Connect with us

Religion

The Holy Spirit and Mother Mary

Abigail George

Published

on

There’s a Eucharistic art to it that we must we aware of when we discuss the roles of the Holy Spirit and Mother Mary. The natural environment. The supernatural. The neurological. The psychological. The monk in prayer and meditation. The celibate life. The immaculate conception. I often gather new insight into modern religious doctrine and teaching from the Austrian poet Rainer Maria Rilke. Let us look at the Christian in awe of God. In awe of the biblical teachings of the supernatural. From an early age, we are taught hope, faith, love.

For the church, for the believer, the non-believer, the atheist believing in spirit is a calling. As the believer is called to service. In suffering the believer must serve. In sorrow we are tested. In sorrow, the believer must serve. Conflict and war will always result in pain, emptiness, futility. Physical wounds are healed, scars remain as a reminder just as stigmata. It is psychic wounds that remain. Words that hurt. Words that challenge us to the very fibre of our being. When you give of yourself to the supernatural God, the believer is uplifted and empowered.

That there is still hope, faith, love for the soul of the non-believer and the spiritual progress of the atheist. Humanity is at a point in time where we are disregarding empathy foolishly and without a second thought. We no longer regard our eternal brotherhood as sacred. And so, I come to humility. The grace of humility and the gracious mercy it offers us. What is the meaning behind the organic semblance and docile acceptance of the living embodiment of Christ. The holy sacraments. The sacred positivity that stems from the rituals of prayer.

Supplication in the church, the crowning of thorns, the thirst, the Kingdom come, angelic realm, obedience and forgiveness are all sacred gifts like the fruit of Mother Mary’s womb. This is life. The figuring out on which side we are on. The simple matter or the complex mandate. How do we choose worship? How does worship exist in all of the pre-existing structures of the church? Why do we believe in the first place? We spend our whole lives celebrating ceremony, searching, studying, observing, education ourselves in rigorous teachings of past scholars.

Scholars that have come before us. Prayer, is it just subtle? Is prayer and meditation on the fruits of the spirit mere moral subterfuge. We have this longing for understanding of the divine and the mysterious, the sacred and the blessing, the understanding of our cultural gifts, tradition and heritage. What is the meaning and the purpose behind the moral fibre of our humanity? Where does it come from if not from an omniscient and omnipresent God? Now let me come to the holiest of holies. God, the Christ. The Christian Saviour. The sacred divine meaning.

The sacred purpose. The sacred sanctification. The moral compass. Is the living Christ a conservative God? A transformative figure that renders every psychological construct in the being of man, every paradigm shift in modern society, the framework of psyche and intellect, the mental and emotional faculties, the physical body and attitude that commands all self-control. That gives rise to a self-concept, the ego, the identity of man and church, the branch of motherhood, sisterhood, obedience, prayer, meditation, spiritual progress and confidence.

The believer sees the effervescent and vital energy, synergy and synchronicity behind the beauty and the ugliness of poverty and death. And in poverty and death, in the cultural background of poverty, looking at it from a religious perspective of piety and grace, we find supernatural signs there. Hidden meanings and a rich symbolism there. In death, the self-concept, the physical body is diminished. The physical in death renders itself to the ether. To the unseen, the eternal (eternity) and the hereafter. In death time stands still. Suffering ceases.

Look at this statement. That humanity is complete in the eternity of poverty and death but is it not our knowledge for the hunger of how we continue to exist that has perplexed humanity for all time. Death and poverty pulls and pushes the believer in the direction of ultimately being perplexed about what spirituality and the spirit really is. The biblical landscape offers us proof and understanding beyond the physical scope. The biblical landscape offers us so much more insight. Is the church nothing but an empty ritual or is it sacred beyond measure? It is not dogma.

