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Zapad 2017

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The Zapad 2017 exercise will begin on September 14, 2017.  It will be carried out jointly by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and Belarus, as well as by other smaller allies.It will be a technical test to check the full interoperability between the Armed Forces of Russia, Belarus and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), namely Kazakhstan, Armenia, the above mentioned  Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

It will also include military leaders from Afghanistan and Serbia as observers.

Also Iran is a possible candidate for the CSTO and the vision of the Zapad 2017 operations, which will be present with some unofficial observers.

Apart from China, considering the countries which founded  the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, only Uzbekistan is missing in the CSTO.

Another essential geopolitical factor which is worth recalling is that in 2013, on the same day, Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Therefore the CSTO is basically the Russia-linked part of the strategic block which – pending the counter-terrorist and anti-jihadist struggle – merged into the China’s current and future area of interest.

The “Zapad” (namely West) manoeuvres are already being prepared  – especially in Belarus – and will take place with at least 100,000 Russian and allied soldiers, with 13,000 Russian soldiers, 280 heavy artillery units and 25 Russian military aircraft.

There is no additional news on the presence of Russia’s allies.

The Zapad 2013 manoeuvres had been even more impressive, with at least 75,000 Russian soldiers officially declared and many others belonging to the Russian Federation’s allies.

Considering a 24% additional units compared to the  official figures, including also the GRU, namely the  military intelligence service, the wide structures of the Russian “covert warfare” – improperly called hybrid warfare – the forces of other allied intelligence services, as well as the infowar and e-warfare ones, we reach approximately a number of 125,000 soldiers and officers.

In Belarus, however, the Russian operative units are not supposed to exceed 3,000, including those of the airborne division stationed in Pskov and those of another division, usually operating in the Western front of the Russian forces.

The manoeuvre areas of the current exercise are Belarus, the Baltic, Western Russia, as well as the Kaliningrad exclave – the old Koenigsberg of Immanuel Kant – and the command will be a single one mainly led by Russia.

Kant’s city is now central again in the Russian military system after the 2008 war in Georgia and it is in this area that the Russian military system can plan joint operations capable of penetrating the enemy lines.

Currently Kaliningrad’s Oblast can always hit also at a distance over 300 kilometres.

Since August 2016, in the region there have been Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles (NATO reporting codename SS-N-26 Strobile), Mach 2 speed, which are launched also by the Hezbollah, Indonesia, obviously Syria and even Vietnam.

In Kaliningrad there are also the Iskander tactical ballistic missiles (NATO reporting code name SS-26 Stone), having a 415 km range in the version for the Russian Forces – carriers which can go undetected by the Patriot missiles and the North American THAAD networks already deployed in Chechnya and Poland.

It is worth recalling that THAAD is the Terminal High Attitude Area Defense and it is a short and medium-range US missile defense system.

Both the Oniks and Iskander missiles, as well as Kalibr (NATO reporting codename SS-N-27 Sizzler), an anti-ship  and land attack cruise missile, are all adaptable to armament with nuclear warheads – as already defined in the chain of command of the Russian 11th Army Corps, created in Kaliningrad in 2009.

In the Russian decision-makers’ typical  perception of the NATO and Western threat, Kalingrad is the center of an arc  stretching from the Arctic to the Barents Sea, to the Baltic and Transnistria up to Crimea and the Black Sea – an arc which is now one of the most advanced Russian defense system.

With specific reference to the Arctic, the issue is clear: for Russia, all attack and response missiles towards the United States transit mostly there.

From the Kola Peninsula, the Northern Fleet – the most powerful of the five Russian fleets – will anyway have easy access to the world’s oceans through the Arctic waters.

It is by no mere coincidence that Putin’s planning is fully focused on both naval power and the Northern Fleet, in particular.

For Russia, the presence of oil and gas in the region and  Westerners’ pressure on the traditional route of Russian trade – namely the Northern and Arctic one – are real direct and explicit threats to national sovereignty.

According to Russian laws, the Northern Sea Route stretches from the Kara Sea, around Siberia, to the Bering Strait and surrounds the whole Arctic on the Russian side.

The area is part of the Russian “Exclusive Economic Zone”.

Moreover, in Transnistria, Russia mostly sees threats to its full freedom of military manoeuvre.

There are 2,000 Russian soldiers still operating on that small territory, which some NATO leaders see as the next point of tension between the Alliance and the Russian Federation.

