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A right-wing party in the new German government

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The reasons to vote for right-wing AfD are the problems, not the AfD itself.

On one hand, the elections to the Bundestag on September 24 2017 in Germany were somewhat boring. The programmes of the parties in charge and designated parties, CDU and SPD, look similar. Too gibberish and far from facts were the appearances of Martin Schulz, designated candidate for chancellor of the social SPD.

Too “mum-like” and an encumbrance to people the statements of Angela Merkel. Most other parties were toothless. On the other hand, the “Alternative für Deutschland AfD” (Alternative for Germany) – a party at the far right – was able to attract the attention all the time. Politicians and even more the media picked up each deliberately or undeliberately failed statement from AfD, ripped it apart, attacked the sourcing politician of AfD and embarrassed them, issued opposing items and questioned the AfD in general. If foreign media were interested at all, they joined this round dance and supported the local media on giving the AfD a much larger platform and more airtime for distributing their programme, than it would have deserved taking its relevance in account.

Condemning, stereotyping and ignoring

The AfD was and will be denounced for its right-wing national and xenophobic statements. This image is created particularly by Alexander Gauland, and – after her withdrawal as leader and recent leaving of Frauke Petry – by Alice Weidel. In venturesome staggering walks along the cliff to criminal offenses, both agitators made the Media work for them.

The journalists appeared being the servants in the slightly random media tactics of AfD. The media boil the AfD down to the subjects Racism and Refugees and in immediate reflex cover merely these two topics. In parallel, the commentators and TV hosts tend to distort the subject under discussion with AfD, adding their own personal opinion on these subjects. It appears the bashing of AfD being some sort of substitutional to wipe off the guilt resting on the shoulders of the Germans after World War 2.

The throughout biased representation of the AfD in the media classifies the party in a fixed place and the politicians happily join in. In doing so, they ignore all those positions of the AfD that made the excellent 12.6% election result possible. The projections for AfD stated just 9.5%. However, a non-representative survey by the Counter Narco-Terror Alliance Germany unveiled just about 60% of the voters for AfD dared to confess openly in doing so. Therefore, our projections were between 11% and 15%.

Germany – a class society?

It seems worthwhile to approach the AfD in order to understand how this acceptance was accomplished – something the media neglected and they still neglect it. As soon as a hot topic was risen – such as the “left- behind” people – the media quickly execute surveys and cites studies, and based on this information they try to rectify the issue and to put the AfD’s position and statements into perspective. This happened and happens with lots of indignations and sound.

This is well known from Austria where the politicians and the media had chosen to apply this procedure against the right-wing national FPÖ and their former chairman Jörg Haider. The media and the politicians opened unhesitatingly the stage for them and tried to support the governing party by attacking the right-wing politicians. However, this proceeding didn’t serve the purpose – in contrast, the FPÖ, its politicians and their programme became well known among the voters.

Prior the elections to the Bundestag 2017 it was the liberal German-French thematic TV channel “arte” wanting to find the people in Germany left behind by the politicians and most media – if they exist at all. The verdict of the German-French media people as well as the numerous fates of people living in Germany are upsetting, just like the title of the broadcast: “Being poor in a rich country”. A similar perception of Germany was transmitted out of Switzerland. The Gini coefficient – it describes the wealth distribution in a country – issued by the Swiss bank Credit Suisse states unpretentious and mathematically a high wealth inequality in Germany. Many rich, a few very rich people and broad base of people with minimal to no wealth live in Germany. Similar to Argentina and Morocco – truly not a glorious chapter for a country with such a big self-conception in social and economic life. This, however, never was brought to the attention of the Germans and the parties packed it into set phrases such as “Time for more equity” („Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit“, SPD) without giving any idea how to materialise it.

The same applies to the poverty rate in Germany rising from an already high 14% (2006) to an even higher 15.7% (2016, source: Paritätischer Gesamtverband) – with a high number of unreported cases since particularly elderly people not applying for social welfare out of shame. This rating puts the highly praised country between two countries with a heavily struggling economy and therefore a comprehensible poverty rate: France and Spain. Associations bringing this issue out several times already were respected with minimal coverage.

