Connect with us


Time for Europe to put Iran’s missile programme in context



European leaders have clearly set themselves apart from the United States and the administration of President Donald J. Trump in relation to the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal. They view the deal—also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—as a success for non-proliferation and international security. In contrast, the current US Government has criticised the deal for failing to address non-nuclear issues, notably Iran’s continuing ballistic missile development, which the USA has long viewed as both a regional and a global threat.

Iran’s missile programme was also one of the main justifications for President Trump’s recent refusal to certify that continuing the suspension of sanctions—a key US commitment under the agreement—is proportionate to Iran’s respective commitments under the JCPOA. As a result, continued US adherence to the deal now depends on the US Congress.

However, while defending the JCPOA, the major European powers have joined the Trump administration in squarely condemning Iran’s missile tests and satellite launches. This commonality of views was highlighted in a joint statement on 13 October 2017 by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, which said that ‘as we work to preserve the JCPOA, we share concerns about Iran’s ballistic missile programme and regional activities [and] . . . stand ready to take further appropriate measures to address these issues’.

The Trump administration expects European countries to take a harder line on this issue. As part of an attempt to address the JCPOA’s ‘many serious flaws’, the US President has urged ‘allies to join us in . . . thorough sanctions outside the Iran Deal that target the regime’s ballistic missile program’.

Given the transatlantic disagreement over the JCPOA, European countries might feel increasing pressure to focus on Iran’s ballistic missile activities in order to find common ground with the USA. But is the Western perspective on Iran’s missile programme based on an objective threat assessment, and is a punitive approach helpful in addressing it?

Transatlantic disagreement over the JCPOA, solidarity against the missile threat

The JCPOA is a multilateral agreement negotiated between Iran, the five permanent United Nations Security Council members and Germany, with the specific aim of putting an end to concerns that Iran’s nuclear programme might be used for military purposes. Although ballistic missiles were left out of the agreement, they were mentioned in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA in July 2015.

More specifically, the missile-related provision in the resolution calls on Iran ‘not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons’ until 2023. This ambiguous formulation has been a source of increasing controversy. The Iranian position is that its missile testing has nothing to do with the JCPOA, because its missiles are conventional and not designed to carry nuclear weapons. This diverges from the Western expectation that Iran should have suspended missile testing for eight years.

On these grounds, the Trump administration argues that Iran’s continuing missile tests violate the spirit of the JCPOA—as well as Resolution 2231. The USA’s Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, has repeatedly called for the Security Council members to punish Iran for its ‘blatant violations’ of Resolution 2231, including ‘provocative and destabilising missile launches’.

European countries, in contrast, have stressed that the JCPOA is essentially a nuclear deal, and that everything else is outside its scope. At the same time, however, they too have condemned Iran’s missile activities as inconsistent with Resolution 2231, even though they do not subscribe to the USA’s accusation of violation.

France, for example, has threatened to push for European sanctions in response to Iran’s missile tests, and has said that it would consider ‘the means to obtain from Iran the cessation of its destabilizing ballistic missile activities’. France, Germany and the UK have also joined the USA in calling for UN Security Council action in response Iran’s missile tests and satellite launches, arguing that the tested missiles are ‘inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons’, and pointing to similarities between satellite launcher and long-range missile technologies.

The link between nuclear weapons and missiles

Although there is no binding international treaty controlling ballistic missiles, they are often associated with nuclear proliferation. This is because ballistic missiles, particularly long-range ones, have historically been the most important delivery system for nuclear warheads.

At the same time, several countries rely on conventionally armed missiles as part of their national security strategies. Of the 31 countries that currently possess ballistic missile capabilities, only 9 are nuclear-armed. The arsenals of most of the remaining 22 states are not generally viewed as problematic due to their short range and small numbers. However, there are also political factors behind the lack of attention to their capabilities, which is why it is rare to hear that Israel and Saudi Arabia actually possess the longest-range ballistic missiles in the Middle East—not Iran.

