Europe
The EU`s Foreign Policy in Development: Player or Payer?

Before analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of European Union (EU) foreign policy in development, it is imperative to understand the conceptual link of EU’s foreign policy with development, and various evolutionary stages of EU’s foreign policy in development.
Since EU’s foreign policy has been associated with the developmental policy, it is, therefore, important to assess the impact of developmental policies internally and externally. Because both the levels provide it with the legitimacy to make decisions and contribute to global cooperation policies.
Broadly speaking, the development policy or stress on development came to prominence after the end of the Cold war. The early 1990s were the time, which not only saw the transition of the geopolitics from bipolarity to unipolarity, rather it was the time that exposed the vacuum in the development sector or the helplessness of global leaders to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and Kosovo. In other words, the power vacuum and absence of a proper mechanism to avert crisis brought the attention of European leaders to formulate a policy on development in form of Millennium Declaration of 2000. In simple words, the critical analysis of EU’s foreign policy would involve the understanding of the developmental policy as well. Therefore, understanding the merits and demerits of development policy would directly inform understanding of foreign policy as well.
Evolutionary Stages of EU’s Foreign Policy in Development
An in-depth study of the European Union’s developments can be divided into following sub-stages for the conceptual clarity. In Carbone’s viewpoint, the time period between the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 and the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris in 2005 can be marked as the major years in terms of the redefinition of the development goals by the leaders of European Commission. The formulation of Brussels consensus can be defined as the essence of European policy on development. It was bolstered by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005) and the European Consensus on Development (EPCC, 2006).[1] Although the formulation of Brussels consensus did provide a European perspective on development, however, the coordination of the sub-facets continues to pose a challenge to EU. Therefore, addressing the obstructions in the way of success or achieving the desired developmental goals remains a matter of concern for scholars and policy analysts.
The European Union as a Player
In order to know whether European Union (EU) has been a player or payer when it comes to its foreign policy in development, it is pertinent to go through the merits and demerits of the development policy to provide an objective analysis.
For advocates, European Union (EU) is not merely a union of twenty-eight nations, rather it one of the significant donors of developing countries and a major trading partner. Its development assistance budget amounts to over 6 billion Euro annually, including 1 billion Euro for emergency and humanitarian aid[2]. Most of the development funding goes to Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of states. The funding is usually provided by the member states. The relevance and impact made it a prominent actor, which is not only limited to Europe, but it plays a paramount role in global politics. The sheer size and success of EU impart it with resources and tools that facilitate the conduct of a stronger foreign policy.
According to the advocates of those who view the merits of EU’s development policy or consider EU as a foreign policy player, the unquestionable commitment of EU members to democracy, peace, rule of law and respect for human rights clearly reflect the resolve to promote and uphold the global norms and principles for all the global actors. Similarly, the overlooked role of women in building economies of the developing world has also been one of the areas of focus for the developmental leaders. To cite an example, global poverty has been halved five years ahead of the 2015 time frame; ninety percent of children in developing regions now enjoy primary education.[3] Despite the viewpoint of critics, The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) associated with health have shown or resulted in positive success. For instance, the mortality rate for children under five years of age in 2012 was almost half that in 1990. Similarly, maternal mortality rate has decreased by 45 % between 1990 and 2013. The target on Malaria can also be fully met with a decline in malaria mortality rates of 42 % between 2010 and 2012. [4]
The European Union as a Payer
The critics or those who perceive the European Union as a payer of developmental policy mostly focuses on the demerits of the developmental policy. It is, therefore, important to take an overview of the arguments or critique. In Carbone’s viewpoint, the European Commission’s effort to “produce a statement on EU development policy (Brussels consensus) was to counter the Washington consensus“. [5] European Union (EU) as a humanitarian actor is another significant pillar of EU’s development policy, this function comes under the emblem of ECHO (the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office). It was created in 1991; the legal status was given in 1996 in form of an approval by European Commission.[6] The idea was to safeguard it from political influences by ensuring objectivity and unbiased approach. However, the recent extension of the role played by EU foreign minister in ECHO could raise questions regarding the autonomy and credibility of ECHO.
