Before analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of European Union (EU) foreign policy in development, it is imperative to understand the conceptual link of EU’s foreign policy with development, and various evolutionary stages of EU’s foreign policy in development.
Since EU’s foreign policy has been associated with the developmental policy, it is, therefore, important to assess the impact of developmental policies internally and externally. Because both the levels provide it with the legitimacy to make decisions and contribute to global cooperation policies.
Broadly speaking, the development policy or stress on development came to prominence after the end of the Cold war. The early 1990s were the time, which not only saw the transition of the geopolitics from bipolarity to unipolarity, rather it was the time that exposed the vacuum in the development sector or the helplessness of global leaders to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and Kosovo. In other words, the power vacuum and absence of a proper mechanism to avert crisis brought the attention of European leaders to formulate a policy on development in form of Millennium Declaration of 2000. In simple words, the critical analysis of EU’s foreign policy would involve the understanding of the developmental policy as well. Therefore, understanding the merits and demerits of development policy would directly inform understanding of foreign policy as well.
Evolutionary Stages of EU’s Foreign Policy in Development
An in-depth study of the European Union’s developments can be divided into following sub-stages for the conceptual clarity. In Carbone’s viewpoint, the time period between the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 and the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris in 2005 can be marked as the major years in terms of the redefinition of the development goals by the leaders of European Commission. The formulation of Brussels consensus can be defined as the essence of European policy on development. It was bolstered by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005) and the European Consensus on Development (EPCC, 2006). Although the formulation of Brussels consensus did provide a European perspective on development, however, the coordination of the sub-facets continues to pose a challenge to EU. Therefore, addressing the obstructions in the way of success or achieving the desired developmental goals remains a matter of concern for scholars and policy analysts.
The European Union as a Player
In order to know whether European Union (EU) has been a player or payer when it comes to its foreign policy in development, it is pertinent to go through the merits and demerits of the development policy to provide an objective analysis.
For advocates, European Union (EU) is not merely a union of twenty-eight nations, rather it one of the significant donors of developing countries and a major trading partner. Its development assistance budget amounts to over 6 billion Euro annually, including 1 billion Euro for emergency and humanitarian aid. Most of the development funding goes to Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of states. The funding is usually provided by the member states. The relevance and impact made it a prominent actor, which is not only limited to Europe, but it plays a paramount role in global politics. The sheer size and success of EU impart it with resources and tools that facilitate the conduct of a stronger foreign policy.
According to the advocates of those who view the merits of EU’s development policy or consider EU as a foreign policy player, the unquestionable commitment of EU members to democracy, peace, rule of law and respect for human rights clearly reflect the resolve to promote and uphold the global norms and principles for all the global actors. Similarly, the overlooked role of women in building economies of the developing world has also been one of the areas of focus for the developmental leaders. To cite an example, global poverty has been halved five years ahead of the 2015 time frame; ninety percent of children in developing regions now enjoy primary education. Despite the viewpoint of critics, The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) associated with health have shown or resulted in positive success. For instance, the mortality rate for children under five years of age in 2012 was almost half that in 1990. Similarly, maternal mortality rate has decreased by 45 % between 1990 and 2013. The target on Malaria can also be fully met with a decline in malaria mortality rates of 42 % between 2010 and 2012. 
The European Union as a Payer
The critics or those who perceive the European Union as a payer of developmental policy mostly focuses on the demerits of the developmental policy. It is, therefore, important to take an overview of the arguments or critique. In Carbone’s viewpoint, the European Commission’s effort to “produce a statement on EU development policy (Brussels consensus) was to counter the Washington consensus“.  European Union (EU) as a humanitarian actor is another significant pillar of EU’s development policy, this function comes under the emblem of ECHO (the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office). It was created in 1991; the legal status was given in 1996 in form of an approval by European Commission. The idea was to safeguard it from political influences by ensuring objectivity and unbiased approach. However, the recent extension of the role played by EU foreign minister in ECHO could raise questions regarding the autonomy and credibility of ECHO.