Nevertheless, Iran’s missiles stand out from the rest for several reasons. Apart from having the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the region, Iran actively develops its missiles through testing. It also has an adversarial relationship with the USA, which has long suspected Iran of having nuclear weapon ambitions. Although it was hoped that the JCPOA would put an end to such concerns, critics argue that Iran might still develop nuclear weapons after the deal expires—in which case it could mate its missiles with nuclear warheads.

Finally, Iran’s past purchases of North Korean missiles and related technology continue to fuel speculation about ongoing missile cooperation between the two countries. Iran has also reportedly provided assistance to the Syrian Government in missile technology.

Iran’s missile programme as a regional deterrent

Iran views its missiles as a counter to the military capabilities of its regional rivals—particularly their state-of the-art, Western-supplied military aircraft. Despite US and international sanctions, which have considerably restricted Iran’s ability to develop its conventional armed forces, the country has become increasingly self-sufficient in developing ballistic missiles.

The role of ballistic missiles in Iran’s national security was highlighted in the 1980s, when its cities were left defenceless against Scud missile and air attacks from Iraq under President Saddam Hussein. Iran’s acquisition and use of its own short-range missiles is regarded as a crucial turning point in the Iran–Iraq War. Since then, Iran’s ballistic missiles have gained further importance as a conventional deterrent—particularly during the escalation of the nuclear crisis in 2006–13, when Israel and the USA threatened military action against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iran’s missile arsenal consists of short- and medium-range missiles. Its longest-reaching operational missiles have a range of 1600 kilometres, which means that they could hit Israeli or US military bases in the Middle East. Although Iran continues to develop its missile capabilities, its focus for the past decade has been on enhancing the accuracy, rather than range, of its missiles. As noted by Michael Elleman, a leading missile expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, there is ‘no evidence to suggest that Iran is actively developing an intermediate- or intercontinental-range ballistic missile [ICBM]’.

In other words, Iran’s pattern of missile testing—which has sought to address the long-standing problem of poor accuracy—is consistent with the programme’s stated purpose as a regional deterrent. It also reinforces the argument that Iran’s missiles are designed to be conventional, not nuclear: nuclear-armed missiles do not need to be accurate, due to their disproportionate destructive power. For conventional purposes, however, inaccuracy severely limits the missiles’ military utility.

Iran’s missile development has also been influenced by the perceived need to respond to the growing number of anti-ballistic missile systems in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Israel. For example, Iran’s Emad missile is equipped with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle, and the Khorramshahr missile is reportedly able to carry multiple warheads. Such features can increase the chances of overcoming missile defences.

The link between space rockets and long-range missiles

Iran successfully used the Safir space launch vehicle (SLV) to send its first satellite into space in 2009, and has since then delivered at least three more satellites into the Earth’s orbit. In addition, Iran has launched animals into space and has plans to send humans there as well. It is currently developing a larger Simorgh SLV to reach higher orbits.

Given the technological similarities between missile and SLV technologies, Iran’s satellite programme has raised suspicions about its potential aims to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Indeed, there are many historical examples of states having converted ICBMs into SLVs, or developing the two technologies in parallel. However, the reverse scenario—that is, SLVs being turned into long-range missiles—has never happened, because ICBM development is more demanding in many ways. Missiles carry warheads that must not just reach space, but must also withstand re-entry into the atmosphere. Further, they need to work reliably under various conditions, with little advance warning.

Although having a satellite programme can contribute to ICBM development, it is not a shortcut to long-range missiles. Even if Iran converted the Simorgh SLV into a long-range missile, it would still need to undergo the normal, time-consuming routine of missile testing, which would not go unnoticed.

Iran’s missiles and NATO’s missile defence policy

Some of the current Western solidarity against the Iranian missile threat can be traced to the missile defence policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—also known as the European Phase Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Introduced by the USA under the Obama administration, EPAA was preceded by the Bush administration’s plans to put large interceptors in Europe to defend the US mainland from hypothetical nuclear-armed ICBMs coming from Iran.

Instead, the aim of EPAA was to protect south-eastern parts of Europe from Iran’s existing arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles. The key idea was to adapt to changing circumstances: while systems against ICBMs were envisioned in the later stages of EPAA, President Obama said that there would be no need for the system if the threat from Iran’s nuclear and missile programs were eliminated.

