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The Saudi Arabian issue

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The 32-year old Prince Muhammad bin Salman, who  is the heir to Saudi Arabia’s throne, wants at first “to eradicate the roots of Islamic extremism” as soon as possible. This means that from now on the confrontation between Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia will be downplayed from infra-Islamic clash of civilization to a normal and natural standard of regional warfare.

 The openings made by Muhammad bin Salman – designated as Crown Prince by his father after many years – such as allowing women to drive are very clear signs that the al-Saud Kingdom does no longer want to be a fundamentalist island in the Middle East nor a silent partner of the United States or of other countries.

 This implies the end of Sunni-Shiite clash of civilizations and the fact that Saudi Arabia agrees to set aside its traditional role as leader of an all-out struggle with the “Ali Sect” led by Iran.

 Let us not be misled by the first reactions to the Saudi official statements.

 The war against Qatar is primarily a fight against the “Muslim Brotherhoods” and the clash with a natural gas power, namely Qatar, against a necessarily oil power, namely Saudi Arabia.

 Other economic cycles, other buyers, other geostrategic and military development lines between Al Thani’s Qatari Emirate and the al-Saud Kingdom.

  Hence, from now on, Saudi Arabia wants to avoid a radical and global war throughout the Middle East to destabilize it and thus conquer the old and modern hegemony of Islam within the Greater Middle East.

 No longer pan-Islamic dreams of glory, but the protection of the Saudi Kingdom’s national interest.

 Hence there are two winners in the current fight: the first is Israel and hence the countries, excluding the United States, which want to reformulate their friendly presence throughout the old Fertile Crescent.

 It is also worth noting that Prince al-Walid, arrested by Muhammad bin Salman, was a fierce enemy of the current US President.

 It should be recalled that the United States led by President Donald  J. Trump yielded to the “Sunni NATO” project, namely the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism, led by the Pakistani General Raheel Sharif.

 The “Sunni NATO”  headquarters are located in Riyadh, which still implies a hard line obviously against Iran and  India, as well as support to the fight against the Afghan Taliban.

 And if the “Sunni NATO” were the project of a strategic and economic internationalization of petromonarchies, thus isolating Iran in a future ever less profitable oil market?

 After the six Saudi Kings, from 1932 onward, Muhammad Bin Salman has inherited de facto power in the Kingdom by his father, Prince Nayef, thus replacing his half-brother who, however, is still a member of the clan holding true power in the Saudi family, the “Sudairy Seven”.

 The current strong man of the Saudi regime, namely the Crown Prince, was raised to the rank of second in the line of succession, in the first half of 2015. In fact, he has become an important personality on the world scene when ten years ago he destabilized – probably permanently – the al-Qaeda network in the Saudi Kingdom and last year decided  – together with his 55-year old cousin, Mohammed Bin Nayef – to exert the utmost pressure on the Houthi rebels in Yemen, a network of Shiites linked to Iran.

 For the al-Saud Kingdom, closing the doors to Iran in its area of ​​influence means to ensure a peaceful internationalization outside the regional Islamic universe, as well as to ensure the Kingdom’s permanent social and religious stability.

 Hence the war between the Shi’a Iranian Republic and the Wahhabi and Sunni Kingdom is bound to keep the Greater Middle East a hot spot and try to control the routes in the Persian Gulf, while the perimeters of the new Middle East global security are redefined outside Syria and the Lebanon.

 A system that the emerging power, namely the Russian Federation, will keep out of the US control lines, while Russia will further expand to Libya, the Lebanon and obviously to the rest of the Maghreb region, not to mention the Horn of Africa and Egypt.

 This is a new redesign of the Western balance of powers towards the Russian and Chinese ones – a new system emerging in the new external, but now essential peripheral areas of the Greater Middle East.

 Nevertheless there is an essential symbolic and political factor which should not be forgotten in the Shakespearean Royal Palace of Riyadh.

