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The EU`s Foreign Policy in Development: Player or Payer?

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Before analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of European Union (EU) foreign policy in development, it is imperative to understand the conceptual link of EU’s foreign policy with development, and various evolutionary stages of EU’s foreign policy in development.

Since EU’s foreign policy has been associated with the developmental policy, it is, therefore, important to assess the impact of developmental policies internally and externally. Because both the levels provide it with the legitimacy to make decisions and contribute to global cooperation policies.

Broadly speaking, the development policy or stress on development came to prominence after the end of the Cold war. The early 1990s were the time, which not only saw the transition of the geopolitics from bipolarity to unipolarity, rather it was the time that exposed the vacuum in the development sector or the helplessness of global leaders to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and Kosovo. In other words, the power vacuum and absence of a proper mechanism to avert crisis brought the attention of European leaders to formulate a policy on development in form of Millennium Declaration of 2000. In simple words, the critical analysis of EU’s foreign policy would involve the understanding of the developmental policy as well. Therefore, understanding the merits and demerits of development policy would directly inform understanding of foreign policy as well.

Evolutionary Stages of EU’s Foreign Policy in Development

An in-depth study of the European Union’s developments can be divided into following sub-stages for the conceptual clarity. In Carbone’s viewpoint, the time period between the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 and the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris in 2005 can be marked as the major years in terms of the redefinition of the development goals by the leaders of European Commission. The formulation of Brussels consensus can be defined as the essence of European policy on development. It was bolstered by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005) and the European Consensus on Development (EPCC, 2006).[1]  Although the formulation of Brussels consensus did provide a European perspective on development, however, the coordination of the sub-facets continues to pose a challenge to EU. Therefore, addressing the obstructions in the way of success or achieving the desired developmental goals remains a matter of concern for scholars and policy analysts.

The European Union as a Player

In order to know whether European Union (EU) has been a player or payer when it comes to its foreign policy in development, it is pertinent to go through the merits and demerits of the development policy to provide an objective analysis.

For advocates, European Union (EU) is not merely a union of twenty-eight nations, rather it one of the significant donors of developing countries and a major trading partner. Its development assistance budget amounts to over 6 billion Euro annually, including 1 billion Euro for emergency and humanitarian aid[2].  Most of the development funding goes to Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of states. The funding is usually provided by the member states. The relevance and impact made it a prominent actor, which is not only limited to Europe, but it plays a paramount role in global politics. The sheer size and success of EU impart it with resources and tools that facilitate the conduct of a stronger foreign policy.

According to the advocates of those who view the merits of EU’s development policy or consider EU as a foreign policy player, the unquestionable commitment of EU members to democracy, peace, rule of law and respect for human rights clearly reflect the resolve to promote and uphold the global norms and principles for all the global actors. Similarly, the overlooked role of women in building economies of the developing world has also been one of the areas of focus for the developmental leaders. To cite an example, global poverty has been halved five years ahead of the 2015 time frame; ninety percent of children in developing regions now enjoy primary education.[3]  Despite the viewpoint of critics, The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) associated with health have shown or resulted in positive success. For instance, the mortality rate for children under five years of age in 2012 was almost half that in 1990. Similarly, maternal mortality rate has decreased by 45 % between 1990 and 2013. The target on Malaria can also be fully met with a decline in malaria mortality rates of 42 % between 2010 and 2012. [4]

The European Union as a Payer

The critics or those who perceive the European Union as a payer of developmental policy mostly focuses on the demerits of the developmental policy. It is, therefore, important to take an overview of the arguments or critique. In Carbone’s viewpoint, the European Commission’s effort to “produce a statement on EU development policy (Brussels consensus) was to counter the Washington consensus“. [5] European Union (EU) as a humanitarian actor is another significant pillar of EU’s development policy, this function comes under the emblem of ECHO (the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office). It was created in 1991; the legal status was given in 1996 in form of an approval by European Commission.[6]  The idea was to safeguard it from political influences by ensuring objectivity and unbiased approach. However, the recent extension of the role played by EU foreign minister in ECHO could raise questions regarding the autonomy and credibility of ECHO.

