Authors: Dr. Enis Omerović and Adil Kulenović
The bilateral international agreement on the state border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, known as the Agreement on the Border between the two states, or more familiarly, as the Tuđman-Izetbegović Agreement, signed in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999 between the then President of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, and the Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, represents in its 23 Articles, conditionally, “a valid act since it has been applied until a new one is made” (V.Đ. Degan, 2013).
This Agreement could also be perceived to contain a transitional or provisional solution, since it has never been ratified by any parliament and does not serve its ultimate purpose – the permanent establishment and determination of the land and sea border between the two neighbors. In this regard, it can even be argued that the Republic of Croatia de facto abandoned the execution of this Agreement when its official authorities decided to embark on the building of a permanent construction at sea. This all supports the fact that the issue of delimitation and demarcation at sea, especially in the area of the Bay of Neum and the Mali Ston Bay, is still permanently undefined and unsettled and thus requires, in our opinion, a serious step towards opening an official dialogue with Zagreb with the involvement of EU institutions, since the Republic of Croatia is a member of the European Union.
The second difficulty should be addressed together with the first. It would be especially important to define the sea boundary, regarding the tip of the Klek Peninsula and the uninhabited islets, Veliki and Mali Školj or, more precisely, the rocks in the Mali Ston Bay, which are part of a unique geomorphologic unit, together with the Klek Peninsula. If we draw the line of equidistance for purposes of delimitation of two states whose shores in one bay lie or are opposite to one another (the Peninsula of Klek and Pelješac), which is in accordance with the international law of the sea, as well as Article 4 (3) of the bilateral Agreement which, inter alia, prescribes that border at the sea stretches “the median line of the sea area between the land of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia”, it could be claimed that the disputed area would belong to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Closely connected to this, the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s access to the High Seas or international waters of the Adriatic Sea and other world seas should be addressed, where no country in the world has territorial sovereignty, nor does it exercise any sovereign rights. High sea areas are world seas and oceans which are outside any state territory and provide a regime of free navigation and overflight, as well as other freedoms inherent to the High Seas. On this part of the planet, according to general customary international law, all countries in the world, under certain circumstances, exercise their jurisdiction over vessels flying the flag of their country.
For these reasons, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982 (UNCLOS) (ratified both by the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) states in Art. 7 (6) of the Convention that, in declaring its straight baselines, from which the width of the territorial sea is measured, the coastal State may not cut off the territorial sea of another coastal state from the High Seas or the exclusive economic zone. As things stand currently, in order to get from the waters of Bosnia and Herzegovina by vessel to the High Seas, it is necessary to pass through the internal waters and the territorial sea of the other coastal state, so that, in crossing the line that represents the outer boundary of the territorial sea, one leaves the sovereign territory of the Republic of Croatia. Further into the High Seas, the Croatian Protected Ecological and Fishing Band (ZERP) has been declared and covers the sea area in the Adriatic Sea from the external border of the territorial sea in the direction of the open sea to its outer boundary, determined by the general international law, and temporarily follows the line of demarcation of the continental shelf established by the Agreement between Italy and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the two Countries in the Adriatic Sea from 1968.
In fact, it is essential for Bosnia and Herzegovina to secure a specific route, that is to say, a corridor, which will physically connect its waters with the High Seas, since it is in an unfavorable geographic position, due to its sealed coastline. At this level, it is state practice to support coastal states to limit the width of their territorial sea, due to the undisputed flow or passage of the other coastal state to the High Seas, in accordance with the above-mentioned UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which represents a codification of this branch of international law. Examples of this are the Republics of Estonia and Finland in the Gulf of Finland in the Baltic Sea, in relation to the Russian Federation (St. Petersburg area), and the Republic of France in relation to the territorial sea of the Principality of Monaco in the Mediterranean Sea.
Hence, Bosnia and Herzegovina should not accept the guarantee of the neighboring state that Bosnia and Herzegovina will have the right only to innocent passage for all vessels to and from Neum or, in the case of some other ports in the state territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since Neum is extremely unconducive to the construction of a larger port which would be open to international traffic – we predict that a port of this type and category could be built on the Klek Peninsula, whose waters are much more suitable, especially in respect of access and sea depth, for the construction of an international port. This is because the right to innocent passage of a vessel is linked to the territorial sea, not to the internal waters of the coastal state. This should have been precisely defined in accordance with the principles and rules of international law, preferably by a bilateral international agreement between the two neighboring states, namely, the existence, the position, the proper width and the legal regime of such a corridor or waterway, which would probably be through the Neretva and the Korčula Channel, to move all vessels to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The legal regime of such a corridor should be explicitly articulated in writing, together with the rights and obligations of both contracting parties, all in accordance with international law.
Therefore, it could be understood that there is a noticeable difference between the right to innocent passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea of a coastal state and the formation of a corridor with a special legal regime. The latter would most likely pass through Croatian territory, as it would be unrealistic to expect that the Republic of Croatia in the area of such a corridor remains without its territorial sovereignty and integrity. This is regardless of the fact that it not very legally rightly inherited from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by its Maritime Code, the straight baselines under the conditions of more sovereign states whose coastlines are touched and lean on one another in the same sea area. Namely, the disputed area in terms of the declaration of these straight baselines is from theCape Proizd (near the island of Korčula) all the way to the southwestern tip of the island of Vodnjak, near some of the more famous Paklinski islands (along the island of Hvar), as this act simply contributed to the “closure” of Bosnian and Herzegovinian waters. We have written “most likely to pass” since it is hard to imagine that in the area of the Neretva and Korčula Channels, with a width of not less than 1-1.5 nautical miles, that condominium (shared sovereignty) can be established or that an international legal regime be determined completely outside Croatian sovereignty.