In fact, it was Philip Breedlove, who served as NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) until May 2016, who noted that Russia tended to deploy large forces on the border between Moldova and Transnistria, with a view to annexing that small, but important region.

In fact, this half-Romanian and half-Russian territory is the major supply and logistics passageway for the Russian forces possibly operating on the Western front towards Europe.

Hence, in the Western diplomats’ and leaders’ logic, the Russian conquest of Crimea directly implies the attack on Ukraine as a whole.

A serious mistake. Putin has no interest in creating further tension with the EU and the United States. He simply wants to maintain and reaffirm effective control over his area of influence, which must be well-separated from that of the United States, NATO and the European Union.

Putin does not want to expand by incorporating dangerous areas that is useless to “hold” militarily. Conversely, he wants to eliminate the Western threat, especially the “covert one” from the countries bordering on the Russian Federation.

However, in a possible clash with NATO, for Russia Kaliningrad is the inevitable point for the Northern Flank’s intelligence data collection, especially if it cannot rely on its old bases in Belarus.

Therefore, in case of a war, Kaliningrad’s Oblast structures would be authorized to destabilize politically and economically and later attack the anti-missile sites in Poland.

Hence, in the Russian doctrine, there is not much difference between military coercion and traditional containment.

Part of the threat is always put in place.

On the other hand, the Kaliningrad forces are those preventing NATO’s unrestricted and unlimited use of the Baltic Sea, in addition to stopping the penetration – through possible missile attacks – of NATO’s ground forces wishing to pass through the Baltic straits.

Furthermore, some Western military decision-makers explicitly theorized the “conquest of Kaliningrad” as compensation for the Russian acquisition of Crimea.

This is another factor to be taken into account in the Zapad 2017 operation, a joint exercise which has been repeated every four years since 1999, although under different formats.

Obviously all the four major operational commands of the Russian forces (the Eastern, Central, Caucasus and Western ones) have been alerted, but – apart from the purpose declared by the Russian Command – the purpose of Zapad 2017 is above all “to plan jointly with the allies, as well as develop a common command and advanced troop training tactic.”

This means that the Russian strategic goal is to limit the presence of NATO troops in Eastern Europe and to make the link between the Alliance and the Russian local and peripheral ruling classes more difficult. An essential aspect to be highlighted is that the Russian strategic goal is also to avoid regime change attempts through actions such as the coloured revolutions or, even worse, the various springs.  Finally its aim is to destabilize the pro-NATO subversive networks in the countries still linked to Russia thanks to the CSTO and, more widely, to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – networks that Russia has already largely identified.

Zapad 2017 is primarily a political and military anti-destabilization operation that could lead to the use of new techniques for destructuring and disrupting the Western covert networks in the East.

Moreover, it is not surprising that Zapad 2017 will be an excellent training ground for both Russian and Belarusian special forces.

Moreover, the exercise is also designed to warn the Atlantic Alliance not to even dare to threaten Belarus.

At legal, historical and strategic levels, however – also for Zapad  2017 – the central point of the Russian reasoning is that the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia was absolutely illegal – and it is not by chance that 1999 was the year when the Zapad joint exercises started.

It was the bombing of Belgrade and the legitimization of Alja Izetbegovic’s Islamic Bosniaks, as well as the obvious illegality of operations in Kosovo, to make Russia “open its eyes”.

Since then Russia has no longer trusted the West and clearly says so.

The Zapad 2017 operations, however, have already been planned in the exercises as early as last April, when the Russian and Belarusian special forces moved together to the Vitebsk region, an area of ​​12,000 square kilometers.

Therefore, with the Special Forces – operating with political and intelligence roles – the Russian war is changing. It is no longer the deployment of the 19th century divisions of the brilliant Soviet General Shaposhnikov.

Between May 11 and 16 last, the 106th Russian Airborne Division, stationed in Tula, arrived in Brest and – jointly with the Belarusian units, it carried out exercises designed to block “illegal armed formations”.

Again within the Zapad 2017 framework, e-warfare exercises have been carried out, clearly against a State enemy, although Zapad may have devoted minor actions against the electronic and Signal Intelligence ones, which currently are also often found in non-State group operations.

Hence protection of Russia’s peripheries, which are also the most significant areas at demographic and economic levels, as well as protection of the Russian exit routes both for strategic and commercial security, and protection of the hotspots, such as Crimea, allowing to have a direct line with Europe.