The scholars and analysts of Africa and other areas of the world in need of development are critical of the conditions associated with developmental projects. In this context, the mechanisms of providing aid or grants via bureaucratic means are considered as an obstacle or ineffective, as it becomes the cause of the delay. Moreover, the proliferation of non-state actors and terrorist organizations, particularly after the Paris attack has given rise to a debate on the prospects of the European project. In simple words, the new wave of fear is the precursor for deepening tensions along the lines of nationalism versus globalization. Furthermore, the management of refugee or migrant influx towards Europe is another obstacle that will continue to be a matter of concern for leaders. Interestingly, the migrant issue is directly intertwined with the humanitarian assistance and the nationalist tendencies of European states to safeguard territorial boundaries. For instance, United Kingdom is another case study that illustrates one of the challenges for the EU internally.

In addition, the repercussion of Euro-zone crisis is something that continues to be a matter of concern for some of the European actors. It represents the proliferation and demerits of an interconnected world in terms of multiplying the implications and impact of the crisis on not only the European but the other interconnected economies. In this context, the mismanagement of the crisis represents questions about the crisis management mechanisms, particularly for the twenty-eight member states.[7]  According to the Reflection Group on the Future of the European Union report, aging populations, hostility to immigration, relatively low levels of investment in research and development, and a foreign policy that is feeble and non-coherent continue to increase the likelihood of the European Union becoming an irrelevant actor. In other words, the chosen response is deemed insufficient, particularly, with respect to the economic crisis.[8]  The very factor is seen as the variable which could accentuate the divisions of European states.

Analysis and Conclusion

To sum up, the capacity of EU to achieve MDG goals for development is questioned by some of the critics. For them, it has the potential to be used for objectives or goals other than the development. The very argument is often cited by the analysts of developing countries as well. For Carbone, the achievement of European Commission in the sector of poverty reduction, particularity, the Sub-Saharan and south-East Asia is questionable. In his view, the aid to the middle-income states has been increased at the cost of funding to underdeveloped states.[9]  For others, EU development aid to countries like Turkey and India is another point of objection. It means that the development and policies of EU should be more synchronized or coherent. Another argument of critics focuses on the association of development with the trade. The aid for India, for instance, is seen as a mean for EU to achieve the economic opportunities. However, it can also be deemed as a case of horizontal coherence, which links development with the trade to enhance relations between EU as an actor and India.

After carefully surveying the arguments of those who view EU as a payer (critics) in pursuit of a developmental and foreign policy, it would be implausible to completely undermine the merits of EU’s achievement as the global player in the developmental sector. That being said, one cannot neglect the critique of European Union’s (EU) role as a developmental actor, because it provides analysts and scholars with areas of improvement for the developmental policy. Keeping in view the fluidity of global environment in terms of increasing space for new kinds of actors and diffusion of power, it is pertinent to highlight the role of actors in attaining global progress and the influence of actors on EU and its relations with states in form of cooperation. Therefore, it would be plausible to suggest that the merits of EU as a development player is important to consider or acknowledge, however, the significance of demerits or the critic’s viewpoint needs to be explored further to understand the root causes of demerits and areas of improvements for the future of EU’s developmental policy.

[1]Veit Bachmann, “The EU as a geopolitical and development actor: views from East Africa,” Online Journal of Political Geography and Geopolitics, January 2013, xx, https://espacepolitique.revues.org/2561?lang=en.

[2]  Laz`r Com`nescu, “THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A GLOBAL PLAYER: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 2, no. 2 (2002): xx, beta.ier.ro/…/RJEA_Vol2_No2_The_European_Union_as_a_Global_Pla…

[3]European Commission, The EU’s Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, (Brussels: European Commission, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/102618.