“But the unemployment rate is at an all-time low for decades” politicians like to state. 5.5% truly is a low figure but looking behind the raw number might be sensible here as well. For instance, an increasing quantity of contracts are for temporary work, today close to one million of the 43 million employees have no permanent appointment. All of them not being able to plan ahead – e.g. to start a family – due to the uncertainty of their employment. Not to overlook the multitude of jobs with low salaries. In many cases, it includes job groups the citizens of Germany rely on, such as personnel in care, education, upbringing but also employees in middle- sized businesses and the industry. The grandparents had only one income and this was sufficient to feed the family, cover the cost for education and to build a house. Today, this is out of reach for a rising number of particularly young people, even with double-income. Quietly, a new class society has been established.

Export surplus and the workforce

In spring, Donald Trump approached Angela Merkel bluntly regarding the high export surplus of Germany. Infamous for his attacks, the Donald included some true word within his rumbling. The export surplus of Germany is respectable – and it hurts the United States as well as other countries and foremost Germany’s European partner countries. Angela Merkel often is perceived as the Chancellor or Economy, particularly for the automotive industry, and the whole economic engine Germany is running smoothly. But the close relation to the economy and the panic-fuelled “angst” of the loss of jobs seduces many politicians including Winfried Kretschmann of the Green Party to react extremely tolerant on the recent criminal activities of the industry. This proximity to the economy is perceived as distant to society by various organisations, some parties and the voters.

The export surplus of Germany is made possible by the low salaries in relation to the cost of living of the majority of the society. This circumstance was denounced by the left media and left parties for some time now, but with no sign of change. The low salaries of a large part of the society shows the first signs of an erroneous trend: Due to the minimal salaries, many citizen can no longer build up a decent retirement pension plan. Even today, many pensioners have to live on 400 Euros per month – this is for one of the richest countries such as Germany simply shameful. Poverty among the elderly will struck more than 20% of the people, with an increasing trend. Particularly women are affected if they are a single mother, divorced women or if they do not live with their married partner – they slip from low income into poverty among the elderly.

The Unions fight and deal ever single year with the industries and employers to improve the situations of the employees. Given the noble goals, the results are eminently pitiful. For instance, last year the kindergarten teachers went on strike to get a reasonable rise of their salaries to cover the real cost of living. Today and depending on their wage bracket, they get not even 100 Euros more per month, with employees in part-time – the majority – not even being able to notice the difference at the end of the month. The improvement in their situation of living and appreciation of their work has been missed by far. The Unions like their power and this has caused several fights among competing Unions. For the kindergarten teachers the Union obtained a homeopathic rise of the salaries hesitatingly touching or even leaving out the real problems of the employees. If the Unions pursue proper solutions, the Unions afterwards would be needed for few cases only, thus their comprehensive power would fall apart. Therefore, the Unions in their inactivity mutate towards servants to the employers, on the expense of the employees and the future generations. The Unions faced an alarmingly insight after the Bundestagswahl: According to the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (senior researches in the election) about 15% of the union members voted for the AfD – where they usually voted for SPD, and some for CDU. A verdict not being a surprise to political observers. The moaning of the IG Metall Union Head of Baden- Württemberg, Mr. Roman Zitzelsberger, unmasks much: „… it is frustrating to see the actual not so bad politics of the past years being punished so mercilessy” („… frustrierend zu sehen, dass die eigentlich nicht schlechte Politik der vergangenen vier Jahre so gnadenlos abgestraft wird“). How shortsighted such statements are still seem not to be within the scope of the guiding people, politicians and Unions. As a member of the AfD stated figuratively during the survey held by the Counter Narco-Terrorism Alliance: “They haven’t heard the shot yet”.

A society splitting itself

It’s a popular opinion xenophobia of the recent times in Germany being an invention by the AfD – but this is past the reality. With the Fall of the Wall and the reunion of the Germans, many East Germans faced the first time xenophobia. Despite the noble promises by the politicians and after the first euphoria, they were not welcome at all in many places. The history repeats itself today with the refugees coming from war zones. Angela Merkel stating „Wir schaffen das!” („We can make it!“) was good for the motivation and well said. But it is indisputably the government, the many voluntary workers and the society being massively overstrained by the rush of refugees. The terror attack on the Weihnachstmarkt in Berlin by Anis Amri was just the visible part of the failing of the government on many levels.