The scholars and analysts of Africa and other areas of the world in need of development are critical of the conditions associated with developmental projects. In this context, the mechanisms of providing aid or grants via bureaucratic means are considered as an obstacle or ineffective, as it becomes the cause of the delay. Moreover, the proliferation of non-state actors and terrorist organizations, particularly after the Paris attack has given rise to a debate on the prospects of the European project. In simple words, the new wave of fear is the precursor for deepening tensions along the lines of nationalism versus globalization. Furthermore, the management of refugee or migrant influx towards Europe is another obstacle that will continue to be a matter of concern for leaders. Interestingly, the migrant issue is directly intertwined with the humanitarian assistance and the nationalist tendencies of European states to safeguard territorial boundaries. For instance, United Kingdom is another case study that illustrates one of the challenges for the EU internally.
In addition, the repercussion of Euro-zone crisis is something that continues to be a matter of concern for some of the European actors. It represents the proliferation and demerits of an interconnected world in terms of multiplying the implications and impact of the crisis on not only the European but the other interconnected economies. In this context, the mismanagement of the crisis represents questions about the crisis management mechanisms, particularly for the twenty-eight member states.[7] According to the Reflection Group on the Future of the European Union report, aging populations, hostility to immigration, relatively low levels of investment in research and development, and a foreign policy that is feeble and non-coherent continue to increase the likelihood of the European Union becoming an irrelevant actor. In other words, the chosen response is deemed insufficient, particularly, with respect to the economic crisis.[8] The very factor is seen as the variable which could accentuate the divisions of European states.
Analysis and Conclusion
To sum up, the capacity of EU to achieve MDG goals for development is questioned by some of the critics. For them, it has the potential to be used for objectives or goals other than the development. The very argument is often cited by the analysts of developing countries as well. For Carbone, the achievement of European Commission in the sector of poverty reduction, particularity, the Sub-Saharan and south-East Asia is questionable. In his view, the aid to the middle-income states has been increased at the cost of funding to underdeveloped states.[9] For others, EU development aid to countries like Turkey and India is another point of objection. It means that the development and policies of EU should be more synchronized or coherent. Another argument of critics focuses on the association of development with the trade. The aid for India, for instance, is seen as a mean for EU to achieve the economic opportunities. However, it can also be deemed as a case of horizontal coherence, which links development with the trade to enhance relations between EU as an actor and India.
After carefully surveying the arguments of those who view EU as a payer (critics) in pursuit of a developmental and foreign policy, it would be implausible to completely undermine the merits of EU’s achievement as the global player in the developmental sector. That being said, one cannot neglect the critique of European Union’s (EU) role as a developmental actor, because it provides analysts and scholars with areas of improvement for the developmental policy. Keeping in view the fluidity of global environment in terms of increasing space for new kinds of actors and diffusion of power, it is pertinent to highlight the role of actors in attaining global progress and the influence of actors on EU and its relations with states in form of cooperation. Therefore, it would be plausible to suggest that the merits of EU as a development player is important to consider or acknowledge, however, the significance of demerits or the critic’s viewpoint needs to be explored further to understand the root causes of demerits and areas of improvements for the future of EU’s developmental policy.
[1]Veit Bachmann, “The EU as a geopolitical and development actor: views from East Africa,” Online Journal of Political Geography and Geopolitics, January 2013, xx, https://espacepolitique.revues.org/2561?lang=en.
[2] Laz`r Com`nescu, “THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A GLOBAL PLAYER: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 2, no. 2 (2002): xx, beta.ier.ro/…/RJEA_Vol2_No2_The_European_Union_as_a_Global_Pla…
[3]European Commission, The EU’s Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, (Brussels: European Commission, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/102618.
[4] European Commission, Annual Report 2014 on the European Union’s Development and External Assistance Policies and Their Implementation in 2013 – European Commission, (Brussels: European Commission, 2014), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/publications/annual-reports/2014_en.htm_en.
[5] Carbone , Maurizio, The European Union and International Development The Politics of Foreign Aid, (London: Routledge, 2007), http://www.dawsonera.com/depp/reader/protected/external/AbstractView/S9780203944684
[6]Shaping policy for development, “The EU as a Humanitarian Actor | Event | Overseas Development Institute (ODI),” Home | Overseas Development Institute (ODI), last modified October 8, 2003, http://www.odi.org/events/26-eu-as-humanitarian-actor.
[7] European Commission, The European Union in a changing global environment, (Brussels: European Commission, 2014), http://eeas.europa.eu/docs/…/eu-strategic-review_strategic_review_en.pdf.