It is not dogma that defines who we are. It is our longing for the fruits of the spirit. It is coming to the realisation that there is more to the ideology of the sonship, the fatherhood and the Godhead. For millions of years, this landscape that we know of as creation is nothing more but proof of the living and unspoiled legacy of the Saviour. Of Christ. Of our Lord Jesus, son of David that was promised to the disciples (the followers), by the sanctification of the brethren. All who seek an audience. All who sought the King of kings. The alpha and omega. The son.

To have an audience with Him, the son of God. The creator of the universe. Priests in ancient time were the gateway keepers to Abba, the living and self-fulfilling prophecy of Jesus Christ, the son of David. What perfect meaning does the Eucharist give to our lives. It is not an arrogant or proud or weak God that we serve. We are taught through the sonship about the privilege of the church, the flesh and blood of Jesus Christ, the fact that he died on the cross of Calvary, that he was sent to earth to save us from our sins. Man, man worships with a sacred impulse.

It is a divine mystery. It means to honour, to obey. The ten commandments are a manifesto of sorts. In prayer, in silence, there is no moral ambiguity, no singularities of deceit, no acts of immorality or theological deception embedded in doctrine and religious treatise. No matter how much we would like to think of our holy Father as just being, He is also a mystery. A mystery of joy and sorrow, grace and mercy. In the past, the biblical teachings were taught about God in such a way that the believer was held hostage to an unforgiving God.

This is where purification takes place by partaking of the body of Christ. Humanity has laws and systems in place that govern us that continually test our faith. The living example of Jesus Christ lives through us. Our norms, values, belief systems that were taught to us through Mother Mary and the Holy Spirit protect us. God is forever omnipresent in these views and statements. We are given the Holy Spirit in the universal household of the church. Mother Mary is our mother. The sonship belongs to us. Holy communion, the body of Christ, the flesh and blood.

Mankind, humanity, the church is raised in the family. Mother Mary becomes the matriarch and the Godhead the patriarch in the family unit. Raised from birth to believe. From the cradle until death we live with the promise of eternal life. We are taught from an early age that the mother-figure is nurturing. The father-figure is caretaker and protector not only of his children but also of his family. It is the same for the living Christ and the resurrected figure of Jesus Christ. We are all descendants from a higher unseen power. A power of spirit. Of holy Saints.

That in and of itself is a powerful statement. Another, the descendants of the Lord Jesus Christ, son of David, the religious teachings, mandates, doctrines passed down from generation to generation, the fatherhood, the sonship, the holy spirit and Mother Mary when taken out of the church makes for an important and significant statement. It is the good news of the Redeemer. Of the Saviour. The eternal trinity. The fruit of the womb of Mother Mary when the immaculate conception took place was a blessing veiled in disguise. It teaches us to have a forgiving heart.

The psychological framework and truth of the spiritual Father, the Christ-like energy and progress is not something that is a complex ideology. The Christ-like effigy, the absolute energy of the Saviour is never arbitrary. We are making a serious mistake (but this is common) if we look at the Christ-like figure as a grave illusion. This Christ-like figure is capable of love, hope, faith and empathy. For without empathy there can be no religious doctrine. Our spiritual maturation comes with the understanding of benevolence and devotion and worship of Mary.

To realise what the gifts are of the holy spirit and Mother Mary is to look at the biblical perspective of the sonship and the Godhead. The gift of the truth belongs to the believer. We only have to contemplate, meditate upon, worship this figure, of Christ, our Lord and Saviour who leads His believers. It is the Godhead that reigns supreme.

Abigail George is a feminist, poet and short story writer. She is the recipient of two South African National Arts Council Writing Grants, one from the Centre for the Book and the Eastern Cape Provincial Arts and Culture Council. She was born and raised in the coastal city of Port Elizabeth, the Eastern Cape of South Africa, educated there and in Swaziland and Johannesburg. She has written a novella, books of poetry, and collections of short stories. She is busy with her brother putting the final additions to a biography on her father’s life. Her work has recently been anthologised in the Sol Plaatje EU Poetry Anthology IV. Her work was nominated for the Pushcart Prize. She briefly studied film.