The scholars and analysts of Africa and other areas of the world in need of development are critical of the conditions associated with developmental projects. In this context, the mechanisms of providing aid or grants via bureaucratic means are considered as an obstacle or ineffective, as it becomes the cause of the delay. Moreover, the proliferation of non-state actors and terrorist organizations, particularly after the Paris attack has given rise to a debate on the prospects of the European project. In simple words, the new wave of fear is the precursor for deepening tensions along the lines of nationalism versus globalization. Furthermore, the management of refugee or migrant influx towards Europe is another obstacle that will continue to be a matter of concern for leaders. Interestingly, the migrant issue is directly intertwined with the humanitarian assistance and the nationalist tendencies of European states to safeguard territorial boundaries. For instance, United Kingdom is another case study that illustrates one of the challenges for the EU internally.
In addition, the repercussion of Euro-zone crisis is something that continues to be a matter of concern for some of the European actors. It represents the proliferation and demerits of an interconnected world in terms of multiplying the implications and impact of the crisis on not only the European but the other interconnected economies. In this context, the mismanagement of the crisis represents questions about the crisis management mechanisms, particularly for the twenty-eight member states. According to the Reflection Group on the Future of the European Union report, aging populations, hostility to immigration, relatively low levels of investment in research and development, and a foreign policy that is feeble and non-coherent continue to increase the likelihood of the European Union becoming an irrelevant actor. In other words, the chosen response is deemed insufficient, particularly, with respect to the economic crisis. The very factor is seen as the variable which could accentuate the divisions of European states.
Analysis and Conclusion
To sum up, the capacity of EU to achieve MDG goals for development is questioned by some of the critics. For them, it has the potential to be used for objectives or goals other than the development. The very argument is often cited by the analysts of developing countries as well. For Carbone, the achievement of European Commission in the sector of poverty reduction, particularity, the Sub-Saharan and south-East Asia is questionable. In his view, the aid to the middle-income states has been increased at the cost of funding to underdeveloped states. For others, EU development aid to countries like Turkey and India is another point of objection. It means that the development and policies of EU should be more synchronized or coherent. Another argument of critics focuses on the association of development with the trade. The aid for India, for instance, is seen as a mean for EU to achieve the economic opportunities. However, it can also be deemed as a case of horizontal coherence, which links development with the trade to enhance relations between EU as an actor and India.
After carefully surveying the arguments of those who view EU as a payer (critics) in pursuit of a developmental and foreign policy, it would be implausible to completely undermine the merits of EU’s achievement as the global player in the developmental sector. That being said, one cannot neglect the critique of European Union’s (EU) role as a developmental actor, because it provides analysts and scholars with areas of improvement for the developmental policy. Keeping in view the fluidity of global environment in terms of increasing space for new kinds of actors and diffusion of power, it is pertinent to highlight the role of actors in attaining global progress and the influence of actors on EU and its relations with states in form of cooperation. Therefore, it would be plausible to suggest that the merits of EU as a development player is important to consider or acknowledge, however, the significance of demerits or the critic’s viewpoint needs to be explored further to understand the root causes of demerits and areas of improvements for the future of EU’s developmental policy.
Veit Bachmann, “The EU as a geopolitical and development actor: views from East Africa,” Online Journal of Political Geography and Geopolitics, January 2013, xx, https://espacepolitique.revues.org/2561?lang=en.
 Laz`r Com`nescu, “THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A GLOBAL PLAYER: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 2, no. 2 (2002): xx, beta.ier.ro/…/RJEA_Vol2_No2_The_European_Union_as_a_Global_Pla…
European Commission, The EU’s Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, (Brussels: European Commission, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/102618.
 European Commission, Annual Report 2014 on the European Union’s Development and External Assistance Policies and Their Implementation in 2013 – European Commission, (Brussels: European Commission, 2014), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/publications/annual-reports/2014_en.htm_en.
