There has been considerable tension between the Kurdistan region and the Iraqi central government, after Kurdistan to hold a referendum on the independence of the region from the Center that caused resentment of Baghdad, which tried with neighboring countries to pressure Kurdistan to cancel the results of the referendum.
Recently, the head of the Kurdistan Region Intelligence Agency warned of major threat facing Kurdistan region and its achievements, following that Kurdistan Region Security Council announced in a tweet late on Wednesday (12 Oct 2017) that messages received indicating that Iraqi forces including the People’s Mobilization Forces (PMF) are preparing “major attacks” on Kurdistan. There have been signs of disagreement between the Governments of Baghdad and Erbil over the disputed areas and their administration since 2003. The question on everybody’s mind this time: Will Iraqi government use force to recapture disputed areas? What will be the upcoming scenarios to administer the disputed areas?
What Are The Disputed Areas?
In short, they are the cities, towns and strategic villages with the absolute Kurdish majority in Kirkuk, Mosul, and Diyala, that form the borders of the southern Kurdistan, which are located along Arab cities and towns. Most of the Iraqi regimes tried to Arabize them and change their reality and their historical and geographical identity by bringing hundreds of thousands of Arab families and their housing instead of the original inhabitants who were displaced and spread during the rule of the Baath, which lasted from 1963 until the fall in 2003. The central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan region has been struggling for years in these areas. The areas which are populated by a mix of nationalities and sects: Majority Kurds and minorities of Arabs, which both Central government and KRG claim administrative rights.
Constitutional Ways to Solve the Problems
Article (140), is a constitutional article binding in the articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (2005), which set the federal government a road map to settle the dispute over the disputed areas in Iraq and determine its fate. The Article 140 of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq defines the disputed areas of Iraq as those that were subjected to demographic change and Arabization policy by the former regime during its rule from 1968 until it’s in 2003. The article includes a mechanism to solve the problems, consisting of three stages: first, normalization, and the treatment of changes in the composition of the population in Kirkuk and disputed areas under the regime of Saddam and after, and the second census in those areas, the latest referendum to determine what the people want, before 31 December 2017. The Federal Government violated the Constitution, which slowed down and delayed the implementation of the contents of Article (140) of the Constitution and evaded its obligations and did not abide by the timetables of the stages of implementation contained in that article.
The failure to implement Article 140 of the Constitution, and some other federal problems such as do not to spend the share of the region from the federal budget and deprive the Peshmerga forces of their financial dues and problems related to the right to extract and export oil and the oil contracts are all unresolved issues that led to some kind of political break between the two governments.
The military developments that took place after the fall of some Iraqi cities with a Sunni majority by the militants of the Islamic State, and the withdrawal of the Iraqi army from disputed areas after the fall of the city of Mosul, Kurdish Peshmerga forces entered these areas and prevented the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) / Daesh to control them.
The New De Facto in Disputed Areas
Since the attacks of Islamic State to the northern Iraq, most of the disputed areas have controlled by the KRG, while others are under the control of Baghdad. The rise of ISIS caused a great loss for the Kurds but provided an opportunity for Peshmerga forces to restore the bulk of the Kurdistan controlled by the Iraqi authorities and some Iraqi Militias. Therefore, the Peshmerga forces will defend the areas that entered it as it did in the past in defense of Kirkuk and other areas. The federal government has not accepted the existence of the Peshmerga forces in those areas. This led to the KRG to deal with the new de facto disputed areas. During his recent visit to the area, Abadi asked for a gradual withdrawal from the territory liberated by the Peshmerga forces during the battles in Mosul. Predictably, the KRG did not accept this withdrawal and continues to remain militarily in each liberation zone.
On September 25, 2017, the referendum took place in Kurdistan region, as well as disputed areas with Baghdad, including Kirkuk in particular. The referendum caused a crisis between Baghdad and Erbil, after the KRG refused to retreat from the result of the referendum, and the Baghdad government maintained its position that rejects it, it was considered a Prime Minister Haider Abadi, the referendum is An unconstitutional exercise that jeopardizes the security and stability of the country, a procedure whose consequences have no real impact, but have serious negative implications for the region itself.
After the referendum, the federal government rushed to take action against the KRG. On September 26, 2017, the Iraqi prime minister asked the Kurdistan region to hand over its airports to the federal government within three days, with the closure of the airspace as of September 29, 2017. He called on the region to cancel all the result of the referendum on secession. Likewise, the Iraqi parliament issued a number of resolutions against the referendum, most notably the obligation of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Haider Abadi) to maintain the unity of Iraq by deploying troops in all areas controlled by KRG after 2003. The parliament also voted to re-control the oil fields in Kirkuk.