[4] European Commission, Annual Report 2014 on the European Union’s Development and External Assistance Policies and Their Implementation in 2013 – European Commission, (Brussels: European Commission, 2014), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/publications/annual-reports/2014_en.htm_en.

[5] Carbone , Maurizio, The European Union and International Development The Politics of Foreign Aid, (London: Routledge, 2007), http://www.dawsonera.com/depp/reader/protected/external/AbstractView/S9780203944684

[6]Shaping policy for development, “The EU as a Humanitarian Actor | Event | Overseas Development Institute (ODI),” Home | Overseas Development Institute (ODI), last modified October 8, 2003, http://www.odi.org/events/26-eu-as-humanitarian-actor.

[7] European Commission, The European Union in a changing global environment, (Brussels: European Commission, 2014), http://eeas.europa.eu/docs/…/eu-strategic-review_strategic_review_en.pdf.

[8]Zornitsa S. Yerburgh, “The European Union: Still a Global Player?,” Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, last modified October 15, 2010, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0050.html.

[9] Ravi Sodha, “Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article “Benefits and Uses of EU Development Aid”,” Home – Atlantic Community, last modified March 1, 2012, http://www.atlantic-community.org/index.php/Open_Think_Tank_Article/Benefits_and_Uses_of_EU_Development_Aid.

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The Leaders of the Western World Meet

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The annual meeting of the G7 comprising the largest western economies plus Japan is being hosted this year by the United Kingdom.  Boris Johnson, the UK Prime Minister has also invited Australia, South Korea, South Africa and India.  There has been talk of including Russia again but Britain threatened a veto.  Russia, which had been a member from 1997, was suspended in 2014 following the Crimea annexation.  

Cornwall in the extreme southwest of England has a rugged beauty enjoyed by tourists, and is a contrast to the green undulating softness of its neighbor Devon.  St. Ives is on Cornwall’s sheltered northern coast and it is the venue for the G7 meeting (August 11-13) this year.  It offers beautiful beaches and ice-cold seas.

France, Germany. Italy, UK, US, Japan and Canada.  What do the rich talk about?  Items on the agenda this year including pandemics (fear thereof) and in particular zoonotic diseases where infection spreads from non-human animals to humans.  Johnson has proposed a network of research labs to deal with the problem.  As a worldwide network it will include the design of a global early-warning system and will also establish protocols to deal with future health emergencies.

The important topic of climate change is of particular interest to Boris Johnson because Britain is hosting COP26  in Glasgow later this year in November.  Coal, one of the worst pollutants, has to be phased out and poorer countries will need help to step up and tackle not just the use of cheap coal but climate change and pollution in general.  The G7 countries’ GDP taken together comprises about half of total world output, and climate change has the potential of becoming an existential problem for all on earth.  And help from them to poorer countries is essential for these to be able to increase climate action efforts.

The G7 members are also concerned about large multinationals taking advantage of differing tax laws in the member countries.  Thus the proposal for a uniform 15 percent minimum tax.  There is some dispute as to whether the rate is too low.

America is back according to Joe Biden signalling a shift away from Donald Trump’s unilateralism.  But America is also not the sole driver of the world economy:  China is a real competitor and the European Union in toto is larger.  In a multilateral world, Trump charging ahead on his own made the US risible.  He also got nowhere as the world’s powers one by one distanced themselves.

Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen is also endorsing close coordination in economic policies plus continued support as the world struggles to recover after the corona epidemic.  India for example, has over 27 million confirmed cases, the largest number in Asia.  A dying first wave shattered hopes when a second much larger one hit — its devastation worsened by a shortage of hospital beds, oxygen cylinders and other medicines in the severely hit regions.  On April 30, 2021, India became the first country to report over 400,000 new cases in a single 24 hour period.

It is an interdependent world where atavistic self-interest is no longer a solution to its problems.

