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The Demarche of Chinese foreign policy in Xi’s Era

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True, every turn and twist in Chinese politics has been accompanied by the compulsive projection of foreign policy in terms of principled constancy and shifts that followed. Nowadays, it is a commonplace to argue how many fundamental changes have occurred in post-Deng China since 1997.

For example, has Chinese foreign policy undergone a great change or transformation of its values, norms, security priorities and core interest over the past two decades? Given this, world media have once again focused on Chinese Communist Party (CPC) Congress held on October 18, in which Xi Jin-ping, the General Secretary of the ruling party of China, delivered the work report outlining the demarche of its foreign policy for the next 3 decades. The questions hereby involve Chinese leader’s perception of our “global community”, their development goals and means, and new tenets of foreign policy for the upcoming decades.

As China is driven by the millennium glory and the centenary shame from the beginning of the 20th century, its people have struggled consistently and persistently for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Considering this, Xi admitted that now China has entered the crucial phase of its rise to a global power since Deng initiated the reform and openness-up in the late 1970s. He vows to continue upholding the fundamental goal of preserving world peace and promoting common development with all countries. Simultaneously, Xi reaffirmed that it is Chinese ruling party’s abiding mission to make greater contributions for building a community with a shared future for mankind in the globalized era.

To the people who hold the doctrine of realism and power politics, it is difficult for them to give up the concept of “the Thucydides trap” simply because China, like any other rising power historically, would surely challenge the ruling power’s interest, value and prestige. Accordingly, Xi appealed in his address at the Congress to reconstructing a new form of international relations featuring mutual respect, reciprocal benefits, justice, and win-win cooperation. This paper aims to interpret the demarche of Xi’s foreign policy from the concept, goal and prospect which were expounded at the CPC Congress.

Conceptually, the Chinese, both ruling and the ruled, have opined that global multi-polarity, economic globalization, IT application, and cultural diversity are the surging world trend forward. Given this, peaceful changes in the global governance system and international order are imperative. In practice, our “global community” is circumscribed by uncertainties and destabilizing factors covering from the increasing shortage of energy, widening gap between rich and poor countries, and hotspot issues in many regions; not to mention alarming unconventional security issues such as terrorism, cyber-security, climate changes and major infectious diseases. As we are living in a community with a shared future, it is feasible for all countries to work together, as “together, we never fail”, while keeping each own identity. As a matter of fact, no country alone can address so many challenges and issues; and no country can afford to retreat into self-isolation as well.

As the largest developing country in the world, China will continue to endorse trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and strive to facilitate economic globalization more open, inclusive, and fairer so that it would benefit all countries concerned. This requires that China actively develop global partnerships and expand the convergence of interests with other countries. At the same time, as the most dynamic rising power along with others like India and Brazil, China has repeatedly declared that she will never pursue development at the expense of others’ interests, nor will China ever give up its legitimate rights and core interests. Due to this, it pursues a national security strategy that is in nature defensive, and henceforth China will never seek hegemony with a view to posing a threat to the world order.

Then, what does China want in its century-long dream for its greatness?

As one of the victims of the imperialist powers in modern history, China had suffered too much more and too much longer than any other countries. Due to this, the Chinese have never paused to pursue their national dream to be a strong power and, with such a goal, they naturally seek to develop reciprocal and friendly ties with countries around the world and eventually to be involved into the global governance. Rather than acting as a revisionist power against the status quo, China has at once demonstrated its respect for the world order, responsibilities for global issues and promotion of mutual benefits and inclusiveness in foreign affairs. More recently, Chinese leaders have expounded their rejection of the Cold War mentality or power politics, but underscored a new approach to enhance state-to-state relations through dialogues, in particular the new practice of “major power diplomacy”. Despite some still trying to accuse China for causing frictions in the region, citing its strained ties with neighbors Japan and the Republic of Korea, Beijing remains committed to the regional stability and peace as playing a more proactive role in preventing conflicts in the region including on the North Korea’s nuclear crisis.

Once again, how does China achieve its centenary mission by 2050?

Doubtless, the Chinese are not “utopian” in view of the complicated world and their still limited leverage in foreign affairs. Since they have steadily pursued national dream for a century, the leading elite in Beijing has been aware of the “global village” that is full of both hope and challenges. Then, Xi frankly admitted that China will endeavor to forge a pragmatic framework for major-power relationship featuring overall stability and mutual respects for each core interests and cardinal interests. China will deepen relations with its numerous neighbors in accordance with the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual understanding and reciprocal benefits. China will continually exercise its utmost efforts to expand and strengthen solidarity and cooperation with other developing states, which remain the foundation of Chinese foreign relations in the 21st century.