In fact, it is today that, after many years, Prince Muhammad bin Salman directly inherits the throne from his Father –  also thanks to a legal-political institution established by King Salman in 2017, namely the “Allegiance Council”, designed to make the process of succession in the Saudi Kingdom smoother and more orderly.

 Born on August 31, 1985, the heir to the throne Prince Mohammed is now 37 and has already been the youngest Defence Minister in the world.

 Even today, however – considering the strong autonomy of Mohammed Bin Salman –  the dynastic institution founded in 2007 seems to be not yet fully operational.

 Mohammed Bin Salman replaced his cousin in June 2017, as part of a major transformation of the political and strategic system inside the Saudi Royal Family.

 The whole network of high-profile “corrupt people” or “traitors” arrested in an anti-corruption sweep by the future Saudi King, is made up of 49 senior officers, Princes and Ministers – a police operation devastating the entire old system of political, financial and strategic equilibria that characterized the old pact of “petrodollar laundering”, which marked the union between the United States and Saudi Arabia when Henry Kissinger negotiated the whole operation, in perfect secrecy, at the end of the “Yom Kippur War” .

  The choice of Muhammad as heir to the throne, upon King Salman’s proposal, was accepted by 31 out of the 34 members of the Allegiance Council.

 Hence the policy line is now clear: the Kingdom wants to govern two parallel evolutionary lines: the exit from the oil-dependent economy, which Prince Muhammad Bin Salman has envisaged in his Vision 2030 program, and the creation of regional hegemony outside oil dependence from the United States, which is now autonomous from the Middle East oil thanks to its shale oil.

 In its already known project, the basis for Saudi Arabia’s  future hegemony regards the acceptance of two new factors: the US future energy autonomy with its “oil and shale gas” and hence Saudi Arabia’s exit from a guaranteed military and economic balance with the United States, as well as the historic collapse of oil barrel prices – oil which, according to the Saudi leaders, must be entirely left to  Shiite poverty and hence to Iran.

 Hence the “Vision 2030” program wants to reduce the Saudi dependence on oil and obviously the dependence of the national economy on the public sector.

 Moreover, the issue lies in making the Royal Family preserve its ability to distribute selective, but important resources to the most politically important walks of Saudi population – on a case-by case basis – to support the regime.

There is no more money for luxuries. The Saudi government’s money must be spent to preserve people’s support that is currently no longer guaranteed.

 In fact, without panem et circenses, it is hard to imagine – in the future – a reasonable stability of the Saudi Royal Family. And panem et circenses will be ever less a burden on US accounts.

  The future dollar equilibria and the end of the Euro as a global currency, as well as the end of the use of  petrodollars by Russia and China, make us think that the new ruling class in Saudi Arabia will be ever less pro-USA and ever more multilateral.

 And it is the Royal Family as such – not in the variety of its many groups – who shall bear responsibility for funds to  masses and for public charity that shall increasingly bear the costs of “liberalization”, of low wages and of the deprivation of union, political and clan protections.

 In fact, if Saudi Arabia does not plan its future “public charity” it will end up like the largely liberalized Lebanon or like the States that, after the crisis in the grain and food commodity market of 2008-2010, had to face the riots that –  manipulated by others – later turned into the “Arab Springs”.

 In this case the probable solution of the future King Mohammed will be greater democratization of choices to replace a reduction in income.

 A “European” solution.

 The Saudi “Vision 2030” project also implies liberalization specifically aimed at creating jobs and opportunities for companies in the service sector and in the tourist and entertainment business, in particular.

 But who are the “purged” of the new Saudi regime?

  They are 49 people, eleven Princes, four Ministers of the new regime that Muhammad Bin Salman – the first heir designated by his father, King Salman, to rule Saudi Arabia –  has agreed to put aside forever.

 There are clear signs of what will happen shortly.

 In this context, it is worth recalling the very important role played by the marginalization of Al Waleed bin Talal in the new Saudi financial and political context.

 Forbes reported he has a personal fortune of over 17 billion US dollars.

