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Is There Such A Thing As “Ethnic Conflict”?

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“Ethnic conflict“ has become a very fashionable notion. However, it was not always so. Indeed, in the not-so-distant past such a notion was practically unknown. In the pre-modern times, conflicts were assumed to take place between power-holders, over pieces of land. The former sought to seize, control and exploit all resources within the latter, including the population that was also perceived and treated only as yet another resource for exploitation.

Ethnic identities of the population residing within particular territories were totally irrelevant to the power-holders and hence did not serve as a source of disputes and conflicts between them. Indeed, having been treated as yet another resource for exploitation, the inhabitants of the targeted lands were regarded as essentially identity-less. What mattered to the power-holders was the land itself, with all its resources, including the subjects residing there. And the subjects themselves, no matter whether they had several diverse ethnic identities or a single unified one, were so powerless as to be unable to launch a conflict between themselves, let alone a rebellion against the power-holders. Thus the powerless could only serve as the powerful’s assets for the land’s occupation and exploitation of its resources. 

Given the increasing presence of the term „ethnic conflict“ in the public communication, we may rightfully ask whether the nature of power, and hence the nature of conflict, has changed so much as to make identity, rather than power itself, the source of the modern type of conflict? True, during the tide of the 18th- and 19th-century revolutions it was proclaimed that power was granted to the people, who have thus ceased to be mere subjects. It was proclaimed that sovereignty – that is, the exclusive power to control a territory and exploit all its resources – was taken from the powerful and given to the powerless. Ever since, sovereignty itself has become treated as a matter of inherent right, that is, a natural posession of the latter, rather than a matter of exercised power, that is, a natural acquisition of the former. Thus, in the earliest modern theories of sovereignty, the former subjects were proclaimed a collective sovereign. And, in accordance with its newly-acquired collective nature, sovereignty itself was proclaimed indivisible and non-transferable. For, whereas the pre-modern individual sovereignty could easily be divided between the sovereign’s descendants and transferred to them by inheritance or marriage, the very concept of modern, collective, popular sovereignty does not allow for any such arrangements: the sovereignty of the people can neither be divided between its collective sub-parts nor distributed among its individual members, nor can it be transferred to them or to any other people. And, according to the derivations of the classical theories of popular sovereignty gathered under the umbrella-name of „nationalism“, the possession of collective identity by a particular people equates to the right to sovereignty, i.e. the exclusive right to control a territory and exploit all its resources. Since identity is thus practically equated with sovereignty, conflict itself comes to be perceived as a struggle for control over a particular collective identity as a presumed source of sovereignty, rather than a struggle for sovereign control over a particular piece of land. Within such a discourse, it becomes conceivable that entire peoples fight one another, simply to assert their identities, which can only be achieved in the form of sovereignty over particular territories. And then, it also becomes conceivable that entire peoples, having successfully asserted their identities in the form of sovereignty over particular territories, strive for mutual „reconciliation“.   

Such discourse, derived from the aforementioned modern theories of sovereignty, dominates the public sphere in almost all modern societies. However, has the nature of power really changed so much as to translate a struggle for control over a particular territory into a struggle for control over a particular collective identity? Or does the discourse itself attempt to hide the true nature of power, centered around the struggle for a particular territory,  and all its resources,  by traditional power-holders, who now appear as a personification of peoples’ identities?

A brief analysis of the so-called „ethnic conflict“ and the so-called „post-conflict transition“ in Bosnia-Herzegovina may offer  a straightforward answer to these rather abstract questions. This particular case is used as a paradigm that depicts the essence of power-relations hidden under the mask of the modern nationalist discourse, according to which ethnic groups naturally fight each other in order to assert their respective ethnic identities and seize exclusive control (that is, sovereign power) over respective targeted territories.

