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The agreement between Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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In early October, King Salman of Saudi Arabia – with 1,500 members of his private entourage and 459 tons of luggage – landed at the Vnukovo airport for the first official visit of a Saudi king to the Kremlin. At military level, Saudi Arabia has already bought from Russia the S-400 Triumph anti-missile system (NATO reporting name: SA-12 Growler), already fully operational in China, which can intercept aircraft and missiles at a speed up to 4.8 kilometers per second (17,000 kilometers per hour) and has the ability of intercepting up to 36 targets at the same time.

 In addition, the Saudi purchase of the anti-tank missile Kornet and other advanced weapon systems is already in an advanced phase of negotiations between the two countries.This is a deal worth 3 billion US dollars, but the sale of weapons is a fundamental strategic priority for Russia.

 According to the 2016 data, the Russian Federation produces over one fifth of the weapons sold in the world while, also thanks to Russia, India and China have now almost reached technological and military self-sufficiency.

 Hence Russia is looking for other markets to sell its weapons, with the consequent and immediate strategic and economic influences and constraints.

 Currently everything works thanks to the unquestionable success achieved so far in Syria.

 Hence Russia is looking for new markets in the Middle East, an excellent area for selling weapons.

 At military level, however, the commercial relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia had already begun in 2012, when the latter had bought a C-300 missile system, with the tacit agreement that said supply would not be sent to Iran.

 The C-300 is one of the most powerful anti-missile systems currently available.

 In my opinion, Saudi Arabia is reemerging from the long phase of more or less explicit support to the jihad in the great arc of crisis stretching from Afghanistan to Syria.

 In Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia is moving away from the well-known support for the Taliban, backed with the largest amount of funds.

 On August 7 last, Mishari al-Harbi, the most prominent Saudi diplomat in Afghanistan, defined the Taliban as “armed terrorists,” while the Saudi Kingdom is seeking in all ways to block the private donations of its citizens to the Afghan “students”.

 There is a fully rational reason underlying this new policy line: Saudi Arabia can no longer see a political advantage in arming and supporting the Taliban, but above all it wants to put a spoke in the wheels of the mediation, organized by Qatar, between the Kabul government and the above-mentioned “students” trained in the Pakistani Qur’anic schools.

  At the beginning of jihad in Afghanistan, the United States and the other countries present there interpreted the Pakistani and Saudi support  as a way to contain the Iranian designs in the Western part of the country, but now King Salman is radically changing the Saudi foreign policy.

 Whatever happens, Afghanistan will have wide regional autonomy – hence the jihad to keep Iran and its regional allies out has no longer much reason to exist.

 From this viewpoint the radical change, which has long been experienced in the relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, is significant.

 The meaning of this unusual manoeuvre is obvious, namely to join  forces against Iran and its old and new proxies.

 Nevertheless, as recalled by one of the leaders of the Afghani Mujahidin, before 2013 Saudi Arabia had strongly supported Qatar’s efforts to “open up” to the Taliban. But now that the relations of the “Afghan students” with Turkey, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have weakened, Saudi Arabia is revising its preferential relations with the old supporters of the Afghan jihad (Turkey, the Arab Emirates and Egypt) and, above all, it is isolating Qatar, the only support left to the jihadist “students”.

 It is a fact that the Taliban still collaborate with Iran and Qatar.

Hezb’ollah was born as a movement of Islamic resistance, without any preconceived idea vis-à-vis the various traditional factions of Islam.

  However, can the support of these two countries replace the relationship with the Saudi private individuals and their Kingdom? Probably so.

 In all likelihood, the Saudi efforts to separate the United States from Qatar – hosting its CENTCOM – could push the United States directly into Saudi hands, while Qatar is putting pressures on the US forces for a quick transfer of their Command, which could possiblybe moved to the Al Dhafra base in Abu Dhabi.

 Reverting to King Salman’s State visit to Russia, he has understood that Russia – and no longer the United States – is now distributing cards in Syria and hence he acts accordingly.