Even more dangerous are the nearly invisible tensions within the society not being related to refugees and terrorists – even if the real threat by refugees and terrorists are belittled by the government, the Verfassungschutz and the secret service in a negligent manner. It is the increasing trench in the society being the real danger. Noticeably those enjoying some wealth and/or occupying a hierarchical higher position fight with exertion for limiting those in lower positions. This has many causes and they neither are racist or xenophobic – but racism and xenophobia could become the symptoms of diverse causes in the medium term. Often, it is just the fear to loose status or coming close to poverty or even to slip into poverty. Furthermore, the German mentality – in contrast to many others – does not know “failure” or not “working”. The intensely believe in hierarchies, the strive to climb up and the circumvention of the ones in lower position/status in all areas of life are the objectives. The overestimation of the own values, the contemptuousness of other or foreign values and the low esteem towards others in general (not just towards certain jobs) doesn’t make it easy for the society to cope with the upcoming complex times. Such concepts will not work if digitization expands into all areas of our life, they will be knocked down.

This fight in defence for the own position and the own life in the German society is omnipresent, but not yet truly visible. The established parties face difficulties to sense these subjects and to adjust themselves to these pestering problems – in the contrary. Instead of fighting low salaries the call for a better rental price limitation and more social house building arose right before the Bundestagswahl. Such measures would be complex, though ineffective and would increase the split in the society and stigmatisation. This politics of symbolism conveys the message of helplessness; it brought the AfD many protesters votes. It also means many AfD voters are not right-wing by far. At the other hand, more than a few voters could be easily radicalized if their difficult personal situation and their social periphery continuously will be neglected. This latent instable condition of an increasing part of the society should force the elites in politics and economy to rethink and act accordingly. Terror doesn’t always come from the outside world, it of course can rise straight out of the middle of society. Moreover, this kind of terror is one of the toughest challenges for society and government. Germany faced it already once, about 40 years ago.

As of today, it is unclear what the AfD wants and can achieve for its voters when sitting in the opposition in the Bundestag. On one hand, the AfD must find itself after the leaving of some of its politicians. On the other hand, the government and the opposition have to consolidate first. Despite the indication the AfD moving to the right– based on the departure of some of its politicians –, the effect of “domestication” of the Bundestag should not be underestimated. Fuss and doing the right-wing rabble will not convince most of the moderate AfD voters. It is safe to say the previous flimsy consensus, waving through of resolutions and the numb debates will become more lively. The new government has the chance to discard the ignorance and lethargy of the past years and focus on the pestering issues lying ahead.

Co-Founder and Co-President of the Counter Narco-Terrorism Alliance Germany; consulting, research, communications specialist and entrepreneur; develops strategies and subsequent concepts for economy, communications and politics; information gathering; analyst, translator, writer and content developer; international experience in industry, technology, media tech, research and education institutes, governmental entities, politics, the UN and more

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Could the EU Make its ASEAN Breakthrough with the Emerging Indo-Pacific Strategy?

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The Indo-Pacific policy guidelines that was announced by the German Federal Foreign Office last week, is a clear signal from Berlin in becoming a shaper for the international order in the volatile region. Entitled “Germany-Europe-Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together”, the policy guidelines is the second of such document in the European Union (EU) after the Macron administration released its own Indo-Pacific strategy back in August 2019. But considering that Germany is the current president of the EU Council, this policy guidelines has been ever more significant. For one, Berlin has made clear its intention to lead Europe into this new Indo-Pacific charge as the ‘third power’ after the US-led coalition and China ⸺ an aim that is highlighted not just by this German government’s policy guidelines but also, incisively described by the French as the ‘mediating power’.