[8]Zornitsa S. Yerburgh, “The European Union: Still a Global Player?,” Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, last modified October 15, 2010, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0050.html.
[9] Ravi Sodha, “Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article “Benefits and Uses of EU Development Aid”,” Home – Atlantic Community, last modified March 1, 2012, http://www.atlantic-community.org/index.php/Open_Think_Tank_Article/Benefits_and_Uses_of_EU_Development_Aid.
Europe
EU’s Energy and Politic Approach to Indonesia: Between Hate and Love

Authors: Akhmad Hanan and Mayora Bunga Swastika
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Europe has been forced to seek alternative energy sources other than Russian gas. Previously, Russia supplied around 40% of Europe’s gas needs through pipelines owned by Russia’s Gazprom. However, Russia decided to cut their gas supply to Europe as a counter action of US and its ally economic sanction. As a result, Europe has left no choice but to buy expensive LNG, optimize renewable energy sources, and tap other coal-producing countries.
Winter came, and it tormented Europeans even more. The energy scarcity due to the absence of Russian gas put many European countries into crisis. They had to pay higher for alternative energy sources as a domino effect of the Russia-Ukraine war. They also decided to utilize coal, contradicting their robust commitment towards energy transition goals and the Paris Agreement. Europe’s decision to turn back on coal has also altered the global energy transition’s geopolitical landscape. Europe is seen as a region supporting accelerated energy transitions and encouraging countries outside the region to follow suit. However, currently, Europe is taking steps contrary to efforts to accelerate the energy transition.
At the same time, Indonesia got their windfall profit through the European situation due to the rising coal price in the market. Europe has been one of Indonesia coal exporters, and following the disruption in Europe’s energy supply, Indonesia attempted to capitalize on the situation by increasing export quotas to Europe. This strategy was taken since Indonesia is one of the world’s largest coal producing countries.
Indonesia’s Ministry of Trade reports coal exports to Europe reached 6.6 million tons in December 2022. Previously, Indonesia only exported less than 1 million tons per year to the same region at the same time. The main reason was some European countries such as Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Greece, Poland, the Netherlands, and Germany increased their demand for Indonesian coal significantly.
Additionally, Indonesia became the top global coal exporter in 2022, with a total of 469 million tons, 9% higher than the previous year. Indonesia used to export coal to developing countries, mainly in Asia. As a result, Indonesia’s state revenue exceeded the targets by almost three times higher than expected. The Indonesia’s ministry of finance calculated the realization of state revenue reached 7.8 million USD, 2.8 million USD higher, and it was highly contributed from the coal trading.
Relations between Indonesia and Europe regarding energy commodities are indeed often tug-of-war. Hitherto, the European Union’s relationship with Indonesia was strained due to Indonesia’s decision on palm oil and nickel commodities. Indonesia’s decision to utilize palm as a biofuel source was feared to increase land use change in tropical forests and reduce its capacity to be a natural based solution in climate change mitigation.
Indonesia’s decision to ban nickel export was also being challenged by the European Union at the WTO in November 2019. The EU claimed this decision was unfairly harming its stainless steel industry. However, Indonesia insisted this decision was made for national development. From Indonesia’s point of view, Indonesia’s decision is one of the efforts to protect its national interests to fulfill domestic supply. Indonesia’s downstream plans will be threatened if Indonesia lifts the nickel export ban as desired by the EU. The Indonesian government has a target to build a nickel smelter in Indonesia. However, Indonesia lost the EU lawsuit regarding the nickel export ban.
Indonesia-Europe relations and Indonesia’s defeat in the nickel export ban lawsuit show that the issue of international relations is still closely interdependent. A country cannot only pay attention to its domestic interests but also pay attention to common interests. In this case, Indonesia and EU benefit from each other when conducting economic cooperation, especially export-import. This can be seen from the benefits when coal exports to the EU increase. Of course, the benefits of this cooperation will not be obtained if the two countries do not cooperate.
Apart from Indonesia’s interest in securing domestic supply, Indonesia should be able to take opportunities to cooperate with other countries, including the EU, in the energy sector. Cooperation between countries that cannot be avoided in the era of globalization should be the foundation for Indonesia in making and carrying out foreign policy. Indonesia must find a win-win solution in its relations with other countries because doing protection in this era is not a solution.