Obviously, foreign policy is always affected by the vicissitudes in foreign affairs, various priorities in domestic politics, and ruling elite’s perception of world reality. Due to this, it is self-evident that Beijing’s foreign policy will be adjusted or even shifted accordingly. But, be aware that the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is a centenary dream which not only needs collective efforts but also closely related to the legitimacy of the ruling party of the CPC; therefore, no leading elite of China dare to change this historical task dictated by the mandate destiny. This is one of the key reasons why President Xi vows to work together through thick and thin to adhere to the fundamental strategy of opening up and pursue balanced development with its doors open wider and wider.

In retrospect, since Xi Jinping initiated the outline of the Belt and Road in 2013, Chinese government has invested tremendous energy, resources and wisdom on building up a sound platform for international cooperation in order to create new drivers of shared development, and inclusive are multiple-fields like public policy, infrastructure, trade, finance and social-cultural connectivity. All indicate that China is anxious to act as a genuine participant of the future world affairs, a responsible power involving the rules-making, and one of the key players to preserve the global order by both peace and force if necessary. No matter which is required in the future, there is no retreat or even hesitation for this giant rising power.

Wang Li is Professor of International Relations and Diplomacy at the School of International and Public Affairs, Jilin University China.

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East Asia

Importance of peace in Afghanistan is vital for China

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image source: chinamission.be

There are multiple passages from Afghanistan to China, like Wakhan Corridor that is 92 km long, stretching to Xinjiang in China. It was formed in 1893 as a result of an agreement between the British Empire and Afghanistan. Another is Chalachigu valley that shares the border with Tajikistan to the north, Pakistan to the south, and Afghanistan to the west. It is referred to as the Chinese part of the Wakhan Corridor. However, the Chinese side of the valley is closed to the public and only local shepherds are allowed. Then there is Wakhjir Pass on the eastern side of the Wakhan corridor but is not accessible to the general public. The terrain is rough on the Afghan side. There are no roads along the Wakhjir Pass, most of the terrain is a dirt track. Like other passages, it can only be accessed via either animals or SUVs, and also due to extreme weather it is open for only seven months throughout the year. North Wakhjir Pass, also called Tegermansu Pass, is mountainous on the border of China and Afghanistan. It stretches from Tegermansu valley on the east and Chalachigu Valley in Xinjiang. All of these passages are extremely uncertain and rough which makes them too risky to be used for trade purposes. For example, the Chalagigu valley and Wakhjir Pass are an engineering nightmare to develop, let alone make them viable.

Similarly, the Pamir mountain range is also unstable and prone to landslides. Both of these routes also experience extreme weather conditions. Alternatives: Since most of the passages are risky for travel, alternatively, trade activities can be routed via Pakistan. For example, there is an access road at the North Wakhjir that connects to Karakoram Highway.

By expanding the road network from Taxkorgan in Xinjiang to Gilgit, using the Karakoram Highway is a probable option. Land routes in Pakistan are already being developed for better connectivity between Islamabad and Beijing as part of CPEC. These routes stretch from Gwadar up to the North.

The Motorway M-1, which runs from Islamabad to Peshawar can be used to link Afghanistan via Landi Kotal. Although the Karakoram highway also suffers from extreme weather and landslides, it is easier for engineers to handle as compared to those in Afghanistan.

China is the first door neighbor of Afghanistan having a common border. If anything happens in Afghanistan will have a direct impact on China. China has a declared policy of peaceful developments and has abandoned all disputes and adversaries for the time being and focused only on economic developments. For economic developments, social stability and security is a pre-requisite. So China emphasizes peace and stability in Afghanistan. It is China’s requirement that its border with Afghanistan should be secured, and restrict movements of any unwanted individuals or groups. China is compelled by any government in Afghanistan to ensure the safety of its borders in the region.

Taliban has ensured china that, its territory will not use against China and will never support any insurgency in China. Based on this confidence, China is cooperating with the Taliban in all possible manners. On the other hand, China is a responsible nation and obliged to extend humanitarian assistance to starving Afghans. While, the US is coercing and exerting pressures on the Taliban Government to collapse, by freezing their assets, and cutting all economic assistance, and lobbying with its Western allies, for exerting economic pressures on the Taliban, irrespective of human catastrophe in Afghanistan. China is generously assisting in saving human lives in Afghanistan. Whereas, the US is preferring politics over human lives in Afghanistan.