Religion

How Constantinople changed the Orthodox World

Published

on

Soon it will be one month since the Ecumenical Patriarchate reinstated the primates of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC KP) and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and finally headed for granting the Ukrainian Orthodox Church the Tomos of Autocephaly.

This decision has already led to large-scale changes in Ukraine and the Orthodox world. So, what’s happening?

Ukraine: Property redistribution, fighting for the new Church’s Primate chair and uncertainty

The first thing the Ukrainians did was redistributing property. A part of the deal between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko on Autocephaly was a number of real estate items in the center of Kyiv. As it is rumored, Metropolitan Emmanuel of France visited the country to review the objects; their size and value quite impressed him.

On October 18, Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada passed the President’s bill on handing St. Andrew’s Church in Kyiv to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Up to that moment the church served as the UAOC’s cathedral but its primate Metropolitan Makarios supported the presidential decision since his organization will be part of the new united Ukrainian Church and he is ready to sacrifice for it.

Meanwhile the UOC KP is getting ready to obtain new real estate items. On October 20, the Synod changed the title of its head: now he will also be the “Holy Archimandrite of the Kyiv-Pechersk and Pochaiv Lavras”, which belong to the UOC MP. On the eve of elections, Filaret seems to demonstrate his supremacy before Makarios and the UOC MP. As it is known, the UOC KP and UAOC are in long-lasting conflict, which escalated since the Tomos will be granted shortly.

The UOC MP certainly is in no haste to recognize Constantinople’s decision: the clergy of a few large eparchies of the Moscow Patriarchate vote for Metropolitan Onufriy and against the Tomos. Met Onufriy openly claims that the Phanar’s actions are uncanonical and calls for defending the faith. Bishops won’t join the new Church without their clergy and dioceses.

For instance, in predominantly anti-Russian Rivne Oblast in western Ukraine, all the clergy and monks unilaterally supported Met. Onufriy.

At a voting by secret ballot in Odessa Diocese, only 3 (!) priests of 406 were against Met Onufriy.

Metropolitan Sofronios of Cherkasy was the only bishop of UOC MP dioceses who openly supported Autocephaly. Cherkasy Diocese’s voting by secret ballot showed that nearly all of the local clergy deprecate the Autocephaly. Facing criticism, Met Sofronios had to publically state that he “won’t join the same Church with Filaret.”

In case Filaret and Makarios don’t reconcile and UOC MP bishops stand aside, the Unification Council will fail. The only result yielded by the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s strategy would be an exarchate and valuable property in the center of Kyiv. But where is the promised unity of the Ukrainian Church?

The world: A schism, the declining authority of the Greek Orthodoxy and the Ecumenical Patriarch

The Ecumenical Patriarchate has failed to reach concord in the world Orthodoxy. It is starting to divide into two camps. Despite the cut ties, Moscow couldn’t be isolated: the Patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch and Slavic Churches are against Constantinople’s hasty actions on the Ukrainian question and the conflict is expected to be universal.

Such stand-offs can’t foster the positions of the Greek Orthodoxy. Constant quarrels between the Local Churches undermines the authority of the Orthodox Church in the eyes of Roman Catholics and Protestants: the Greek Orthodoxy once again looks ridiculous.

The ambiguous events influencing the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s reputation also added oil to the fire. First, the contents of the confidential talks on August 31 with Patriarch Kirill were leaked. The negotiations were recorded only by Constantinople’s representative, so it couldn’t have been published without prior consent of Patriarch Bartholomew.

The Ecumenical Patriarch is quite aggressive toward the Russian Orthodox Church without presenting grounds for his accusations. Thus, he has recently blamed Moscow for the dissemination of “well-paid articles” and “black propaganda” without clarifying what he meant.

Obviously, scandals like this one and aggression toward other Churches negatively affects Bartholomew’s reputation. Moreover, it looks like the Ecumenical Patriarchate strives not for the Unity of the world Orthodoxy but for its own supremacy over other Churches.