 In all likelihood, the now old King Salman is also promoting the Russian support for his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is expected to inherit his throne.

 An agreement to increase the oil price, which is essential for both countries, has been still discussed, but nothing leaks out of the Kremlin, while Putin has argued for the need to further use the Saudi sovereign funds in the Russian economy.

 Out of the 10 billion US dollars promised by Saudi Arabia to Russia in 2015, only one has been provided so far.

 The King’s visit to Russia had been promised in a phone call with Putin as early as March 2015, but it had been postponed many times.

 Ironically, however, the USSR was the first to recognize the independence of the Kingdom created by King Abdulaziz.

 The official relations between Russia and the Kingdom of Hejzah and Nejid – the official name of the Al-Sauds’ Kingdom until 1936 – started as early as 1926.

 The strategic reason is obvious and is similar to the one which led Stalin to be the first to recognize the State of Israel, namely to be a thorn in the flesh in a region dominated by the British Empire, by favouring both the “quasi-friends” (Israel) and the “future enemies” (Saudi Arabia).

 In 1938, however, following the “elimination” – during the Stalinist purges – of the Russian envoy to Saudi Arabia, Karim Kharimov, who was a personal friend of the King, the relations between the two countries were broken off.

 Bilateral relations were resumed only in 1991.

   An “Indian Spring”, the distance between Russia and Saudi Arabia, an extraordinary stroke of luck for the US strategic and economic interests in the Middle East – a stroke of luck that today, with the meeting between Putin and King Salman, is virtually over.

 King Faisal, assassinated by his nephew Faisal bin Musaid in 1975, when he was Saudi Foreign Minister, visited Russia only in 1933, but it was a visit having scarce bilateral importance.

 It is worth recalling that, after discarding the other three previous candidates, last mid-July Russia had provided to Saudi Arabia its agreement on the appointment of Ahmed al Wahishi as Yemen’s Ambassador to Russia.

 Russia is interested in not making the conflict in Yemen turn into a war against Iran.

 While for Iran the primary strategic interest of the Houthi insurgency in Yemen is to create an expensive, unpredictable, lasting and dangerous engagement for Saudi Arabia.

  Well before the meeting between Putin and King Salman, an agreement had been signed between the two countries to further reduce the oil output, thus making the crude oil price increase.

 After a long struggle to become China’s first supplier – won by Russia  against Saudi Arabia in 2014 with the signature of a 30-year contract with China worth 400 billion US dollars only for natural gas – last year King Salman signed contracts to the tune of 13 billion dollars with Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam.

In October 2016, however, the Russian Federation purchased – through Rosnet – a 49% shareholding of Essar Oil, the first private Indian oil company having a 50% stake in Kenya Petroleum Refineries Ltd, which is fully owned by Essar.

  India is the primary market where, in the future, Russia and Saudi Arabia will clash for their oil and gas.

  Currently Saudi Arabia and Russia together produce a quarter of all the oil used in the world. Obviously, the agreement between the two countries to limit the extraction of crude oil is related to the new extraction of oil and gas in the United States, which is already a danger to all the old OPEC countries or the autonomous countries such as Russia (or Norway).

 Reducing the crude oil price means potentially driving the US shale oil and shale gas out of business – and this is the first strategic goal uniting the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia.

 The Russia-OPEC agreement on the reduction of crude oil price has finally been postponed until March 2018, but said agreement will be probably extended at least until the end of 2018.

 Saudi Arabia, however, still wants a closer relationship with the Trump’s US administration, which can provide technology to put an end to Saudi Arabia’s economic dependence on oil by the end of 2030, according to King Salman’s plans.

 This is key to the current relationship between Russia and Saudi Arabia: the latter agrees with the winner in Syria, namely Vladimir Putin, to reduce the crude oil price and put the United States in trouble. Nevertheless the latter remains the primary market for transforming the Saudi economy – by force, taking the fast track, as was the case with the Soviet “five-year plans”.

 Moreover, it is the same plan of the current Russian leadership that can achieve it only by signing effective agreements with all OPEC countries.