The US has destroyed Afghanistan during the last two decades, infrastructure was damaged completely, Agriculture was destroyed, Industry was destroyed, and the economy was a total disaster. While, China is assisting Afghanistan to rebuild its infrastructure, revive agriculture, industrialization is on its way. Chinese mega initiative, Belt and Road (BRI) is hope for Afghanistan.

A peaceful Afghanistan is a guarantee for peace and stability in China, especially in the bordering areas. The importance of Afghan peace is well conceived by China and practically, China is supporting peace and stability in Afghanistan. In fact, all the neighboring countries, and regional countries, are agreed upon by consensus that peace and stability in Afghanistan is a must and prerequisite for whole regions’ development and prosperity.

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East Asia

Shared Territorial Concern, Opposition to US Intervention Prompt Russia’s Support to China on Taiwan Question

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image credit: kremlin.ru

The situation around the island of Taiwan is raising concerns not only in Chinese mainland, Taiwan island or in the US, but also in the whole world. Nobody would like to see a large-scale military clash between China and the US in the East Pacific. Potential repercussions of such a clash, even if it does not escalate to the nuclear level, might be catastrophic for the global economy and strategic stability, not to mention huge losses in blood and treasure for both sides in this conflict.

Earlier this week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Moscow continued to firmly support Beijing’s position on Taiwan as an integral part of China. Moreover, he also underlined that Moscow would support Beijing in its legitimate efforts to reunite the breakaway province with the rest of the country. A number of foreign media outlets paid particular attention not to what Lavrov actually said, but omitted his other remarks: the Russian official did not add that Moscow expects reunification to be peaceful and gradual in a way that is similar to China’s repossession of Hong Kong. Many observers of the new Taiwan Straits crisis unfolding concluded that Lavrov’s statement was a clear signal to all parties of the crisis: Russia would likely back even Beijing’s military takeover of the island.

Of course, diplomacy is an art of ambiguity. Lavrov clearly did not call for a military solution to the Taiwan problem. Still, his remarks were more blunt and more supportive of Beijing than the standard Russia’s rhetoric on the issue. Why? One possible explanation is that the Russian official simply wanted to sound nice to China as Russia’s major strategic partner. As they say, “a friend in need is a friend indeed.” Another explanation is that Lavrov recalled the Russian experience with Chechnya some time ago, when Moscow had to fight two bloody wars to suppress secessionism in the North Caucasus. Territorial integrity means a lot for the Russian leadership. This is something that is worth spilling blood for.

However, one can also imagine that in Russia they simply do not believe that if things go really bad for Taiwan island, the US would dare to come to its rescue and that in the end of the day Taipei would have to yield to Beijing without a single shot fired. Therefore, the risks of a large-scale military conflict in the East Pacific are perceived as relatively low, no matter what apocalyptic scenarios various military experts might come up with.

Indeed, over last 10 or 15 years the US has developed a pretty nasty habit of inciting its friends and partners to take risky and even reckless decisions and of letting these friends and partners down, when the latter had to foot the bill for these decisions. In 2008, the Bush administration explicitly or implicitly encouraged Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili to launch a military operation against South Ossetia including killing some Russian peacekeepers stationed there. But when Russia interfered to stop and to roll back the Georgian offensive, unfortunate Saakashvili was de-facto abandoned by Washington.

During the Ukrainian conflicts of 2013-14, the Obama administration enthusiastically supported the overthrow of the legitimate president in Kiev. However, it later preferred to delegate the management of the crisis to Berlin and to Paris, abstaining from taking part in the Normandy process and from signing the Minsk Agreements. In 2019, President Donald Trump promised his full support to Juan Guaidó, Head of the National Assembly in Venezuela, in his crusade against President Nicolas when the government of Maduro demonstrated its spectacular resilience. Juan Guaido very soon almost completely disappeared from Washington’s political radar screens.

Earlier this year the Biden administration stated its firm commitment to shouldering President Ashraf Ghani in Afghanistan in his resistance to Taliban advancements. But when push came to shove, the US easily abandoned its local allies, evacuated its military personal in a rush and left President Ghani to seek political asylum in the United Arab Emirates.

Again and again, Washington gives reasons to conclude that its partners, clients and even allies can no longer consider it as a credible security provider. Would the US make an exception for the Taiwan island? Of course, one can argue that the Taiwan island is more important for the US than Afghanistan, Venezuela, Ukraine and Georgia taken together. But the price for supporting the Taiwan island could also be much higher for the US than the price it would have paid in many other crisis situations. The chances of the US losing to China over Taiwan island, even if Washington mobilizes all of its available military power against Beijing, are also very high. Still, we do not see such a mobilization taking place now. It appears that the Biden administration is not ready for a real showdown with Beijing over the Taiwan question.