What about dealing with the security of the borders between NATO and Russia with new criteria?

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

Defense

War to End or War to Follow?

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“It’s going to be hard to meet the May 1st deadline”. These were the recent words of US president Joe Biden in his address to the impending US withdrawal of Afghanistan. Whilst his opinion paints a ghastly picture for the forthcoming months, the negotiations run rampant to strike the common ground. However, with continued attacks being launched by the Taliban followed by incessant threats to the US regime to withdraw its troops by the agreed deadline, a hard stance seems legitimate both from the US front and the NATO: both facing a quandary that could either end the decades’ long warfare or fuel insurgency for decades to come.

The US invaded Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11th Attacks in 2001. Although the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003 followed a similar suit, the stint lasted only 26 days in a massive scale drive to disarm Iraq of the weapons of mass destruction; allegedly in tandem with the looming threat posed to the United States by the World Trade Centre debacle. However, the invasion of Afghanistan proved to be one of the costliest wars; both in terms of artillery and military men.

Cited as one of the rarest areas of agreement between President Biden and his predecessor, Mr. Donald Trump, both favoured the ‘Bring an end to the endless war’ slogan. Before leaving the office, Mr. Trump signed a waiver to ordain the Pentagon to level down the US troops in Afghanistan to 2500 troops, bypassing the reservations of the congress to retain the level at 4000 troops. President Biden, despite being prudent of the hasty withdrawal, rejoiced the idea to bring the soldiers back. In line with his narrative, the US recently proclaimed to withdraw the remaining combat forces from Iraq whilst retaining only the training forces in the country. The 3rd round of talks between Washington and Iraq culminated with the joint statement: “Based on the increasing capacity of the ISF [Iraq Security Forces], the parties confirmed that the mission of U.S. and Coalition forces has now transitioned to one focused on training and advisory tasks, thereby allowing for the redeployment of any remaining combat forces from Iraq, with the timing to be established in upcoming technical talks”.

It is evident that the US wants to enact the plan to bring back the troops, however, Afghanistan poses a paradox in comparison to Iraq. While alleged Iran-backed militants continue to lock horns with both the ISF and the US troops, the US has consolidated a stronger hold evidenced by the recent rebuttal via airstrikes against the Iran-backed militants in Syria. The US holds the premise that Iran seeks economic relief and thereby has no incentive to disrupt the peace but to maintain it. Similarly, the US wants to make a compromise with Iran via renegotiating the JCPOA accord, with a possibility of stretching the ambit to include Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program and the regional proxy wars purportedly financed by Iran, before a hard-line administration takes over the Iranian parliament later this year. So, with a fledgling Iraqi military and expanding prospects of negotiation with Iran, the US could safely pull out the troops whilst still maintaining pressure and presence in the guise of militaristic training in Iraq.

Afghanistan paints a graver reality in contrast. Despite rounds and rounds of negotiations over months, the continued violations of the agreement by the Taliban are making it riskier to draw out the troops. While the US wants to maintain its presence in the country, the wavering Ghani-administration adds oil to fire. A war that has claimed more than 2500 US soldiers and millions of civilians could face an impasse as the 3-week timeslot narrows over the decision-makers. Gen. Frank McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, has repeatedly claimed that the Taliban have not fully lived up to the commitments they made in the February 2020 agreement: “Violence levels are too high for a durable political settlement to be made”.

The Biden administration, CIA, and NATO face a dilemma to decide the mechanism of withdrawal before the clock ticks through. As the terror groups propagate in the neighbouring Middle East, an unplanned withdrawal could drive the entire region into jeopardy. This might be the primal concern of president Biden and the Pentagon. The flailing ISIS could find haven in the political fiasco the unravels after the US completely withdraws from the country, leaving the Afghani government at the whims of the insurgents. However, expecting a complete withdrawal is just naivety. The US is known to covertly operate hundreds of secret bases in cahoots with NATO throughout the infringed nations. While it’s supposedly claimed that the Taliban are privy to the location of the bases in Afghanistan, nothing definitive could be added in edgewise to the argument.