Finally, in support of the assertion that any coastal state should have unimpeded (not just innocent passage, which is subject to various restrictions on the part of the coastal state) access to the High Seas, there is the final determination of the arbitral award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in the case the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia of 2017, according to which the Republic of Slovenia, through the so-called junction of 2.5 nautical miles wide, i.e. the physical link of its territorial waters with the high seas area of the North Adriatic was awarded a corridor from their waters, where Slovenia enjoys full sovereignty to the High Seas, where many freedoms are guaranteed to all countries of the world, both coastal and non-coastal, as well as to those with an unfavorable geographic position regarding access to the sea, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, as the Chairman of the Arbitration Council in this very case, G. Guillaume, stated in the public statement of the arbitral award, “the junction between the Slovenian territorial sea and the High Seas is a space where ships and planes have the same right of access to Slovenia as well as in the High Seas. The Court identified the area of the Croatian territorial sea that is adjacent to the Italian waters within which a special legal regime would be applied. The corridor is approximately 2.5 nautical miles wide, and located immediately next to the border, according to the Treaty of Osimo, within Croatian territorial waters. A special legal regime should guarantee the integrity of the Croatian territorial sea, and Slovenian free communication between its waters and the High Seas.” It follows that the free communication of a coastal state between its waters and the High Seas is not the same as its right/obligation to innocently pass through the waters of another coastal state. It should, therefore, be concluded that the first term refers to the freedom of navigation and over flight to a little more extent than that provided by the institute of the innocent passage of foreign ships to territorial sea, which is only a necessary passage, since every foreign vessel must navigate through this area on the shortest conventional route, without disruption or delay. Moreover, this accessory or connecting corridor would have a kind of limitation of Croatian sovereignty and jurisdiction, since it would be in the spirit of this particular legal regime that would go in the middle of the Neretva and Korčula Channel. It would be worth questioning, moreover, whether Croatian internal waters should be left where they are now. The same question appeared to have been posed by a legal scholar from Croatia – “the question remains whether the waters of Croatia delimited by the territorial sea of Bosnia and Herzegovina can continue to be considered as having the legal status of internal waters.” (B. Vukas, 2006).
Accordingly, a maritime corridor with a specific legal regime needs to be differentiated widely, or clarified in detail, so it does not necessarily represent identical international legal categories with the right to innocent passage of foreign ships and the right of transit passage. These latter terms are characteristic of the very specific maritime zones and parts of the sea which are not the subject of our current exploration and explication.
When all interconnected notions finally acquire their coherent power in terms of consistency, then will be the time to discuss continuing the construction of a permanent artificial installation on the sea, called the Pelješac Bridge (mainland – Pelješac Peninsula). Having understood that the Republic of Croatia only wants to connect two parts of the mainland, that is, the northern and southern ends of their country with a high-quality road link, this modern traffic connection should not endanger, or be detrimental to, the interests of their neighbors. Therefore, for the purpose of solving the traffic difficulties of the Republic of Croatia, the continuation of the construction of the Pelješac Bridge should be permanently solved by settling the so-called previous issues elaborated earlier – the permanent maritime delimitation on the Adriatic Sea as well as the permanent determination of the land border through a bilateral international frontier treaty, which will be applied equally and in good faith by both signatory parties and which will, above all, be confirmed in both the Croatian Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 would be applicable in the event of any dispute as to its application, and the interpretation of certain provisions thereof. In addition to this, as mentioned above, it is necessary to establish in an internationally appropriate manner the legal regime and the width of the future corridor, which will represent, inter alia, a junction between Bosnian and Herzegovinian waters and the High Seas of the Adriatic.
Hence, only after the final determination of all the aforementioned, and after a thorough, concrete and legally binding determination of the legal regime of the corridor above which the permanent bridge will be built, the scientific and professional processing of the project known as the Pelješac Bridge must be approached. This should meet all the technical characteristics of bridges that have already been built over water within the international legal regime, i.e. international waterways, such as the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge and the Bosporus Bridge in Istanbul that cross over the waters of the Bosporus strait which is under international legal regime, or the Oresund bridge (although most of the international maritime traffic takes place above the underwater tunnel) linking the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of Sweden and which is also located over the international waterway. This means that if the agreement between the two neighboring coastal states in this part of the Adriatic Sea could be achieved, in the sense of completing its construction and opening it for all road traffic, the bridge of these dimensions must have a certain minimum navigation height and a minimum range between the pillars, or at least the central ones, so that big ships could also sail into the Neum waters.
Bosnia and Herzegovina always somehow tends to delay consideration of certain questions. If this continues, there is a great chance that there will be no single institutional response, with the result that the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to this important international legal issue will remain very vague and indeterminate. Additionally, there is a very long internal tradition which does not encourage political cooperation, and a lack of understanding of things that are of fundamental significance to the whole country, not just to one of its constituent peoples.