Obviously, the political parties in Shia National Alliance press on Abadi, to implement the decision of parliament to redeploy the army in the disputed areas as soon as possible. Abadi called on Iraqi military leaders to prepare a comprehensive report on the situation in the northern Iraqi axis before discussing the plan to redeploy the Iraqi federal forces in the disputed areas. The security leaders warned that the current situation is not appropriate to implement this decision, which may push a military clash with Peshmerga forces in those areas and the negative impact on the country.
Some scenarios results in of Kurdish referendum are predictable in the disputed areas, including:
The first option is the entry of the Iraqi army into Kirkuk and the disputed areas under to bring the Peshmerga forces back to the pre-Daesh area. This certainly led to a short tactical military clash between both sides. Currently, with the aim of launching an attack on the city of Kirkuk and the seizure of its oil fields, Iraqi army and militia gather in Taza Khurmatu and al-Bashir village south of Kirkuk. These forces have been preparing for attack the city and began to move around the city. The commander of Unit 70 of Peshmerga forces, Jaafar Sheikh Mustafa, on Friday said that the Iraqi army and PMF gave the Kurdish forces two hours to hand over Kirkuk. This is an internal conflict, certainly will concern the United States, but will not push Washington to intervene immediately. Thus, the US to prevent a full-scale eruption of clashes will put a pressure on Erbil and Baghdad to contain the conflict and make an agreement to administer the areas.
This brings us to the second scenario, which is a joint administration of disputed areas until the resolution of Article 140 of the Constitution through a referendum in which people choose to stay with Baghdad or go to Kurdistan. As a way to contain the conflict, Pafel Talabani – Son of Jalal Talabani has offered to dissolve the Kirkuk provincial council, remove its governor if needed, create a joint administration in the areas and enter talks with Baghdad within the framework of the Iraqi constitution.
The third option is less likely to be a full-scale military confrontation. If the Peshmerga refused to allow the Iraqi army to enter those areas and hand over the oil fields to Baghdad, the Iraqi government would have to implement the parliament’s decision to use force, which would lead to the entry of the militia into the crisis line. In this case, the international community will interfere to protect Kurdistan region and prevent of much deteriorating of the security situation in Iraq. From this point, the last scenario will be establishing a buffer zone. Indeed, this needs the UN Security Council (UNSC) approves of draft cease-fire proposal by one of its members to create a security zone and arrival of peacekeeping forces. Similar the buffers reflect the stalemate following Israeli invasions of Lebanon aimed at eliminating cross-border attacks by guerrillas. In this case, the UNSC should help Erbil and Baghdad to revisit Article 140, the transitional provision of the Iraqi Constitution that mandates the normalization, census, and referendum processes that must occur to determine the future status of each disputed territory. This will resolve whether the territories will become part of the KRG or will remain within the Baghdad’s system of governorates.
In sum, the military conflict in the disputed areas is highly expected than before. The United States certainly protect the Kurdistan region, but no guarantee has made in disputed areas. Several scenarios for the future of disputed areas are expected, including the establishment of a buffer zone in these areas between KRG and Baghdad.
What is the public sphere today in Turkey?
The concept of public sphere, which was started to be examined in Europe in the 1960s, has different meanings according to different perspectives, as a definite definition cannot be made today, and this situation creates important discussion topics about the use of such spaces.
Long debated the definition of public space in Europe, in Turkey also began to affect 1980”l year. After the 1980 coup, some communities, which were kept out of sight, fearing that the Republic project would be harmed, demanded the recognition of their ethnic and cultural identities. Thus the concept of the public sphere in Turkey, especially since the early 1990s to be addressed in various academic publications, use and began to discuss political issues.
Especially in the past years, the public sphere debates on the headscarf issue were discussed from various angles. The debate started with Prime Minister Erdogan’s criticism of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who did not invite his wife to a NATO dinner, saying “Dolmabahçe is not a public space”, and the President of the Council of Higher Education, Prof.Dr. Erdoğan Teziç; He responded by emphasizing that the public sphere is not a “ geographical definition ” but a functional concept.
