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David and Goliath: How Qatar took on the world…and nearly won

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To say that the Middle East is a region of instability would be an understatement. The ongoing violence in Syria & Iraq receives heavy international news coverage. Now though, it seems it’s perpetuated up through to the highest levels of diplomacy.

Four months ago, a coalition of Arab nations abruptly cut off all diplomatic ties with Qatar. Qatar is famous for being the world’s richest country per capita. Among the various allegations were that Qatar is funding terrorism. Having an amicable relationship with Iran seems to only make things worse.

The coalition includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The coalition has called for the shutdown of Al Jazeera. A preposterous claim, as Al Jazeera is widely considered the only true bastion of free press in the region. The Qatari foreign minister likened this ludicrous demand to if China were to call for the UK to shut down BBC.

Currently, no evidence has surfaced to back up these claims. On the contrary, Qatar has insisted, that along with the US, it has fought tirelessly in the War On Terror. It would make sense too, seeing as the US military has a middle east headquarters at the Qatari Al Udeid Airbase.

Despite global media coverage, it seems that most of the world has viewed this as a mere family fall. Of course, with the hope that it’s all a misunderstanding that will end up in hug and make up.

Sadly, far from just being a small regional squabble, the ramifications are proving to be more serious. The fall out is threatening to disturb decades of global diplomatic progress.

Last week in Paris, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) held an election to appoint its new leader.

UNESCO is headquartered in Paris and was set up as the intellectual agency of the UN in post-war 1945. The agency is tasked with promoting peace, social justice, human rights and international security. It strives for international cooperation on educational, science and cultural programs.

UNESCO is best known for its World Heritage program. Its true aim though is to promote and maintain peace through inter-cultural understanding.

After more than a year of campaigning, 8 candidates from various nations competed for the votes of the Executive Board.

Among the candidates were Qian Tang of China, Audrey Azoulay of France, Moushira Khattab of Egypt and Hamad Al-Kawari of Qatar.

This election was of prime importance. UNESCO has been crippled by funding issues and politicization. In 2009, the United States withdrew their funding contribution, a third of UNESCO’s total budget. This was in response to UNESCO choosing to recognize Palestine as a member state.

This election was widely referred to as the ‘Arab election’. Uniquely, 4 of the 8 candidates in contention were from the Arab world. Up until now, no leader of UNESCO has come from the Arab world. Many diplomats around the world and those in the media have said it’s their time.

The electoral process begun on the 9th of October and consisted of several rounds of voting. Executive Board members voted for their preferred candidates. Each round sought to result in a candidate with a majority (30) of the 58 total votes.

After the first round of voting, Hamad Al-Kawari of Qatar emerged as the frontrunner.

Al-Kawari, a seasoned diplomat has decades of experience as ambassador to various nations, including France and the US. Having previously, served as the Minister of Culture for his country, Al-Kawari was clearly the favorite.

Disappointingly for China, Tang didn’t win more than 5 votes and pulled out from the contest in the 3rd round. This was despite Tang currently being UNESCO’s Assistant-Director-General for Education. Clearly, having the support of a sole superpower was not enough.

Trailing behind Qatar were France and Egypt. Egypt’s candidate, Khattab, had received much criticism in the run up to the election. Her backers, the oppressive El-Sisi regime, are under intense scrutiny itself for a litany of human rights abuses. Among those are the jailing of journalists and political opponents and censorship. Many NGOs and media outlets warned that if elected, Khattab would only be a mouthpiece of Egypt’s dictator, el-Sisi.

Egypt’s image has deteriorated rapidly in the past several months, with several experts calling for the US to limit its relations with it.

After four rounds of voting, Al-Kawari continued to lead from the front. In contention for second place was Egypt and the French candidate, Audrey Azoulay.

Azoulay’s candidature was announced at the last minute, the day before the deadline, the 15th of March of this year. This was widely speculated as a last minute foreign policy push by President Hollande prior to his departure.

Azoulay, just 45-years, old briefly served as Culture Minister for France. Daughter of Andre Azoulay, adviser to Morocco’s King Mohamed VI, she has no diplomatic experience.