So, let us define the notion of ethnic identity and its application to the Bosnian political environment. Without any ambitions to provide a comprehensive definition, but rather an operative one, we may define this type of identity as being rooted in a myth of common origin. In this sense, members of an ethnic group share a belief in their common ancestors. They may well share common language, religion, values, and customs; but they may also share some or all of these features with other groups. What distinguishes one group from all others, and what constitutes the basis of its identity, is a shared myth of common ancestors. There is yet another important feature that usually caracterizes ethnic groups, which makes them distinct one from another and from other types of groups: a link with a particular territory, which a group considers its own living space and commonly depicts as a land of its forefathers. It means that such a territory is directly linked with the group’s identity. Such a territory normally has its provisional boundaries, fluctuating together with the symbolic boundaries of the group itself. Within the frame of the modern nationalist discourse, when a group asserts its will  to transform provisional territorial boundaries into formal state borders, it transforms itself into a sovereign nation. Of course, a group does not have to share a myth of common origin to claim sovereignty over a particular territory and thus transform itself into a nation: it is sufficient for a group to become homogenized by a claim to sovereignty to undergo such a transformation; Americans are probably the most famous example.

Now, let us see how these parameters apply to the groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina usually referred to as ethnic ones. Firstly, they all share a common language, which every independent linguist would confirm without hesitation; and they also share it with the populations of the neighbouring countries of Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia. Secondly, they all share common South Slavic origin, and most of their common traditional customs; in other words, if we put aside their diverse religious traditions (Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim), we may well say that they share a common culture. Thirdly, prior to the 1992-1995 war, they never had distinct ethnically defined territories and predominantly lived together, especially in urban areas. As sociological research has shown, distinct religious groups may live mixed in common areas, whereas distinct ethnic groups usually possess or aspire to possess their distinct territories, just as distinct nations possess or aspire to possess their separate sovereign states. So, from a sociological point of view, prior to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, its distinct groups predominantly displayed the features of religious, rather than ethnic or national, groups.

On the other hand, in the former Yugoslavia, and especially after its breakup, in the public discourse these groups were commonly referred to as „nations“. This practice was particularly strange given the fact that one of them was commonly named after its religious identity as Muslims; at the same time, the other two were commonly labeled as Serbs and Croats, in accordance with the nationalist narratives established in the Balkans by the end of the 19th century, which basically proclaimed all Catholics members of the Croat nation and all the Orthodox members of the Serb nation. In this way, labeled as „nations“, they were all implicitly stimulated to claim sovereignty of their own, that is, to claim exclusive control over particular territories and thereby transform these territories into sovereign states or, alternatively, to cede these territories from Bosnia-Herzegovina and unite them with the neighbouring nation-states, Serbia and Croatia. Strangely, these narratives, mostly coming from Serbia and Croatia, have never encountered serious intellectual or political resistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although they represent a clear threat to its integrity. Obviously, the very meaning of the term „nation“ has never been taken into serious consideration by social scientists in this country. Of course, pragmatic politicians have not missed the opportunity to utilize the implications of the term for their own purposes.  

However,  these hidden implications never took the form of overt territorial and political claims before 1991. Prior to that, the very idea of distinct, let alone separate, ethnic territories within Bosnia-Herzegovina had been inconceivable. Yet, since then, this idea has acquired monopolistic status within the public discourse in this country. How has this happened?

The whole process was launched in a rather bizarre way. Prior to the elections in 1990, in which the three ethnonationalist parties won for the first time, the whole country was suddenly flooded with hundreds of thousands of the so-called ethnic maps, according to which particular ethnic groups were assigned „their own“ territories, on the basis of statistical majority: wherever a particular group had a majority of 51%, that piece of land was assigned to the group as its exclusive possession. No one has ever explained who was behind such a huge and expensive intelligence operation, but the very appearance of the maps in such huge numbers was a clear suggestion to all the country’s inhabitants that they should classify themselves along the lines of ethnic division and consequent territorial partition. Indeed, ever since then the idea of belonging to a particular ethnic majority in a particular territory has become the prime stake in the country’s political life. Ever since, the leaders of the three ethnonationalist parties have been persistent at using the maps manipulatively to  raise insecurity and tensions among the country’s inhabitants, the majority of whom hitherto had not cared much about articulation of their ethnic identity, let alone about creation of exclusive ethnic territories. However, the maps and the politicians’ messages clearly signalled that one’s existence, indeed one’s very survival, was to be projected only within such units. Systematically spread rumours that the ethnonationalist leaders were already negotiating how to distribute territories as the exclusive ownership of their respective groups directly supported such projections.