 Carbone , Maurizio, The European Union and International Development The Politics of Foreign Aid, (London: Routledge, 2007), http://www.dawsonera.com/depp/reader/protected/external/AbstractView/S9780203944684
Shaping policy for development, “The EU as a Humanitarian Actor | Event | Overseas Development Institute (ODI),” Home | Overseas Development Institute (ODI), last modified October 8, 2003, http://www.odi.org/events/26-eu-as-humanitarian-actor.
 European Commission, The European Union in a changing global environment, (Brussels: European Commission, 2014), http://eeas.europa.eu/docs/…/eu-strategic-review_strategic_review_en.pdf.
Zornitsa S. Yerburgh, “The European Union: Still a Global Player?,” Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, last modified October 15, 2010, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0050.html.
 Ravi Sodha, “Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article “Benefits and Uses of EU Development Aid”,” Home – Atlantic Community, last modified March 1, 2012, http://www.atlantic-community.org/index.php/Open_Think_Tank_Article/Benefits_and_Uses_of_EU_Development_Aid.
Iceland’s Historic(al) Elections
The morning of September, 26 was a good one for Lenya Run Karim of the Pirate Party. Once the preliminary results were announced, things were clear: the 21-year-old law student of the University of Iceland, originating from a Kurdish immigrant family, had become the youngest MP in the country’s history.
In historical significance, however, this event was second to another. Iceland, the world champion in terms of gender equality, became the first country in Europe to have more women MPs than men, 33 versus 30. The news immediately made world headlines: only five countries in the world have achieved such impressive results. Remarkably, all are non-European: Rwanda, Nicaragua and Cuba have a majority of women in parliament, while Mexico and the UAE have an equal number of male and female MPs.
Nine hours later, news agencies around the world had to edit their headlines. The recount in the Northwest constituency affected the outcome across the country to delay the ‘triumph for women’ for another four years.
Small numbers, big changes
The Icelandic electoral system is designed so that 54 out of the 63 seats in the Althingi, the national parliament, are primary or constituency seats, while another nine are equalization seats. Only parties passing the 5 per cent threshold are allowed to distribute equalisation seats that go to the candidates who failed to win constituency mandates and received the most votes in their constituency. However, the number of equalisation mandates in each of the 6 constituencies is legislated. In theory, this could lead to a situation in which the leading party candidate in one constituency may simply lack an equalisation mandate, so the leading candidate of the same party—but in another constituency—receives it.
This is what happened this year. Because of a difference of only ten votes between the Reform Party and the Pirate Party, both vying for the only equalisation mandate in the Northwest, the constituency’s electoral commission announced a recount on its own initiative. There were also questions concerning the counting procedure as such: the ballots were not sealed but simply locked in a Borgarnes hotel room. The updated results hardly affected the distribution of seats between the parties, bringing in five new MPs, none of whom were women, with the 21-year-old Lenya Run Karim replaced by her 52-year-old party colleague.
In the afternoon of September, 27, at the request of the Left-Green Movement, supported by the Independence Party, the Pirates and the Reform Party, the commission in the South announced a recount of their own—the difference between the Left-Greens and the Centrists was only seven votes. There was no ‘domino effect’, as in the case of the Northwest, as the five-hour recount showed the same result. Recounts in other districts are unlikely, nor is it likely that Althingi—vested with the power to declare the elections valid—would invalidate the results in the Northwest. Nevertheless, the ‘replaced’ candidates have already announced their intention to appeal against the results, citing violations of ballot storage procedures. Under the Icelandic law, this is quite enough to invalidate the results and call a re-election in the Northwest, as the Supreme Court of Iceland invalidated the Constitutional Council elections due to a breach of procedure 10 years ago. Be that as it may, the current score remains 33:30, in favor of men.
Progressives’ progress and threshold for socialists
On the whole, there were no surprises: the provisional allocation of mandates resembles, if with minor changes, the opinion polls on the eve of the election.