There should be recalled the situation with the “pearl in Constantinople’s crown” – the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America (GOA). In summer, some of its influential supporters spoke about independency following the example of Ukraine, but these talks were cut off. Meanwhile, for several months the Phanar has been trying to displace Archbishop Dimitrios. Against the background of the Ukrainian Autocephaly and open war with Moscow, the attempts to restrict the GOA’s independence and kick out its primate look cynical. Otherwise, it can urge the Archdiocese’s clergy and laity to unite for independency.

Relations with the ROC: the future of the ecumenical dialogue in question

The rupture between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate has influenced not only the processes between the two Churches. In cooperation with the ROC, Constantinople conducted active inter-confessional negotiations, but since Moscow refused to take part in them, the future of the relations, first of all with Roman Catholics, are not that promising. Now the talks led by Constantinople won’t be all-Orthodox, and this can be a pretext for predominantly anti-Ecumenical Churches to abandon them.

Besides, the Phanar’s actions will affect the Orthodox Diaspora: without the ROC, the Assemblies of Bishops won’t be that effective, their activity can stall.

At this moment, it’s unclear what awaits us in the future but one thing is obvious: the Orthodox world has changed and it will never be the same. Yes, Constantinople has won in the battle for supremacy becoming “the first without equals.” But the price is too high.

Continue Reading

Religion

The Politics of Canons and Borders

Daniil Parenkov

Published

on

The conflict surrounding the Orthodox church in Ukraine has moved irrevocably beyond the purely intra-ecclesiastical agenda. Experts, political scientists, and journalists have plunged headlong into the subtleties of canon law, the history of intra-Orthodox relations and discussions of the psychological profiles of the church hierarchs. As a rule, they consider the situation in a rather limited political context, assessing its consequences either for Russia–Ukraine relations or for Russia’s relations with the West.

At the same time, the problem of autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is far broader than the question of the future of Orthodoxy in a particular country or its relations with its neighbours. It would seem that a more extensive analysis of the current processes is possible using the approaches employed in the modern theory of international relations, which acknowledges the existence in global politics of denominational actors with their own objectives and principles [1]. Such a post-secular take will make it possible to delineate the interests of secular and religious actors and assess the balance of power on the political and religious map of the world (that overlap, but rarely coincide).

Orthodox Centres of Power in Global Politics

In recent history, the Roman Catholic Church has long been the only significant religious actor of in the international arena. Historically, the Holy See was sufficiently independent of secular authorities, and had the structure and resources that allowed it to harbour global ambitions. In the 20th century, the Lateran Accords made it possible for the Roman Catholic Church to retain its secular extra-territorial authority. In terms of “religious economy,” the Roman Catholic Church, as the world’s largest denomination, was bound to perceive itself on a global scale, which it does, seeing all countries and continents as its “religious market.” Other religious movements lacked either the requisite strength of numbers or a requisite structure acting on behalf of its followers, or were subordinated to secular authorities, which made it impossible for them to entertain similar ambitions. This applies to autocephalous Orthodox Churches that either viewed themselves as regional actors or simply struggled for survival.

The first window of opportunity for the emergence of independent Orthodox centres of power appeared with the fall of the Russian and Ottoman Empires, the two states in which virtually all the world’s Orthodox population was concentrated. The Patriarchate of Constantinople immediately seized the opportunity afforded by the weakening of control over the religious sphere and attempted to use its status as the “first among equals” to take the leading positions in the family of Orthodox Churches. In 1922, Patriarch Meletius II of Alexandria declared Phanar’s right to govern the parishes of the so-called diaspora (that is, the parishes outside the territories of local Churches), and in 1923, he attempted to hold and chair a “Pan-Orthodox Congress.” Moreover, same year, taking advantage of the difficult situation of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), Meletius II hastened to spread his influence on its territory as well. He took the Orthodox population of Estonia and Finland under the governance of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and also interfered in the affairs of the Church in Poland. The ROC’s independence at the time was so fleeting that the growing demands of the Phanariotes encountered virtually no resistance.