Europe
Europe’s relations with Africa and Asia are on the brink of collapse, and Russia is benefiting

More than one year since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the world remains caught in the middle. Against a backdrop of high energy and food prices, ravaging inflation, social unrest and fears of another global recession, Western and Russian blocs are once again vying for support from nations of the developing world.
Emmanuel Macron, Olaf Scholz, Sergei Lavrov, Qin Gang, and Anthony Blinken are just some of the names that have made high-profile visits to Africa in the last 12 months. All have largely focused on cooperation and trade, yet each has done so with a discourse reflecting a kind of Cold War reboot, with Ukraine as one of its most prominent symptoms.
Each in their own way, armed with their respective propaganda, these superpowers wish for nations of Africa and Asia to pick a side. Yet, unlike the previous century, those nations cannot so easily be made to choose, nor should they have to. Russia understands this. The West does not.
It’s no secret that Africa has been reluctant to overtly condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, or to participate in Western efforts to sanction and isolate the warring country. Instead, African and Asian nations have continued to welcome these longstanding partners with open arms – widely condemning the war, but not Russia.
In Malawi, for instance, Russia’s deliveries of tens of thousands of tonnes of fertiliser amidst global shortages are seen as a gift from heaven by struggling farmers. Malawi’s minister of agriculture shook hands with the Russian ambassador, describing Russia gratefully as “a true friend”. Russia’s announced plans to send 260,000 tonnes of fertiliser to countries across Africa, is certain to spread similar sentiments.
In my country Congo-Brazzaville, the government signed five major cooperation agreements with Russia in the midst of its war with Ukraine, including for the construction of a new oil pipeline and to enhance military cooperation.
This charm offensive, prominently led by Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, who has visited South Africa, Eswatini, Angola, Eritrea, Mali, Sudan and Mauritania just since January, is already nourishing pro-Russian sentiment throughout the continent, and stands in sharp contrast to the damp squib that was President Emmanuel Macron’s recent African adventure.
In his press conference with Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) President, Felix Tshisekedi, in what was perhaps the most deaf-tone faux pas of his entire trip, President Macron was repeatedly asked to condemn Rwanda’s support for M23 rebels causing havoc in eastern DRC – a situation that closely resembles Russia’s covert support for Donbass separatists in recent years. For all intents and purposes, he failed to do so.
Instead, when a French journalist quizzed him on former Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian’s disparaging mention of an “African-style compromise” in relation to President Tshisekedi election in 2019, Macron proceeded to lecture the Congolese President on freedom of the press – much to the disbelief of those witnessing the scene.
Despite President Macron’s effusive rhetoric about ‘new relationships’ and ‘new starts’, his outburst was yet another bitter reminder of Europe’s longstanding paternalistic and dissonant attitude towards the continent. This is the same attitude whereby decades of European political and military influence on the continent have failed to generate meaningful progress when they did not actively undermine those efforts. Africans are wise to this and refuse to take it anymore, as evidenced by the growth in anti-French sentiment in West Africa. Russia, China and others, though far from being without reproach, are merely seizing the presented opportunities.
Just as the share of EU aid going to Africa has declined significantly, similar problems are afoot with Europe’s relations in Asia. Its share of Southeast Asian merchandise trade, excluding China, fell by over a third over the last two decades. Western Europe was the destination for less than a tenth of Malaysian, Singaporean, South Korean and Taiwanese exports in 2021. Russia is again moving fast to fill the gap, adopting China as its main trading partner, and consistently exporting oil and gas to eager Asian buyers, rather than to the West. When Russia suspended its double taxation treaties with “unfriendly” countries around the world in mid-March, most Southeast Asian countries were exempted from this measure.
Moreover, Russia has over the last decade become the largest arms supplier to the region, recently running joint naval exercises with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia have all rejected imposing sanctions on Moscow, whilst Malaysia signed a memorandum of understanding with Russia to improve agricultural trade earlier this year.
One cannot fault these nations for engaging in partnerships and cooperation with international partners, in the interest of addressing their most urgent societal priorities. Nor can one fault African and Asian countries for taking with a pinch of salt a discourse on international values and change, when this supposed change stems not from recognition of current flaws, but from the impositions of emergent global trends.
What lessons can be given about territorial integrity and justice, when the events of 2011 in Libya, as well as their enduring consequences, remain traumatically fresh in African minds, or when the posture of African countries relative to the war in Ukraine is almost identical to that of Europe relative to the conflict in the eastern provinces of the DRC?