However, in expectation of any kind of determination on the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with or without the Pelješac Bridge, the problem of the permanent “drawing” of the borderline between the two countries, both on the sea and on the land, will remain. The question of the access corridor or the connection of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s waters with the High Seas will not be sorted out alone. So, is it wise to wait for the international community or the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (if it is still here?!) to take steps to protect the international interests of this state?
This is an opportunity to see the strength of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian diplomacy which will once again demonstrate its position on the international stage. There is certainly a consistent lack of unity, resulting predominately from the less than satisfactory territorial organization, and attempts to build a state on the basis of ethnicity. This lack of unity is reflected in the impossibility of coming to clear institutional views on the part of the official state government. There may again be the emergence of a culture of conflict and non-cooperation at the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which could, adopt the declaration, as a political act, with precisely defined conclusions), the Council of Ministers and the Presidency.
But if dialogue is opened, perhaps after formal disagreement through a diplomatic note to the Republic of Croatia, the latter will surely have the advantage, or at least a better negotiating position, due to its European Union membership. This fact may well be crucial (since the European Union also recognizes the interest in land consolidation of its territory, so that its members can better monitor and control their state territory, with the goal of Croatia’s entry into the Schengen area) to the success of the negotiations as a diplomatic mean of settling one international dispute, which surely here does exist, at least with respect to the territorial title. Finally, it is worth mentioning that an international dispute does not need to be specifically proclaimed, the essence is in the existence of a disagreement with respect to essential facts, or in their apparently different interpretations.
If there is an international dispute between two coastal states that share the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea – that is not debatable – it is now best to choose the most appropriate and effective means of settling the dispute with, if possible, mutual interest as its aim. In this respect, it would be best to choose the most appropriate means for peaceful settlement of disputes from a large palette of diplomatic and legal means that are equally available to each state. Based on the foregoing, a dispute can be brought before the ICJ in The Hague, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg, or it can be “easily” settled through ad hoc arbitration, i.e. special arbitration tribunals. But for the decision, which is the only outcome of these legal proceedings, it is necessary to wait for years, since such international legal processes can be very long-lasting and, above all, extremely expensive. In any case, Bosnia and Herzegovina will surely need to find a modus operandi in solving the above-mentioned issues with its western neighbor. This could be found in the Joint Team of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia for Negotiations on the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Delimitation at Sea or, perhaps, on a general level, in a body that will be composed on a parity basis, such as the Inter-State Diplomatic Commission for the Determination of the Border Line, which should, inter alia, settle the border dispute over the Danube River between the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Croatia, still, so far, with little success. All this graphically demonstrates the complexity of the international law of the sea, particularly in the area of delimitation.
The billion-dollars closer to disaster: China’s influence in Montenegro
Montenegro is building its first-ever motorway. Due to a huge loan scandal, it’s now become the country’s highway to hell. 40 bridges and 90 tunnels are expected to be built and financed by the Chinese. However, the project has been hit by corruption allegations, construction delays and environmental tragedies. Today, out of the planned 170 kilometers, just 40 have been completed.
The motorway is one of the most expensive in the world. It’s financed by a loan from China loan. Paying back this money is creating problems. The story starts with Montenegro’s former Prime Minister and current President, Milo Dukanović. He conceived the motorway to boost trade in the small Balkan country.
However, lacking funds to start construction, he accepted a billion-dollar loan from China in 2014. Other investors didn’t want to get involved. Prior to this, French and American feasibility studies highlighted the risks of such an oversized project. The European Investment Bank and the IMF also announced that it was a bad idea.
Now, with the pandemic crushing Montenegro’s tourism-dependent economy, the country is struggling to find a way to finance the missing stretches of road.
The motorway should link Bar Harbor in the south to the border with Serbia in the north. The first section was scheduled to be finished in 2020, but it still isn’t.
Politicians promised that the motorway contraction will boost employment in Montenegro. However, the Chinese contractor brought in its own workers, with no contracts or social security contributions.
An NGO backed by the EU is investigating corruption allegations involving subcontractors. Out of the huge loan from China, 400 million Euros were given to subcontractors, which some of them are linked with President.
In Montenegro people are hoping that there will be justice and someone should pay for this ambitious constructions plan. However, some fear that China has its eyes on Bar’s deep-water harbor. When signing the billion-dollar-loan with China, Montenegro agreed to some strange terms, like giving up sovereignty of certain parts of the land in the case of financial problems. Arbitration in this scenario would take place in China using Chinese laws.
A long-term harbor concession would fit nicely into China’s “Belt-and-Road-Initiative”, a global infrastructure project to access markets. Harbor authorities in Bar are already hoping for an economic upturn and have plans for two new terminals.
The Chinese-managed motorway isn’t just mired in cronyism allegations; it’s also accused of damaging the protected Tara river valley. The ecology group ‘Green Home’, after several monitoring of Tara River, has concluded that impact of incompetent construction on river is disastrous. Sediment from the construction site is trickling into the water, preventing the fish from spawning.
Chinese managers have been accused of ignoring basic EU standards and Montenegro is criticized for failing to supervise construction correctly. Rubble has changed the Tara riverbed, perhaps irreparably.