Before defining the public sphere, the understanding that shows that the definition of space in the Ottoman Empire was shaped as less private, private, very private and very very private is still one of the biggest reasons for the definition of the public sphere. While expressing, it reminds that he entered the Ottoman literature in a different way in the 19th century. Thinkers who indicate the association of the public sphere with the state in general express it as the sphere that is related to the state, not the “public”. “When you say ‘public’, the state comes to mind immediately; We mean something like government administration, its organs, organizations, officials, or activities, an official domain that is owned or run under state control. However, as Habermas said, the public sphere is above all the sphere in which the public opinion is formed in our social life ”.
As citizens of the city, we observe that some projects have spread to the spaces defined as public space due to the fact that today’s public space and public space concepts have not been defined precisely and construction activities have increased due to the anxiety of rent.
Erdogan’s Calamitous Authoritarianism
Turkey’s President Erdogan is becoming ever more dangerous as he continues to ravage his own country and destabilize scores of states in the Middle East, the Balkans, and North Africa, while cozying up to the West’s foremost advisories. Sadly, there seems to be no appetite for most EU member states to challenge Erdogan and put him on notice that he can no longer pursue his authoritarianism at home and his adventurous meddling abroad with impunity.
To understand the severity of Erdogan’s actions and ambitions and their dire implications, it suffices to quote Ahmet Davutoglu, formerly one of Erdogan’s closest associates who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and subsequently Prime Minister. Following his forced resignation in May 2016 he stated “I will sustain my faithful relationship with our president until my last breath. No one has ever heard — and will ever hear — a single word against our president come from my mouth.”
Yet on October 12, Davutoglu declared “Erdogan left his friends who struggled and fought with him in exchange for the symbols of ancient Turkey, and he is trying to hold us back now…. You yourself [Erdogan] are the calamity. The biggest calamity that befell this people is the regime that turned the country into a disastrous family business.”
The stunning departure of Davutoglu from his earlier statement shows how desperate conditions have become, and echoed how far and how dangerously Erdogan has gone. Erdogan has inflicted a great calamity on his own people, and his blind ambition outside Turkey is destabilizing many countries while dangerously undermining Turkey’s and its Western allies’ national security and strategic interests.
A brief synopsis of Erdogan’s criminal domestic practices and his foreign misadventures tell the whole story.
Domestically, he incarcerated tens of thousands of innocent citizens on bogus charges, including hundreds of journalists. Meanwhile he is pressuring the courts to send people to prison for insulting him, as no one can even express their thoughts about this ruthlessness. Internationally, Erdogan ordered Turkish intelligence operatives to kill or smuggle back to the country Turkish citizens affiliated with the Gülen movement.
He regularly cracks down on Turkey’s Kurdish minority, preventing them from living a normal life in accordance with their culture, language, and traditions, even though they have been and continue to be loyal Turkish citizens. There is no solution to the conflict except political, as former Foreign Minister Ali Babacan adamantly stated on October 20: “… a solution [to the Kurdish issue] will be political and we will defend democracy persistently.”
Erdogan refuses to accept the law of the sea convention that gives countries, including Cyprus, the right to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for energy exploration, while threatening the use of force against Greece, another NATO member no less. He openly sent a research ship to the region for oil and gas deposits, which EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell called “extremely worrying.”
He invaded Syria with Trump’s blessing to prevent the Syrian Kurds from establishing autonomous rule, under the pretext of fighting the PKK and the YPG (the Syrian Kurdish militia that fought side-by-side the US, and whom Erdogan falsely accuses of being a terrorist group).
He is sending weapons to the Sunni in northern Lebanon while setting up a branch of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) in the country—a practice Erdogan has used often to gain a broader foothold in countries where it has an interest.
While the Turkish economy is in tatters, he is investing hundreds of millions of dollars in the Balkans, flooding countries with Turkish imams to spread his Islamic gospel and to ensure their place in his neo-Ottoman orbit. Criticizing Erdogan’s economic leadership, Babacan put it succinctly when he said this month that “It is not possible in Turkey for the economic or financial system to continue, or political legitimacy hold up.”
Erdogan is corrupt to the bone. He conveniently appointed his son-in-law as Finance Minister, which allows him to hoard tens of millions of dollars, as Davutoglu slyly pointed out: “The only accusation against me…is the transfer of land to an educational institution over which I have no personal rights and which I cannot leave to my daughter, my son, my son-in-law or my daughter-in-law.”
Erdogan is backing Azerbaijan in its dispute with Armenia (backed by Iran) over the breakaway territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is inhabited by ethnic Armenians and has been the subject of dispute for over 30 years.