An alternative, and quite a plausible notion at present, could be an outright refusal to withdraw the troops before the Taliban strictly adhere to their side of the deal. The resulting warfare would subsume the past 2 decades of mayhem. The deal would most likely completely crumble and perish. The evidence is scattered over the last three months. In March, the attack on the Afghan security checkpoint in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz left 6 soldiers dead. An attack a few days ago in the province of Herat left 9 Afghan police personnel dead when the Taliban militants targeted two police checkpoints. The recent blow came when the Taliban attacked the NATO airbase in Kandahar: a base frequented by 100s of US troops. The brazen attitude and timing of the attacks could not send a clearer message of warning to follow the deadline.

President Biden faces a choice now. While the cards are clustered and the consequences are muddled, the foremost decision hangs: How to go about the negotiations? Whilst made abundantly clear that the troops might not withdraw completely from Afghanistan, he confidently patched his perspective by adding:“Can’t picture the US troops still being in Afghanistan next year”. So, while the agreement stands to make a safe withdrawal, the deadline of May 1st poses a challenge if the exceeding violence alludes to any clue. With mounting pressure from the republicans and a synonymous example of withdrawal in Iraq, President Biden should ideally emphasize on withdrawal of the troops, even if not entirely. This would allow the Biden administration to elongate the negotiations to quench violence instead of retreating without question. However, execution is the key. Deviating from the agreement forged by Mr. Donald Trump or taking an aggressive stance could easily incite the chaos further: making the Afghan war translate into Biden’s war for decades to follow.

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Defense

Dual Use Technology Imports Aiding Pakistan’s Covert Nuclear Programme

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Terrorism

A recent threat assessment report by the Norwegian security agencies reportedly highlighted the unhindered exploitation of dual use technology by Pakistan. Norwegian authorities have determined Pakistan to be among the countries posing greatest threat to them. With this report, Norway became the latest country to raise alarm about the ‘Pak’ practice of bypassing all international safeguards in gaining latest nuclear technology on the pretext of using it for education and health.

However, Norway is not the only country to realise the immense risk stemming from transferring critical technologies to Pakistan. Its assessment follows several other countries’ public acknowledgement of the nuclear threat posedby Pakistan. Czech Republic in its report titled “Annual Report of the Security Information Service for 2019” also drew global attention towards Pakistan misleading the world in procuring internationally controlled items and technologies to aid its nuclear programme.

The evidence of Pakistan’s covert nuclear programmes go well beyond these reports. In 2019,the US Department of Justice indicted five persons associated with a Pakistan based front company for operating a network that exported US origin goods to Pakistan. The indictment identified 38 separate exports involving 29 different companies from around the country between September 2014 and October 2019. The network used to conceal the true destinations of the goods in Pakistan by showing front companies as the supposed purchasers and end users. However, US Justice Department statement disclosed that the goods were ultimately exported to Pakistan’s Advanced Engineering Research Organization (AERO) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission without export licenses. Both AERO and PAEC are on the US Commerce Department’s Entity List, which imposes export license requirements for organizations whose activities are found to be contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests.

Similarly, German authorities disclosed in 2020 that Pakistan had sought technology for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) “in order to retain a serious deterrent potential against ‘arch enemy’ India”. The agency provided a detailed account of Pakistan’s efforts to steal information and material about nuclear weapons.

However, to fulfill its destructive agenda, Pakistan does not shy away from using the name of its poor public and students. Its government has repeatedly claimed that it seeks the dual use technologies for social and economic upliftment of the country by utilizing the technology in its health and education sectors.

But, these baseless arguments no longer seem to cut the ice with western countries. Meanwhile, on their part, Pak officials have complained against the latest Norwegian report on grounds that other countries may deny access to technology to Pak students for their advanced studies and Pakistani researchers would be refused admission to International institutes and universities. However, the Norwegian authorities have maintained their stance as based on independent assessment of the issue, including confidential inputs.

Several instances of Pakistan having gained access to dual technology in the garb of peaceful purposes have come to light in the recent years. And the risk continues considering Pakistan’s terror background and its history of stealing technologies from different parts of the world. It is the unsavory reputation of Pakistan as a troublemaker that has gone global and the country is viewed with suspicion even when humanitarian considerations come to fore.

Given the poor governance standards and history of failure of civil institutions in Pakistan, these observations provide a justification for apprehensions of the western countries. It remains to be seen whether these disclosures lead to sanctions or new export controls against Pakistan or the country again succeeds in misleading the world by playing victim’s card.

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Defense

Kickbacks in India’s defence purchases

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Prime minister Narendra Modi of India boasts his government of being corruption- free. But, his claim has become questionable in the light of recent audit of Rafale purchase in France.