The release of such document, of course, reverberates different responses from political observers outside of Europe. For instance, Sebastian Strangio sees the German latest move as part of Europe’s reassessment of its approach to China and boldly predicts that other EU nations are to follow suit with their new stand on China. Prominent Filipino expert, Richard Javad Heydarian, meanwhile, is of the view that Germany’s pursuit as the shaper of international order is deliberately focused on the key regions which bear strategic importance to Europe overall. On the other hand, Xin Hua, adopts a pessimistic view on the ability of Europe to influence the Indo-Pacific region. With Berlin’s policy guidelines, the Chinese scholar sees Europe’s reliance on soft power (such as norms diffusion)to influence the Indo-Pacific region, in contrast to the US that projects its hard power in the region through military prowess in the region, will make it less than what it aimed as the shaper of international order.

Be it applause or skepticism, the observers are in the same view that Berlin’s latest move is a drastic shift from its previous ambiguous position on the Indo-Pacific region which has become the hotbed for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision pushed by the US and its military allies such as Japan and Australia. With this policy guidelines in place, it signals the seriousness of the German government in joining the Indo-Pacific region with the rest of the EU, as a third power that is independent from the US camp and China. What is left is the forming of a full European-level Indo-Pacific strategy and its implementation in the years ahead.

The ASEAN Context

In the ASEAN context, Germany’s move has created two questions that are worthy to ponder. First, how will this emerging Indo-Pacific strategy be different to Europe’s current cooperation policy toward ASEAN as a whole? This is the foremost question to ask among ASEAN member states as the German government’s Indo-Pacific policy  guidelines singled out the Southeast Asian bloc as the country’s focused cooperation partner in different areas of cooperation: climate change, marine pollution, rule of law and human rights, culture, education, science, trade and technology. That said, this is not the first time ASEAN appeared as the important partner for the EU.As a matter of fact, two-way cooperation has been ongoing since the establishment of dialogue relations in 1977.

As of 2020, two EU-ASEAN Action Plans have been agreed upon, implemented and in the middle of enforcement. Within the Action Plan (2018-2022) that runs through the year 2022, a myriad of cooperation areas has been outlined, spanning across political-security, economic and socio-cultural pillars. In particular, those areas of cooperation identified in Germany’s Indo-Pacific policy guidelines are within the trans-regional plan as well. What is new is that Berlin has set security policy as a special focus area for Indo-Pacific cooperation ⸺ a point that is emphasized by the German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas in his press release following the announcement of the country’s Indo-Pacific policy guidelines. In line with such niche orientation, Germany can readily lead the European initiative to assist ASEAN in the two sub-areas of non-traditional security that do not have substantial cooperation but chiefly important in the coming months and years: cybersecurity and public health security. These two sub-areas will be the best start for the EU’s Indo-Pacific push in the ASEAN region.

Second, how will the EU’s Indo-Pacific approach be different from its current dogmatic approach in its cooperation with ASEAN? By all means, it is no secret that dogmatic adherence to rules and norms remained to be the greatest obstacle for the EU’s full amelioration of ties with ASEAN in the past years. As of today, the EU’s ban of Indonesian and Malaysian imports as well as its unease on Filipino President Duterte and Burmese junta’s human rights records, are the contentious issues that prevented the European bloc to go past its finishing line in negotiating a full free trade pact with ASEAN. From such case alone, it is clear that the European bloc’s normative stance predicated upon Brussels’ strictly defined rules, norms and values on climate change and human rights issues, is in play when comes to international cooperation with ASEAN.

Having said that, Germany’s latest Indo-Pacific policy guidelines do not precisely highlight of its normative stance apart from maintaining the international rules-based order in the volatile region. But on the other hand, Germany’s aim for the EU to become the shaper of such order also sparks an open-ended question of whether its strict adherence to rules, norms and values (as in the present) will continue to be the defining feature of its cooperation with ASEAN. From the Indo-Pacific policy guidelines, this question is yet to be answered by the German government and perhaps, this dilemma is to betackled in the EU’s emerging Indo-Pacific strategy. Should a pragmatic approach is adopted by the EU ⸺ as has been recently demonstrated by the conclusion and enforcement of the EU-Vietnam Partnership and Cooperation Agreement despite human rights concern in the ASEAN member state ⸺ it will definitely clear the normative obstacle for the eventual conclusion of a free trade pact with the Southeast Asian bloc. More than that, it stands to facilitate greater cooperation in all areas of partnership between the two regions.

