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Old friend never be forgotten: China’s stance on Zimbabwe

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Authors: Jamal Laadam & Wang Li

To the most people who believe in the doctrine of power politics, what China needs from Africa is only to guarantee its consistent supply of natural resources, open new markets and create strong alliances in Africa. Meanwhile, Africa in general can receive investment and multiple aid from China.

This is quite superficial with regards to the Sino—African relations. China has long stated that the two sides have shared the same past experiences of the Western powers’ exploitation and also have the future destinies shared to become peaceful and prosperous states in the world. Behind this long-term relationship are their mutual respect, reciprocal understanding and high-level personal friendship. Historically, it can be traced to the mid-1950s, especially after 1963 that Chinese relationship with Africa has been the foundation of Beijing’s foreign policy strategy.

Due to this, China’s stance on the resignation of former Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe is clear and consistent: “as a good friend of Zimbabwe, China appreciates the efforts of various parties in Zimbabwe to properly resolve the relevant issue through dialogue and negotiation within the legal framework with a view to the long-term and fundamental interests of the nation. China deems that the Zimbabwean people are capable of maintaining political stability and national development.” Behind this soft tone is that China opposed to any great powers’ interference with the domestic affairs of Zimbabwe. For example, China argues that only the Zimbabwean people who will run their own business and other countries will not be allowed to dictate the future direction of Zimbabwe’s politics.

Yes, China and Zimbabwe have enjoyed friendly relations for a long time. Both peoples have stood the testing of time and ever-changing international landscape. In recent years, the practical cooperation in various fields between the two sides have continuously moved forward and brought tangible benefits to each other. China highly values its relations with Zimbabwe and stands ready to work with various parties of Zimbabwe to promote Sino-Zimbabwean friendship and across- the-board cooperation. For example, two Chinese state-owned companies, South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Co. (CSR) jointly signed an agreement with Mugabe’s regime in 2009, in exchange for an $8 billion investment in infrastructure with supply of Chinese equipment and technologies. Moreover, the Chinese are aware that the stability and development of Zimbabwe would serve the local people’s interests and are the shared aspiration of the African and the global communities.

As noted, the Chinese have indeed cherished the personal friendship with Robert Mugabe. Even though it is reported that the Beijing leaders are a little bit disappointed about this old friend Mugabe’s misleading of Zimbabwe’s economic policy which led to rampant corruption, China hopes Zimbabwe to sustain stability and security without any chaos. After all, Mugabe remains seen as making historic contribution to Zimbabwe’s national independence and liberation from the former colonial ruling. He is also an active advocate and promoter of the Pan-African movement. To most Chinese who have witnessed the past three decades, Mugabe has long been committed to Sino-Zimbabwe friendship and made important contribution to the mutual strategic partnership. Although China appeals to Mugabe’s decision to resign as the head of state, he is still seen as “a good friend of the Chinese people”.

On 24 November, just days after Mugabe’s step-down, Emerson Mnangagwa was sworn in as the president. He was a guerilla leader during the Rhodesian Bush War. After Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, Mnangagwa held a series of senior cabinet positions under Mugabe, including as minister of state security and later minister of defense. More important is that Mnangagwa had received both his military training and political leadership in the Beijing School of Ideology during the pre-independence campaign. Clearly, Chinese leaders have been well-familiar with this new President. As early as his visit to China as VP of Zimbabwe in 2015, Mnangagwa vowed to promote political confidence and pragmatic cooperation between the two sides, since China agreed to provide all assistance in economic planning, transportation and infrastructure, special economic zone and industrial park construction, capacity building as well as human resource training to Zimbabwe. In China, Mnangagwa expressed his welcome to Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in Zimbabwe. This is one of the core reasons behind Chinese official line that “China’s friendly policy towards Zimbabwe remains unchanged. We stand ready to proactively enhance the exchange and cooperation with Zimbabwe and scale China-Zimbabwe friendship to a new height in the principle of equality, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation.”

