ enterprises like those of Rinat Akhmetov, Igor Kolomoisky, and Viktor Pinchuk, who control gas production companies and can send natural gas to their enterprises are affected in this situation.
If Ukraine could produce enough gas tomorrow, its citizens can’t afford high-priced Ukrainian gas and hydrocarbon products. The reserves are 5000 ft. below the surface and the costs of drilling and extraction are quite high.
The only way Biden’s Ukraine can become energy independent is if fuel prices perpetually soar from now on. Ukraine will be able to pay financial obligations like World Bank loans and investors like Hunter Biden.
According to Yuriy Vitrenko, the newly appointed CEO of Ukraine’s energy behemoth Naftogaz, Nord Stream 2 will give Gazprom a dominant position in Europe, giving it significant leverage over Germany and other EU countries.
The only option to avert this scenario is for Ukraine to gain access to gas from other gas-producing countries like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, or Azerbaijan, which would gladly use Ukraine’s transit system to sell gas to Europe.
“Germany should ensure that Gazprom cannot obstruct us,” Vitrenko argues.
“They must do so before Nord Stream 2 is completed, while Germany retains the essential leverage.”
The Germans must impose a moratorium until this type of competitive solution is implemented.”
If Russia refuses to cooperate, it will show that Nord Stream 2 is simply a geopolitical weapon aimed at harming Ukraine and monopolizing Europe’s energy markets, according to Vitrenko.”We have a transit system in Ukraine.” Let us compete to bring other gas providers into Europe,” we argue.
Vitrenko believes that once Nord Stream 2 is completed and the present five-year contract expires in 2025, Russian gas will no longer flow via Ukraine.
Arsen Avakov, Ukraine’s Interior Minister, has claimed that Russia may not even complete the current contract.
He warned that Moscow may disrupt Ukraine’s pipeline network to hinder gas transit across the nation and boost the argument for Nord Stream 2.
What’s interesting about this is it brings us right back to a graft-investor scenario reminiscent of Biden-Burisma. The companies feed profits to investors instead of reinvestment into equipment and permitting.
Secondly, Vitrenko wants the most expensive gas in Europe to materialize in his Ukrainian pipe. Caspian Sea gas, like Ukrainian fracked gas, is extremely costly to produce. The average Ukrainian won’t be able to afford it even if it was a possibility.
It’s only now that we get to the part that will make Americans and Europeans equally appalled.
Biden is using gas and oil cost spikes due to his mandated production cuts and the attempt to shutter Nordstream II to support Ukraine.
The more hydrocarbon product costs spike, the less dependent the EU and Ukraine are on Russian gas. This means fewer Russian gas transits to the EU.
As a consequence, Ukraine can profitably frack hydrocarbons and pay oligarchs, political grafts, and international loans. The gas is too expensive for Ukrainian people but investors like Hunter Biden or Amos Hochstein make out like bandits.
The more profitable the expensive EU oil and gas production rigs become, the more diverse gas purchases are and short-term energy diversification and security is achieved through extremely high price energy products.
If energy costs are through the roof, Joe “Brandon” has a clear runway to dismantle the US economy and Democrats will do what Democrats are doing.
Why should this infuriate you? What’s the difference between $1.80 per gallon and $4.00 per gallon gasoline in the US when it’s coming out of your pocket? The difference is Ukraine’s ability to pay its bills. The difference is Ukrainian politicians dealing with their own problems like grownups. The difference is Ukraine starts acting like a partner and less like a petulant child throwing temper tantrums.
How do higher fuel costs transfer to high retail off-the-shelf product costs?
Do high energy costs contribute to runaway inflation?
Now you know.
It is a hard enough choice to bear the cost in lives when a war is worth fighting and can’t be avoided. Ukraine’s Zelensky doesn’t want Donbass back in the fold. Just a few weeks ago, Zelensky described the citizens he claims to want back as “subhuman.”
The Ukrainians, as of January 2022, are not good partners or friends to America. They are unworthy of American support. Do we want to give them the opportunity to send American kids to war so their oligarchs and our politicians can steal more?
The Stewards of Hate
A big bear is rattling the open door of his cage. He cannot abide a NATO spear in his belly. Hence Valdimir Putin’s demand for Ukraine to remain out of it, and for the military alliance to stop its advance into eastern Europe.
For 72 years until 1991, Ukraine was a republic of the Soviet Union, and before that for centuries an oblast of the Imperial Russian empire. In 1939, parts belonging to Poland were annexed.