All in all, the EU’s emerging Indo-Pacific strategy should need to address these two questions that have surfaced fromthe former’s past and current experiences with ASEAN. While the German government’s Indo-Pacific policy guidelines have set new tone to Europe’s engagement with the volatile region, such document has yet to tackle these two difficult questions. Only by tacklingthese two questions will the EU be able to make its much-needed ASEAN breakthroughwith the emerging Indo-Pacific strategy.

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A Recipe For The War

prof. Zlatko Hadzidedic

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Authors: Zlatko Hadžidedić, Adnan Idrizbegović*

There is a widespreadview that Germany’s policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina has always been friendly. Also, that such a policy stimulated the European Union to adopt a positive approach to the Bosnian quest to eventually become a part of the Euro-Atlantic integrations. However, Stefan Schwarz, a renowned German politician, in his recent comment for Deutsche Welle, raised the question of the true nature of Germany’s policy towards Bosnia,from 1992 to the present day.Here we shall try to offer possible answers to this question, so as to present a brief history of that policy.

A history of (un)recognition

Germany officially recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state on April 6, 1992.Prior to that, such recognition had been grantedto two other former Yugoslav republics, Slovenia and Croatia,on January 15, 1992. Germany recognised these two states against the advice by Robert Badinter, a jurist delegated by the European Commision to arbitrate in the process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, to recognise all Yugoslav republics simultaneously. Under the pressure by Germany, 12 members of the European Community (United Kingdom, Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece, Austria) recognised Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992. As Washington Post wrote on January 16, 1992,

The German government hailed today’s event as a historic development and immediately opened embassies in the two republics. But France and Britain, which still harbor doubts about the wisdom of early recognition, said they would wait to see if Croatia fulfilled its promises on human rights before carrying out an exchange of ambassadors.

There is a well-known myth, spread by the diplomats of Britain and France, that ‘early recognition’ of Slovenia and Croatia triggered the war in the former Yugoslavia. Such a claim is both absurd and obscene, bearing in mind that Serbia had already waged war against Slovenia and Croatia and was preparing a military attack on Bosnia for several months. However, the question that should be posed here is, why Germany recognised Slovenia and Croatia separately, instead of recognition of all the Yugoslav republics simultaneously, as advised by Badinter and strongly supported by the US? Does that imply that Germany practically left the rest of the republics to their fate, to be occupied and annexed by Serbia, which controled the former Yugoslav army and its resources? Was it a deliberate policy, or simply a reckless decision? In the same article, WP quotes the then German Minister of Foreign Affairs: 

“The German policy on Yugoslavia has proved correct,” said German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. “We’ve said for months that if the Community decided on recognition . . . that would initiate a process of rethinking, above all by the leadership of the Yugoslav army.”

Mr. Genscher probably offered a definite answer to that question. Also, the actual response of the Yugoslav army’s leadership to the German push for separate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, counted in hundreds of thousands of dead and millions of ethnically cleansed in Croatia and Bosnia, testifies to the ‘correctness’ of such thinking. Yet, was it a momentary miscalculation by Genscher, the then Minister, or a long-term German foreign policy towards Bosnia, already projected to be the ultimate victim of the Yugoslav army’s agression?

An answer to this question is not very difficult to reach if we consider the German policy concerning the initiatives for ethnic partition of Bosnia, disseminated through the channels of the European Community. These proposals may have been initiated and instigated by the British Foreign Office and the French Quai d’Orsay; yet, partition along ethnic lines has always been the only European consensus about Bosnia, a consensus in which Germany participated with all its political will and weight.

Appeasement, from Munich to Lisbon

Prior to the 1992-1995 war, the European Community delegated the British and Portugese diplomats, Lord Carrington and Jose Cutileiro, to design a suitable scheme for ethnic partition of Bosnia, and in February 1992 they launched the so-called Lisbon Conference, with the aim of separating Bosnian ethno-religious communities and isolating them into distinct territories. This was the initiation of the process of ethnic partition, adopted in each subsequent plan to end the war in Bosnia. However, at the Lisbon Conference such a ‘solution’ was imposed by Carrington and Cutileiro as the only available when there was no war to end, indeed, no war in sight; and, curiously, it has remained the only concept the European Community, and then the European Union,has ever tried to apply to Bosnia.