As the USSR grew stronger and the Soviet Empire emerged, the opportunities of independent Orthodoxy were shrinking and finally collapsed when the world split into two global ideological camps. Orthodoxy found itself in the part which did not presuppose any independent ecclesiastical institutions. It should be noted that the provisional “restitution” of the ROC’s canonical territories which took place as the USSR moved West, was the result of the secular authorities, not the ecclesiastical authorities, realizing their interests.

The situation changed radically with the collapse of the USSR. About 185 million Orthodox Christians, over 90 per cent of their total number, lived in the countries of the former socialist bloc (primarily Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Kazakhstan). For the first time in modern history, large Orthodox communities that emerged on the ruins of the Soviet Empire had their own ecclesiastic bodies independent of the secular authorities. The actual, rather than the nominal separation of church and state (which in the post-Soviet and post-Imperial reality mostly meant that the state would not interfere in the affairs of the Church) allowed the ecclesiastical hierarchy to reconsider the significance and purposes of the institutions they headed. As soon as they became accustomed to the new situation of religious freedom, as soon as this part of the “market” that previously had been excluded from the global religious economy was opened, the struggle to define roles, boundaries and common goals intensified within Orthodoxy.

The process of shaping a new system of international ecclesiastical relations was launched in the Orthodox world. The word “new” here essentially means “first.” The Orthodoxy did not have its “Westphal” capable of serving as the starting point for defining common canonical rules and stable canonical boundaries. Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, where intra-ecclesiastical relations are regulated by a codified and regularly updated canonical law system enhanced by the efficiency of its hierarchical organization, Orthodox Churches do not have a uniform canonical law for intra-Orthodox relations. The most recent Ecumenical Council took place in 787, and the most Local Council, whose provisions were included in the Orthodox Canon Law, concluded in 880. The majority of key documents on church governance date to the 4th century. Such distance in time inevitably creates room for various readings and interpretations. Local Churches regularly accuse each other of misinterpreting a particular rule to fit their interests. The lack of more modern documents that are recognized by all churches is largely due to the above-mentioned limited international agency of Orthodox Churches.

The “great powers” of the Orthodox world – Constantinople and Moscow – took shape during this process. Of all the Churches, they are the only ones with sufficient resources (although they are of different nature), hierarchs of the requisite mindset and, mostly importantly, with the desire to fight for the right to format the “Orthodox factor” in global politics. As for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, its principal and essentially only resource is the “symbolic capital” of its “first among equals” status. The ambitions of the Phanariotes are determined by the conditions of their survival: without the Pan-Orthodox status and inclusion into the global “religious market,” the ecumene of the Ecumenical Patriarchate will dwindle to 3000 Istanbul parishioners, which even the western media never fail to mention. The Patriarchs of Constantinople cannot afford the role of leaders of a national church, the role most Orthodox leaders assume, because they do not have a national church.

Moscow’s stance is based on an entirely different logic. Even without Ukraine, the ROC’s parishioners account for over a half of all Orthodox believers. The Russian Orthodox Church also inherited from the Russian and Soviet empires the largest and most well-developed infrastructure and an established system of relations with today’s Russian authorities: these are resources that other churches lack. The idea of Moscow as the “Third Rome,” as the holy keeper and defender of global Orthodoxy, is inheritance that the ROC received from its “symphony with the state.” This self-perception of both church hierarchs and large proportion of parishioners, multiplied by their numbers, prompts the Moscow Patriarchate to define its global strategy.