China’s policy towards Africa is of long-term strategic dimension. Therefore, China has insisted on three tenets in terms of the crisis management in Africa generally and in Zimbabwe this time. First, China appeals to all parties of Zimbabwe that they should put aside the group’s interest with a view to strive for a peaceful and proper settlement of the relevant issue under the legal framework and in light of Zimbabwe’s national stability and social order. Actually, this is the consensus among the social elites and the ordinary people as well throughout the country. Second, China has large amount of invests in Zimbabwe which has the potentials to be one of the most dynamic economies and prosperous country in Africa. By 2015, China had invested nearly 400 million US dollars, much more than many other FDI sources, into Zimbabwe. At the present time, Chinese firms in Zimbabwe are the most dominant one among foreign firms. When Mugabe made his state visit to China in 2015, during which he held meetings with Chinese President Xi who confided to Mugabe that “China won’t forget its old friends”. Third, China has consistently taken a friendly policy towards Zimbabwe, and their cooperation is comprehensive and beneficial to both peoples. Due to this, Beijing looks forwards to consolidating the further cooperation with Zimbabwe in accordance with the principle of equality, mutual benefit, and win-win cooperation, no matter who takes power in Harare.

Now, Mugabe is gone finally. But Africa‘s rising exposure to China has led to larger exports to China and have helped boost economic growth on the continent. The introduction of the New Strategic Partnership has further cemented Sino- African relations and reinforced China’s commitment to mutual economic benefit policy towards Africa. It is widely noted that just one week ago before Mugabe was advised to step-down, General Chiwenga, commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces, paid a “normal” working visit to China. During their meetings with the Chinese counterparts, both sides had opined that it is significant to push forward and to further strengthen mutual exchanges at all levels, deepen pragmatic cooperation in various fields, so as to promote further development of bilateral state and military relations between the two countries. Given the sanctions against Zimbabwe over the past two decades, China has been the largest military hard-ware supplier, along with its growing economic clouts. Zimbabwe has purchased from China all sorts of military equipment such as air defense radars, air craft’s and much other medical equipment; inclusive are China’s military advisers and mechanical technicians who have worked with their Zimbabwean counterparts.

With a new chapter turned in Zimbabwean history, its new president vows to develop economics as the priority of his political agenda. No matter how he takes the inspirations from Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and Chinese lessons, it is clear that the new administration headed by the old veteran guard reached out to the world that “We want change in Zimbabwe. And I’m prepared to work for any political party that can change our country from poverty to prosperity.” This is really the opportunity for China, if smartly enough, to act as a responsible power in terms of the poverty-alleviation in Zimbabwe and the stability-promoter in Africa as well.

Let’s see how the leadership in Beijing reacts to their old friend’s needs in Harare taking a new road towards domestic reform and international openness.

Jamal Ait Laadam, Specialist in and North African Studies and Western Sahara Issue, a Ph.D. fellow in Jilin University School of Public Affairs

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East Asia

Hong Kong: No more China’s disheartened capitalism, please

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Hong Kong’s unrest started in June 2019. It was triggered by the plans to allow extradition to mainland China. Critics felt this could compromise judicial autonomy and jeopardise free-speech legacy.

Until 1997, Hong Kong was under the British rule as an overseas territory (effectively a colony), but then returned under the mainland China jurisdiction. Under the Deng’s “one country, two systems” arrangement, it has considerable autonomy, and Hongkongers (Mandarin: 香港人) enjoy comparatively more civic rights.

The controversial bill was finally withdrawn in September 2019. Under the slogan ‘too little too late’, the demonstrations continued, growing even larger. Protesters now demand full democracy and an independent inquiry into police actions.

Lately, clashes between police and activists have turned worryingly violent; police firing rubber bullets and occasionally even live rounds, while protesters counter-attacking officers by throwing stones and petrol bombs.

Generational and Class struggle is back?

What still remains rather underreported are social and generational dimensions of the protests. Hence, it indeed feels to comment on some distorting interpretations and oversimplified views.

As an illustration, one can take reporting such as James A. Dorn’s columns (eg. “If protesters want to protect Hong Kong’s way of life, they must win the war of ideas”). This author is cited as a China specialist. Essentially, he is a senior fellow of the Cato Institute, a conservative think tank similar to The Heritage Foundation, which often declares Hong Kong the “world’s freest economy”, even though Hong Kong’s working class endures horrid living conditions here.