India had ordered 36 of these fighter aircraft from France in September 2016. The 7.8 billion government-to-government deal for 36 fighter jets was signed in 2016. The Indian Air Force has already raised its first squadron of the Rafale jets at Ambala and is due to raise the second one at Hasimara in West Bengal.

India expects to receive more than 50 percent of these fighters by April-end. The first batch of five Rafale jets had arrived in India on July 28 and was officially inducted on September 10 by the government.

In a startling disclosure, the French Anti-Corruption Agency, Agence Française Anticorruption

has announced that their inspectors have discovered an unexplained irregularity during their scheduled audit of Dassault. According to details, “the manufacturer of French combat jet Rafale agreed to pay one million euro to a middleman in India just after the signing of the Indo-French contract in 2016, an investigation by the French publication Mediapart has revealed. An amount of 508,925 euro was allegedly paid under “gifts to clients” head in the 2017 accounts of the Dassault group  ( Dassault paid 1 million euro as ‘gift’ to Indian middleman in Rafale deal: French report India Today Apr 5, 2021). Dassault tried to justify “the larger than usual gift” with a proforma invoice from an Indian company called Defsys Solutions. The invoice suggested that Defsys was paid 50 per cent of an order worth 1,017,850 for manufacturing of 50 dummy models of the Rafale jets. Each dummy, according to the AFA report, was quoted at a hefty price of 20,357. The Dassault group failed to provide any documentary evidence to audit about the existence of those models. Also, it could also not explain why the expenditure was listed as a “gift to clients” in their accounts.

Shady background of Defsys

Defsys is one of the subcontractors of Dassault in India. It has been linked with notorious businessman Sushen Gupta. Sushen Gupta. He was arrested and later granted bail for his role in another major defence scam in India, the AgustaWestland VVIP Chopper case.

The Enforcement Directorate charged Sushen Gupta for allegedly devising a money-laundering scheme for the payouts during the purchase of the helicopters.

Rampant corruption in India

Corruption in defence deals is a norm rather than an exception in India. They did not spare even aluminum caskets used to bring back dead bodies from the Kargil heights (“coffin scam”). Investigations into shady deals linger on until the main characters or middleman is dead. Bofors is a case in point.

Why investigation of defence deals since independence recommended

India’s Tehelka Commission of Inquiry headed by Mr. Justice S N Phukan had suggested that a sitting Supreme Court Judge should examine all defence files since independence.

Concerned about rampant corruption in defence purchases allegedly involving Army personnel, he desired that the proposed Supreme Court Judge should by assisted by the Central Vigilance Commission and the Central bureau of Investigation.

He stressed that unless the existing system of defence procurement was made more transparent through corrective measures, defence deals would continue to be murky. He had submitted his report to then prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, but to no avail. The Commission had examined 15 defence deals including the AJT, Sukhoi, Barak missiles, T-90 tanks, tank navigation systems, simulators, hand-held thermal. imagers, Karl Gustav rocket and Kandla-Panipat pipeline. The irregularities in the scrutinised defence deals compelled the Commission to suggest de novo scrutiny of all defence purchases since independence.

Tardy trial

The courts have absolved Rajiv Gandhi of involvement in the BOFORS scam. However, a considerable section of Indian people still believes that ‘Mr. Clean’ was not really so clean. The BJP exploited Rajiv’s acquittal as an election issue. Kuldip Nayyar, in his article “The gun that misfired” (Dawn February 14, 2004) laments, “There was practically no discussion on Bofors-guns kickbacks in the 13th Lok Sabha which has been dissolved for early elections. Once Rajiv Gandhi died the main target – the non-Congress parties lost interest in the scam”.

According to analysts, the mechanisms of public accountability in India have collapsed. Corruption has become a serious socio-political malady as politicians, bureaucracy and Armed Forces act in tandem to receive kickbacks. The anti-corruption cases, filed in courts, drag on for years without any results. To quote a few case: (a) There was no conviction in Bofors-gun case (Rs 64 crore), because of lethargic investigation (the case was filed on January 22, 1990 and charge sheet served on October 22, 1999. Among the accused were Rajiv Gandhi, S K Bhatnagar, W N Chaddha, Octavio, and Ardbo. The key players in the scam died before the court’s decision). (b) No recoveries could be made in the HDW submarine case (Rs 32.5 crore). The CBI later recommended closure of this case. (c) Corruption in recruitment of Armed Forces.