Contrary to the foundations of political theory, sovereignty of the Bosnian state was thus divided, and its parts were transferred to the chiefs of three ethnic parties. The EC recognised these usurpers of the state sovereignty, having promoted them into legitimate representatives of their respective ethnic communities. The Carrington-Cutileiro maps were tailored to determine the territorial reach of each of these communities. What remained to be done afterwards was their actual physical separation, and that could only be performed by war, genocide and ethnic cleansing. For, ethnically homogenous territories, as envisaged by Carrington and Cutileiro, could only be created by a mass slaughter and mass expulsion of those who did not fit the prescribed model of ethnic homogeneity. In this way, the European Community created a recipe for the war in Bosnia.Yet, ever since the war broke out, the European diplomats have never ceased claiming that the ‘chaos’ was created by ‘the wild Balkan tribes’, who ‘had always slaughtered each other’. 

No one ever noticed German opposition to the Lisbon principles of ethnic separation and territorial partition, clearly leading to war and bloodshed. Is it, then, possible that German foreign policy was truly surprised by the Lisbon’s bloody outcome? Or the Lisbon Agreement was tailored in the best tradition of the Munich Agreement, as a consensus on another country’s partition between the three leading European powers – Great Britain, France, and Germany –  again,in the name of peace?

Landgrab rewarded

In the following ‘peace plans’ for Bosnia, the European Community was represented by Lord Owen, accompanied by the representatives of the Organization of United Nations, Cyrus Vance and Thorwald Stoltenberg. Although the British diplomacy was clearly dominant in these attempts to find a ‘proper’ model for Bosnia’s ethnic partition, Germany’s Foreign Ministry was always fully present there through its Director of Policy Planning Staff, Wolfgang Ischinger. In the structure of the German Ministry, this position is occuppied by the most senior career diplomat, so that there can beno doubt about Ischinger’s capacity to articulate Germany’s strategic interests. During the process of negotiations under the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans, Ischinger coordinated German policy towards Bosnia together with Michael Steiner, the head of„SoBos“ (Sonderstab Bosnien), a special Bosnian unit established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[i]

During the war in Bosnia, from 1992 to 1995, Germany and the European Community never abandoned the concept of Bosnia’s ethnic partition. In 1994,Germany took a more active role in its implementation within the (informal) International Contact Group, consisting of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the US, where Germany was represented by both Ischinger and Steiner. The Contact Group Plan defined the final model of ethnic separation, having led to the ultimate breakup of the Bosnian territory into two ethnically cleansed and homogenised ‘entities’, tailored in accordance with an arbitrary proportion of 51:49%, which was subsequently implemented in the Dayton Peace Accords. The entire struggle within the Contact Group was fought over the percentage and disposition of territory granted to particular ethnic communities, two of which served as Serbia’s and Croatia’s proxies. The principle of ethnic partition was never put in question. In this process, Germany became the exclusive advocate of Croatian interests, in Croatia’s attempts to cede the south-western part of Bosnia, whereas Britain and France advocated the interests of Serbia in its efforts to cede eastern and western parts of Bosnia. To some people’s surprise, the United States was the sole defender of Bosnia’s territorial integrity within the Contact Group. However, under the pressure by the European Community, the US was forced to make concessions, so as to eventually accept the prescribed 51:49% territorial distribution as an’internal reorganisation’ of Bosnia.

The US thus tacitly accepted the European initiatives to reward the landgrab of Bosnia’s territory, performed by Serbia and Croatia, against the UN Charter and international law. The European Community’s leading powers –Great Britain, France, and Germany – claimed that there was no other option but to accept such a landgrab, because the status quo, caused by the neighbours’ military aggression, could not possibly be altered. To strengthen this argument, the European Community also played the main role in imposing an arms embargo on the ‘warring parties’. This embargo effectively deprived the landlocked Bosnian army of the capacity to purchase weaponry and thus alter the status quo and liberate the country’s territory. Here the EC acted as a whole, again, without any dissent on Germany’s or anyone else’s part. 

Whose responsibility?