The next decisive step to implement these maps on the ground and officially partition the country along the ethnic lines was instigated by the Chairperson of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington. Ethnic partitioning was further promoted by his aide, the Portugese diplomat Jose Cutilleiro, who led a  series of secretive negotiations between the leaders  of Bosnia’s three ethnonationalist parties, Mr Izetbegović of SDA, Mr Karadžić of SDS, and Mr Boban of HDZ, known as the Lisbon Conference in 1991 and 1992. It is of the utmost importance to note that these negotiations began a  year before the Bosnian war started, so that the partition was NOT proposed because of the necessity to end the armed conflict (as all „international mediators“ have subsequently claimed). Moreover, it was the war itself that was fought along the lines drawn on the map agreed upon in Lisbon, where the ethnically profiled armies were taking over the agreed territories to become ethnically exclusive. Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina was fully partitioned in Lisbon well before the war. However, the war itself, alongside  the process of ethnic cleansing, was necessary to implement the partitioning on the ground and eliminate minority population from the territories earmarked for  ethnic majorities. That may be the reason why any reference to the Lisbon Conference has remained shrouded in silence. Of course, the Conference itself was held in almost total secrecy, but the main reason for its absence from the official history is that it  established the permanent normative framework not only for the war operations and ethnic cleansing, but also for all the subsequent failures to restore the Bosnian society and state to its pre-war form.

What was reportedly promoted in Lisbon was simply a map of the intra-state borders, which were implemented by the war operations,  formalized by the subsequent peace negotiations, and are still in existence preventing the restoration of the normal pre-war communication between the country’s citizens. However, what the Lisbon Conference actually promoted is no less than a total overthrowal of the most basic principles of popular sovereignty, those ones declaring that sovereignty is essentially indivisible and non-transferable. In Lisbon, the state sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the basis of its Constitution, was divided into three parts and then transferred to the three ethnic groups represented there by the three ethnonationalist leaders. Each of the groups was assigned particular territories over which their respective political structures have since attempted to exercise sovereign control.

The subsequent developments, based on the assumptions adopted in Lisbon and formalized in the Dayton Peace Agreement, have demonstrated that even such a twisted interpretation of sovereignty has not been an end of the transformations of the country’s structure. For, these territories, formally assigned to the three ethnic groups to exercise sovereign control over them, have practically been transformed into private property of their respective ethnic oligarchies. Even such a divided and transferred sovereignty has been reduced to private land ownership, with most of the resources within these territories having been granted as private property to individual members of these oligarchies, under the pretext of privatization, which was set as a precondition for joining the Western structures, such as the European Union and NATO.

Obviously, the so-called „ethnic conflict“ which physically destroyed the country between 1992 and 1995 and continues to destroy the Bosnian society in the political and economic sphere,  has never been performed as an interface between the three communities. Since its very beginning, it has been a process of distribution and redistribution of private possessions between the three ethnic oligarchies. As such, it has always been a product of the premeditated political strategies. These strategies have been promoted and performed by the local political oligarchies, but have also been sponsored by some of the global players, whose agenda – from the Lisbon Conference to the present day – has been the partition of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This also means that the so-called „ethnic conflict“ is not to be regarded as an inherent part of the collective identity of the country’s existing ethnic groups, but rather as an artificially generated project designed by the aforementioned local oligarchies and their global sponsors,  in accordance with their immediate political goals.