Legal cover for middlemen

Central Vigilance Commissioner P Shankar had alleged (October 2003): “The CVC had submitted its defence deals report on March 31, 2001. Yet a year later, the government has not conducted the mandatory departmental inquiry to fix responsibility”. Shankar explained that the CVC had examined 75 cases apart from specific allegations made by former MP Jayant Malhoutra and Rear Admiral Suhas V Purohit Vittal. Malhoutra’s allegations were about middlemen in defence deals. After his report, the ministry lifted the ban on agents in November 2001 to regularise the middlemen. Purohit, in his petition in the Delhi HC on a promotion case, had alleged unnecessary spare parts were bought from a cartel of suppliers instead of manufacturers, at outrageous prices and at times worth more than the original equipment.

Past cases forgotten to continue business as usual

There were ear-rending shrieks about the Taj-heritage corridor case, Purulia-arms-drop case and stamp-paper cases. Indian Express dated November 11, 2003 reported that the stamp-paper co-accused assistant Sub-Inspector of Police drew a salary of Rs 9,000, but his assets valued over Rs 100 crore. He built six plush hotels during his association for 6 years with the main accused Abdul Karim Telgi. The ASI was arrested on June 13 and charged under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act. Investigations by the Special Investigating Team (SIT) probing the stamp scam had found that the ASI Kamath accepted Rs 72 lakh from the scam kingpin, Abdul Karim Telgi, on behalf of IGP Sridhar Vagal.

The problem is that the modus operandi of corruption ensures that it is invisible and unaccounted for. There are widespread complaints that the politicians exercise underhand influence on bureaucracy to mint money. For instance, the Chief Vigilance Commissioner complained to Indian Prime Minister (November 8, 2003) that at least “six cabinet ministers, handling key infrastructure ministries, are harassing chiefs of public sector undertakings for ‘personal favours’, and in some cases even for pay-offs”.

For example, one PSU (Public Sector Udertaking) chief is said to have complained that he was asked to get Rs 20 crore delivered to his minister’s party office and when he refused, he was “denied” an extension. Indian Express dated February 19, 2004 reported, under reportage titled “Figuring India” that ‘Rajiv Pratap Rudy is only one in a long line of ministers who have misused the funds and facilities of Public Sector Undertakings”. The newspaper appended the following bird’s-eye view of the funds (available for corruption) at the PSUs command: Rs 3, 24,632 crore total investment in PSUs, Rs 36,432 crore profits, 12,714 crore profits of monopolies in petroleum, Rs 5,613 CRORE profits of monopolies in power Rs 7,612 crore, profits of monopolies in telecom Rs 10,388 crore, Rs 61,000 crore invested in PSUs in 1991-1998, Rs 19,000 crore returns during 1991-1998.”

Corruption as proportion of gross Domestic Product

Professor Bibek Debroy and Laveesh Bhandari claim in their book Corruption in India: The DNA and RNA that public officials in India may be cornering as much as ₹921 billion (US$13 billion), or 5 percent of the GDP through corruption.

India 86th most corrupt (Transparency International corruption ranking Jan 29, 2021)

India’s ranking on the Corruption Perception Index– 2020 is 86. The index released annually by Transparency International ranks 180 countries by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and business people. It uses a scale of zero to 100, where zero signifies the highest level of corruption and 100 is very clean.

All-round corruption

In India, anti-corruption focuses on big ticket graft. But it is petty corruption that hurts common people more. Both need to be weeded out. A former World Bank president Robert Zoellick once said, “Corruption is a cancer that steals from the poor, eats away at governance and moral fibre, and destroys trust.”

According to Transparency International, CPI-2020 shows that corruption is more pervasive in countries least equipped to handle Covid-19 and other crises. “Covid-19 is not just a health and economic crisis. It is a corruption crisis. And one that we are currently failing to manage,” Delia Ferreira Rubio, chair of Transparency International said. “The past year has tested governments like no other in memory, and those with higher levels of corruption have been less able to meet the challenge. But even those at the top of the CPI must urgently address their role in perpetuating corruption,” she added.

Concluding remarks

Click Wikipedia to know that Narendra Modi’s “Net worth” is “₹ 2.85 Crore” (June 2020). This figure defies his humble financial background. He has a penchant for hobnobbing with “crony capitalism”. It appears he is worth a lot more.  Those who make illicit money have a knack to hide it.

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