The investment of Prince Al Walid, the elder son of King Abdullah Abdulaziz and of Riad El Sohl, the Lebanese Prime Minister in the 1950s, are spread in the main Western areas: Twitter, Lyft, Eurodisney, Twentieth Century Fox, a tower in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, which is the highest in the world and was supposed to open in 2019.

 He sold a yacht to Donald Trump, whom he hates, but has still significant investment in Apple, News Corp., as well as the ownership of the Savoy Hotel in London and the MBC satellite TV network. Other purged officials are the Head of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, Amr al Dabbagh, as well as Ibrahim Assaf, the former Minister of Finance, and finally Bakr Bin Laden, the Head of the Binladen Group, a well-known real estate and investment group.

 Other purged officials include another former Saudi  Minister of Finance, Adel Fakieh, a reformer from day one, as well as Khaled al Tuwajiri, a manager of the Saudi traditional economic sector.

 They are all accused of having embezzled public funds to transfer them to their private accounts.

 A source of enrichment and “visible consumption” of the al-Saud extended family, as Veblen would have said.

 Now the family is no longer a single one and the Saudi  government will have a less corporatist and, above all, less personalist logic.

This Saudi “cleansing” operation marks the end of the old link between Arab internationalization and Sunni jihadist terrorism. Muhammad bin Salman’s reforms also marks the Saudi Kingdom’s closure to the flows of the market-world, while there is the re-emergence of the clash between Shiites and Sunnis in a new Middle East, where Saudi Arabia has already established a new relationship with Russia and Israel and decided to effectively follow Xi Jinping’s model, which involves a change of the regime through a fight  against “corruption”.

 It was one of the world’s economic leaders, namely al-Walid Bin Talal, to agree to support Gaddafi before his end in 2011, while the shadows were already casting over the Libyan leader.

 In fact, al-Walid ibn Talal attempted to sell one of its A340 Airbus for 120 million US dollars through a Jordanian broker, Daad Sharaf, who was very close to Gaddafi.

 Daad Sharaf also had to receive a 6.5 million Us dollar “brokerage” fee, but Prince Al Waleed sold to others the airplane probably already used to carry the Lockerbie attacker back to Libya.

 A network in which business mixed dangerously with the Saudi geopolitical operations – at a time when, on the one hand, Saudi Arabia supported the vague “fight against terrorism” and, on the other, fomented it.

 There is no need to recall here the long and very significant story of the relationship between the old Chief of the intelligence services, Turki al-Faisal, a very strong representative of the “Sudairy Seven” and of the network that led part of the Saudi establishment to play the crazy, but not senseless card of al-Qaeda.

 Furthermore, for al-Walid there are also charges – already known in the global financial circles – of corruption, bribery, embezzlement and insider trading.

 The strong reaction of the Royal Family currently in power against the part of al-Saud members who participated in the crazy rush of the “high” oil price phase – when everything was possible, both gains and illegality, as well as economic growth and frauds – is a very effective way to win support from the Saudi people, fed up with the idle rentier or “opulent ruling class” attitudes of some members of the Royal Family.

  Probably the end of the cycle between Sunni jihad and growth of the Kingdom will be the point in which the Greater Middle East will be redesigned: a de facto alliance between Saudi Arabia and Israel, both united by the Shiite danger, between the Golan Heights for Israel and South Yemen for Saudi Arabia; a new alliance between Saudi Arabia, Israel and Russia; China’s entry in the region; the new US positioning and obviously the often ridiculous irrelevance of the European Union.

 The system of the future King Muhammad – after the strange death of Prince Mansur Bin Muqrin in the region of Asir, Saudi Arabia, the husband of a daughter of old King Fahd and later Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, as well as son of Muqrin al-Abdulaziz, who had been Crown Prince from January to April 2015 – will be a political balance in which keeping the country united and preserving the link between the Royal House and the Saudi people will be the beacon of the monarchy.

 No longer a predatory ruling class, also in relation to the West, but an elite who wants the Kingdom’s political expansion, as well as its economic transformation and hence the end of the oil-dependent economy – a regime that wants to play all its strategic cards, well aware that a King (the United States) is leaving and another King (the Russian Federation) is entering the scene in the region.