“Phanarian Papism” vs. “Council Confederation”

The differences between the models that Moscow and Phanar offer to the rest of Orthodoxy turned out to be fundamentally opposite. Based on the nature of its resources, the Patriarchate of Constantinople banked on unifying the Orthodox world along the lines of the Catholic model, striving to transform its primacy of honour into unquestionable primacy. The course Meletius II set in the early 20th century was continued by his successors in the late 20th century. Thus, one of Constantinople’s first acts following the collapse of the USSR was to establish ecclesiastical bodies in Estonia parallel to those of the ROC. For obvious reasons, other Orthodox Churches gave Phanar’s ambitions the cold shoulder. It should be noted, however, that Constantinople made a rather effective use of its “symbolic capital” outside Orthodoxy proper, converting it into recognition of the Patriarch as the spiritual leader in the eyes of the West. Such was the purpose of the frequent meetings that the Patriarchs of Constantinople held with Popes, the inclusion of environmental issues on the agenda and the other tactical moves aimed at establishing themselves in the role of Orthodoxy’s principal speaker in the western media space.

The model proposed by the Russian Orthodox Church can be provisionally termed a “council confederation” model. The ROC strove to enshrine the existing areas of canonical influence and set clear rules of the game based on making decisions at councils following the principle of a consolidated position. The ROC probably counted on retaining the leading role through its qualitative and quantitative superiority over other churches. At the same time, the Moscow Patriarchate demonstrated certain flexibility: internal mobilization of resources and centralization of power go hand in hand with the readiness to grant broad autonomy to individual parts, and conservative rhetoric in Russia coexisted perfectly within the framework of establishing contacts with Catholics and Anglicans.

Ukraine as the Point of Collapse

The problem of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian church would have never grown to its current scale had it been solely a matter of the independence of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. A competitive environment formed in Ukraine that made it possible for various religious organizations to co-exist in the country regardless of anyone’s recognition. Canonical law does not affect issues of property or worship. Those of Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchs who wanted absolute independence from the Russian Orthodox Church could opt for non-canonical bodies. A significant number of bishops would still prefer to remain part of a larger community with another scale of interests. This desire can hardly be explained by some external pressure, more likely, it is testimony to their similar views on the role and strategy of the Russian Orthodox Church. Ultimately, it should be kept in mind that Ukrainian hierarchs account for nearly a third of Russian Orthodox bishops, and nearly a third of delegates at the 2009 Council that elected Patriarch Kirill of Moscow were Ukrainian citizens.

The current actions of the Patriarchate of Constantinople are based on its own interests, which could only be implemented in today’s international situation. The increasing struggle between the ROC and Phanar took its final shape in 2016 with the collapse of the Pan-Orthodox Council that had been in the works since 1961; for the Orthodox world, it would have become the Eighth Ecumenical Council. With the refusal of the Russian Orthodox Church and several other Churches to attend the Council, the issue of determining a universally acceptable system of international ecclesiastical relations was driven into a virtual impasse. The opportunity to determine the map of the Orthodox ecclesiastical world through negotiations was missed. The further logic of the process demanded a conflict that would serve as a catalyst for the public uncovering of contradictions and setting down the real balance of power.

The conflict surrounding Orthodoxy in Ukraine proved to be just such a catalyst. The Patriarchate of Constantinople used a local coincidence of its interests with those of the Ukrainian authorities and the geopolitical situation to move to the active stage of the conflict. Phanar declared the territory outside Russia that was of great importance for the ROC to be its canonical demesne. Additionally, by lifting the anathema from the leaders of Ukraine’s schismatic churches, Phanar practically confirmed its vision of itself as the final judicial body of the Orthodox world. It does not matter whether the Ecumenical Patriarchate will grant autocephaly to a specific religious body in Ukraine or whether it will look for ways to formally subsume the Ukrainian Church. In any case, its key objective is to remove this territory from the area of Moscow’s influence and to stake out its own presence there thereby enshrining the new balance of power.

A Schism or Disintegration?

The conflict between Moscow and Constantinople has reached a new level. Its further development will determine the future of the world Orthodoxy and affect, at the very least, the position of Christianity in Europe, where some 257 million Catholics and about 200.5 million Orthodox Christians live. If the contradictions between the principal centres of power are not resolved, then the risk it that Orthodoxy may cease to exist in its current form. Without the Russian Orthodox Church, the Orthodox world loses any qualitative significance. And without the “symbolic power” of the rest of the Orthodox world, the Moscow Patriarchate is no more than Russia’s national religion, which may sit well with some politicians and hierarchs, but contradicts the internal logic of the Church and Christian universalism.