 The magnitude of Saudi investment in the United States is still extraordinary and unique: last May Saudi Aramco signed a 50 billion dollar contract with the US oil companies, while Minister Khalid al Falih has finalized a further 200 billion US dollar contract to produce in Saudi Arabia goods and equipment that were previously imported from the United States.

 King Salman’s plan, however, is to limit Saudi Arabia’s oil dependence and, in the meantime, to turn his country into an active trading platform for the Greater Middle East.

 Hence no more trouble spots in Saudi Arabia’s neighbouring countries.

 With the exception of Iran and its allies, at least for the time being.

 They are the only oil, political and religious competitors capable of attracting and pushing the many Shiite minorities throughout the Sunni Middle East to rebellion – including the Saudi largest oil extraction region.

 Another bilateral economic system, which was certainly not disrupted – at least for a short time – was that of military supplies between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

 While, according to 2016 data, Saudi Arabia currently absorbs 35 billion US products and services, it is worth noting that the Saudi  Kingdom is the fifth largest arms buyer in the world.

 In 2017 the Saudi military spending alone has accounted for 61 billion US dollars, namely 21% of the country’s current budget.

 As is well-known, the United States is currently the largest exporter of weapons in the world.

 Hence it is by no mere coincidence that the first meeting between King Salman and Putin has been held precisely for the purchase of a Russian weapon system that the United States has not at such an advanced level and that could block its missiles.

 Therefore Saudi Arabia fears the possible reactions of Middle East countries which have US-made missiles available.

 A goal that defines Saudi Arabia’s utmost strategic autonomy from the United States.

Not to mention a globally important project – certainly designed by the Saudi leaders to “make money”, namely Aramco’s new presence on the stock market.

 Next year Saudi Arabia is expected to start selling a 5% shareholding of Aramco on the market – the largest takeover bid in the stock market history.

 The competition between the New York and the London Stock Exchange to obtain this transaction is already fierce, but – at this juncture – nothing prevents the Russian Federation from acquiring oil companies of the Saudi network.

 Yet another level of contrast between the two old bilateral competitors, namely the old United States and the old Soviet Union, in the new guises prepared for celebrating globalization.

King Salman, however, does not want to put all his eggs in one basket.

 In fact, last May the Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, already visited Russia to discuss the Syrian and oil issues.

 As far as Syria is concerned, Saudi Arabia recognizes the de facto victory of the Russian-led coalition and accepts the possible construction of the South Pars gas pipeline from the sea between Qatar and Iran across the Syrian territory- probably in exchange for a financial compensation.

 In all likelihood, Jordan – a traditional ally of Saudi Arabia – will play a special role in the new gas pipeline.

 Later Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation signed a 3.5 billion US dollar military cooperation agreement, preceding the one previously mentioned, envisaging technology transfers that are extremely important for the new Saudi local industry.

 With specific reference to Syria, it is worth recalling that, only thanks to Saudi Arabia, Russia could have a platform for the negotiations – through Egypt – between the Russian forces and the Syrian opposition for Ghouta East and Rastan – an agreement that would have never been possible without the Saudi mediation.

 In short, King Salman does no longer want clashes around his country. He only wants a peaceful route for the new future trade that will characterize the Saudi non-oil-dependent economy.

 Moreover, the rapprochement between Russia and Saudi Arabia is viewed favourably by Israel, which – as many people say – is Russia’s “silent ally” in the Greater Middle East.

 It is worth recalling that Iran is using the clash in Yemen to push Saudi Arabia into a very long, expensive and unpredictable war.

 Russia has no reason to support Iran in the Houthi insurgency against the Yemeni Sunnis. Russia does not need many clashes around its immediate strategic interests in the Middle East oil fields.

 Not even in Syria, Russia and Iran shall have the same goals in the future.

 Iran wants an allied and dependent Syria, while Russia does not want only Westerners near its military ports in the Mediterranean exercising hegemony over  a traditionally friendly country like Syria.