He is exploiting Libya’s civil strife by providing the Government of National Accord (GNA) with drones and military equipment to help Tripoli gain the upper hand in its battle against Khalifa Haftar’s forces. Former Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis said in February 2020 that “The unclear Turkish foreign policy by Erdogan may put Turkey in grave danger due to this expansion towards Libya.”
He is meddling in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in an effort to prevent them from settling their dispute unless Israel meets Palestinian demands. He granted several Hamas officials Turkish citizenship to spite Israel, even though Hamas openly calls for Israel’s destruction.
He betrayed NATO by buying the Russian-made S-400 air defense system, which seriously compromises the alliance’s technology and intelligence.
He is destabilizing many countries, including Somalia, Qatar, Libya, and Syria, by dispatching military forces and hardware while violating the air space of other countries like Iraq, Cyprus, and Greece. Yakis said Turkey is engaging in a “highly daring bet where the risks of failure are enormous.”
Erdogan supports extremist Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and an assortment of jihadists, including ISIS, knowing full well that these groups are sworn enemies of the West—yet he uses them as a tool to promote his wicked Islamic agenda.
He regularly blackmails EU members, threatening to flood Europe with Syria refugees unless they support his foreign escapades such as his invasion of Syria, and provide him with billions in financial aid to cope with the Syrian refugees.
The question is how much more evidence does the EU need to act? A close look at Erdogan’s conduct clearly illuminates his ultimate ambition to restore much of the Ottoman Empire’s influence over the countries that were once under its control.
Erdogan is dangerous. He has cited Hitler as an example of an effective executive presidential system, and may seek to acquire nuclear weapons. It’s time for the EU to wake up and take Erdogan’s long-term agenda seriously, and take severe punitive measures to arrest his potentially calamitous behavior. Sadly, the EU has convinced itself that from a geostrategic perspective Turkey is critically important, which Erdogan is masterfully exploiting.
The EU must be prepared take a stand against Erdogan, with or without the US. Let’s hope, though, that Joe Biden will be the next president and together with the EU warn Erdogan that his days of authoritarianism and foreign adventurism are over.
The views expressed are those of the author.
Syrian Refugees Have Become A Tool Of Duplicitous Politics
Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria the issue of Syrian refugees and internally displace has been the subject of countless articles and reports with international humanitarian organizations and countries involved in the Syrian conflict shifting responsibility for the plight of migrants.
The most notorious example of human suffering put against political games is the Rukban refugee camp located in eastern Syria inside the 55-km zone around Al-Tanf base controlled by the U.S. and its proxies.
According to official information, more than 50,000 people, mostly women and children, currently live in the camp. This is a huge number comparable to the population of a small town. The Syrian government, aware of the plight of people in Rukban, has repeatedly urged Washington to open a humanitarian corridor so that everyone can safely return home. However, all such proposals were ignored by the American side. U.S. also refuse to provide the camp with first aid items. Neighbouring Jordan is inactive, too, despite Rukban being the largest of dozens other temporary detention centres in Syria, where people eke out a meager existence.
At the same time, the problem is not only refugee camps. Syria has been at war for a decade. The country’s economy has suffered greatly over this period, and many cities have been practically grazed to the ground. Moreover, the global coronavirus epidemic didn’t spare Syria and drained the already weakened economy even more. However, Damascus’ attempts of post-war reconstruction and economic recovery were undermined by multiple packages of severe sanctions imposed by the U.S. At the same time, U.S.-based human rights monitors and humanitarian organizations continue to weep over the Syrian citizens’ misery.
The situation is the same for those refugees who stay in camps abroad, especially in countries bordering on Syria, particularly Jordan and Turkey. Ankara has been using Syrian citizens as a leverage against the European states in pursuit of political benefits for a long time. No one pays attention to the lives of people who are used as a change coin in big politics. This is equally true for Rukban where refugees are held in inhuman conditions and not allowed to return to their homeland. In those rare exceptions that they are able to leave, refugees have to pay large sums of money that most of those living in camp are not able to come by.
It’s hard to predict how long the Syrian conflict will go on and when – or if – the American military will leave the Al-Tanf base. One thing can be said for sure: the kind of criminal inaction and disregard for humanitarian catastrophe witnessed in refugee camps is a humiliating failure of modern diplomacy and an unforgivable mistake for the international community. People shouldn’t be a tool in the games of politicians.
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