The NATO Secretary General at the time, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, also referred to the Iranian threat when arguing for EPAA to be adopted as official NATO policy. However, since that decision was made at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the alliance has avoided direct references to Iran. At the same time, NATO has never openly challenged the US argument that EPAA is essentially about Iran—except for stressing that the system ‘is not about any one country, but about the threat posed by proliferation more generally’.

Arguably, European countries valued EPAA primarily because it was seen to strengthen the transatlantic link and provide additional reassurance against Russia. Unlike many other forms of military cooperation, land-based missile defences have meant permanent US presence on European soil. This trade-off seemed unproblematic during the height of the Iran nuclear crisis, but the picture has changed considerably since then. Despite the landmark nuclear deal, in May 2016 NATO began to construct a new missile defence site in Poland against intermediate missiles—which Iran does not possess.

Nevertheless, US officials justify the new Polish site in terms of the Iranian threat, pointing to the possibility that Iran might still develop longer-range missiles. Meanwhile, NATO continues to talk about the generic threat of missile proliferation and points to over 30 countries with ballistic missile capabilities, without unpacking what this threat means in concrete terms.

European disinclination to subject NATO’s missile defence policy to critical scrutiny can be understood in terms of inertia, the desire to ensure US presence on the continent, as well as the heightened need to maintain transatlantic unity after the events in Ukraine. This creates a bias that makes European countries less prone to question US assessments of the Iranian missile threat, also outside the context of EPAA.

Putting Iran’s missile programme in context

The prevailing Western tendency to target Iranian missiles while ignoring the overall military balance in the Middle East reflects the historical experience of the USA and its regional loyalties. Despite mounting pressure to join this approach and the related punitive measures, European countries should put the issue of Iran’s missiles in its proper context.

Iran’s ballistic missile programme does not constitute a global threat. Rather, it is part of broader regional security dynamics, and cannot be addressed in isolation. As missiles play a key role in Iran’s national security strategy, it is unrealistic to expect that the country will forgo efforts to improve their operationality and survivability through testing.

In September 2017, President Hassan Rouhani responded to US condemnation of Iran’s missile development by stating: ‘No matter if you like it or not, we will boost our defence and military capabilities to the extent deemed necessary for defence. We will not seek permission from anyone to defend our country and our land.’

A punitive approach to Iran’s missile programme is not only likely to be ineffective, it could also undermine simultaneous European attempts to maintain the JCPOA, lending legitimacy to potential measures by the US Congress to link US adherence to the JCPOA with the missile issue. Even if the US measures do not directly impact the JCPOA, new sanctions against Iran’s missile programme might further impede international trade with Iran, thus increasing the already pervasive Iranian perception that sanctions relief is not being implemented.

Therefore, it is important that European countries do not let the missile issue distract them from seeking to maintain the JCPOA as their first priority. The former US Department of State coordinator for the deal’s implementation, Jarrett Blanc, recently argued that ‘Iran and its missiles are less dangerous because of the JCPOA. That accomplishment cannot be sacrificed for an unrealistic effort to pressure Iran on ballistic missiles’.

However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no way to constrain Iran’s missile programme. Given repeated statements by Iranian officials that the country has no need of missiles beyond the range of 2000 km, Iran could in principle agree to limit its missiles to that level. As for any further limits to Iran’s ballistic missile programme, they are unfeasible without parallel discussions with other states in the region about their respective military capabilities.

Unfortunately, it is not an optimal time to discuss either Iran’s missiles or the broader issues of regional security. As the JCPOA has shown, arms control negotiations require at least some mutual respect and trust, both of which are clearly absent from the current US–Iranian relationship and in relations among Middle Eastern countries. This also casts a shadow on any attempts by others to start a missile dialogue with Iran, which would probably be rejected as part of the controversial US plans to ‘renegotiate’ the nuclear deal. Further, any new Iranian compromises with the West should not be expected at a time when previous promises under the JCPOA are in such serious doubt.