 Neither does it want Syria and any other Middle East country to be too closely dependent each other, because this would deprive the Russian Federation of its autonomous line of communication with its Mediterranean ports.

 Not to mention the control of jihad – a contagion that could spread to Chechnya – and the creation of a rampart towards the Arabian peninsula.

 Another Russian essential goal in Syria.

 Obviously while Russia is particularly interested in a new relationship with Saudi Arabia from the oil, economic and strategic viewpoints, it has no reason to disregard Iran.

 The common interests between Russia and Iran are decisive and inevitable in Afghanistan, Iraq and also in Syria.

 Russia cannot certainly lose these strategic axes only to rush to embrace Saudi Arabia.

Hence the Russian Federation will maintain its ties with the Shiite Republic. It will accept some Saudi interests in the Middle East region, between Jordan and the Lebanon, but it will support Iran in the Central Asian system, which Russia cannot certainly neglect.

  Nevertheless it will not even disregard the new oil and military system,  established in the new agreements with Saudi Arabia, which could also be a stabilizer of Russian interests in the Middle East and an economic partner to be taken away from the United States.

  If all goes well, Russia could create a strategy based on two options between Saudi Arabia and Iran, without either of them being in a position to threaten – too closely – the Russian interests stretching from the Greater Middle East to Central Asia.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Is Israel Taking Advantage of a Longtime Strategic Partner for Russia?

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In February, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu met with his Russian counterpart, President Vladimir Putin. In what can only be described as a bravado attempt to flaunt the strength of the ties between the two countries, Netanyahu pointed out that, “tourism is at an all-time high, with 400,000 Russians visiting Israel every year and about 200,000 Israelis visiting Moscow every year,” adding that, “(he has) the honor to contribute somewhat to this statistic.” The first part of that statement is accurate; yet, the latter part is far from the truth. Russo-Israeli relations had been improving for decades before Netanyahu entered the Israeli political scene.

Primakov’s Mission: Laying the Foundations for Russo-Israeli Relations

The “founder” of improving Russo-Israeli relations, Yevgeny Primakov, made a point (almost a mission) of maintaining some type of relationship between the two countries. Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War all the way up to the latter years of Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership, Moscow officially considered Israel a “pariah state.” However, in the 1970s, during the “Brezhnev Years,” Primakov, a Jewish-born Soviet, was a key member of Soviet delegations that held several rounds of secret talks with the Israelis (usually in hotel rooms from Vienna to Tel Aviv) despite Moscow breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel.

Following Brezhnev’s death, Primakov continued his “mission” by maintaining correspondence with his Israeli counterparts while serving in various capacities within the Soviet establishment in order to preserve communications between the two countries. When Gorbachev began his perestroika and glasnost policy, relations between the Soviet Union and Israel slowly began to improve. Gorbachev’s policies allowed Soviet Jewish “refuseniks” to immigrate to Israel, which eventually led to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel in October of 1991—two months before the breakup of the Soviet Union. In December of that same year, Gorbachev announced the breakup of the Soviet Union but relations between the newly formed Russian Federation and Israel continued.

The 1990s were a tough decade for the newly formed Russia. The breakup of the Soviet Union saw the end of a social, cultural, economic, and political lineage that lasted for roughly seventy years dissolve overnight, thereby sending the citizens into dearth and poverty at unimaginable levels. As a result, Russia was a very weak state and did not have much leverage in the international arena. It did not help that the Yeltsin government implemented an American-backed “shock therapy” economic policy that de-modernized the country several decades and left the vast majority of the state in calamitous conditions.

Under the Yeltsin presidency, Russia was destabilized to a high degree (some would argue that it was worse than the years of the Great Depression in the 1930s), crushing their economy. Russians often term the “Yeltsin years” or the decade following the breakup of the Soviet Union as smutnoe vremya (time of troubles), or smutnoe for short, in reference to political crises caused by tumultuous transition periods. The term was most notably used following the demise of the Rurik dynasty, which eventually saw the establishment of the Romanov dynasty. It was also used, to a lesser extent, during the years of the Russian Revolution—the transition from the Russian Empire to Soviet Russia.