A French candidate for the leader of a UN agency is generally seen as a ‘safe’ vote. Out of the 10 Director-Generals that have lead UNESCO in the past, 7 of those have been from Europe or the US. A French leader would seem to be the default with its headquarters being in Paris.

For the fifth and final round of voting, the top two candidates from the previous day would compete. However, Azoulay and Khattab were tied for second. Votes were first taken to decide who would go against Al-Kawari.

France’s Azoulay prevailed and thus the world waited for the final round of voting against Qatar.

The Arab, anti-Qatar coalition had lost their preferred candidate, Khattab. Despite Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE not having a seat on the Executive Board, their influence no doubt is substantial.

They could have embraced the fact that with Al-Kawari, the arab world could, for the first time, have one of their own at the head of UNESCO. Or they could choose to act spitefully and undermine his efforts. Unfortunately, they chose the latter. The Egyptian Foreign Minister of Egypt, Sameh Shoukry was rather explicit in this. He was seen openly finger prodding and berating the Ambassador Kenya to vote against Qatar. His words were “despite it being a blind vote, we’ll know who you voted for”.

To add to the drama, President Trump of the United States announced his plan to withdraw the country from UNESCO. Israel was to follow suit. Both countries have loudly accused UNESCO of anti-Israel bias in the past. Whether the thought of a Qatari Director-General was the last straw is only speculation. Perhaps, President Trump was simply in another insular, anti-diplomatic mood.

Al-Kawari was the first candidate to announce his campaign and had begun work almost 2 years ago. Considered the underdog from the beginning, Al-Kawari visited over 60 world leaders during that time. Each visit, he would seek to understand the needs of each nation so he could best serve them as head of UNESCO.

Entering the first round of voting, it was clear he was the underdog no more. Al-Kawari had already received the firm support of many around the world. Support came from nations as diverse as Sweden, Pakistan, South Africa and Guatemala. With such strong support from Latin America, Guatemala’s own candidate pulled out of the race in support of Qatar.

Despite it all, the fierce Arab lobby against Qatar tipped the balance. In the final round, Azoulay won the required majority of 30 votes. Al-Kawari was just 2 votes short, with 28.

The results pose key two questions:

  1. What if anything did, France or UNESCO gain from the appointment of Azoulay?

For France, not much. France already has formidable soft-power as a nation. It is considered by many to be the cultural capital of the world and is the country frequented most by tourists. It’s unlikely that the head of UNESCO being French will do much for it. In addition, France has significant issues with maintaining its own cultural institutions, the additional burden of UNESCO may eventually turn out to be a diplomatic failure for the French Government as many regions felt France had little or no right to even contest for the post due to the unofficial regional rotation of the UNESCO DG post.

For UNESCO? It doesn’t make a strong statement about its pursuit for diversity and understanding. This election was the perfect time to appoint an arab candidate. Instead of striving to depoliticize the agency, it allowed itself to be swayed by political infighting and the bullying of the United States.

An inexperienced candidate with no diplomatic experience will do little to add the stability the agency needs.

  1. Is Qatar the real winner here?

Qatar’s Al-Kawari began the race as an underdog, fought his way to the front of the pack and it required a regional crisis to defeat him. With the United States throwing a tantrum and choosing to leave the agency, would have Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain had followed suit?

Qatar through Al Kawari’s global campaign was able to gain significant support from the developing nations and small islands nations.  In a highly significant diplomatic bow to his candidature, Guatemala withdrew its candidate in favour of Qatar. The support from El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina and St. Kitts and Nevis  has created new bonds for Qatar and this indeed has given the small nation a stronger foreign policy advantage.

His campaign, director by Dentons strategist Richard Griffiths was hailed as a great success for Qatar by the international community as Hamad al Kawari visited every country on the 58 member executive board. This intensive campaigning gave Qatar and their candidate a strong foothold in regions such as Latin America, South Asia and East Africa.

Even if Al-Kawari had secured the extra 2 votes, would these countries have kicked their level of spite up a notch? It certainly is not out of the question. Rumours suggested that Al Kawari would never take office as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the blockade countries would spare no expense or political capital to block him from taking office. The UN general conference still would need to confirm him on Nov.10 in New York.