 And also aware that Israel is now a well-acquired fact in the Middle East.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

Middle East

Resolving Israel-Palestine Conflict Key to India’s Geopolitical Gravity in the Middle East

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In 1978, India’s External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a call to the international community to “raise their voice in protest against the injustice being meted out to Palestinians”. In a public meeting too, Vajpayee had then asserted that the land belongs to the Arabs, and that Israel has to vacate that land. From Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has thoroughly supported the Palestinian cause in all its geopolitical and geo-economic considerations. In September 1950, Nehru officially recognised the State of Israel, while the Palestinian State was recognised by India in 1988. Modi, too has furthered this legacy. In a joint statement with President Mahmoud Abbas during his visit to Palestine in February 2018,Modi asserted that India hopes that Palestine will soon become an independent country. And Modi’s support to Palestine has also continued consistently, despite a contrary – but limited – popular perception at home bearing some pro-Israeli emotions. In 2020 alone, India donated $5 million to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in support of the cause. In the UN General Assembly session in December 2020, India supported the Palestinian cause, and “urged both parties to re‑engage to advance the goal of a two‑State solution”. Also, it was highlighted at this session that “India provides scholarships and trainings to more than 200,000 Palestinians every year” and India “pledged $10 million over the coming three years” to UNRWA for the Palestinian cause.

It is imperative now to briefly understand the Palestinian issue in a perspective. Since the 16th century and until 1917, the region was ruled by the Ottoman Empire – though with a very brief Egyptian regime in the 19th century. At the end of 1917, Palestine was controlled by the British who had already announced their support to establish a national home for the Jews through the Balfour Declaration of 1917. After the first world war, Great Britain was granted the Mandate to rule Palestine – which was also endorsed by the League of Nations. This British Mandate of Palestine was functional till 1947, when the United Nations came up with a Partition Plan envisaged under the General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) on the future government of Palestine. The resolution, that was adopted on 29 November 1947, mentioned that the British Mandate will be terminated, and two independent states (Arab and Jewish), along with a Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem will be established in Palestine no later than 1 October 1948. The Arab leadership however rejected this Resolution (calling for two states), and solicited their rights to national self-determination as per the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

As the British control ended in 1948, the Jewish people declared an independent State of Israel, which was not acceptable to the Arabs. Then began the Arab-Israel conflict in 1948, which helped Israel control a large area of the region, while Gaza Strip and the West Bank went under the Arab control. This was, in fact, an actualisation of the Jewish nationalism that was seeking a separate homeland for itself. In June 1964, the League of Arab States – a regional congregation of the Arab countries founded in 1945 in Cairo – helped form a Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) to fight for the cause of the Palestinian people. However, the Six-Day War happened in 1967, in which Gaza Strip and the West Bank were also occupied by Israel.

The Palestinians too resisted through protests and rebellions often termed as “Intifada” which happened first between 1987 and 1993 (when the first Oslo Accord was signed), and later during the early 2000s(known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada).The Oslo process began as a peace process between Israel and Palestine with the signing of two Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995. This peace process was based on UN Security Council Resolutions and its mandate was to provide the Palestinian people their right to self-determination. In July 2000, President Bill Clinton brought together Israeli leader Ehud Barak and the PLO leader Yasser Arafat at Camp David for a peace accord. Clinton’s efforts however failed. The Al-Aqsa or the second intifada happened after the failure of this peace talk. In 2015, Abbas had blamed Israel of its lack of commitment to follow the provisions of the Oslo process. The conflict between Israel and Palestine has however continued with intermittent violence more often. Most recently, the Arabs became closer to Israel through the Abraham Accord brokered by the United States and signed in September 2020. The agreement, however, has lost its sheen now with the recent Israeli attack on Al-Aqsa mosque, and the ongoing conflict.