The ruling three-party coalition has rejuvenated its position, winning 37 out of the 63 Althingi seats. The centrist Progressive Party saw a real electoral triumph, improving its 2017 result by five seats. Prime-minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir’s Left-Green Movement, albeit with a slight loss, won eight seats, surpassing all pre-election expectations. Although the centre-right Independence Party outperformed everyone again to win almost a quarter of all votes, 16 seats are one of the worst results of the Icelandic ‘Grand Old Party’ ever.
The results of the Social-Democrats, almost 10% versus 12.1% in 2017, and of the Pirates, 8.6% versus 9.2%, have deteriorated. Support for the Centre Party of Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, former prime-minister and victim of the Panama Papers, has halved from 10.9% to 5.4%. The centrists have seen a steady decline in recent years, largely due to a sexist scandal involving party MPs. The populist People’s Party and the pro-European Reform Party have seen gains of 8.8% and 8.3%, as compared to 6.9% and 6.7% in the previous elections.
Of the leading Icelandic parties, only the Socialist Party failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold: despite a rating above 7% in August, the Socialists received only 4.1% of the vote.
Coronavirus, climate & economy
Healthcare and the fight against COVID-19 was, expectedly, on top of the agenda of the elections: 72% of voters ranked it as the defining issue, according to a Fréttablaðið poll. Thanks to swift and stringent measures, the Icelandic government brought the coronavirus under control from day one, and the country has enjoyed one of the lowest infection rates in the world for most of the time. At the same time, the pandemic exposed a number of problems in the national healthcare system: staff shortages, low salaries and long waiting lists for emergency surgery.
Climate change, which Icelanders are already experiencing, was an equally important topic. This summer, the temperature has not dropped below 20°C for 59 days, an anomaly for a North-Atlantic island. However, Icelanders’ concerns never converted into increased support for the four left-leaning parties advocating greater reductions in CO2 emission than the country has committed to under the Paris Agreement: their combined result fell by 0.5%.
The economy and employment were also among the main issues in this election. The pandemic has severely damaged the island nation’s economy, which is heavily tourism-reliant—perhaps, unsurprisingly, many Icelanders are in favor of reviving the tourism sector as well as diversifying the economy further.
The EU membership, by far a ‘traditional’ issue in Icelandic politics, is unlikely to be featured on the agenda of the newly-elected parliament as the combined result of the Eurosceptics, despite a loss of 4%, still exceeds half of the overall votes. The new Althingi will probably face the issue of constitutional reform once again, which is only becoming more topical in the light of the pandemic and the equalization mandates story.
New (old) government?
The parties are to negotiate coalition formation. The most likely scenario now is that the ruling coalition of the Independence Party, the Left-Greens and the Progressives continues. It has been the most ideologically diverse and the first three-party coalition in Iceland’s history to last a full term. A successful fight against the pandemic has only strengthened its positions and helped it secure additional votes. Independence Party leader and finance minister Bjarni Benediktsson has earlier said he would be prepared to keep the ruling coalition if it holds the majority. President Guðni Jóhannesson announced immediately after the elections that he would confirm the mandate of the ruling coalition to form a new government if the three parties could strike a deal.
Other developments are possible but unlikely. Should the Left-Greens decide to leave the coalition, they could be replaced by the Reform Party or the People’s Party, while any coalition without the Independence Party can only be a four-party or larger coalition.
Who will become the new prime-minister still remains to be seen—but if the ruling coalition remains in place, the current prime-minister and leader of the Left-Greens, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, stands a good chance of keeping her post: she is still the most popular politician in Iceland with a 40 per cent approval rate.
The 2021 Althingi election, with one of the lowest turnouts in history at 80.1%, has not produced a clear winner. The election results reflect a Europe-wide trend in which traditional “major” parties are losing support. The electorate is fragmenting and their votes are pulled by smaller new parties. The coronavirus pandemic has only reinforced this trend.
The 2021 campaign did not foreshadow a sensation. Although Iceland has not become the first European country with a women’s majority in parliament, these elections will certainly go down in history as a test of Icelanders’ trust to their own democracy.