The Dayton Peace Accords is commonly perceived as an American political project. The partition of Bosnia is thus being interpreted as a concept that emerged for the first time during the Dayton negotiations, and its authorship is ascribed exclusively to the American negotiator, Richard Holbrooke. However, it is not so. The history of Bosnia’s partition clearly demonstrates that this very concept has persistently been promoted by the European Community, and then by the European Union, from the 1992 Lisbon Conference to the present day. Even the notorious partition proportion of 51:49% was determined by the Contact Group, well before the Dayton Conference. A clear responsibility of the US negotiators is that they caved in to the pressures by the EC within the Contact Group. Still, the consistent striving to impose ethnic partition as the sole appropriate concept for Bosnia should definitely be attributed to its real advocates – the members of the European Community. Since Italy and Yeltsin’s Russia certainly played a minor role in the Contact Group, the lion’s share of responsibility for the final outcome, verified in Dayton, belongs equally to three EC powers, Great Britain, France, and Germany. The fact that the British policy-makers conceived the very principle of ethnic partition, that their French colleagues were so enthusiastic about its implementation, while the Germans accepted it as the best available mode of appeasement, abolishes neither of them of gigantic moral and political responsibility for all the suffering the Bosnians have had to go through.

*Adnan Idrizbegović, Independent Researcher, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina


[i]As consequent advocates of the German foreign policy in the Bosnian episode, both Ischinger and Steiner have continuously enjoyed upward promotion within the ranks of the German foreign policy establishment. Thus Ischinger first took the position of the Ministry’s Political Director under Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, and then of the Staatssekretär (deputy foreign minister) under Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer.Ischinger also represented Germany at numerous international and European conferences, including the 1999 G8 and EU summit meetings in Cologne/Germany and the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at the United Nations, New York. He was also appointed as the European Union Representative in the Troika negotiations on the future of Kosovo in 2007. Since 2019, Ischinger has been co-chairing on the Transatlantic Task Force of the German Marshall Fund and the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung (BKHS) and, finally, has become the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference (!). During his mandate in the Contact Group, Steiner was awarded the position of head of the Ministry’s co-ordination unit for multilateral peace efforts. After the war, he served six months (January–July 1997) as a principal deputy to Carl Bildt, the first high representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1998, he was selected by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to work as the Chancellor’s foreign and security policy adviser.

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Why the West Needs a New Eurasian Strategy

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The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which was established in 2014, has earned a bad international reputation. In 2012, Hillary Clinton called Eurasian integration “a move to re-Sovietize the region,” although the Eurasian Economic Union had yet to emerge.Other Western high-ranking politicians have largely avoided the topic of Eurasian integration in their speeches, but they actually appear to have accepted Clinton’s vision. After the Ukraine crisis, Western policy towards Russia was simply extended to include Russian-led integration projects: the EAEU was denied recognition, whereas EU-EAEU economic cooperation was and is out of the question. Is this policy worth it?

Strictly speaking, when it comes to elaborating a Eurasian strategy, non-EAEU countries have a limited range of policy options to choose from. First, they could actively resist Eurasian integration through supporting alternative integration projects and inciting conflicts among EAEU nations. Second, they may passively counteract integration processes by means of neglecting the realities ensuing from the EAEU’s existence. Third, they could recognize the EAEU’s right to exist and establish comprehensive relations with the Union. Finally, they may use Eurasian integration to advance their own interests.

The active and passive resistance strategies are based on several assumptions. The first one is that Eurasian integration boosts Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space. In fact, this logic does not always work, since institutional limitations associated with Eurasian integration may have an opposite effect. The Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission, which is one of the key EAEU bodies, is composed of 10 commissioners representing 5 member states, and the Board’s decisions are made by a qualified majority. Other governing bodies of the Union make their decisions by consensus. This means that Eurasian integration can serve as a check on Russia’s economic policies: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan can collectively block any official decision of the Union. Moreover, there is no indication that the EAEU ensures Russia’s effective leadership in the post-Soviet space: the Eurasian Economic Union lacks a positive agenda for the future, which actually makes Moscow’s role fairly contextual. Therefore, the perception of the EAEU as subordinated to Russia and its interests appears to be misleading: incredible as it seems, Western countries could effectively use EAEU institutions to promote their agenda instead of counteracting Eurasian integration as such.