It was during the breakup of Russia following an independence referendum that Ukraine opted to separate. But NATO is another story. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (NATO’s eastern counterpart), Russia had expected the West to do the same. Instead, NATO became a US fig leaf for its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Apparently, everyone in the world saw through this — except the US — as it embroiled itself in both countries, and the bill for the misadventures rocketed from $80 billion to an estimated $5 trillion.
The EU, a path to riches for East Europeans, is a Ukrainian dream, and Russian troops the reality when they wake up. Such are the facts, no matter how much the Ukrainians are trying to ignore them.
If the powerful Russian bear is the Ukrainian bete noire, its polar opposite is the case in India. A powerful Hindutva movement abhors the Muslim minority. It blames them for India’s problems, very much akin to the situation for Jews in pre-WW2 Germany. Not unsurprisingly given the roots of the RSS, which modeled itself after the Nazis, instituting uniforms and drills. A former member assassinated Gandhi for being too soft on Muslims. Post independence, the RSS was banned by India’s first government which was led by Jawaharlal Nehru, a secular socialist.
The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is a former RSS pracharak — that is an active member who devotes himself full time to promoting RSS doctrine and, like a missionary, in seeking new members. As an ambitious politician, he shed RSS ties when he entered politics and as leader expresses the wish for unity — sentiments not shared by his BHP colleagues.
There is the yogi elected chief minister of India’s largest state, and his undisguised derogatory opinions of Muslims. Worse, at a political event at the end of December, leaders called openly for the killing of Muslims, and India’s leaders kept silent. After general social media outrage at the speeches, the police finally registered a case against some of the speakers for ‘promoting hatred between religious groups.’
Videos show many of the speakers are prominent religious leaders often present with senior ministers in the BJP government. Imagine, calling for genocide in 2021. The world reacted to the effort to eliminate Tutsis in Rwanda where it also began with reviling and dehumanization. Genocide and even incitement to genocide is a crime. Hence the prosecutions. Incitement to genocide is recognized as a separate crime under international law and an inchoate crime which does not require genocide to have taken place to be prosecutable.
The founders of post-independence India, Gandhi and Nehru who took pride in being secular, must be in agony over international outlaws wanting to become the stewards of their child.
Lithuania is left in the dust
The nearly completed Nord Stream 2 is again in focus. It has become known that the U.S. Senate on January 13 failed to pass a bill to slap sanctions on Russia’s Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline sponsored by Republican Senator Ted Cruz. The tally was 55 in favor and 44 against the bill that needed 60 votes to pass. Those who voted against his bill said it risked breaking unity in Washington and in Europe. U.S. senators said also Cruz sanctions on Nord Stream 2 could harm relations with Germany which is very important for the U.S. foreign policy and economy.
Top Ukrainian officials, as well as Lithuanian government supported Cruz’s bill, arguing the United States should do everything in its power to halt the pipeline project.
The link is designed to export gas from Russia directly to Germany by bypassing Ukraine, through which Russia has sent gas to Europe for decades. That would deprive Ukraine of lucrative transit fees and potentially undermine its struggle against alleged Russian aggression. The decision will allow the completion of the gas pipeline to Europe without the imposition of further US sanctions. Earlier Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis said that the a deal between the United States and Germany on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was a “mistake”. It is interesting that the vote came as U.S. and European officials held high-level talks with their Russian counterparts. It is quite possible that the decision about Nord Stream 2 pipeline was the result of these negotiations.
This fact has sparked anger and has become great political disappointment for the Lithuanian officials who view the project as a security threat.
Lithuania, positioning itself as the main Ukraine’s patron in Europe, is confused with such U.S. decision. Lithuania promotes the U.S. interests and support all American initiatives even to the detriment of its own interests. Only this month Lithuania took a number of steps to prove its commitment to US policy. Lithuania even has dared to challenge China, one the main US strategic competitors. It continues to spend millions of dollars on military purchases from the U.S. using the narrative of “the threat from the East”. In December Lithuania signed an agreement with the U.S. to improve military interoperability.
The more so, the Lithuanian government has decided to accelerate its planned purchase of a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) amid Russia’s military buildup on its border with Ukraine. The decision to buy US’ Lockheed Martin system in 2026, two years earlier than Vilnius previously planned.
The country also regularly holds political consultations with the U.S. officials to coordinate its further actions. But the U.S. in its turn does not pay attention to Lithuania’s opinion and makes decision in its favour.
Lithuanian government should gain Lithuanians’ support and pay attention to their needs. The matter is discontent in Lithuanian society is growing every day. Thus, on January 13, the usual commemoration of Freedom Defenders saw loud booing and heckles from the crowd of protesters who called on the government (and the parliament) to resign.
It is obviously that the threat from the East is not so real as threat to be fired due to loss of confidence in near future.
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