Environmental experts proposed alternative layouts of the motorway that would have avoided the Tara valley, but they were ignored.
The river Tara is UNESCO protected and it should be forbidden to gravel the soil and sand, but this is happening there because of the construction work.
All over the Western Balkans, Chinese investment has slowed down EU compatible reforms. China’s silk road ambitions are not always in line with EU standards of good governance, environmental protection, rule of law and transparency. Their influence is creating a wedge between the EU and the Balkan states.
Cyprus conflict: How could be Resolved and Reunified?
Cyprus conflict has been regarded as one of the conflicts that are so far difficult to find a resolution for it. The conflict has been considered intractable, due to its complexity multiple endeavors failed to bring on a solution. The conflict that erupted between Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island had a different language, culture, and religion. These two components are the triggers of the Cyprus conflict which have dragged external actors into the conflict. After independence, these two ethnic groups were granted self-governance as one state on the Island. They have been given an authority based on a constitution that has been enacted by the presence of external actors. They shared the governance of the island until the Coup of 1974 that led to separate these two ethnic groups into two constituencies which resulted in two separate regions. Turkish intervention in the 1980s divided the island into two republics. The self-declaring of an independent state for ethnic Turkish in Northern Cyprus has made the conflict intractable. The tension grew strain between them until 2014 when the reunification discussions opened between the two sides. (1)
There is a primary and secondary actor in the conflict, both actors have their interests in the conflict. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are the main actors and the external actor such as Turkey, Greece and Britain are the main secondary actors.
Historical background of the conflict
Cyprus has been a victim of its geographical significance, due to its geopolitical importance has been conquered by multiple empires in the region. The ownership of Cyprus has changed hands among the empires such as Greeks, Egyptian, Roman, Ottoman. And British as the last empire took over from the Ottoman empire from 1878 until independence in 1960.Cyprus conflict has national, regional, and international dimensions, so the solution should take the account of multiple actors. In addition to the ethnic nationalism in terms of conflict between Greek -Turkish Cypriots, there are other actors such as Turkey and Greece. Moreover, there are international actors such as the EU,NATO, and the United Nations.(2)As Cyprus connects three continents, its geopolitical importance has lent it both vulnerability and strengths. That is why history has been of external powers’ interest.
The root cause of the conflict attributes to the lack of national identity within Cypriot society, lack of commonality has paved the way to disagreement over multiple cases. When Britain took over the administration of the island did not allow these two ethnicities to intermingle, during the independence made them too strange to each other to get along together under one state. The actual independence struggle itself was to reunification with motherland Greek which was unacceptable for Turkish Cypriots. The guerrilla war itself that was initiated by Greek Cypriot was to reunify with Greece, not for its independent state. The reunification was not in the interest of both Turkey and Great Britain. So, the conflict started, and later the North Cypriots self-declared their ethnic state. External powers fuelled the conflict for their interest. In so case, the conflict in Cyprus took in the international aspect which later UN involved to stop fighting.(3)
One of the main causes of the conflict between these two groups was security, the Turkish Cypriots did not experience security towards their Cypriots counterpart. There was inequality both socially and economically. The Greek Cypriots within the republic had more power in all sectors of life, therefore the Turkish experienced alienation which gave them a feeling of a stranger inside their own country. To fill the security vacuum they resorted to external support and Turkey was ready to present them this security. In this way, external powers such as Greece, UK, and Turkey shifted their role from guarantor to a supporter of one side over the other that made the conflict more intractable. In the referendum, the majority of Turkish Cypriots voted yes to Annan Plan but on the other side most of the Cypriot Greek vote no to this plan. Annan’s plan was an initiative to start the process of the reunification of the Island in one whole state instead of two divided states.(4)
Divide and rule
Divide and rule strategy has been a tactic of all European colonizers from the time of the Roman empire until the end of the colonization. The Dutch and the Spanish have made benefit from this strategy. All of these empires including Britain and France have employed different ways but most Western colonialist have used four basic tactics as 1)“The creation of the differences within the conquered population 2) the augmentation of existing differences 3) the channeling or exploitation of these differences for the benefit of the colonial power; and 4) the politicization of these differences so that they carry over into the post-colonial”. Britain even used an educational system to promote segregated education between ethnic Greece and Turkish Cypriots. In such a way Greek schools were staffed by teachers from Greece and Turkish schools by teachers from Turkey. They used the same tactics in Nigeria between the South and the North in a way opened more schools in the South than in the North which created different education levels.(5)
The policy of divide and rule was one of the most important strategies that have been employed by the British empire during its colony and after decolonization. The British empire has divided the people of the colonized states into multiple parts. The division policy has been followed to facilitate the governing process such as the Partition policy in India. Adoption of this strategy was the paramount goal for British empire expansion. Otherwise, it had been difficult for Britain to keep control over all these places in the world. There are various examples regarding partition policy such as in Palestine in the Middle East or Zimbabwe in Africa. Britain in contrast to France has employed segregation by dividing people to rule better. Internal Cyprus conflict is the result of the independence movement and decolonization process which led to dividing the state between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.(6)The treaties of guarantors and alliances or unworkable constitutions were the start of the intercommunal conflict between Greeks and Turkish on the island.