To put it bluntly, any new international institution can be described as an empty vessel that needs to be filled with a particular content. Eurasian integration is a very young project, and its future identity is contingent upon many internal and external factors. Instead of serving as an instrument of Russian expansionism, the EAEU may well be transformed into a mechanism of Russia’s modernization and Westernization. Few people would argue today that ASEAN is hostile to Western countries, although the Association was initially conceived to keep South-East Asia away from both Soviet and American influence and involvement. So is there any reason to portray the EAEU as hostile to America and Europe? As of 2020, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, which are EAEU members, maintain cordial relations with the West. These are the very countries that could serve as conduits for reshaping the EAEU according to Western interests and ideals by blocking unfavorable decisions and pushing a more pro-Western agenda, and they do have institutional capabilities to do so.

The second assumption underlying the resistance strategy is that Eurasian integration is a very weak project driven by the momentary interests of the Russian Federation. Hence, it is inferred that there is no point in maintaining the dialogue with the EAEU because the whole integration project is doomed to failure in the long term. This perception is emblematic of a very limited understanding of post-Soviet politics in Western countries: in reality, it is highly likely that the EAEU will outlast the political regimes that currently govern EAEU countries, as Eurasian integration is conducive to quite a few forces and interest groups present in the region. Migrant workers are only one of such groups: Russia has been the key destination for Central Asian migrants for decades, and this is a fact that exists independently of political developments. Elaborating some kind of a modus vivendi with the EAEU is worthwhile, as Eurasian integration is more complex that it is thought to be.

The Integration Dilemma

The third assumption of those opposing Eurasian integration is that the EAEU is a potential competitor for European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. This argument has a solid basis, since the intensification of Eurasian integration processes in the 2010s can rightly be characterized as Russia’s response to NATO enlargement and to the EU’s Eastern Partnership project. Samuel Charap and Mikhail Troitskiy refer to this competition between Europe and Eurasia using the term “integration dilemma.” They argue that “[b]y promoting engagement with the states of post-Soviet Eurasia largely through integration initiatives that are de facto closed to one another, the West and Russia have (often unintentionally) forced these states to make zero-sum choices.” The “integration dilemma” can strike at almost any post-Soviet country: Belarus, Moldova, and Armenia can fall victim to this dilemma, just as Ukraine did in 2014.

However, following the logic of the “integration dilemma” is a flawed strategy. What we have seen in practice is that a country’s accession to the EAEU has little impact on its relations with external actors. For instance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) freely operates in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, although these countries are frequently described as belonging to Russia’s sphere of influence. The Open Societies Foundations operate in Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, although George Soros, its founder and chair, has a bad image in Eastern Europe. This once again proves my point that influencing and shaping the EAEU is more effective than counteracting it.

Since the integration dilemma is still there, let me assume that the resistance strategy is a perfect fit. If so, counteracting Eurasian integration requires creating and nurturing alternative identities, which would be strong enough to defy the Eurasian core. This resembles the all too familiar strategy of isolating Russia through detaching it from other post-Soviet states, which was one of the roots of the ongoing crisis in Russia’s relations with the West. Although Russian state media contends that the West has been adept at nurturing anti-Russian sentiments in the post-Soviet space, it can be said that the resistance strategy has been less successful and effective than is often supposed.

First, while surveys show that strong pro-Western sentiments exist in Ukraine or Armenia, the situation is quite different in Central Asian countries, where Russia continues to enjoy unquestionable moral authority. Second, European integration is a more difficult path than Eurasian integration when it comes to institutional, political, and economic prerequisites, which means that popular support for European integration might erode over time if there is no or little noticeable progress in the integration process. Finally, detaching Russia from its neighbors is quite costly, since it requires this very progress, which presupposes conducting comprehensive political and economic reforms in post-Soviet countries and stimulating these reforms through financial aid.

All this means that the strategy of resisting Eurasian integration is unlikely to achieve its objectives at an affordable cost, whereas the policy of wisely influencing it seems to be more fruitful and less bellicose. Then why not adopt this policy for the good of America, Europe, and Eurasia?

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