As usual, these power-holders – just like those pre-modern ones – have sought to establish their own control over particular territories in order to assure possession and exploitation of their resources. The so-called „ethnic conflict“ in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been just a cover-up, as is usually the case with „ethnic conflicts“ around the world. Such is the nature of power, and it has not changed. It is only that power-holders now seek to cover it up by mobilizing the masses and trigerring massive conflicts, depicting it as genuine conflicts between entire collectivities.

In this sense, the terms „reconciliation“ and „post-conflict transition“, implying that so-called „ethnic conflicts“ are authentic occurrences on the level of entire collectivities rather than artificial products generated on the level of narrow political elites, should also be dismissed as misnomers. 

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Any signs of a chill between France and Germany?

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The past few months have seen many signs of growing friction and divisions between the two European superpowers, Germany and France. Before the February vote on changes to the EU Third Energy Package, meant to expand the European Commission’s power to regulate Europe’s electricity and natural gas market, France opposed, until the very last moment, Germany’s position on the issue. In April, Paris and Berlin failed to agree on how much more time Britain should be given to decide on its withdrawal from the EU. During the recent presidential elections in Ukraine, France and Germany supported various candidates. Moreover, they are equally divided on who will be the new head of the European Commission. What is happening in relations between members of the “European tandem”?

During the latter half of 2018, it looked as if relations between the EU’s two powerhouses were reaching a new strategic level. In a joint statement made in Meseberg in June, Berlin and Paris outlined their shared vision of the European Union’s future development. In late August, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas simultaneously spoke out about a new role for Europe to make it “sovereign and strong.” During their informal meeting in Marseille in September, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel agreed on a coordinated response to the main challenges facing Europe and on concerted work on shaping the “agenda for Europe.”

In November, the two leaders spoke in favor of creating a “European army,” “real Pan-European armed forces” capable of defending Europe. And in January of this year, they inked a broader cooperation accord in Aachen, which commentators described as a “new big step” in bringing the two countries closer together. The Treaty of Aachen covers new areas of political cooperation, including common projects and commitments in the fields of defense and international relations.

Just a month later, however, the Franco-German rapprochement hit a snag over two strategic projects worth billions of euros, namely the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and trade relations with the United States. Here the interests of Paris and Berlin differ the most. Underscoring the seriousness of the rift, Emmanuel Macron canceled a planned trip to a security conference in Munich in what many commentators described as a “demonstrative” move. As for the issue of completing the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, the compromise reached by France and Germany and approved by the European Parliament, imposed on Berlin “a formula that the German government wanted to avoid.”

Regarding the issue of trade relations with the United States, it wasn’t until mid-April that Brussels collectively managed to prevail over France, which had been blocking the start of pertinent negotiations with Washington.  Any delay may cost the German automakers multi-billion dollar fines from the United States. If the French succeed in delaying the start of negotiations, Germany, which is already experiencing a sharp slowdown in economic growth, may end up the loser again.

France’s sudden move left the German media guessing whether Macron’s actions were dictated by his displeasure about Berlin’s “slow response” to his initiatives, or by Donald Trump’s threat to sanction companies involved in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, including the French concern Engie. Or maybe Macron had resorted to this “show of force” in a bid to strengthen his hand amid the conflict with the “yellow jackets” and growing tensions with Italy?

Indeed, the statement made in Meseberg and the treaty signed in Aachen could have proved too much of a compromise for Macron, if not a serious blow to his ambitions. According to critics, “the Treaty of Aachen dodges the most sensitive topics characteristic of modern Europe.” Including migration and political unification of Europe – something Macron is so eager to accomplish. The treaty makes no mention of a common EU tax and financial policy, while the issue of creating a single economic space is spelled out declaratively at best. Angela Merkel essentially emasculated virtually all of Macron’s initiatives pertaining to the financial and economic reform of the EU and the Eurozone. Emmanuel Macron has been out to become one of the EU’s leaders, or even its sole leader, ever since he became president in 2017. All the more so following Britain’s exit from the bloc and amid the ebbing political authority and the planned resignation by 2021 of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, once the informal leader of a united Europe.