Yet this should not discourage long-term thinking. European countries could use their political channels with Iran and other regional actors to get a more thorough understanding of their respective security concerns. Such knowledge could then be used to inform future discussions on Iran’s missiles, as well as a more comprehensive arms control dialogue in the region—a goal that has long evaded international efforts, but is still worth pursuing.

First published in

Continue Reading


Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety and Security

Sonia Naz



Wyn Bowen and Matthew Cottee discuss in their research entitled “Nuclear Security Briefing Book” that nuclear terrorism involves the acquisition and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon from a state arsenal. The world has not experienced any act of nuclear terrorism but terrorists expressed their desires to gain nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has observed many incidents of lost, theft and unauthorized control of nuclear material. The increased use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes has intensified the threat that terrorist can target these places for acquiring nuclear materials. They cannot build a nuclear weapon because production of a nuclear weapon would require a technological infrastructure. Thus, it is the most difficult task that is nearly impossible because the required infrastructure and technological skills are very high which even a strong terrorist group could not bear easily, but they can build a dirty bomb.

A dirty bomb is not like a nuclear bomb. A nuclear bomb spreads radiation over hundreds of square miles while nuclear bomb could cause destruction only over a few square miles. A dirty bomb would not kill any more people than an ordinary bomb but it would create psychological terror. There is no viable security system for the prevention of nuclear terrorism, but the only possible solution is that there should be a stringent nuclear security system which can halt terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials.

The UN Security Council and the IAEA introduced multilateral nuclear security initiatives. Pakistan actively contributed in all international nuclear security efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. For example, United States President Barak Obama introduced the process of Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)in 2009 to mitigate the threat of nuclear terrorism. The objective of NSS was to secure the material throughout the world in four years.

Pakistan welcomed it and not only made commitments in NSS but also fulfilled it. Pakistan also established a Centre of Excellence (COEs) on nuclear security and hosted workshops on nuclear security. In addition to all this, Pakistan is a signatory of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and affirms its strong support to the resolution. It has submitted regular reports to 1540 Committee which explain various measures taken by Pakistan on radiological security and control of sensitive materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) transfer. Pakistan is the first country which submitted a report to the UN establishing the fact that it is fulfilling its responsibilities. Pakistan ratified Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 2016. It is also the member of Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). It can be rightly inferred that Pakistan is not only contributing in all the international nuclear security instruments but has also taken multiple effective measures at the national level.

Pakistan created National Command Authority (NCA) to manage and safeguard nuclear assets and related infrastructures. The Strategic Plan Division (SPD) is playing a very important role in managing Pakistan’s nuclear assets by collaborating with all strategic organizations. Establishment of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA)in 2001 is another development in this regard. The PNRA works under the IAEA advisory group on nuclear security and it is constantly improving and re-evaluating nuclear security architecture. National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS) was established under PNRA in 2014. Pakistan has also adopted the Export Control Act to strengthen its nuclear export control system. It deals with the rules and regulations for nuclear export and licensing. The SPD has also formulated a standard functioning procedure to regulate the conduct of strategic organizations. Christopher Clary discusses in his research “Thinking about Pakistan’s Nuclear Security in Peacetime” that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals are equipped with Permissive Action Links (PALs) for its stringent security. According to Pakistan’s former nuclear scientist Samar Mubarakmand, every Pakistani nuclear arsenal is now fitted with a code-lock device which needs a proper code to enable the arsenal to explode.

Nonetheless the nuclear terrorism is a global concern and reality because terrorist organizations can target civilian nuclear facility in order to steal nuclear material. The best way to eradicate the root of nuclear terrorism is to have a stringent nuclear security system.

Western media and outsiders often propagate that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals can go into the wrong hands i.e. terrorists, but they do not highlight the efforts of Pakistan in nuclear security at the national and international level. The fact is that Pakistan has contributed more in international nuclear security efforts than India and it has stringent nuclear security system in place.

Continue Reading


India’s Probable Move toward Space Weaponization



The term Space Weaponization tends to raise alarm as it implies deployment of weapons in the outer space or on heavenly bodies like Sun and Moon or sending weapon from earth to the outer space to destroy satellite capabilities of other states. Thus, space weaponization refers to the actions taken by a state to use outer space as an actual battlefield.