Authors like him allude to a “war of ideas” and do criticise socialism with Chinese characteristics, even though China has made tremendous economic progress and enjoyed political stability. One wonders why such views and opinions about Hong Kong or China should be considered or adopted.

China has not dictated how the US or other Western countries should run their economies or political systems, nor has it solicited advice from these free market theoreticians or think tanks. China has lifted at least half a billion people out of poverty, helping to alleviate poverty globally.

Another country which has done exceptionally well and which has not subscribed to neoliberal dogma but retains strong state control of the economy and political freedom is Singapore.

Hong Kong’s main problem is that the sacrosanct free market has become a political excuse for government non-interference, allowing tycoons and big businesses to freely game the system, gorge themselves on Hong Kong’s resources and create large wealth disparities that have contributed to our current social and political instability.

This neither alleviated the suffering of Hong Kong’s working class nor solved the housing problem. Rather it has allowed tycoons to profit. The city needs tax reform so that government revenue does not rely on land sales.

The policy of non-intervention has led to tycoons and big businesses privatising necessities like housing, health care, education and, through the Mandatory Provident Fund, retirement savings. This benefits the private sector at the expense of the public.

Driven by an unrestrained greed, someone wishing to monetise, gambles with our future. Simply, compare the Gini for Hong Kong of 1997 and of today, and see yourself.

Massive social costs to enrich few – Parasites among us

Nowhere in the world is housing as unaffordable and nowhere has it made property developers as wealthy. Allowing markets to set prices only reinforces the housing crisis, as does letting local and foreign investors buy up property despite the housing shortage. Another absurdity is calling for more free competition to break up the property cartel.

As professor Anis H. Bajrektarevic observed and compared: “… it seems that the narrative by which the ‘freedom’ obsessed and spoiled capitalist youth is fighting the big egalitarian communist apparatus is overly simplified and is, thus, short in capturing the truth… It is [what is happening last months in Hong Kong] closer to an outcry of excluded and pauperised youth – quite similar to the one on the streets of Europe, whose protests faded away years ago … [Well] educated but disfranchised youth that feels the generational warfare replaced the social welfare… The Hongkongers are not fighting against the egalitarian ideas or system. Quite to contrary, they are bitterly opposing social inequality and endemic generational exclusions. The very tomorrow of European society might be – prudently or violently – decided on the streets of Hong Kong.”

A low-tax regime mostly benefits the landlord class and big business. Hong Kong residents actually pay among the highest taxes in the world in the form of high rents and housing prices, yet they have scant social safety nets. A wealth tax and more progressive taxes should be imposed to generate government revenue, instead of relying on land sales.

Hong Kong needs the opposite of the free-market dogma, so we can have more humane living conditions and social stability. Or as a former Vice-chancellor of the Hong Kong University wonderfully captured: “Neither violence, nor Beijing, can fix City’s housing shortage and lack of a social safety net.”

Many Hongkongers have lost out due to economic changes, and many have deep-seated distrust of mainland China. The Hong Kong government must first address their social exclusions and financial insecurities, enhancing all-generational debate before it can work on fostering a sense of Chinese identity.

 From our partner International Affairs

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China struggles to fend off allegations of debt trap diplomacy

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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Desperate for cash, Tajikistan is about to sell yet another vital asset to China at a time that countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives are demanding renegotiation of debt settlements that either forced them to surrender control of critical infrastructure or left them with unsustainable repayments.

The pending Chinese acquisition of  a stake in Tajikistan’s aluminium smelter, coupled with earlier tax concessions to Chinese companies that would substantially reduce the trickle down effect of investments for the troubled Tajik economy, suggest that China has yet to fully take account  of frequent criticism of its commercial approach to Belt and Road-related projects.

The Washington-based Center for Global Development warned last year that “23 of 68 countries benefiting from Belt and Road (BRI) investments were “significantly or highly vulnerable to debt distress.”

The centre said eight countries — Tajikistan, the Maldives, Pakistan, Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, and Montenegro — were particularly at risk.

“There is…concern that debt problems will create an unfavourable degree of dependency on China as a creditor. Increasing debt, and China’s role in managing bilateral debt problems, has already exacerbated internal and bilateral tensions in some BRI countries,” the report said.