From our partner RIAC
EU-Balkan Summit: No Set Timeframe for Western Balkans Accession
On October 6, Slovenia hosted a summit between the EU and the Western Balkans states. The EU-27 met with their counterparts (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo) in the sumptuous Renaissance setting of Brdo Castle, 30 kilometers north of the capital, Ljubljana. Despite calls from a minority of heads of state and government, there were no sign of a breakthrough on the sensitive issue of enlargement. The accession of these countries to the European Union is still not unanimous among the 27 EU member states.
During her final tour of the Balkans three weeks ago, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the peninsula’s integration was of “geostrategic” importance. On the eve of the summit, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz backed Slovenia’s goal of integrating this zone’s countries into the EU by 2030.
However, the unanimity required to begin the hard negotiations is still a long way off, even for the most advanced countries in the accession process, Albania and North Macedonia. Bulgaria, which is already a member of the EU, is opposing North Macedonia’s admission due to linguistic and cultural differences. Since Yugoslavia’s demise, Sofia has rejected the concept of Macedonian language, insisting that it is a Bulgarian dialect, and has condemned the artificial construction of a distinct national identity.
Other countries’ reluctance to join quickly is of a different nature. France and the Netherlands believe that previous enlargements (Bulgaria and Romania in 2007) have resulted in changes that must first be digested before the next round of enlargement. The EU-27 also demand that all necessary prior guarantees be provided regarding the independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption in these countries. Despite the fact that press freedom is a requirement for membership, the NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) urged the EU to make “support for investigative and professional journalism” a key issue at the summit.”
While the EU-27 have not met since June, the topic of Western Balkans integration is competing with other top priorities in the run-up to France’s presidency of the EU in the first half of 2022. On the eve of the summit, a working dinner will be held, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called for “a strategic discussion on the role of the Union on the international scene” in his letter of invitation to the EU-Balkans Summit, citing “recent developments in Afghanistan,” the announcement of the AUKUS pact between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which has enraged Paris.
The Western Balkans remain the focal point of an international game of influence in which the Europeans seek to maintain their dominance. As a result, the importance of reaffirming a “European perspective” at the summit was not an overstatement. Faced with the more frequent incursion of China, Russia, and Turkey in that European region, the EU has pledged a 30 billion euro Economic and Investment Plan for 2021-2027, as well as increased cooperation, particularly to deal with the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Opening the borders, however, is out of the question. In the absence of progress on this issue, Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia have decided to establish their own zone of free movement (The Balkans are Open”) beginning January 1, 2023. “We are starting today to do in the region what we will do tomorrow in the EU,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama when the agreement was signed last July.
This initiative, launched in 2019 under the name “Mini-Schengen” and based on a 1990s idea, does not have the support of the entire peninsular region, which remains deeply divided over this project. While Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are not refusing to be a part of it and are open to discussions, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, who took office in 2020, for his part accuses Serbia of relying on this project to recreate “a fourth Yugoslavia”
Tensions between Balkan countries continue to be an impediment to European integration. The issue of movement between Kosovo and Serbia has been a source of concern since the end of September. Two weeks of escalation followed Kosovo’s decision to prohibit cars with Serbian license plates from entering its territory, in response to Serbia’s long-standing prohibition on allowing vehicles to pass in the opposite direction.
In response to the mobilization of Kosovar police to block the road, Serbs in Kosovo blocked roads to their towns and villages, and Serbia deployed tanks and the air force near the border. On Sunday, October 3, the conflict seemed to be over, and the roads were reopened. However, the tone had been set three days before the EU-Balkans summit.
German Election: Ramifications for the US Foreign Policy
In the recent German election, foreign policy was scarcely an issue. But Germany is an important element in the US foreign policy. There is a number of cases where Germany and the US can cooperate, but all of these dynamics are going to change very soon.