Space militarization on the other hand is a rather less offensive term which stands for utilization of space for intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance missions through satellites to support forces on ground in the battle field. Space militarization is already in practice by many states. In South Asia, India is utilizing its upper hand in space technology for space militarization. However, recent concern in this regard is India’s attempts to weaponize space, which offers a bleak situation for regional peace and stability. Moreover, if India went further with this ambitiousness when Pakistan is also sending its own satellites in space, security situation will only deteriorate due to existing security dilemma between both regional counterparts.

Threats of space weaponization arise from the Indian side owing to its rapid developments in Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMDs) and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). Both of these technologies, BMDs and ICBMs, hand in hand, could be used to destroy space based assets. In theory, after slight changes in algorithms, BMDs are capable of detecting, tracking and homing in on a satellite and ICBM could be used to target the satellites for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Many international scholars agree on the point that BMD systems have not yet acquired sophistication to give hundred percent results in destroying all the incoming ballistic missile, but they sure have the capability to work as anti-satellite systems. The reason behind the BMD being an effective anti-sat system is that it is easier to locate, track and target the satellites because they are not convoyed with decoys unlike missiles which create confusions for the locating and tracking systems.

India possesses both of the above-mentioned technologies and its Defense Research and Development Organization has shown the intention to build anti-satellite weaponry. In 2012, India’s then head of DRDO categorically said that India needs an arsenal in its system that could track the movement of enemy’s satellite before destroying it, thus what India is aiming at is the credible deterrence capability.

One thing that comes in lime light after analyzing the statement is that India is in fact aiming for weaponizing the space. With the recent launch of its indigenous satellites through its own launch vehicle not only for domestic use but also for commercial use, India is becoming confident enough in its capabilities of space program. This confidence is also making India more ambitious in space program. It is true that treaties regarding outer space only stop states from putting weapons of mass destruction in outer space. But, destruction of satellites will create debris in outer space that could cause destruction for other satellites in the outer space.

On top of it all the reality cannot be ignored that both Pakistan and India cannot turn every other arena into battlefield. Rivalry between both states has already turned glaciers and ocean into war zones, resultantly affecting the natural habitat of the region. By going for ballistic missile defences and intercontinental ballistic missiles India has not only developed missile technology but also has made significant contribution in anti-sat weaponry, which is alarming, as due to security dilemma, Pakistan will now be ever more compelled to develop capabilities for the security of its satellites. So far both states are confined till space militarization to enhance the capabilities of their forces, but if that force multiplier in space goes under threat, Pakistan will resort to capability to counter Indian aggression in space as well, which will be the classic action-reaction paradigm. Thus, it is pertinent that India as front runner in space technology develop policy of restrain to control the new arms race in the region which has potential to change the skies and space as we know them.

Continue Reading


Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy: Impact on Strategic Stability in South Asia

Sonia Naz



Most significant incident happened when India tested its nuclear device on18 May, 1974.After India’s nuclear test, Pakistan obtained the nuclear technology, expertise and pursued a nuclear program to counter India which has more conventional force than Pakistan. Pakistan obtained nuclear program because of India, it has not done anything independently but followed India. Pakistan just wanted to secure its borders and deter Indian aggression. It was not and is not interested in any arms race in the region. It is not signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT). Pakistan has not signed NPT and CTBT because India has not signed it. Since acquiring the nuclear weapons, it has rejected to declare No First Use (NFU) in case of war to counter India’s conventional supremacy.

The basic purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter any aggression against its territorial integrity. Riffat Hussain while discussing Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine argues that it cannot disobey the policy of NFU due to Indian superiority in conventional force and it makes India enable to fight conventional war with full impunity. Pakistan’s nuclear posture is based on minimum credible nuclear deterrence which means that its nuclear weapons have no other role except to counter the aggression from its adversary.  It is evident that Pakistan’s nuclear program is Indiacentric.. Owing to the Indian superiority in conventional forces Pakistan nuclear weapons balance the conventional force power percentage between the two states. In November 1999, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar stated that ‘more is unnecessary while little is enough’.