Progress on the construction of a road in Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, a narrow strip in the east of the country that touches the Chinese border and separates Tajikistan from Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, may explain China’s seeming insensitivity to the concerns of beneficiaries of the People’s Republic’s largesse.

The road would link the corridor to Central Asia in the north and Pakistan’s Chinese-built Arabian Sea port of Gwadar in the south, a crown jewel in China’s infrastructure- and energy driven Belt and Road initiative.

To be sure, the road has local rather than geopolitical significance for workers building the road and the region’s shepherds as documented by anthropologists Tobias Marschall and Till Mostowlansky.

The road creates temporary employment for labourers. For shepherds, it facilitates access to mountain pastures.

For China, the stakes are geopolitical and economic.

The road would not only facilitate commerce with Central Asia as well as traffic from Gwadar but also construction of shorter pipelines as well as a fibre optic cable.

Perhaps more importantly, it would together with a military base in Tajikistan and Chinese cross border operations in the corridor itself, facilitate the movement of troops in China’s gradual projection of military power beyond its borders, particularly in regions adjacent to its troubled north-western province of Xinjiang.

The road’s potential military significance raises questions about the sustainability of a presumed division of labour between Russia and China under which Russia shoulders responsibility for security in Central Asia while China concentrates on economic development.

Ironically, if the examples of Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Pakistan and Malaysia coupled with anti-Chinese sentiment in Central Asia, fuelled in part by the brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, are anything to go by, China’s approach to Belt and Road-related development could turn out to be a threat to its broader geopolitical ambitions and regional security policy.

Sri Lanka recently demanded that China return control of Hambantota port.

Sri Lanka became the poster child of allegations that China was pursuing debt trap diplomacy when it two years ago surrendered to China control of the port as part of a deal to reduce the country’s debt payments.

China lent Sri Lanka US$5 billion between 2010 and 2015 for infrastructure projects that included development of Hambantota at interest rates of up to 6.3 percent.

By comparison, World Bank and Asian Development Bank rates on soft loans range from 0.25 to three percent.

“The perfect circumstance is a return to the norm. We pay back the loan in due course in the way that we had originally agreed without any disturbance at all,” said newly appointed Sri Lankan prime minister Ajith Nivard Cabraal.

Similarly, the foreign ministry of the Maldives said earlier this month that it was seeking to restructure its Chinese debt.

“Borrowings by the previous government were unreasonable and put us in difficulty. But we can solve this mess through diplomatic means,” said foreign minister Abdulla Shahid.

Last month, former president Abdulla Yameen was jailed for five years and fined US$5 million for corruption during his term that ended late last year. Mr. Shahid’s government has accused China of land grabs during Mr. Yameen’s reign.

In a rare success, Malaysia earlier this year negotiated a one third reduction in the cost of a US$15.7 billion Belt and Road-related rail project.  In a further concession, China agreed that 70 percent of the workforce would be Malaysian and that Malaysian contractors would get 40% of the civil works.

China has repeatedly been accused of employing Chinese rather than local labour for Chinese-funded projects along the Belt and Road and importing materials from China rather than sourcing them locally.

The government of Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan has been less successful than its Malaysian counterpart.

It recently bowed to Chinese pressure to revive hundreds of projects initially suspended after it came to office in 2018.

The appointment of a retired lieutenant general as head of a new authority overseeing the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that groups Belt and Road-related projects reflected China’s wariness towards messy Pakistani politics and preference for dealing with the country’s military.

With Sri Lanka as the anti-thesis, analysts suggest that China is determined to make Pakistan a success story.

“The big battle at the moment is about CPEC’s reputation, and Beijing cares about salvaging that. They need to show BRI has been a success, that it hasn’t put Pakistan’s economy in trouble and that there isn’t a backlash. If they can’t do it in a context like this, it suggests that there is something flawed in the model,” said Pakistan and China scholar Andrew Small.

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Standing up to China: Czech mayor sets a high bar

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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A Czech mayor’s refusal to endorse Beijing’s One China policy potentially sets a high bar as Western powers grapple with how to respond to allegations of excessive use of violence by police against Hong Kong protesters and the implications of leaked documents detailing a brutal crackdown in China’s north-western province of Xinjiang.