What remains is the fact that Qatar has shown that when it comes to the highest levels of diplomacy, it is a contender. Despite the regional squabbles, Qatar won the support of half of the world. Qatar may have lost the Director General of UNESCO post but they have gained in Al Kawari an internationally known Statesman with significant backing globally.

This support will not be forgotten by either side. Perhaps Qatar is just getting started, and the world has shown Qatar they can be a player globally.

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Middle East

The US-Iran deal and its implications for the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe

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Image credit: EPA

The ongoing meetings between the US and Iran since the beginning of April in Vienna show new signs of progress. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s chief negotiator and Deputy Foreign Minister, in the last days suggested that a ‘new understanding’ is being shaped. Any possibility of reaching an agreement and the US returning to the deal once abandoned by former US President Donald Trump, will result in a new state of affairs in wider Eurasia. New opportunities may also emerge for the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe creating new sources for security and development.

The nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed between Iran and six world powers – the USA, Russia, China, France, the UK and Germany – back in 2015 was envisaged to bring Iran’s nuclear enrichment process under stricter international inspection and monitoring. In response, the US and other participants of the deal pledged to lift sanctions imposed on Iran. 

However, in May 2018 the process was mostly undermined by former US President Donald Trump, whose administration decided to withdraw from the deal. The withdrawal was followed by a new wave of sanctions and targeted assassinations of a few prominent Iranians, among them General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, killed by an American drone strike in Iraq in January 2020. All the efforts of the Trump administration to dismantle the Iranian regime and its ambitions resulted in the resumption of the nuclear enrichment program. Upon his election, President Joe Biden expressed his sincere interest in returning to the deal. This led to the recent negotiations between Tehran and Washington in the Austrian capital. 

The fact that Iran and the US are mutually interested in the restoration of the JCPOA can be explained in a number of ways. The most apparent aspect is the US return to the international arena which it, to some extent, left under Trump’s isolationist policy. The American active engagement in the nuclear deal with Iran is aimed at various targets. In reviving the deal, Washington may hinder the hardliners’ return to power in Iran during the upcoming presidential elections this summer. Besides, Iran is becoming a regional bastion for China, which uses Iran’s economic vulnerabilities to maximise its gains. Finally, the rapprochement of Turkey and Russia creates another danger for US interests in the region, prompting it to reconsider its politics in the Middle East. In other words, the US and Iran need this recovery in relations for reasons stemming from the core principle of Realism, the balance of power; in order not to allow dramatic shifts in the geopolitical landscape, not only in the Middle East but also in central Eurasia. 

Russia’s strengthened stance in the South Caucasus following the second Karabakh war can primarily be explained by its emerging relations with Turkey, which were described by Russia’s chief diplomat, Sergei Lavrov, as ‘sui generis co-operation and competition’. This odd couple could dismantle hopes of peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chaired by the US, France and Russia. The Russian-Turkish duo have created the vast majority of the broader region’s flash points ranging from Libya to Syria and Karabakh. Russia’s rapprochement with Turkey is in Moscow’s favour and is aimed at disuniting NATO. On the other hand, Turkey’s bold politics speak about its global ambitions and desire to set its own course. Both behaviours are in direct contradiction of American vital interests, which is reflected in harsh criticism of the Kremlin and Ankara. In the case of Moscow, this reached a historic post-Cold War peak – Biden’s recent scandalous statement on Putin, calling him a ‘killer’, has inflamed relations between the two countries. 

The USA is actively supporting any activities aimed at decreasing the influence of Russia and China in various parts of the world. One of such projects is the so-called ‘Three Seas Initiative’. Created in 2015 by the presidents of Croatia and Poland, this project brings together the twelve states of Eastern and Central Europe located between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. The main goal is to counter the growing Russian and Chinese influence in the region, which is less developed than Western Europe and more open to foreign direct investments. Aimed at developing infrastructure, energy co-operation and digitalisation, the initiative seeks to create ”North-South” energy and infrastructure corridors. Given the US ambitions to reduce the region’s dependence on Russian energy supplies, the nuclear deal with Iran opens new opportunities. The fact that the Chinese Silk Road is heading to Europe via Central Asia and Turkey, it could be better to allow Iran to export its gas through Armenia and Georgia to Eastern Europe under the Black Sea. Firstly, this would solve the European dependence on Russian energy supplies. The export of natural resources has been traditionally used by the Kremlin as a foreign policy instrument. The reduction of dependence on Russian commodities will ultimately reshape the Kremlin’s behaviour abroad making it more predictable and constructive. The fear that this may plunge Russia into China’s orbit, turning it a puppet state for Beijing, are groundless given the Russian bear’s historical caution of the Chinese dragon. The second important contribution of the Iranian pipeline will be to increase the energy security of Ukraine, which is trying to integrate itself into European infrastructure and move come closer to EU standards at the same time as coping with Russian energy blackmail.