The current political situation in France is also calling for more decisive actions by President Macron. To ensure at least a relative success in the upcoming European elections, he needs to enlist the support not only of the traditional left-and right-centrists, but possibly of some representatives of the new European right too. Whether or not Angela Merkel stands down in 2021, or after the elections to the European Parliament (as has been rumored since April), Emmanuel Macron essentially remains the only top-level proponent of greater European integration. (Unless Merkel ultimately moves to the head of the European Commission, of course). With Macron eyeing a second presidential term in 2022, the advancement of the modernization model for France depends directly on the success of the European project. And here any significant changes in the European Union “mainly depend on the position of France’s privileged partner – Germany.”

All this means that Macron needs a breakthrough now that Berlin is going through a “complicated power transit” with Merkel having resigned as the head of the CDU and preparing to hand her post as Federal Chancellor over to a successor. Therefore, she is now taking her time and, according to her successor as CDU leader, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, is holding out for a new vector in the development of the European project as “the common denominator of the distribution of political forces after the elections.” Does this mean that Berlin’s is staking on the success of its candidate in the ongoing struggle for the next president of the European Commission? For the first time ever, the CDU and the CSU have managed to nominate a common candidate who has “good chances” of heading the EU’s executive body.

Meanwhile, Berlin is facing an intractable dilemma. Since 1949, “avoiding by all means situations necessitating a hard choice between France and the United States has been a key principle of German foreign policy.” This approach “survived all governments and coalitions, and was maintained after the reunification of Germany.” Under the present circumstances, however, remaining firmly committed to the transatlantic relationship threatens to further destabilize the European integration project, which is now seen as being key to Germany’s future. Simultaneously, a course aimed at minimizing damage from the policy of external powers that threatens the fundamental German interests might necessitate radical and ambitious geopolitical maneuvers that would almost inevitably revive the Europeans’ and Americans’ historical fears of “German instincts.”

US and British analysts already worry that “the

[geopolitical]

shackles that are voluntarily accepted [by Germany] can be thrown off.” They also wonder how long it will take before new generations of Germans want to restore their country’ full state sovereignty.

In Germany itself, promotion of such slogans have already given the Alternative for Germany party (AfD) the third largest fraction in the Bundestag. A major paradox of the current European and German policy is that Berlin’s activity or passivity is equally detrimental to the Pan-European project and could eventually lead to the EU’s fragmentation and even disintegration.

However, the Franco-German “tandem” is already being dogged with contradictions and compromises, which are highly unpopular among many in the German establishment. The cautious response by many EU members to the latest joint geopolitical initiatives of Berlin and Paris, gave Germany more reasons to fear that Macron’s global ambitions could exacerbate the differences that already exist in the EU. Many in Germany have long suspected Macron of wishing to make the EU instrumental in his foreign policy aspirations.

Some experts still believe that at the end of the day the current chill between Germany and France may turn out to be just a sign of the traditional “propensity for taking independent political decisions.” The sides are sizing each other up to see “who will be setting the rules of the roadmap in the future.”  Also, Paris’s tougher stance towards Berlin may be a tactical ploy, a pre-election maneuver to “hijack” part of the agenda from the “national populists” of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe where many people are not happy about the German “diktat.”

Emmanuel Macron has proved once and again his ability to ride the wave of public discontent with certain issues. His Plan for Europe, published in early March, carefully avoids any mention of France’ and Germany’s leading role in advancing EU reforms.

On the other hand, the foreign policy of the leading European powers has a long history, and long-term geopolitical considerations continue to play a significant role. Germany, for one, has traditionally been looking for a counterweight to the Anglo-Saxons, while France – to German dominance in Europe. As a result, the search by Paris and Berlin for common points of political contact is now turning into intense efforts to find the “lowest common denominator.” The overall impression is that we will only be able to see a greater deal of certainty in relations between the two countries after the results of elections to the European Parliament have been summed up.  The distribution of roles both within the “European tandem” and in the EU as a whole depends on which political forces – pro-Macron or pro-Merkel, the Europeans will vote for.