Prague mayor Zdenek Hrib rejected a sister city agreement between the Czech capital and Beijing in late October because it included a clause endorsing the One China policy, which implicitly recognizes China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, as well as Hong Kong and Tibet.

Mr. Hrib argued that the agreement was a cultural arrangement and not designed to address foreign policy issues that were the prerogative of the national government.

The mayor’s stance has since taken on added significance against the backdrop of US President Donald J. Trump’s signing of legislation that allows for the sanctioning of Hong Kong officials, embarrassing Communist party leaks that document repression in Xinjiang, the election of a new Sri Lankan government that intends to adopt a tougher policy towards China, and simmering anti-Chinese sentiment in Central Asia and beyond.

Mr. Hrib’s rejection was in fact a reflection of anti-Chinese sentiment in the Czech Republic as well as opposition to the pro-China policy adopted by Czech president Milos Zeman.

To be sure, Mr. Hrib, a 38-year old medical doctor who interned in Taiwan, was shouldering little political or economic risk given Czech public anger at China’s failure to fulfil promises of significant investment in the country.

On the contrary, Mr. Hrib, since becoming mayor in mid-2018, appears to have made it his pastime to put Mr. Zeman on the spot by poking a finger at China.

Mr. Hrib visited Taiwan in the first six months of his mayorship, flew the Tibetan flag over Prague’s city hall, and rejected a request by the Chinese ambassador at a meeting with foreign diplomats to send Taiwanese representatives out of the room.

Beijing’s cancellation of a tour of China by the Prague Philharmonic Orchestra in response to Mr. Hrib’s provocations forced Mr. Zeman to describe the Chinese retaliation as “excessive” and his  foreign minister, Tomas Petricek, to declare that “diplomacy is not conducted with threats.”

Perhaps more importantly, M. Hrib was taking a stand based on principles and values rather than interests. In doing so, he was challenging the new normal of world leaders flagrantly ignoring international law to operate on the principle of might is right.

“Our conscience is not for sale,” said Michaela Krausova, a leading member of the governing Pirate Party of the Prague city council. Ms. Krausova and Mr. Hrib’s party was founded to shake up Czech politics with its insistence on the safeguarding of civil liberties and political accountability and transparency.

While couched in terms of principle, Mr. Hrib’s stand strokes with newly installed Sri Lankan president Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s intention to wrest back control from China of the island’s strategic Hambantota port that serves key shipping lanes between Europe and Asia.

Hambantota became a symbol of what some critics have charged is Chinese debt trap diplomacy after Sri Lanka was forced to hand over the port to China in 2017 on a 99-year lease because the government was unable to repay loans taken to build it.

“I believe that the Sri Lankan government must have control of all strategically important projects like Hambantota. The next generation will curse our generation for giving away precious assets otherwise,” Mr. Rajapaksa said.

Fears of a debt trap coupled with the crackdown on Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, which targets not only Uighurs, but also groups that trace their roots to Central Asian countries, have fuelled anti-Chinese sentiment in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.

“Given that China is likely to continue to expand its presence, further irritating local publics, the temptation of opposition groups to exploit such anger will only grow. If that happens…the anti-Chinese demonstrations that have taken place to date will be only the prelude to a situation that could easily spiral out of control, ethnicizing politics in these countries still further,” said Central Asia scholar Paul Goble.

Beyond Xinjiang, anti-Chinese sentiment in Central Asia is fuelled by some of the same drivers that inform Czech attitudes towards China.

The shared drivers include unfulfilled promises, idle incomplete Chinese-funded infrastructure projects, widespread corruption associated with Chinese funding, and the influx of Chinese labour and materials at the expense of the local work force and manufacturers.

Beyond Xinjiang, Central Asians worry about potential debt traps. The Washington-based Center for Global Development listed last year two Central Asian nations, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as risking China-related “debt distress.”

Warned China and Central Asia scholar Ayjaz Wani: “Chinese principles in Central Asia are hegemonic. China has always interacted with Central Asian states without regarding their cultural identities, but according to its own vested interests… However, the ongoing anti-China sentiments may be coming to a tipping point.

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