In recent times, Israel too has been facing domestic political instability. In the last two years, it has seen four legislative elections, the last one being held on 23 March 2021. Israel has 120 seats in the Knesset – its unicameral parliament. In the recent elections, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-oriented Likud Party won only 30 seats – too less to form a government. Owing to its failure to form a government, the President of Israel on 5 May 2021 invited opposition leader Yair Lapid, who belongs to the centre-oriented Yesh Atid Party, to form a government. Now, the ongoing conflict in Palestine that began at the Al-Aqsa mosque, is happening during the regime of Netanyahu, a caretaker Prime Minister. Netanyahu is adopting all means – precisely the ones that could arouse Jewish sentiments and Jewish nationalism – to come to power. This is creating hindrance for Lapid who is seeking to mobilise political support to form his government. Before Lapid could mobilise efforts to form a government, Netanyahu led his people into an undesired, and a violent, conflict.

Netanyahu, who is already facing multiple charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust, intends to delay the process of government formation. In all likelihood he foresees himself as heading the next government too, and is comfortable risking even a civil war for his people! Therefore, in all likelihood, Netanyahu’s ouster will only strengthen Israel’s parliamentary democratic system. It is in Israel’s own national and geopolitical interests to remove Netanyahu from office, and give Lipad a chance to bridge the divide within the Israeli society, and bring an end to the crisis and killings that erupted recently. A resemblance of the situation can be seen from the example of the US presidential elections, when in January 2021, the Americans accused their outgoing president Donald Trump of inciting violence at the Capitol, and considered him as a threat to national security. They went ahead to seek his removal from office even before Joe Biden’s inauguration!

Considering the political instability in Israel, and the ongoing violence, India definitely has a larger role to play in its extended neighbourhood. On 10 February 2018, Palestine conferred on Modi its highest honour for foreign dignitaries titled “Grand Collar of the State of Palestine” in Ramallah. This also brings with itself much responsibility for India to exercise its regional influence in the current context. In our own geo-strategic interests and for the restoration of regional security at large, India must intervene in the ongoing conflict and play a pivotal role in ensuring peace and regional stability in West Asia – a crucial component of India’s Indo-Pacific construct as well.

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The Return of the ‘Arab Voice’ Through a Portal From the Underworld

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The events of the “Arab Spring” that began 10 years ago were considered a tectonic shift, capable of overturning the previous development logic of the Middle East. While the collective West counted on “democratisation” due to their liberal ideology, Russia or China called for a more cautious assessment of what was happening. The region itself has been torn apart by the clash of ideologies, identities, wars, terrorism, drought, and, most importantly, the stagnation or underdevelopment of socio-economic systems. In many ways, it was the impasse in the development of states (and statehood) coupled with an external factor at a certain stage in history that predetermined the scale of these problems.

As noted in the Valdai Club report “The Middle East in Search for Lost Awakening” about the Middle East leaders, “This constellation, brought to the fore by extraordinary circumstances that happened in a tormented region of a crumbling world, is emerging as a generation of tacticians.” “Excessive pragmatism” and the absence of “philosophical quests”—these words really characterise the current elites in the region. This is how the history of the Middle East developed, especially the part of it where the balance of influence between global forces was ruined after the collapse of the USSR. In many ways, the elites of the Middle East states have to react, because, being in a region that has become an experimental testing ground, each of them could find themselves in the position of a “pariah”. Moreover, no one was going to leave such a pariah in peace, he was destroyed, if not by neighbours, then by external forces. The latter had enough strength, resources, capabilities and influence to implement strategies and “romantic” (but terrifying in practice) ideologies.

In the post-bipolar world, one external factor has been expressed too strongly—the United States, which has paid special attention to the Middle East region. American ideology for the Middle East was packaged in pretty boxes, but behind them was the brutal reality of military repression. It was only resistance that gave rise to a change in approaches, a redrawing of policy, the use of other methods of realising interests and, ultimately, taking into account the interests of the “other part”. But direct resistance without the necessary resources and suitable external conditions of the game between the global poles means looking for trouble. The Arab leaders were not ready for this. Given such regional uncertainty and the “bull in a china shop”, there could only be a desire to react, not to build a strategy; to answer, avoiding collisions, but not to threaten to attack.