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Revisiting the Bosnian War

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Genocide is not an alien concept to the world nowadays. However, while the reality (and the culprit) is not hard to profile today, history is ridden with massacres that were draped and concealed from the world beyond. Genocides that rivaled the great warfares and were so gruesome that the ring of brutality still pulsates in the historical narrative of humanity. We journey back to one such genocide that was named the most brutish mass slaughter after World War II. We revisit the Bosnian War (1992-95) which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 100,000 innocent Bosnian citizens and displaced millions. The savage nature of the war was such that the war crimes committed constituted a whole new definition to how we describe genocide.

The historical backdrop helps us gauge the complex relations and motivations which resulted in such chaotic warfare to follow suit. Post World War II, the then People’s Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the then Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina became one of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia in 1946 along with other Balkan states including Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. As communism pervaded all over Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina began losing its religion-cultural identity. Since Bosnia-Herzegovina mainly comprised of a Muslim population, later known as the Bosniaks, the spread of socialism resulted in the abolition of many Muslim institutions and traditions. And while the transition to the reformed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963 did ease the ethnic pressure, the underlying radical ideology and sentiments never fully subsided.

The Bosniaks started to emerge as the majority demographic of Bosnia and by 1971, the Bosniaks constituted as the single largest component of the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina population. However, the trend of emigration picked up later in the decades; the Serbs and the Croats adding up to their tally throughout most of the 70s and mid-80s. The Bosnian population was characterized as a tripartite society, that is, comprised of three core ethnicities: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. Till  1991, the ethnic majority of the Bosniaks was heavily diluted down to just 44% while the Serbian emigrants concentrated the Serbian influence; making up 31% of the total Bosnian population.

While on one side of the coin, Bosnia-Herzegovina was being flooded with Serbs inching a way to gain dominance, the Yugoslavian economy was consistently perishing on the other side. While the signs of instability were apparent in the early 80s, the decade was not enough for the economy to revive. In the late 80s, therefore, political dissatisfaction started to take over and multiple nationalist parties began setting camps. The sentiments diffused throughout the expanse of Yugoslavia and nationalists sensed an imminent partition. Bosnia-Herzegovina, like Croatia, followed through with an election in 1990 which resulted in an expected tripartite poll roughly similar to the demographic of Bosnia. The representatives resorted to form a coalition government comprising of Bosniak-Serb-Craot regime sharing turns at the premiership. While the ethnic majority Bosniaks enjoyed the first go at the office, the tensions soon erupted around Bosnia-Herzegovina as Serbs turned increasingly hostile.

The lava erupted in 1991 as the coalition government of Bosnia withered and the Serbian Democratic Party established its separate assembly in Bosnia known as ‘Serbian National Assembly’.  The move was in line with a growing sentiment of independence that was paving the dismantling of Yugoslavia. The Serbian Democratic Party long envisioned a dominant Serbian state in the Balkans and was not ready to participate in a rotational government when fighting was erupting in the neighboring states. When Croatia started witnessing violence and the rise of rebels in 1992, the separatist vision of the Serbs was further nourished as the Serbian Democratic Party, under the leadership of Serb Leader Radovan Karadžić, established an autonomous government in the Serb Majority areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The vision and the actions remained docile until the ring of independence was echoed throughout the region. When the European Commission (EC), now known as the European Union (EU), and the United States recognized the independence of both Croatia and Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina found itself in a precarious position. While a safe bet would have been to undergo talks and diplomatic routes to engage the Serbian Democratic Party, the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović failed to realize the early warnings of an uprising. Instead of forging negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosniak President resorted to mirror Croatia by organizing a referendum of independence bolstered by both the EC and the US. Even as the referendum was blocked in the Serb autonomous regions of Bosnia, Izetbegović chose to pass through and announced the results. As soon as the Bosnian Independence from Yugoslavia was announced and recognized, fighting erupted throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Bosnian Serbs feared that their long-envisioned plan of establishing the ‘Great Serbia’ in the Balkans was interred which resulted in chaos overtaking most of Bosnia. The blame of the decision, however, was placed largely on the Bosniak president and, by extension, the entire ethnic majority of the Bosniaks. The Bosnian Serbs started to launch attacks in the east of Bosnia; majorly targeting the Bosniak-dominated towns like Foča, Višegrad, and Zvornik. Soon the Bosnian Serb forces were joined by the local paramilitary rebels as well as the Yugoslavian army as the attacks ravaged the towns with large Bosniak populations; swathing the land in the process. The towns were pillaged and pressed into control whilst the local Bosniaks and their Croat counterparts were either displaced, incarcerated, or massacred.