The Iranian pipeline is able to solve the economic and energy independence of the Eastern and Central European EU member states which participate in the ‘Three Seas Initiative’. It may liberalise the energy market of the region and will boost economic development, reducing its gap with Western Europe. 

Finally, the US-Iranian possible rapprochement may also change the state of affairs in the South Caucasus region. The increased Russian presence and active Turkish involvement in the region are aimed at keeping other external actors – and first and foremost the West – out of it. In the long run, this will threaten Georgia’s European dreams in the same way it has harmed Armenia’s democratic aspirations. Alternatively, the vision of being a transit route for Iranian energy pipelines to Europe, whilst also helping to connect India and Eastern Europe, could elevate the security of Georgia and Armenia to a new level.

Therefore, the US-Iran agreement is essential for restoring the balance of power in the region, in order not to allow the main competitors to maximise their gains. This deal promises new opportunities for Central Eurasia, creating room for manoeuvre for the region’s small and fragile countries.

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Middle East

The Mediterranean: Will Turkey be successful in pulling Egypt to its side?

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The Mediterranean acts as a channel connecting Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The region has, however, become a bone of contention due to varying political setups, religions and cultural values, economic resources, and the existence of crisis situations. The maritime dispute between Turkey and Greece is highly contentious, developing new complexities that worries the international community. Greece prefersinternational arbitrationwhile Turkey favors the option of bilateral negotiationsconstituting asthe main cause of friction between the two countries.

Historically, root of the crisis also lies in conflicting claims by Turkey and Greece concerning maritime boundaries and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), threatening Ankara’s “Blue Homeland”doctrine. To further aggravate the situation, the dispute has now been intertwined withdisputes in the eastern Mediterranean among Turkey and a coalition of countries including France, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates that are doused in geopolitical tensions, energy disputes and Libyan conflict.

Gas discoveries in eastern Mediterranean have increased Turkey’s greed for hydrocarbon exploration. Turkey aims to solve its longstanding economic challenges and reduce its energy dependency due to which the country has increased its energy-related exploration activities in the region resulting in a major gas discovery thus shaping the region towards resource competition. Moreover, Turkey seeks to establish itself as an energy hub for Europe and has signed several oil and gas pipeline deals with Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, and Russia. However, its aspirations have significantly remained unsuccessful, and the gas discoveries have deepened its concerns of being left out from the region’s emerging energy and security order due to the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF).

Conflict in the Mediterranean has unwittingly pushed Libya into a proxy war. Scuffle between Libyan National Army (LNA) and Government of National Accord (GNA) has pushed Turkey to increase its support for GNA by sending troops and weapons to Libya which is a move directly affecting the ongoing situation in the region. GNA signing its EEZ agreement with Turkey while Greece turning to LNA and signing an agreement with Egypt have contributed to exacerbating the dispute. Not only this, but major European powers have shown keen interest in the region that patently require Turkey’s support in terms of migration and counterterrorism. If the conflict between the Turkish-backed GNA and the LNA stabilizes, this would result in an ordered flow of migrants to Europe.

Moreover, Europeans do not wish to abandon a 2016 German-brokered deal between Turkey and the European Union (EU) that allows Turkey to maintain a considerable control over refugee movements into Europe. On counterterrorism, France to fight against the terrorism in southern Libya and Benghazi, allied with Haftar against Turkey, despite recognizing the GNA’s sovereignty.  France has developed security partnerships with UAE and Egypt, who are opponents of Turkey in the region.