The current situation encapsulates the failure of both the Phanar and Moscow models, and their revitalization appears unlikely. Subsequently, events may follow one of two principal scenarios. The first scenario will be determined by the disintegration of the family of Orthodox Churches. Granting autocephaly to the Ukrainian church sets a decisive precedent for triggering the atomization of Orthodoxy. The protestant principle of “one state, one church” will deal a blow not only to the ROC, but also to other Orthodox churches, including the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The scale of disintegration will increase through the collapse of the unified legitimation system and, consequently, through the multiplication of Orthodox sects and the increased personal ambitions of individual bishops who would want autocephaly for themselves or at least autonomy within their states. Ukraine will be the first on the list; ultimate canonical confusion there will create all the requisite conditions for an explosive growth of the number of self-proclaimed patriarchs. Atomization will entail marginalization and relegation to the periphery of the religious world map. Emasculating and adapting the Church doctrine to the new realities, essentially an Orthodox “Reformation” and the end of universal Orthodoxy and the Diptych as its symbol will be the final chord in this scenario.

The second scenario is slightly less dramatic. The conflict between Phanar and the ROC will end with Orthodox Churches splitting into two camps with centres in Moscow and Istanbul. Other Orthodox Churches will try to remain neutral, but the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow will force them to pick a side. Orthodoxy will be plunged in its most deep-running split since the Great Schism. Long-term, neither party is likely to win. The schism will either evolve into disintegration, or return to the starting point of the 1990s. The struggle between the two camps will effectively remove Orthodox Churches from global religious politics; the Roman Catholic Church will boost its standing in global Christianity and ardent Protestant denominations will be far more visible on the religious map than Orthodoxy.

Under both scenarios, a way out of the crisis is possible if new charismatic leaders emerge who are capable of offering new integration points for the Orthodox world. Ethnic or country affiliations will have no special significance; what is going to be of far greater importance is the ability to sweep along the believers who are tired of the canonical confusion, militant rhetoric and the feeling of conflict. One could suppose that the project of “Orthodox reboot” will go beyond the boundaries of the current Orthodox borders. Both Ancient Eastern churches (often counted when calculating the total number of Orthodox churches) and individual non-Orthodox Churches (such as the Armenian Church or the Anglican Church) may also be involved.

Under any scenario, the current situation decreases the level of autonomy of Orthodox Churches while increasing their dependence on secular authorities as their potential sponsors or allies in the struggle against the opposing camp. Given the experience of church–state relations within Orthodoxy, the religious sphere is under threat of politicization, while the influence the Church has on political processes will shrink. Globally, it entails the dwindling of “religious multipolarity” as a factor in maintaining the political multipolarity.

  1. 1. See, for instance, Wilson E. After Secularism: Rethinking Religion in Global Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 222 pp.

First published in our partner RIAC

Continue Reading

Religion

Is the Ecumenical Patriarchate Fine with St. Andrew’s Church in Kyiv?

Hanna Wozniak

Published

on

On October 18, Ukrainian Parliament approved the handover of St. Andrew’s church in Kyiv to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. During the second hearing, 237 deputies voted for the bill (first, 216 deputies gave their votes). The project was personally initiated by President Poroshenko. It is reported that Parliament obliged the Cabinet to complete the handover in one month since the bill is adopted.

St Andrew’s Church was constructed between 1747 and 1754, to a design by the Italian architect Bartolomeo Rastrelli, and is rightfully considered one of Ukraine’s most beautiful religious structures.

Now it is the cathedral of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), but it’s a state property and part of the Sophia of Kyiv National Sanctuary. That is why the decision to hand over the church was reviewed by members of Parliament.

Nevertheless, the church won’t be transferred to the ownership but for use of Constantinople. As the bill reads, it was done to provide the Phanar with a place where its clergy can hold services, ceremonies and processions – on condition that the Ecumenical Patriarchate will comply with cultural protection laws.