While the frail Bosnian government managed to join hands with the Croatian forces across the border, the resulting offense was not nearly enough as the combination of Serb forces, rebel groups, and the Yugoslavian army took control of almost two-thirds of the Bosnian territory. The Karadžić regime refused to hand over the captured land in the rounds of negotiations. And while the war stagnated, the Bosniak locals left behind in small pockets of war-ravaged areas faced the brunt in the name of revenge and ethnic cleansing.

As Bosniaks and Croats formed a joint federation as the last resort, the Serbian Democratic Party established the Republic Srpska in the captured East, and the military units were given under the command of the Bosnian-Serb General, Ratko Mladic. The notorious general, known as the ‘Butcher of Bosnia’, committed horrifying war crimes including slaughtering the Bosniak locals captured in violence, raping the Bosniak women, and violating the minors in the name of ethnic cleansing exercises. While the United Nations refused to intervene in the war, the plea of the helpless Bosniaks forced the UN to at least deliver humanitarian aid to the oppressed. The most gruesome of all incidents were marked in July 1995, when an UN-declared safe zone, known as Srebrenica, was penetrated by the forces led by Mladic whilst some innocent Bosniaks took refuge. The forces brutally slaughtered the men while raped the women and children. An estimated 7000-8000 Bosniak men were slaughtered in the most grotesque campaign of ethnic cleansing intended to wipe off any trace of Bosniaks from the Serb-controlled territory.

In the aftermath of the barbaric war crimes, NATO undertook airstrikes to target the Bosnian-Serb targets while the Bosniak-Croat offense was launched from the ground. In late 1995, the Bosnian-Serb forces conceded defeat and accepted US-brokered talks. The accords, also known as the ‘Dayton Accords’, resulted in a conclusion to the Bosnian War as international forces were established in the region to enforce compliance. The newly negotiated federalized Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted 51% of the Croat-Bosniak Federation and 49% of the Serb Republic.

The accord, however, was not the end of the unfortunate tale as the trials and international action were soon followed to investigate the crimes against humanity committed during the three-year warfare. While many Serb leaders either died in imprisonment or committed suicide, the malefactor of the Srebrenica Massacre, Ratko Mladic, went into hiding in 2001. However, Mladic was arrested after a decade in 2011 by the Serbian authorities and was tried in the UN-established International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). The investigation revisited the malicious actions of the former general and in 2017, the ICTY found Ratko Mladic guilty of genocide and war crimes and sentenced him to life in prison. While Mladic appealed for acquittal on the inane grounds of innocence since not he but his subordinates committed the crimes, the UN court recently upheld the decision in finality; closing doors on any further appeals. After 26-years, the world saw despair in the eyes of the 78-year-old Mladic as he joined the fate of his bedfellows while the progeny of the victims gained some closure as the last Bosnian trail was cased on a note of justice.

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Greece And Yugoslavia: A Brief History Of Lasting Partitions

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Prior to the 1992-1995 Balkan war, the European Community delegated the British and Portugese diplomats, Lord Carrington and Jose Cutileiro, to design a suitable scheme for ethno-religious partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in February 1992 they launched the Lisbon Conference, with the aim of separating Bosnian ethno-religious communities and isolating them into distinct territories. This was the initiation of the process of partition, adopted in all subsequent plans to end the war in Bosnia. However, such a concept was stipulated by Carrington and Cutileiro as the only available when there was no war to end, indeed, no war in sight; and, curiously, it has remained the only concept that the European Community, and then the European Union, has ever tried to apply to Bosnia.