Under these conditions, the most valuable skill was concealing one’s opinion—to avoid additional problems and reactions. The “Arab voice” and the character of a proud Bedouin, taught to young Arabists in domestic universities—went underground from regional politics, but did not disappear. We can assume that, hiding, the Arab nationalist movements are waiting for the necessary external and internal conditions to mature. The glimpses of the ideas accompanying these movements, although loudly sounded on the streets during the 2019–2020 protests in the Arab world, are still barely noticeable. Arab nationalist movements have not gained internal resources. External players ignored the ongoing mass demonstrations, as if not noticing them, but the elites of the Arab countries—disunited and with limited legitimacy—felt the growing demand of the population for justice.

Despite the fact that the protesters primarily addressed their demands to their own governments, there is another aspect related to external forces. Before speaking about this, we must indicate that we are talking primarily about the Arab world that suffered during the Arab Spring. There is a difference between the Middle East—a British-designed construction to designate countries on the maritime way to India—and the Arab world. The Arab world includes Arab states, while the Israelis, Iranians or Turks are considered by many representatives of Arab nationalism as hostile external forces. Thus, there are two levels of conditional external influence on the affairs of the Arab world—regional and global. Thus, the protests in Arab countries carry an Arab nationalist charge directed against the interference of their neighbours such as Turkey and Iran (and even Israel, despite the normalisation of relations), and against the West. A separate problem is the perception by Arab nationalists of the corrupt regional regimes and their leaders, which sold their souls to the West. All this leads to limited support from the West for these protests (as opposed to the “Arab Spring”), and a desire to exploit them, to rule behind the scenes. There should be no illusion that in the event of the arrival of nationalist forces, the Iranians and Turks, as well as the Americans, will have to reduce their presence.

Parallel worlds, but no portal

The political map of the Middle East is well known to everyone, as well as the fact that it often does not reflect the real state of affairs. The states themselves do not exist within their borders—even those are determined by the colonial past. They also have difficulty settling down in lands which they claim. Of course, this state of affairs did not develop without the participation of neo-colonialism, a characteristic feature of which is irresponsibility. But this is not the point—we are talking about the region itself. And here the approach of a “game” reflects the situation well.

Imagine that you are playing a computer game with a portal. So, you are on one map, and then go into the portal—and you are transferred to the same map, but of a different colour, with different content and another set of tasks. These are parallel worlds. Using this analogy, one world of the Middle East is the one we are used to see on the political map, the other reflects the real state of affairs. The first world is the world of invented nation-states, the second is a complex world of clans, tribes, Islamist movements and external interests (specific military boots, tanks, aircraft and aircraft carriers) that are not visible on the first map. This is a more complete, complex structure, but the main thing in it is the threads of connections that lead from one actor to another, regardless of boundaries. Precisely speaking, the borders on this second map do not exist.

Today’s Middle East is immersed in this “second map”. For example, the sheikhs of Iraqi tribes are associated with representatives of their tribes—the heads of large and often high-tech corporations—in Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Kuwait. The Westernised clans which presently rule Iraq are closely linked with London by their threads and finances. This map clearly shows that adherence to the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in the Russian Federation) gives rise to the unexpected alliance of many groups throughout the Middle East (from the elites in Qatar and Turkey to the Egyptian oppositionists who have gone underground; from the Islamist parties of Tunisia and Morocco to the Islamist movements in Idlib). There are also radicals of different colours who can establish control over territories, sell smuggled oil (and everything that brings money to maintain another parallel world—and such scenarios are known in computer games). The very existence of this other world requires the participation of those who generally want to remain on the first map. States and regimes also have to go through the portal in order to keep their finger on the knobs of this game—they do it in order to survive. Hence, for example, there is Tehran’s specific approach with the use of Shiite groups in the failed states. All this, again, without looking at the borders, which were easily dissolved by Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Americans who killed him, by this very murder also showed that they knew no borders. No one will ever remember how and when the portal of chaos to this parallel world was opened.