Similar to the “Brezhnev years” of stagnation in the 1970s, Israel proved to be a sanctuary for many Russian Jews during this chaotic period. Russian Jews (and other Jewish citizens from former Soviet satellite states) were no exception to this smutnoe of the 1990s, and as a result, Soviet and Russian Jews chose to immigrate to Israel in large numbers.

Despite the tough economic times in Russia, the Russian political elite, which included the then-Russian Foreign Minister (and eventual Prime Minister) Yevgeny Primakov, did its best to preserve its relations with Israel, while maintaining its longstanding foreign policy principle of a two-state solution regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This was consistent with its overall foreign policy of stability in the region. In the 1990s, Russia (similar to the Gorbachev era of the Soviet Union) maintained a balanced approach when it came to the Middle East, ensuring its national interests were preserved.

The Putin Era: Advancing Interactions, Strategic Engagement, and Navigating the Palestinian Question

Relations between Israel and Russia significantly improved under Russia’s current leader, Vladimir Putin. Throughout his nineteen years in office, since being elected in 2000, President (and Prime Minister) Putin has often received many Israeli Prime Ministers along with other Israeli officials. Putin and others have also visited Israel on many occasions. Both Israeli and Russian officials often cite the size of the Jewish community in Russia and the Russian diaspora in Israel as proof of warming relations. In fact, today the Russian Jewry often claim that the community has it better under the current leader than at any other point in Russian history. And, there is a reason for that. The extent of anti-Semitism in Russia is minimal in comparison to the past. This increased acceptance is reinforced by President Putin. The Kremlin often speaks kindly of the Jewish community in Russia, and Putin has even taken it a step further by stating that Israel and Russia have common histories – namely that the two despise fascism and Nazism of any kind. In addition, the Russian Jewry now has the freedom to practice its religion with no fear of retribution today and can travel to Israel freely—a right greatly curtailed in the Soviet Union.

Despite being political rivals, President Putin, like others, sought Primakov’s advice when it came to the Middle East. Being an Arabist and an expert on the Middle East, Primakov felt (and wrote extensively) that Russia’s main challenge in the 21st century was to fight international terrorism—something that the new President agreed with (and still agrees with to this day). The President has long sought better relations with the Zionist entity as a result of his belief that one of Russia’s main national interests in the region is reducing international terrorism. President Putin believes, for better or worse, that Israel can be a strategic partner in fighting international terrorism. However, President Putin and the entire policy class also believe in a two-state solution along the 1967 borders (in reference to the land Israel captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War) to allow for a future Palestinian state to exist alongside Israel. Furthermore, the Russian policy class believes that state sovereignty must be respected. On the former, Israel has made little to no effort and, on the latter, Israel has consistently overstepped its bounds with regards to state sovereignty, often pushing hard enough to destabilize the region.

A policy reversal by the Israelis on the Palestinian question – that is to disengage from the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as fully withdrawing from Gaza – seems highly unlikely. Moreover, it also seems unlikely that Israel will cease its illegal excursions in other countries, such as what it is doing in the Syrian arena. This begs some fundamental questions: is Israel’s belligerence putting its citizens in harm’s way and, more importantly, is it risking losing Russia as a national security partner, with its fifty years of unofficial relations and twenty-plus years of official relations? If this is the case, then Israel will be putting itself in a very dangerous conundrum.

The United States, Russia, & Israel: Is it a Triangle?

It is true that Israel, for decades, has relied on the United States for military aid and moral support in the international community in times of war. However, since the fallout of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the United States has been slowly (but surely) leaving the scene. American citizens do not want their country to be extensively engaged in the Middle East or elsewhere. They would rather the exorbitant amount of money spent on these commitments abroad be invested in improving lives of American citizens through domestic programs, like healthcare, education, and increased job security. The direct lineage between the elections of candidates Barack Obama and Donald Trump (not John McCain, Mitt Romney, or Hillary Clinton) proves this to be the case. We are seeing further evidence of this as politicians vie for control of the Democratic Party. Voices within the party are justifiably asking questions out loud that have been asked behind closed doors for years. Questions like: why is it that a foreign country receives so much financial support from the United States when many of its own citizens still struggle to survive? As a result, support for Israel in the American political scene is waning, despite the Israeli lobby’s claim. Today, only a certain portion of the Republican Party blindly supports Israel wholeheartedly. At some point, those voices will grow quieter and quieter or, at the very least, become less influential.