Contrary to the foundations of political theory, sovereignty of the Bosnian state was thus divided, and its parts were transferred to the three ethno-religious communities. The Carrington-Cutileiro maps were tailored to determine the territorial reach of each of these communities. What remained to be done afterwards was their actual physical separation, and that could only be performed by ethnic cleansing, that is, by war and genocide. For, ethno-religiously homogenous territories, as envisaged by Carrington and Cutileiro, could only be created by a mass slaughter and mass expulsion of those who did not fit the prescribed model of ethno-religious homogeneity. The European Community thus created a recipe for the war in Bosnia and for the perpetual post-war instability in the Balkans. Yet, ever since the war broke out, the European diplomatic circles have never ceased claiming that this ‘chaos’ was created by ‘the wild Balkan tribes’, who ‘had always slaughtered each other’. There was also an alternative narrative, disseminated from the same sources, that Russia promoted the programme of ‘Greater Serbia’, which eventually produced the bloodshed in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Facts on the ground, however, do not support either of these narratives. All these ‘tribes’ had peacefully lived for centuries under the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, until nationalist ideas were imported into Serbia and Greece at the beginning of the 19th century. On the other hand, Russia’s influence in the Balkans could never compete with the influence of the Anglo-French axis. The latter’s influence was originally implemented through the channels of Serbian and Greek nationalisms, constructed on the anti-Ottoman/anti-Islamic and anti-Habsburg/anti-Catholic grounds, in accordance with strategic interests of the two West European powers to dismantle the declining empires and transform them into a number of puppet nation-states. In these geopolitical shifts, nationalist ideologies in the Balkans utilized religious identities as the most efficient tool for mobilization of the targeted populations and creation of mutually exclusive and implacable national identities.

The pivotal among these nationalist ideologies has been the Serb one,  built on the grounds of Orthodox Christianity, with its permanent anti-Islamic and anti-Catholic agenda. The existence and expansion of Serbia was always explicitly backed by London and Paris – from a semi-autonomous principality within the Ottoman territory in the 1830s and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1882, through the 1912-13 Balkan wars and World War I, to its expansion into other South Slavic territories in the form of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), promoted at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919.

Eventually, the Serbian elites – supported by the Anglo-French axis, again – used the dissolution of the communist Yugoslavia as an opportunity for implementation of the 19th-century ‘Greater Serbia’ programme, that is, Serbia’s expansion in all the Yugoslav territories populated by the Orthodox Christians. However, this time ‘Greater Serbia’ was used as a catalyst in a bigger geopolicial reshuffling advocated by the UK and France – the simultaneous implementation of four ethnnically homogenous greater-state projects, including ‘Greater Serbia’ (transferring the Orthodox-populated parts of Bosnia, plus Montenegro and the northern part of Kosovo, to Serbia), ‘Greater Croatia’ (transferring the Catholic-populated parts of Bosnia to Croatia), ‘Greater Albania’ (transferring the Albanian-populated parts of Kosovo and Macedonia to Albania) and ‘Greater Bulgaria’ (transferring the Slavic parts of Macedonia to Bulgaria).

Since 1990s, ethno-religious nationalisms in the Balkans have served only  this geopolitical purpose – creation of ethno-religiously homogenous ‘greater’ states, including the disappearance of Bosnia and Macedonia, whose multi-religious and multi-ethnic structure has been labelled by the British foreign policy elites as “the last remnant of the Ottoman Empire“ that needs to be eliminated for good. The only major foreign power that has opposed these geopolitical redesigns is the US, which has advocated the policy of inviolability of the former Yugoslav republics’ borders. Yet, the US has never adopted a consistent policy of nation-building for Bosnia and Macedonia, which would be the only one that could efficiently counter the doctrine of ethno-religious homogeneity promoted by the UK and France and supported by most EU countries.   

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