Multiple differences within Cypriots society laid the foundation of conflict that was exploited by external powers. They have different languages, religions, and cultures which mistakenly have been a catalyst of the conflict.
Cyprus geographically is important for major powers in the region therefore all three so-called guarantor countries such as Greece, Turkey, and Britain sought to keep influence on the Island. Through developing nationalism, the external powers gained a foothold there, from the 1960s onwards they urged national identity based on primordial principles. Both Greek and Turkey alongside Britain in a variety of ways intervened in the internal situation of the people of Cyprus. The population in Greece attached to different countries to protect themselves from another side. In such a way the idea of union with Greek the mainland for Greek Cypriot was the goal. And for the Turkish Cypriots, the partition of the Island was a case of maintaining the Turkish identity. The importance of the Island came to the surface even more in the period between 1960 -1974 when the two ethnic groups divided, and the external powers entered the conflict with support confined to nationalism toward both sides(7)
National identity is what binds the people together, in Cyprus, there are religion and language have been the main elements of their national identity. But for the new generation in Cyprus, there are other elements alongside religion and language to become an individual identity. Most of the new generation are speaking fluently English which gives them a new allegiance and a new identity. In the modern era, principles of gender, human rights, freedom, and democracy are the main goals for human beings to stand for it. So multiple factors replaced the traditional elements of identity building.(8)
The conflict in Cyprus starts directly after the independence before the independence both Turkish and Greek Cypriots were fighting Britain and seeking independence. But after Britain’s withdrawal, primordial values in terms of ethnic affiliations were promoted, and intercommunal fighting erupted between them.
Geopolitical interests in Cyprus have played a big role in regional politics in the Middle East. This significance made the Island a victim of regional and international politics. It is an important gateway for three continents namely Asia, Europe, and Africa. Due to its location which is connecting three continents, has attracted major powers. It locates in a place that can control the connections of the most important chokepoints in the Mediterranean such as Bab-el-Mandeb, the Suez channel, and the Hormuz Strait. Where through these chokepoints import and export from oil and gas producers are transported to industrialized countries. Due to its significance has become of external powers’ interest throughout history. From Cyprus, it is easier to surveil all these chokepoints and from modern time, the USA has established an intelligence base to observe the Eastern Mediterranean and further.(9)
Even though Cyprus far away from most of the international powers, due to its importance geopolitically most of the major power through one or another way established a kind of link with it.USA under the excuse of NATO alliances with Turkey and Greece has a presence there. Britain has physical military bases and works as a guarantor based on the London-Zurich agreement. Turkey as a guarantor and links to ethnic Turkish Cypriots, Greece as a guarantor and links to Greek Cypriot, European Union through the republic memberships. So, the conflicts in Cyprus have both national and international aspects. (10)
Late discoveries of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean surfaced the importance of the Island again. Egypt, Israel, and the Republic of Cyprus started to explore gas in the area which provokes Turkey. Against this background, Turkey intensifies its presence in the Mediterranean by starting to explore natural gas alongside other actors there. This development triggers the start of shifting a balance of power and new alliances which leads to a new equilibrium in the region. Even Turkey has threatened to blacklist those firms that are developing offshore gas exploration.(11) findings of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean have enhanced amicable relationship among Israel, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus, on the other side Turkey got a foothold in the waters of Southern Cyprus through the Northern republic which is recognized by only Turkey. These alliances made all countries in the region insecure which reflected negatively on the other conflicted areas such as Syria and Libya.(12)
The conflict in Cyprus is considered intractable which means resolving is more difficult than the other. Establishing peace on the Island can be achieved by adopting a conflict transformation approach. In this method, all walks of society participate in the peacebuilding process. , through individual participation, reconciliation will be materialized in a way that all citizens on the island are direct contributors and participators in the process. In doing so conflict transformation make benefits from civil society promoting which binds individual from both ethnic groups. In so case the allegiance shifting away from ethnicities to citizenship based on individual rights and interests. Conflict transformation is suited to the case of Cyprus which refrains the two ethnic groups form an in-group attachment.
So far peacemakers on the Island have sought to find a solution for the conflict based on the conflict resolution approach. This kind of solution has promoted ethnic nationalism and in-group allegiance, therefore international mediation whether coercive or non coercive has failed to find a common interest between these two ethnic groups. Coercive peacebuilding is a Modell that is practiced by Russia which has never given sustainable peace such as Russia’s mediation in Ukraine, Chechenia, Libya, and Syria. (13)
There is non-coercive intervention conflict resolution such as the ideas of William Zartman which allows the conflict parties to reach a mutually hurting stalemate. This method at the end of the day creates a time ripeness for negotiation in which both sides reach a level of damage in terms of the utility of war.Ripeness moment has been used as a strategy to convince and force the conflicting sides to apply to the negotiation and come into a sustainable agreement which results in peacebuilding.(14)
Resolving the conflict through international and external mediation results in a temporary solution that potentially re-emerges after the international system and shifting of their interests. Thus, the conflict can be sustainable only in the case of internal solutions based on individual rights and finding common interests among the population regardless of religion, language, and cultures.