When America leaves the scene and becomes less influential on the international stage, Israel will be left alone. Yet, Israel can move eastward in pursuit of securing its national interests, creating a new alliance with Russia, a country that is more invested in the region today. This can be beneficial to Israel’s national security but, for that to happen, Israel will need to change its course on both the Palestinian question and its excursions in the region. The decision is a “no-brainer” given that the current course is creating an outcome where Israeli citizens are endangered from rockets as well as stabbings, shootings, and car-ramming attacks.

Russia, who seems to be invested in the region for the long haul, has been a willing partner thus far. Most recently this was evident when Russia –– in coordination with its military and the Syrians –– cooperated with Israel to help return the body of the fallen Israeli soldier, Zachary Baumel, who was killed in the 1982 “Lebanon War.” However, the Israeli establishment cannot take its Russian counterparts for granted forever. While the vast majority of the Russian policy class and President Putin still seem to want better relations with Israel and are willing to give it the benefit of the doubt, this is not guaranteed going forward. The policy class is not homogenous and some within it can override the Russian President when they deem Russia’s national interests are being jeopardized, as we saw when Russia finally decided to deliver its S300 surface-to-air missile systems to Syria. Thus, if Israel continues its confrontational activity in the region and prolongs its actions towards the Palestinians, Russia has cards at its disposal that will be unfavorable to Israel—leaving Israel isolated and weaker.

The ball is in Israel’s court. It must decide if it wants better relations with Russia or not. For the moment, the Russian policy class desires this; there is no doubt. However, at some point, Russian patience might run out. With the United States slowly leaving the scene, Israel would be wise to move closer to Russia. However, for that to happen, it needs to seriously consider changing its policy towards the Palestinians and cease its military excursions in the region. Israel should not test Russia’s resolve like it has done in the past, because the consequences for the Zionist entity could prove to be existentially dire.

First published in our partner RIAC

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Russian- Arab Cooperation Forum

Kester Kenn Klomegah

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On April 16, Moscow hosted the 5th Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum to review comprehensively its strategic goals and achievements, challenges and layout plans for the future. The Fifth Ministerial Session of the Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum, for the first time, attracted 14 ministers from the League of Arab States (LAS), and representatives from north Africa (Maghreb) and from the Arab world. It was also attended by the three foreign office representatives of the Council of the Arab League (Iraq, Sudan and Somalia), as well as Tunisia (as current Arab League Summit chair) and the Arab League Secretary General.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov agreed, in an opening remarks at a news conference, to continue joint work in the interest of a Libyan settlement, supported the UN Secretary-General Special Representative in Libya Ghassan Salame’s efforts to implement the road map he developed to normalise the situation in Libya.

“We have a common goal which is to help the Libyans overcome their current differences and reach a stable agreement on national reconciliation. To this end, Russia is working with all the political forces of Libya, without exception,” he said.

“We discussed various situations in the Middle East and North Africa, including Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Iraq. We supported the decisions adopted at the recent Arab League summit in Tunisia, the documents that capture the commitment to increase the role of the League in the region’s affairs. We strongly welcome such decisions,” the Minister added.

Lavrov further referred to the 12th session of the Russian-Arab Business Council and the 4th Arabia-Expo International Exhibition as significant events that enormously contributed to creating additional opportunities in the interest of promoting business cooperation between Russian and Arab organisations.

Earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin sent a message of greetings to the participants and guests of the 12th session of the Russian-Arab Business Council and the 4th Arabia-EXPO International Exhibition, held from April 8 to 10.