If the US does not put its whole weight behind the Taiwan island, the latter will have to seek some kind of accommodation with the mainland on terms abandoning its pipe-dreams of self-determination and independence. This is clear to politicians not only in East Asia, but all over the place, including Moscow. Therefore, Sergey Lavrov has reasons to firmly align himself with the Chinese position. The assumption in the Kremlin is that Uncle Sam will not dare to challenge militarily the Middle Kingdom. Not this time.

From our partner RIAC

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East Asia

Russia-Japan Relations: Were Abe’s Efforts In Vain?

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Expanding the modest elements of trust in the Japan-Russia relationship, talking through reciprocal concerns before they lead to conflict, avoiding bilateral incidents, and engaging in mutually beneficial economic cooperation is the way forward.

One year after the end of Shinzo Abe’s long period of leadership, Japan has a new prime minister once again. The greatest foreign policy challenge the new Japanese government led by Fumio Kishida is facing is the intensifying confrontation between its large neighbor China and its main ally America. In addition to moves to energize the Quad group to which Japan belongs alongside Australia, India, and the United States, U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration has concluded a deal with Canberra and London to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines which in future could patrol the Western Pacific close to Chinese shores. The geopolitical fault lines in the Indo-Pacific region are fast turning into frontlines.

In this context, does anything remain of the eight-year-long effort by former prime minister Abe to improve relations with Russia on the basis of greater economic engagement tailored to Moscow’s needs? Russia’s relations with China continue to develop, including in the military domain; Russia’s constitutional amendments passed last year prohibit the handover of Russian territory, which doesn’t bode well for the long-running territorial dispute with Japan over the South Kuril Islands; and Russian officials and state-run media have been remembering and condemning the Japanese military’s conduct during World War II, something they chose to play down in the past. True, Moscow has invited Tokyo to participate in economic projects on the South Kuril Islands, but on Russian terms and without an exclusive status.

To many, the answer to the above question is clear, and it is negative. Yet that attitude amounts to de facto resignation, a questionable approach. Despite the oft-cited but erroneous Cold War analogy, the present Sino-American confrontation has created two poles in the global system, but not—at least, not yet—two blocs. Again, despite the popular and equally incorrect interpretation, Moscow is not Beijing’s follower or vassal. As a power that is particularly sensitive about its own sovereignty, Russia seeks to maintain an equilibrium—which is not the same as equidistance—between its prime partner and its main adversary. Tokyo would do well to understand that and take it into account as it structures its foreign relations.

The territorial dispute with Russia is considered to be very important for the Japanese people, but it is more symbolic than substantive. In practical terms, the biggest achievement of the Abe era in Japan-Russia relations was the founding of a format for high-level security and foreign policy consultations between the two countries. With security issues topping the agenda in the Indo-Pacific, maintaining the channel for private direct exchanges with a neighboring great power that the “2+2” formula offers is of high value. Such a format is a trademark of Abe’s foreign policy which, while being loyal to Japan’s American ally, prided itself on pursuing Japanese national interests rather than solely relying on others to take them into account.

Kishida, who for five years served as Abe’s foreign minister, will now have a chance to put his own stamp on the country’s foreign policy. Yet it makes sense for him to build on the accomplishments of his predecessor, such as using the unique consultation mechanism mentioned above to address geopolitical and security issues in the Indo-Pacific region, from North Korea to Afghanistan. Even under Abe, Japan’s economic engagement with Russia was by no means charity. The Russian leadership’s recent initiatives to shift more resources to eastern Siberia offer new opportunities to Japanese companies, just like Russia’s early plans for energy transition in response to climate change, and the ongoing development projects in the Arctic. In September 2021, the annual Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok did not feature top-level Japanese participation, but that should be an exception, not the rule.

Japan will remain a trusted ally of the United States for the foreseeable future. It is also safe to predict that at least in the medium term, and possibly longer, the Russo-Chinese partnership will continue to grow. That is no reason for Moscow and Tokyo to regard each other as adversaries, however. Moreover, since an armed conflict between America and China would spell a global calamity and have a high chance of turning nuclear, other major powers, including Russia and Japan, have a vital interest in preventing such a collision. Expanding the still very modest elements of trust in the Japan-Russia relationship, talking through reciprocal concerns before they lead to conflict, avoiding bilateral incidents, and engaging in mutually beneficial economic cooperation is the way forward. The absence of a peace treaty between the two countries more than seventy-five years after the end of the war is abnormal, yet that same unfinished business should serve as a stimulus to persevere. Giving up is an option, but not a good one.

From our partner RIAC

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