Promoting common interest within the conflicting sides can result in sustainable peacebuilding. to achieve this goal enhancing the principles of democracy such as human rights, freedom, and supporting civil society which finally binds the individuals together based on citizenship than ethnicities allegiance. Through the principles of democracy, primordial nationalism is replaced by civic nationalism. This strategy has been used in Canada which resulted in positive consequences in terms of coexistence between Quebec and the rest of the populations. The people of Quebec find their interests with the English people than with the French people in the other land.(15)
“There are four main factors which tend to create internal conflict: discriminatory political institutions; exclusionary national ideologies; intergroup politics; and elite politics”. (Michael E. Brown 1997).These factors apply to the conflict on the island, due to the longevity of the conflict common national identity has been weakening year after year. And there are four main schools to settle ethnic disputes that can be used to mitigate the hostility between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The first school concentrate on coercive intervention to create a balance of power(Fen Osler Hampson1997),the second school concentrate on non-coercive intervention through confidence building or ripe moment and power-sharing(Fen Osler Hampson1997),and the third schools argue that just political order is important and supporting civil society(Fen Osler Hampston1997),and the fourth school includes the use of the conflict resolution workshops which seek to reduce stereotyping in the citizen level(Jhon Burton1972)(16)
Creating a national identity in Cyprus is of paramount importance to mitigate the hostilities between the two ethnic groups, in away the people of Cyprus should promote their Cypriots attachment instead of external attachment towards Greece by Cypriot Greek and attachment to Turkey by Turkish Cypriots. Finding commonality between these two ethnicities inside Cyprus in away way both ethnicities feel secure toward each other is a path for a solution. Geopolitically a powerful Cyprus is not in the interest of external stakeholders such as Turkey and Greece therefore they always are seeking to hold the republic of Cyprus divided and weak. In such a way they would be able to intervene and make benefit from its geopolitical importance in the region which has its importance by locating among three continents. Creating a sense of Cypriot’s identity facilitates establishing a civic nationalism which paves the way to coexistence and cooperation toward a common goal. Democratic principles that give citizenship, equal economic and social rights, and free political participation are elements that can be achieved under civic nationalism, in such a way materializing a Cyprus nationalism based on duty and rights, not ethnic belongings.(17)
Through civil society promoting and confidence-building measures, the relationship between communities is possible to yield positive results. As Christopher Michell says, “Local peacebuilding and national peace” In a way Channels of communication can be promoted through grassroots communication. Building multiple organizations would lead to building more trust among the ordinary people in such a way mutual interest facilitates the foundation of peace. Through civil society promoting the relationship between local and national level which ultimately peacebuilding is achieved.(18)
Enhancing the role of civil society based on track two diplomacy, the two communities can open multiple channels of communication which at the end of the day the fear of insecurity is dissipated for those who voted no in the referendum in 2004. As these two ethnicities have different backgrounds in terms of language and religion and both of them have a connection to the different motherlands, they are seeking security from their respective motherlands. But in the case of building internal security through low politics strategy and micro-level communication, this fear is covered as Oliver Richmond says “NGOs fulfill vital roles that states and their agencies cannot take on”. (19)
Another alternative to promote peace and finding a resolution for the Cyprus conflict is economic factors through gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean which gives benefits for economic prosper for the people of Cyprus. In 2014 enormous gas discovery in the region has given the prospect of the reunification of Cyprus and ending the long conflict. As multiple actors have been involved in the Cyprus conflict, its resolution should be internationally in a way all actors experience security towards each other.(20)
After Cyprus accession to the European Union, there was more possibility of finding a mutual solution thatyields joint interest for both communities in Cyprus. The people of Cyprus have lived peacefully through history the conflict flared up in 1950 during the independence war against the United Kingdom, therefore, the application of the methods of Roger and Fisher (2011) can result in positive consequences. There are some of the methods that underpin the process of negotiation of the resolution of the conflicts. These methods are” 1)Don’t bargain over position 2) separate the people of the problem 3) focus on interests, not positions 4) invent options for mutual gains 5) insist of objective criteria”.(9) In the case of Cyprus, joint gains can be achieved through gas exploration and redistribute the resources’ revenue equally over the Cyprus population.(21)
Based on the oven mentioned points Greek and Turkish Cyprus can find commonality and mutual interests which leads to coexistence and cooperation instead of fighting each other and experiencing insecurity.
Cyprus has been a pivotal case for most empires in the old and new history. All empires had sought to keep control over the island, which they were using as a corridor between East and West. As it connects Asia, Africa, and Europe, the major powers were interested to keep control over it. The Island was occupied by the Greek, Roman, and Ottoman empires until 1870 was deliver to the British empire. These external powers made the way for inter-communal groups to fight each other. Its significance urged these external powers to sow the soul of dissension between the two main ethnic groups as a divide and rule strategy. There are primary and secondary actors in the Cyprus conflict, the primary are the two ethnic groups such as Turkish and Greeks who are living on the Island. Finding the solution for this conflict can start from the primary actors such as Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Through the transformation approach, the relationship between these two ethnic groups is promoting and based on low-level interaction peacebuilding starts to flourish. Moreover, there are secondary actors are playing an expansive role within the Cyprus conflict. The fatherlands of Greece and Turkey are involved by supporting their ethnic groups on the Island. Through establishing the bases of security for both ethnic groups is the foundation of the conflict resolution for the intractable conflict of Cyprus.