The National Command Authority (NCA), comprising the Employment Control Committee, Development Control Committee and Strategic Plans Division, is the center point of all decision-making regarding the nuclear issue.According to the security experts first use option involves many serious challenges because it needs robust military intelligence and very effective early warning system. However, Pakistan’s nuclear establishment is  concerned about nuclear security of weapons for which it has laid out stringent nuclear security system. Pakistan made a rational decision by conducting five nuclear tests in 1998 to restore the strategic stability in South Asia, otherwise it was not able to counter the threat of India’s superior conventional force.

The NCA of Pakistan (nuclear program policy making body) announced on September 9, 2015 the nation’s resolve to maintain a full spectrum deterrence capability in line with the dictates of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ to deter all forms of aggression, adhering to the policy of avoiding an arms race.”It was the response of Indian offensive Cold Start Doctrine which is about the movement of Indian military forces closer to Pakistan’s border with all vehicles. Pakistan wants to maintain strategic stability in the region and its seeks conflict resolution and peace, but India’s hawkish policies towards Pakistan force it to take more steps to secure its border. Pakistan’s nuclear establishment is very vigorously implementing rational countermeasures to respond to India’s aggression by transforming its nuclear doctrine. It has developed tactical nuclear weapons (short range nuclear missiles) that can be used in the battle field.

Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said in 2013 that Pakistan would continue to obey the policy of minimum credible nuclear deterrence to avoid the arms race in the region. However, it would not remain unaware of the changing security situation in the region and would maintain the capability of full spectrum nuclear deterrence to counter any aggression in the region. Dr. Zafar Jaspal argues in his research that Full credible deterrence does not imply it is a quantitative change in Pakistan’s minimum credible nuclear deterrence, but it is a qualitative response to emerging challenges posed in the region. This proves that Islamabad is not interested in the arms race in the region, but India’s constant military buildup forces Pakistan to convert its nuclear doctrine from minimum to full credible nuclear deterrence.

India’s offensive policies alarm the strategic stability of the region and international community considers that Pakistan’s transformation in nuclear policies would be risky for international security. They have recommended a few suggestions to Pakistan’s nuclear policy making body, but the NCA rejected those mainly because Pakistan is confronting dangerous threats from India and its offensive policies such as the cold start doctrine. Hence no suggestion conflicting with this purpose is acceptable to Pakistan. This is to be made clear at the all national, regional and international platforms that Pakistan is striving hard to maintain the strategic stability while India is only contributing toward instigating the regional arms race.

Continue Reading


Green Planet24 mins ago

Proof of Human Impotence and Agency in Climate Change While Disasters Multiply

To be rational is to know that weather events cannot be causally related to climate change, although exacerbation is another...

South Asia6 hours ago

Pakistan not a Threat for Israel: Clearing Misconceptions

Ever since 1998; the beginning of Pakistan’s nuclear age, the state’s self-defense mechanism has been a source of worry and...

Americas8 hours ago

Swalwell a Major Contender for U.S. Presidency in 2020

One of the most gifted politicians in the Democratic Party — and fastest-rising — is the 37-year-old Eric Swalwell, whose...

Middle East10 hours ago

Amid ethnic protests, Iran warns of foreign meddling

Iran has raised the spectre of a US-Saudi effort to destabilize the country by exploiting economic grievances against the backdrop...

Green Planet21 hours ago

To beat hunger and combat climate change, world must ‘scale-up’ soil health

Healthy soils are essential to achieve ‘Zero Hunger’ – and other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – peace and prosperity, the...

Energy22 hours ago

CPEC: The not so cool COAL corridor

With energy comes wealth and with wealth comes prosperity! No one can doubt the veracity of this conclusion. But most...

Economy24 hours ago

Social Mobility and Stronger Private Sector Role are Keys to Growth in the Arab World

In spite of unprecedented improvements in technological readiness, the Arab World continues to struggle to innovate and create broad-based opportunities...


Copyright © 2018 Modern Diplomacy