Today, the experts of the Gulf monarchies or American think tanks believe that the Iranians are to blame for the troubles of the region because of their “Khomeinist” or neo-Shiite ideology. But if you analyse the recent history of the region, you can come to other conclusions. It’s not even about the specific overthrow of the Mossadegh government organised by the American special services and the coup d’état in Iran in 1953. When in 2003 the Americans invaded Iraq, one of the largest and most significant states for the balance of power in the region, a very big “black hole” appeared in the Middle East. Two years earlier, the Americans had invaded Afghanistan. And throughout this period of time, they strengthened their military contingent in the Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and other countries. In these conditions, Iran could not stand aside. It was surrounded by countries that the United States destroyed, and from which a stream of refugees poured. The portal was already open, it was necessary to act—to ensure their safety. And Iran began to use all the tools it had, developing a wide and specific network of contacts throughout the region. It worked best where people clung to their identities in the destroyed states (Iraq was destroyed by the Americans, Syria or Yemen in many ways by regional players, including the Gulf states). But it seems that with the restoration of statehood, the role and influence of external forces—like the Iranians—will weaken.

“Arab voice” from the underworld

In many regions of the world, there are regional structures whose goal is integration and interaction. In the Arab world, all the projects that have been offered since the 20th century fell apart before being realised. The key supranational organisation, periodically representing the voice of the Arab world, was the Arab League. In the 20th century the participation of the Arab League in regional affairs meant legitimacy. The organisation, of course, was criticised, but it continued to function. In the 21st century a lot has changed. A number of decisions discredited this organisation, and many began to forget about it. But has the naive desire to establish an “Arab nation” disappeared?

In the Arab segment of social networks, one can find the concept of janahei al-alam al-arabiy or “two wings of the Arab world”. As a rule, this means Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, cooperation between these two countries could provide an interesting synergistic effect that would force non-Arab regional and global powers to reckon with the countries with the largest Arab population and the largest hydrocarbon resources. Nevertheless, such an alignment has not yet taken shape. Having carried out a number of active foreign policy moves with the aim to demonstrate its capabilities during the 2010s, Saudi Arabia never received the status of a recognised leader of the Arab world (despite making this claim in previous periods). As we have already noted, Iraq was undermined by an external invasion, while the Syrian issue—and Syria is considered the “heart” of the Arab world—finally demonstrated the regional forces’ lack of the ability to seek compromises, as well as the inferiority of the “regional” forces to resolve conflicts independently. There is also the problem of the structural return of such a major force as Egypt, which over the past decade has not occupied a place worthy of its status in regional affairs.

Half a century ago, the “Arab voice” in world affairs came from Cairo. Gamal Abdel Nasser forced the global powers to adjust, to work with each other and against each other, to seek answers to questions that were not always raised by them. The very formulation of the Arab position in international relations was presented in one form or another. Arab socialism, which in fact was a hidden form of Arab nationalism, was generally accepted and widespread. Later it would be said that the regimes failed, the ideology of Arab nationalism failed. The Islamist movements have launched attempts to replace it, but even they, once in power, will not be able to solve pressing problems. Hamas and Hezbollah, specifically, are not considered suitable for nation states, there are also questions related to how effective these structures could be in addressing the conditions of the revived Arab states. It seems that if state institutions are rebuilt, there would be little room for them. But this can happen only at the moment when the player approaches the solution of the tasks set in the “underworld”—he finds a portal that will either bring him to a new map, or return him back to the old one, but understandable, familiar, with the established rules of the game. And this process can be spurred on not by internal, but by external conditions.