Getting to Yes which is concentrating on interests than position is helpful to resolve disputes between conflicting sides. In the case of Cyprus looking forward than looking back is facilitating the process of negotiation. Some points can be used in the process of negotiation in the Cyprus conflict. Most important points er 1) bargaining over interests than position 2)separating the people from the problem 3)mutual gain 4) insisting on objective criteria.(22)
Based on the conflict transformation strategies and win-win negotiations, citizens can be drawn into the negotiations. These measures within conflict resolution by engaging civil society the fear of insecurity can be dissipated. In that case, the conflicting parties within Cyprus society could be reunified and the main causes of their internal conflicts are transformed and resolved.
- 1)Bishku, Michael B. “TURKEY, GREECE AND THE CYPRUS CONFLICT.” Journal of Third World Studies 8, no. 1 (1991): 165-79. Accessed January 17, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45193321
- 2)IlkeDagli, “The Cyprus Problem:Why Solve a Comfortable Conflict?”,5 April2017.Accessed 15 Januar2021.https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Blog/the-cyprus-problem-why-solve-a-comfortable-conflict
- 3)ZenovStavrindes,The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and statehood, Second edition 1999, accessed Januar 15,2021. https://www.academia.edu/25355954/THE_CYPRUS_CONFLICT_National_Identity_and_Statehood
- 4)Hadjipavlou, Maria. “The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding.” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 3 (2007): 349-65. Accessed January 4, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640515.
- 5)Morrock , Richard. “Heritage of Strife: The Effects of Colonialist “Divide and Rule” Strategy upon the Colonized Peoples.” Science & Society 37, no. 2 (1973): 129-51. Accessed January 13, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40401707.
- 6) Christopher, A. J. “‘Divide and Rule’: The Impress of British Separation Policies.” Area 20, no. 3 (1988): 233-40. Accessed January 5, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20002624.
- 7)Navda Morag.” Cyprus And the Clash of Greek And Turkish Nationalisms”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics(2004), 10:4, 595-624.AccessedJanuary5,2021. DOI: 10.1080/13537110490900368
- 8)ErgünÖzgür, Nur Köprülü& Min Reuchamps,” Drawing Cyprus: Power-sharing, identity, and expectations among the next generation in northern Cyprus”, Mediterranean Politics,(2019) 24:2, 237-259, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2017.1404720
- 9) Legh,James &VukovicPredrag.”A Geopolitics of Cyprus” A Middle east review of the international affair,Vol15,Iss.4(Dec2011)pp 59-70.Accessed January Dec2021. https://search.proquest.com/openview/549749e72a734a643fd5ce00fa64b493/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=54955
- 10)Roucek, Joseph S. “CYPRUS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN GEOPOLITICS.” Il Politico 41, no. 4 (1976): 732-46. Accessed January 6, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43209935.
- 11)Tagliapietra, Simone, Towards a New Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor? Natural Gas Developments between Market Opportunities and Geopolitical Risks (February 26, 2013). FEEM Working Paper No. 12.2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2225272 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2225272
- 12) Efrain Inbar &Shmuel Sandler,”The Importance of Cyprus” Middle East Quarterly,spring2001,pp.51-58.Accessed Januar132021, https://www.meforum.org/29/the-importance-of-cyprus
- 13)David Lewis,”Russia as Peacebuilder?Russia’s coercive mediation strategy,”George CMarshall European Center for Security Studies,June 2020,Nr.061.Accessed Januar142021,
- 14) William Zartman,” The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments”, Global Review of Ethnopolitics2001, 1:1, 8-18, DOI: 10.1080/14718800108405087
- 15) Raymond Breton, “From ethnic to civic nationalism: English Canada and Quebec, Ethnic
- and Racial Studies”, 11:1, 85-102, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.1988.9993590
- 16) Oliver P. Richmond , “Ethno‐nationalism, sovereignty and negotiating positions in the Cyprus conflict: obstacles to a settlement”, (1999),Middle Eastern Studies, 35:3, 42-63, DOI: 10.1080/00263209908701278
- 17) Christopher Mitchel, “ Beyond Resolution: what does Conflict Transformation Actually transform?”, Peace and Conflict Studies, 5,1,2001,Vol.9,Nr 1.Accessed 13Januar 2021.https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1020&context=pcs/
- 18) Landon E. Hancock & Christopher Mitchell, “Local Peacebuilding and Legitimacy: Interactions between National and Local Levels”, Routledge,2018.
- 19) Henry Carey &Oliver Richmond, “Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs” 2003 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- 20) Ayla Gürel& Laura Le Cornu, “Can Gas Catalyse Peace in the Eastern Mediterranean?”, The International Spectator, (2014) 49:2, 11-33, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2014.906799
- 21) Roger Fisher & William Ury,“ getting to yes: Negotiation an Agreement without Giving in”,2011, penguin books, New York.
- 22) Roger Fisher & William Ury,“ getting to yes: Negotiation an Agreement without Giving in”,2011, penguin books, New York.