The message reads, in part:“Over the years of its work, the Russian-Arab Business Council has fully proved its relevance and effectiveness and contributed to promoting direct dialogue and practical interaction between the business communities of Russia and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa.

The council’s energetic efforts serve to expand and diversify trade, to increase mutual investment and implement promising joint projects in the manufacturing industry and agriculture, energy and high technologies, transport and infrastructure.

Large-scale Arabia-EXPO exhibitions are an essential area of the council’s activities. They introduce the latest economic, scientific and technological achievements of the Arab states to the Russian people and offer an opportunity for entrepreneurs to exchange business proposals and innovative ideas.

I hope the current session of the council will be substantive and will make it possible to outline new forms and mechanisms for equitable cooperation, as well as to strengthen friendship and mutual understanding between our nations.”

The Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum was officially launched in 2009 with the signing of a memorandum between the Russian Federation and the Arab League. Since then it has proved its importance as a mechanism of a regular exchange of opinion and coordination of positions on major regional and international issues. 

An in-depth exchange of views were held during the meeting on the situation in the Middle East and North Africa, particular attention was paid to coordinating practical steps to further enhance the whole range of relations between Russia and Arab countries, primarily trade and economic relations, investment, culture, education and people-to-people ties. At the end of the Forum, a joint declaration adopted as well as an action plan to implement the principles, objectives and tasks of Russian-Arab cooperation for 2019-2021.

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The Results of the Azerbaijan- Russia Industrial Cooperation Forum

Asim Suleymanov

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On April 4, the Azerbaijan-Russia Industrial Cooperation Forum was held in Baku with the participation of representatives of relevant government agencies and entrepreneurs. Speaking at the forum, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Economy Shahin Mustafayev noted that the political will and joint efforts of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia laid a solid foundation for expanding economic cooperation between two countries. The relations between Azerbaijan and Russia, which are developing in all areas, are at a strategic level.

Within the framework of the forum, three Russian companies – Rostselmash, Transmashholding and Service Invest – signed the cooperation agreements with Azerbaijani partners. State Duma Deputy Dmitry Savelyev, commenting on the results of the event, noted that Russia and Azerbaijan had obviously moved from the initial steps in building economic partnership to a normal working process.
The result is visible to the naked eye: last year’s trade turnover amounted to $ 2.5 billion, exceeding the figure for 2017 by 19%. It shows the great interest of companies in joint projects.

According to the parliamentarian the countries have long-term successful experience in opening joint ventures in the industrial sector, and not only in the oil and gas sector. Industrial cooperation is developing at full speed.
The real examples of mutual investment were the SOCAR Polymer project, the construction of a pharmaceutical enterprise in the Pirallahi industrial park, and the cooperation of the Ganja car plant with the Russian enterprises KamAZ and Ural. A service center that would make maintenance and repair of Mi helicopters in Azerbaijan is supposed to be opened.

Moreover, at this stage of cooperation we can talk about readiness for cooperation in the international arena. The Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia and the Russian Export Center (REC) are launching the Unified Export Support System. Regional hubs will be formed in 19 countries (including China, Turkey, Germany, Vietnam, Uzbekistan and Singapore).

Moreover, the creation of joint assembly plants considers promising point of economic growth. Such a joint project will expand the market for engineering represented by Middle East and Southeast Asia countries. An important role in this regard should be played by agreements at the level of state corporations.

“This year, President Ilham Aliyev signed a decree establishing the Azercelli company. This company will be engaged in the development of the non-oil sector, the production of defense and import-substituting industrial products. In cooperation with Rostec that is among the ten largest industrial corporations in the world in terms of revenues Azercelli can begin its expansion into the huge markets in Africa and the Middle East.”

The long-term friendly relations of two states, based on good-neighborliness and taking into account the national interests of a partner, the Russian parliamentarian considers the main trump card in the joint entry into international markets. “If there is a conflict of interests in some areas of activity, then in order to pass events like the Russian-Azerbaijani forum of industrial cooperation, where both parties can always sit at the negotiating table and find mutually acceptable solutions, as was done throughout the history of the relations.

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