***

These external conditions are formed by the “crumbling” world. In this world, the “Arab voice” can be heard. The voice itself can again sound from Cairo—the capital of the state with the largest Arab population and a rich history, which is actively developing its armed forces and economy (impressive achievements in the last five years), as well as political experience and regional recognition. It is the country where the headquarters of the Arab League is located, and can distinguish itself favourably over the next decade, not only and not so much because of its own development, but rather because of the serious decline of its neighbours, who will not have time to recover (Lebanon, Syria, Libya, etc.)

From our partner RIAC

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Middle East

Justice delayed is justice denied. I lost my family to Iran Regime’s barbarity

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Mohammad Shafaei’s family- The toddler in his mother’s arm is Mohammad Shafaei

On May 4, over 1,100 families of the victims of the 1988 massacre in Iran wrote a letter to the international community. We called on the United Nations and European and American governments to take immediate action in preventing the regime from further destruction of their loved ones’ graves.

I was one of the signatories. I have lost six of my relatives to the regime’s cruelty. I was seven years old when my parents were arrested for their democratic ideals and activism.

My father, Dr. Morteza Shafaei, was a well-respected and popular physician in Isfahan. He was admired by people because he was extremely compassionate and giving to others. He was brutally executed by the regime in 1981 simply because he sought a democratic future for his family and his compatriots. The mullahs also killed my mother, two brothers, Majid (only 16) and Javad, and one of my sisters, Maryam, along with her husband.

By the age of 8, I had lost my entire family, save for one sister, as a result of the regime’s executions and crimes against humanity.

Mohammad Shafaei

The 1988 massacre stands as one of the most horrendous crimes against humanity after World War II. In the summer of that year, based on a religious decree issued by Khomeini, then-Supreme Leader of the theocratic regime in Iran, tens of thousands of political prisoners were liquidated. Most of the victims belonged to the principal democratic opposition movement Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).

It is believed that the regime massacred at least 30,000 political dissidents that year in the span of a few months. This much was confirmed by the designated heir to the regime’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri both in his published memoires and leaked audiotape in 2016, in which he condemned the ongoing crime against humanity in August 1988 during a meeting with high-ranking regime officials.

Those officials continue to serve the regime today in high-ranking positions. Ebrahim Raisi, for example, who was a member of the “death committees” in charge of rounding up and killing the political prisoners, is currently occupying the highly sensitive post of the Judiciary Chief. He is expected to announce his candidacy to run for President during the June election. After the June 2009 uprising, he said, “Moharebeh (waging war on God) is sometimes an organization, like the hypocrites (MEK). Anyone who helps the MEK in any way and under any circumstances, because it is an organized movement, the title of Moharebeh applies.” According the Islamic Punishment Act, the punishment for Moharebeh is death.

For years, the clerical regime has been systematically and gradually destroying the graves of the victims of the 1988 massacre in Tehran and other cities. As the world learns more about the killings and the international outrage grows, Tehran’s mullahs are scrambling to clear all traces of their crimes against humanity.

Most of us have forgotten where exactly our loved ones are buried, many of them in mass graves. The campaign for justice for victims of 1988 has gained greater prominence and broader scope. International human rights organizations and experts have described the massacre as a crime against humanity and called for holding the perpetrators of this heinous crime to account.

Paranoid of the repercussions of international scrutiny into this horrific atrocity, the Iranian regime has embarked on erasing the traces of the evidence on the massacre by destroying the mass graves where they are buried. The regime has tried to destroy the mass graves of massacred political prisoners in Tehran’s Khavaran Cemetery in the latest attempt. Previously, it destroyed or damaged the mass graves of the 1988 victims in Ahvaz, Tabriz, Mashhad, and elsewhere.

These actions constitute the collective torture of thousands of survivors and families of martyrs. It is another manifest case of crime against humanity.  

The UN and international human rights organizations must prevent the regime from destroying the mass graves, eliminating the evidence of their crime, and inflicting psychological torture upon thousands of families of the victims throughout Iran. 

Moreover, the Iranian public and all human rights defenders expect the United Nations, particularly the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michele Bachelet, to launch an international commission of inquiry to investigate the massacre of political prisoners and summon the perpetrators of this heinous crime before the International Court of Justice.

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