Egypt’s possession of two liquefication facilities, making the country act as both an exporter and re-exporter of LNG including a potential Cyprus-Egypt pipeline beneficial to Egypt in terms of economic stability, and help establish itself as a regional power. Cyprus-Egypt pipeline will allow Cyprus to export gas from the Aphrodite gas field to Egypt for liquefaction and Egypt would then reexport LNG to the European market. Turkey, however, argues that revenue generated from the process must be shared with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TNRC). Turkey’s continuation on the belligerent course will bring consequences for Egypt making its support for Greece more prominent. Turkey also stands with Mediterranean cooperation through initiatives like the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum that focuses on exploitation and regional energy resource sale.

Turkey is keen to become a regional gas trade hub thus looks forward to the initiative of a Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) which transfers from Azerbaijan to Europe through Turkey. Reducing the region’s reliance on Russian gas could certainly achieve the goals. Talks between Israel and Turkey of a pipeline from Israel to Europe were also initiated, however relations between Turkey and Israel have deteriorated following Erdogan blatantly supporting Palestine. This led Israel to work with Cyprus and Greece on the EastMed pipeline, stemming in devaluation of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline.

Most of the Middle Eastern countries have recalibratedtheir foreign policy following Joe Biden’s presidential win in the United States. Similarly, both Turkey and Egypt have begun to revise their foreign policies as well. The two countries have initiated a series of new diplomatic dialogue including Turkey and Greece signing a maritime delimitation agreement in August 2020.Nonetheless Egypt did not accept Greece’s thesis of having claims over islands in the south of Aegean Sea and it also announced a new oil and gas exploration bid with taking Turkey’s coordinates of the continental shelf into consideration. Moreover, Egypt began to change its Libya policy and improve relations with GNA. Turkey has stated that it is willing to negotiate dialogue with Egypt and focus on common interests.

Understanding the new developments, it is suggested to continue to alleviate tensions as the two countries enjoy same moral values at cultural level, given their shared past and historical ties. That is only possible if the expansionist pan-Islamistproject stops with Erdogan and does not continue with future Turkish governments. Cairo and Ankara must move together on the issues concerning Palestine, Libyan conflict, and the eastern Mediterranean. Despite possible pressure from the Democrats in the Biden administration, Egypt seems reluctant to consider convergence on Islamic synthesisand integration of Muslim brotherhood. Complete normalization of relations between the two sides may take time therefore to establish trust in one another, all parties must take certain confidence-building steps.

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Israel and Turkey in search of solutions

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Twelve and eleven years have elapsed since the Davos and Mavi Marmara incidents, respectively, and Turkey-Israel relations are undergoing intense recovery efforts. They are two important Eastern neighbours and influence regional stability.

Currently, as in the past, relations between the two countries have a structure based on realpolitik, thus pursuing a relationship of balance/interest, and hinge around the Palestinian issue and Israel’s position as the White House’s privileged counterpart. However, let us now briefly summarise the history of Turkish-Jewish relations.

The first important event that comes to mind when mentioning Jews and Turks is that when over 200,000 Jews were expelled by the Spanish Inquisition in 1491, the Ottoman Empire invited them to settle in its territory.

Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognise Israel in 1949. Israel’s first diplomatic Mission to Turkey was opened on January 7, 1950 but, following the Suez crisis in 1956, relations were reduced to the level of chargé d’affaires. In the second Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Turkey chose not to get involved and it did not allow relations to break off completely.

The 1990s saw a positive trend and development in terms of bilateral relations. After the second Gulf War in 1991 -which, as you may recall, followed the first Iraqi one of 1980-1988 in which the whole world was against Iran (with the only exception of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Syria, Libya and the moral support of Enver Hoxha’s Albania) – Turkey was at the centre of security policy in the region. In that context, Turkey-Israel relations were seriously rekindled.

In 1993, Turkey upgraded diplomatic relations with Israel to ambassadorial level. The signing of the Oslo Accords between Palestine and Israel led to closer relations. The 1996 military cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, which provided significant logistical and intelligence support to both sides.

In the 2000s, there was a further rapprochement with Israel, due to the “zero problems with neighbours” policy promoted by Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party. I still remember issue No. 3/1999 of the Italian review of geopolitics “Limes” entitled “Turkey-Israel, the New Alliance”.