Obviously, the UAOC’s consent was also obtained. Its primate Metropolitan Makarios said that if the UAOC was part of the new Local Orthodox Church he agreed to give his cathedral to the Exarch of Constantinople. Along with this he claimed that the UAOC needs another church in Kyiv in return, for example, St. Cyril’s Church or Church of the Savior at Berestove.

But here comes a peculiar detail: St Andrew’s Church was closed for restoration in 2015 and since then services haven’t been held there. The restoration will continue for at least a year and only after this the building will be opened, said a representative of the National Sanctuary complex “Sophia of Kyiv”, which owns the church. Besides, a special agreement will be signed between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the sanctuary complex according to which the church will operate both as a place of worship and a museum (like the Refectory Church of St. Sophia’s Monastery where services are held from 8 till 10 AM, and later it is open as a museum).

Does this property comply with the demands of Constantinople? After the Synod held on October 9-11, the Phanar published the decision on Ukraine’s autocephaly. One of the points was to restore the Patriarchate’s Stavropegion in Kyiv. According to Poroshenko, St. Andrew’s Church will become the “embassy” of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Ukraine. Kyiv seems to have decided that Constantinople would be fine with a church closed for restoration. The representatives of the world Orthodox leader would reside in a museum – and that, as politicians think, also shouldn’t confuse the Phanar. Moreover, the church won’t be owned but only used by Constantinople.

The Patriarchate seems to have come around with it as Secretary of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP), Archbishop Yevstratiy (Zorya) noticed that the state and the Phanar already agreed upon St. Andrew’s Church becoming the cathedral for the Stavropegion. But why was this very church, witnessing a long-standing restoration, chosen for the Constantinople Exarch?

Meanwhile, intriguing is the behavior of Filaret (Denysenko), the now-recognized primate of the UOC KP. On October 20, the UOC KP Synod changed the title of its head. Now the Church’s Primate will also be called the Archimandrite of Kyiv-Pechersk and Pochaiv Lavras, which seemingly reflects Filaret’s desire to get them at his disposal. At the moment both Lavras belong to the UOC MP, so it looks like the “Archimandrite” doesn’t want to comply with the fifth point of the Constantinople Synod decree in which the Patriarchate appeals to all sides involved that they avoid appropriation of Churches, Monasteries and other properties.

In any case, the transfer of St. Andrew’s Church shows how chaotic the process of creating a new Church in Ukraine is. Isn’t there a more decent estate to hand over to the Ecumenical Patriarchate?

Continue Reading

Latest

Newsdesk5 hours ago

UN sounds alarm as Venezuelan refugees and migrants passes three million mark

The number of refugees and migrants who have left Venezuela worldwide has now reached three million, the two main United...

New Social Compact6 hours ago

Hunger and obesity in Latin America and the Caribbean compounded by inequality

For the third consecutive year, the number of those chronically hungry has increased in Latin America and the Caribbean, while...

Green Planet7 hours ago

Putting the brakes on fast fashion

Fashion revolves around the latest trends but is the industry behind the curve on the only trend that ultimately matters...

Terrorism8 hours ago

ISIL’s ‘legacy of terror’ in Iraq: UN verifies over 200 mass graves

Investigators have uncovered more than 200 mass graves containing thousands of bodies in areas of Iraq formerly controlled by the...

Reports11 hours ago

From unemployment to growing cyber-risk: Business executives have different worries

There are significant differences in risk perceptions across the eight regions covered in the World Economic Forum’s Regional Risks for...

Africa12 hours ago

South Sudan Need to invest in peace for economic development

The 2017 Global Peace Index (GPI) shows that despite continuing socio-economic and geopolitical turmoil in the world, there are more...

Americas1 day ago

Trust: Lessons from my Brazilian driver

Trust takes years to build, seconds to break, and forever to repair– Anonymous Be safe. That’s what we’re always told...

Trending

Copyright © 2018 Modern Diplomacy