Disconnecting From SWIFT? No, We Did Not Hear About It
The European Parliament has adopted another resolution on Russia. It reflects the key political claims against Moscow which have recently been on the Union’s official agenda. These include the aggravation of the situation in Ukraine, the “Navalny case”, the diplomatic scandal between Russia and the Czech Republic concerning the explosion of a military warehouse in 2014. The resolution contained radical proposals. Disconnect Russia from SWIFT and stop imports of energy resources in the event of an aggravation of the conflict in Donbass, reconsider relations between Russia and the EU, develop new sanctions regimes, etc. These proposals generated headlines in the media. However, the stock markets ignored them. The resolution did not cause any fluctuations of the ruble or Russian blue chips. Why did this happen and should the resolution be taken seriously?
At first glance, the resolution confirms that high consensus of one of the key (along with the EU Council) legislative bodies of the EU. It was adopted by 569 votes in favour, 67 against, and with 46 abstentions. Kiev and Prague welcome the resolution. Their political positions are uncompromisingly reflected in the document, although, for example, in the case of the explosion at a Czech military depot, there is no consensus, even in the Czech Republic itself. Not to mention the situation around Donbass, where the military build-up was carried out on both sides. According to an already established tradition, Russia is declared guilty of all obvious and perceived problems. Naturally, the document also reflects the “Navalny case”. Earlier, the European Parliament had already issued two resolutions. One in connection with the alleged poisoning, and the other after the arrest of the Russian opposition YouTuber Navalny. Tough measures against Moscow were proposed in previous resolutions as well. In some ways, their intention is consistent with American bills on “draconian sanctions”, such as DASKA: to designate a “lowest denominator” and possible measures that the European Union could potentially take. The threat of disconnection from SWIFT was the “icing on the cake”, which, as expected, was popular in the media success.
However, the markets ignored the resolution of the European Parliament. There are several reasons for this.
First, the period of aggravation of the situation in Donbass is clearly over. Yes, the problem itself has not been resolved. The conflict will smoulder for a long time, and new rounds of escalation will be still felt. There are no prospects for the implementation of the Minsk agreements. However, the prospect of an open military clash, which loomed on the horizon a month ago, has receded into the background. Ukrainian diplomacy was unable to achieve progress towards the revision of the Minsk agreements, although it temporarily returned the topic of Donbass to the political and media mainstream. Russia has shown that it is ready to balance the military build-up in Donbass without hesitation and to respond to a possible attempted military solution. The next round of exacerbation has so far fizzled out without leading to qualitative changes in the sanctions regime against Russia, or in the political positions of the parties.
Second, the radical proposals of the European Parliament are unlikely to find a response in the European Commission and the EU Council. The head of EU diplomacy, Josep Borrell, has already noted that decisions on restrictions on SWIFT and Nord Stream 2 are not within the competence of the European Union. It is obvious that disconnecting Russia from SWIFT will lead to colossal losses for both Russian business and EU companies doing business with Russia. The refusal to purchase Russian energy resources will also lead to significant costs. The Nord Stream 2 project remains in the interests of the European Union and Germany. Moreover, the disconnection from SWIFT, taking into account its consequences for the Russian economy, can simply be perceived by Moscow as an act of aggression with all the ensuing political consequences. The EU is losing the opportunity to strengthen and promote the role of the euro as a more desirable instrument for international payments. In particular, the share of the euro is likely to grow in trade between Russia and the PRC, ousting the US dollar. Manipulation with SWIFT will hurt Brussels’ plans to promote the euro globally.
Finally, thirdly, the real magnitude of the political contradictions between Moscow and Brussels is clearly not up to such radical steps. Yes, relations between Russia and the EU are in a deplorable state. The political dialogue periodically breaks down amid mutual accusations. There are no ways to resolve the most serious contradictions so far. However, the “level of support” of the existing, albeit bad, relations is still strong and its “breakdown to the bottom” has not yet taken place, even despite a number of recent local shocks. The “warehouse case” in the Czech Republic has not generated a pan-European chain reaction and has mostly damaged bilateral relations between Moscow and Prague. Most of the EU members are not eager to get involved in this scandal. The Navalny case will remain a toxic asset for a long time to come. But it, too, has not yet led to fundamental shifts. As for Ukraine, Moscow is clearly not eager to get involved in a military conflict, although it has demonstrated its force. To a certain extent, such demonstrations even reduce the likelihood of a violent scenario in the resolution of the conflict. At the same time, they do not bring political solutions closer. In general, the existing problems are large-scale. Their cumulative effect will increase. But its weight for the measures proposed in the European Parliament resolution is clearly not enough.
The only innovation that currently has a political perspective is the proposal for a new sanctions mechanism on corruption. A similar mechanism has recently been established in the UK. It involves freezing the assets of persons suspected having ties to corruption. The European Commission may well develop proposals for such a mechanism and submit it to the EU Council for consideration. The chances of its approval are very high. However, even if it is used against Russian individuals, its impact on economic ties between the EU and Russia will be extremely low. This may be the reason for the possible success of such an idea. The European Commission and the EU Council will show that they are loyal to at least some of the requirements of the European Parliament. At the same time, the use of the mechanism will remain in their hands, and the risks for the business will be minimal.
Moscow will also draw its conclusions from the rhetorical exercises of the European Parliament. Despite the fact that the risks of it implementing the recommendations of parliamentarians are negligible, this is another incentive for the Russian authorities to continue working on an alternative financial infrastructure in partnership with their foreign partners, who are also the target of unilateral restrictive measures.
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