In 2002, an Israeli company undertook the project of modernising twelve M-60 tanks belonging to the Turkish armed forces. In 2004, Turkey agreed to sell water to Israel from the Manavgat River.

Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to Israel in 2005 was a turning point in terms of mediation between Palestine and Israel and further advancement of bilateral relations. In 2007, Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas spoke at the Turkish Grand National Assembly one day apart. High-level visits from Israel continued.

On December 22, 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert came to Ankara and met with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In that meeting, significant progress was made regarding Turkey’s mediation between Israel and Syria.

Apart from the aforementioned incidents, the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations occurred five days after the above stated meeting, i.e. Operation “Cast Lead” against Gaza on December 27, 2008. After that event, relations between the two sides were never the same as before.

Recently, however, statements of goodwill have been made by both countries to normalise political relations. In December 2020, President Erdoğan stated he wanted to improve relations with Israel and said: “It is not possible for us to accept Israel’s attitude towards the Palestinian territories. This is the point in which we differ from Israel – otherwise, our heart desires to improve our relations with it as well”.

In its relations with Israel, Turkey is posing the Palestinian issue as a condition. When we look at it from the opposite perspective, the Palestinian issue is a vital matter for Israel. It is therefore a severe obstacle to bilateral relations.

On the other hand, many regional issues such as Eastern Mediterranean, Syria and some security issues in the region require the cooperation of these two key countries. For this reason, it is clear that both sides wish at least to end the crisis, reduce rhetoric at leadership level and focus on cooperation and realpolitik areas.

In the coming months, efforts will certainly be made to strike a balance between these intentions and the conditions that make it necessary to restart bilateral relations with Israel on an equal footing. As improved relations with Israel will also positively influence Turkey’s relations with the United States.

Turkey seeks to avoid the USA and the EU imposing sanctions that could go so far as to increase anti-Western neo-Ottoman rhetoric, while improved relations with Israel could offer a positive outcome not only to avoid the aforementioned damage, but also to solve the Turkish issues related to Eastern Mediterranean, territorial waters, Libya and Syria. Turkey has no intention of backing down on such issues that it deems vital. Quite the reverse. It would like to convey positive messages at the level of talks and Summits.

Another important matter of friction between Turkey and Israel is the use of oil and gas in the Eastern Mediterranean reserves between Egypt, Israel, Greece and Cyprus (Nicosia).

This approach is excluding Turkey. The USA and the EU also strongly support the current situation (which we addressed in a previous article) for the additional reason that France has been included in the equation.

The alignment of forces and fronts in these maritime areas were also widely seen during the civil war in Libya, where Turkey, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, France, as well as other players such as Russia, Italy, etc. came into the picture.

Ultimately, a point of contact between Turkey and Israel is the mediation role that the former could play in relations between Iran and Israel, especially after the improvement of Turkish-Iranian relations.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the U.S. airstrike in Baghdad – which killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020 -the Turkish Foreign Minister stated that the U.S. action would increase insecurity and instability in the region. He also reported that Turkey was worried about rising tensions between the United States and Iran that could turn Iraq back into an area of conflict to the detriment of peace and stability in the region. There was also a condolence phone call from President Erdoğan to Iranian President Rouhani, urging him to avoid a conflictual escalation with the United States following the airstrike.

Consequently, it is in the Turkish President’s interest to maintain an open channel with Iran, so that he himself can soften the mutual tensions between Israel and Iran, and – in turn – Israeli diplomacy can influence President Biden’s choices, albeit less pro-Israel than Donald Trump’s.

Turkey is known to have many relationship problems with the United States – especially after the attempted coup of July 15-16, 2016 and including the aforementioned oil issue – and realises that only Israel can resolve the situation smoothly.

In fact, Israel-USA relations are not at their best as they were under President Trump. President Erdoğan seems to be unaware of this fact, but indeed the Turkish President knows that the only voice the White House can hear is Israel’s, and certainly not the voice of the Gulf monarchies, currently at odds with Turkey.

Israel keeps a low profile on the statements made by President Erdoğan with regard to the Palestinians- since it believes them to be consequential – as well as in relation to a series of clearly anti-Zionist attitudes of the Turkish people.

We are certain, however, that President Erdoğan’s declarations of openness and Israeli acquiescence will surely yield concrete results.

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