The Germans’ strategic culture makes it hard to be aligned perfectly with the US and disagreements can easily damage the relations. After the tension between the two countries over the Iraq war, in 2003, Henry Kissinger said that he could not imagine the relations between Germany and the US could be aggravated so quickly, so easily, which might end up being the “permanent temptation of German politics”. For a long time, the US used to provide security for Germany during the Cold War and beyond, so, several generations are used to take peace for granted. But recently, there is a growing demand on them to carry more burden, not just for their own security, but for international peace and stability. This demand was not well-received in Berlin.
Then, the environment around Germany changed and new threats loomed up in front of them. The great powers’ competition became the main theme in international relations. Still, Germany was not and is not ready for shouldering more responsibility. Politicians know this very well. Ursula von der Leyen, who was German defense minister, asked terms like “nuclear weapons” and “deterrence” be removed from her speeches.
Although on paper, all major parties appreciate the importance of Germany’s relations with the US, the Greens and SPD ask for a reset in the relations. The Greens insist on the European way in transatlantic relations and SPD seeks more multilateralism. Therefore, alignment may be harder to maintain in the future. However, If the tensions between the US and China heat up to melting degrees, then external pressure can overrule the internal pressure and Germany may accede to its transatlantic partners, just like when Helmut Schmid let NATO install medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe after the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan and the Cold War heated up.
According to the election results, now three coalitions are possible: grand coalition with CDU/CSU and SPD, traffic lights coalition with SPD, FDP, and Greens, Jamaica coalition with CDU/CSU, FDP, and Greens. Jamaica coalition will more likely form the most favorable government for the US because it has both CDU and FDP, and traffic lights will be the least favorite as it has SPD. The grand coalition can maintain the status quo at best, because contrary to the current government, SPD will dominate CDU.
To understand nuances, we need to go over security issues to see how these coalitions will react to them. As far as Russia is concerned, none of them will recognize the annexation of Crimea and they all support related sanctions. However, if tensions heat up, any coalition government with SPD will be less likely assertive. On the other hand, as the Greens stress the importance of European values like democracy and human rights, they tend to be more assertive if the US formulates its foreign policy by these common values and describe US-China rivalry as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism. Moreover, the Greens disapprove of the Nordstream project, of course not for its geopolitics. FDP has also sided against it for a different reason. So, the US must follow closely the negotiations which have already started between anti-Russian smaller parties versus major parties.
For relations with China, pro-business FDP is less assertive. They are seeking for developing EU-China relations and deepening economic ties and civil society relations. While CDU/CSU and Greens see China as a competitor, partner, and systemic rival, SPD and FDP have still hopes that they can bring change through the exchange. Thus, the US might have bigger problems with the traffic lights coalition than the Jamaica coalition in this regard.
As for NATO and its 2 percent of GDP, the division is wider. CDU/CSU and FDP are the only parties who support it. So, in the next government, it might be harder to persuade them to pay more. Finally, for nuclear participation, the situation is the same. CDU/CSU is the only party that argues for it. This makes it an alarming situation because the next government has to decide on replacing Germany’s tornados until 2024, otherwise Germany will drop out of the NATO nuclear participation.
The below table gives a brief review of these three coalitions. 1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism and 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism. As it shows, the most anti-Russia coalition is Jamaica, while the most anti-China coalition is Trafic light. Meanwhile, Grand Coalition is the most pro-NATO coalition. If the US adopts a more normative foreign policy against China and Russia, then the Greens and FDP will be more assertive in their anti-Russian and anti-Chinese policies and Germany will align more firmly with the US if traffic light or Jamaica coalition rise to power.
|Issues Coalitions||Trafic Light||Grand Coalition||Jamaica|
1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism. 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism.
In conclusion, this election should not make Americans any happier. The US has already been frustrated with the current government led by Angela Merkel who gave Germany’s trade with China the first priority, and now that the left-wing will have more say in any imaginable coalition in the future, the Americans should become less pleased. But, still, there are hopes that Germany can be a partner for the US in great power competition if the US could articulate its foreign policy with common values, like democracy and human rights. More normative foreign policy can make a reliable partner out of Germany. Foreign policy rarely became a topic in this election, but observers should expect many ramifications for it.
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