What lessons should be drawn from European courts proceeding to the seizure of Malaysian assets and properties worth $15 billion – including lucrative oil and gas assets – based on a questionable arbitration authorised by a Spanish arbitrator facing criminal prosecution from the Spanish authorities? And who will really benefit, given that this claim on sovereign territories, derived from a mid-nineteenth agreement between a long-vanished Sultanate and a colonial-era British company, is funded by unknown third-party investors?
The willingness of European courts to confiscate the resources and assets of a sovereign Asian nation on such flimsy grounds is not lost on observers in Africa and across the developing world.
Whatever the answer to these questions may be, it is evident that relations between the old and new worlds will continue to strain as long as underlying assumptions and beliefs do not evolve. Specifically, change is needed in those attitudes that continue to consider developing nations as oblivious to the many contradictions of rhetoric and practice that characterise the world as we know it – whether in terms of: a system of aid and trade that nourishes the imbalances and ills it purports to address; a discourse on international law and values that crumbles in the face of past transgressions and current drives for reforms; or even negotiations on climate finance in which urgency stops when economic interests begin.
The Western world can only reverse this trajectory by seeking out a genuinely new footing in its relations with the countries of Africa and Asia – challenging its own assumptions and understandings about what a respectful partnership between equally legitimate nations truly means. This is not about paying lip-service to ideals struggling to remain convincing, nor is it about entirely conceding these ideals on the altar of economic pragmatism.
Rather this means accepting a due share of responsibility for the current state of affairs, understanding expectations for the future, being willing to make real concessions, and aligning discourse with dollars and deeds. In doing so, the Western world will reassure those of us that continue to believe in the promises of the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that these were not merely pretences to maintain hegemony in the face of existential threats, but rather an enduring vision for a better world that remains worth fighting for today.
Europe
A Muscular U.S. Foreign Policy and Changing Alliances

Imagine a country rich in fossil fuels and another nearby that is Europe’s premier industrial power in dire need of those resources — is that a match made in heaven?
Not according to Joe Biden who quashed it as if it was a match made in hell. Biden was so much against any such rapprochement that to end all prospects of a deal, he ordered the bombing of the Nord Stream pipelines. Two out of four lines were severely damaged, about 50 meters of them and Russia chose not to conduct repairs. Instead,it is pumping its gas up through Turkey.
So far, Russia has not responded to this act of war but a leader can not afford to lose face domestically or internationally, and one may not be surprised if an American facility or ship suffers an adverse event in the future.
In the meantime, Russia has become fast friends with China — the latter having its own bone to pick with Biden. China, a growing industrial giant, has almost insatiable energy needs and Russia stands ready to supply them. An informal deal has been agreed upon with a formal signing ceremony on March 20, 2023.
So who won this fracas? Russia gets to export its gas anyway and China, already generating the world’s highest GDP on a purchasing-power-parity basis, has guaranteed itself an energy source.
Of course there is Ukraine where Biden (like the US in Vietnam) is ready to fight to the last Ukrainian. Despite a valiant resistance, they are not winning, for Russia continues to solidify its hold on Ukraine’s east, most recently by taking Soledar and capturing parts of the transport hub Bakhmut itself.
And then there is Saudi Arabia: hitherto a staunch U.S. ally, it is now extending a hand of friendship to Iran, which its previous king used to call the snake in the Middle East. But Saudi Arabia is keenly aware of the vassal-like manner in which the U.S. has treated Germany, its ally with the largest economy in Europe, over its desire to buy cheap gas from Russia. The deal was nixed and observers estimate it cost Germany a couple of points of GDP growth. Such a loss in the U.S. would translate to almost zero growth.
India used to be a neutral country between the great powers. In fact, its first leader after independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a leading figure in the non-aligned movement. It is now being tugged towards the US.
The latest tug is ICET or the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies. Its purpose is to find ways to engage through “innovation bridges” over the key areas of focus. This coordination between the two countries is to cover industry, academia and government.
On the other hand, India’s arch rival Pakistan used to be in the US orbit for decades. Now it is virtually a Chinese client state even though for a time, particularly during the Afghan war, it was a source of much help for the US.
Such are the vagaries of alignments in a multi-polar world, particularly when under pressure from major powers.
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