 First published in our partner International Affairs

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Sino-Italian Partnership and European Concern

Mohamad Zreik

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A crucial moment in modern European history is that the European doors opened to Chinese President Xi Jinping in Italy during a reception that is like receiving kings and leaders. Once again China is moving west despite all the American warnings from the Chinese dragon coming from the East, and this time it was Italy’s accession to the One Belt One Road initiative.

The Chinese president said that his country’s relationship with Italy is excellent and that the Sino-Italian common interests are the basis for a fruitful future. The Italian prime minister said that Italy is a key partner in the Belt and Road initiative and that trade between Italy and China should increase. But all this positive atmosphere is met with dissatisfaction and fear by the United States and some Italians, which is totally opposed to dealing with China because it considers it a threat to its national security and therefore to the national security of Italy.

In order to prevent espionage or transfer of experience by the Chinese, it was agreed to establish an oversight authority. In an expression of US rejection of the agreement, White House official Garrett Marquis wrote last week on Twitter that Rome “does not need” to join the “New Silk Road”. In an effort to ease US concerns, Luigi Di Maio said before taking part in an Italian-Chinese economic forum in Rome that the relationship will not go beyond trade, as we remain allies of the United States, and remain in NATO and the European Union.

The Italian economy, which is in a recession, is pushing the Italian government to form an alliance with China. Many European policy experts consider Italy to be a Trojan horse for China in the European region, which will have political implications for the future of the EU and the future of the Italian-American relationship; especially as the Chinese giant Huawei is expected to participate in the launch of the technology “G5” mobile phones in Italy.

China’s opening up is not limited to Italy, but to Europe as a whole. In the last visit by the Chinese president to Europe, he moved from Italy to Monaco and Paris and met President Emmanuel Macron, who is trying to open up to Beijing. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has opposed the Sino-Italian rapprochement with signing the agreement to join the Belt and Road Initiative, so that Italy will be the first G7 country to join the initiative.

Beijing is interested in investing in Italian ports, including the port of Trieste on the Adriatic, to boost its exports to Europe. Italy seeks to balance trade with China. According to official data, trade between the two countries grew by 9.2% compared to 2016, reaching 42 billion euros. Italy managed to cut its trade deficit with China by 1.37 billion euros, increasing exports to Beijing by 22.2%, while imports rose to 28.4 billion euros, an increase of 4% compared to 2016.

But the most important issue remains the weak Italian economy, which will survive under Chinese debt, and the Sri Lankan experience proves that China is dealing with countries with economic interests. So, will the European gateway withstand the Chinese economic giant, or will it be a Chinese economic and political region in the future?

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Summit in Berlin: Pressure on Serbs

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On April 29 Summit of the Western Balkans leaders was organized under the initiative of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron. In advance, it was known that the whole meeting was organized only and exclusively because of the Kosovo issue. Summit was opened by German Chancellor Merkel and French President Macron who pointed out that Western Balkans remains EU priority, adding that this is only an informal discussion, and no final solutions for Kosovo should be expected. The official meeting was followed by a working dinner, that finished late in the evening.

A letter summarizing the pledges of the meeting with a special focus on Serbia – Kosovo dialogue and economic integration of the region, was signed as the event concluded. After the meeting was concluded, President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic stated that the talks had been difficult, but nevertheless thanked Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron for their contribution. According to him, it shows their commitment for the Western Balkans, which is important for maintaining peace in Europe. He added that everybody urged Kosovo`s leaders to revoke the tariffs  introduced for Serbian goods .

President of self-proclaimed Kosovo Hashim Thaci also found last night talks difficult, adding that the Summit finished without any tangible results. Frozen conflict between Belgrade and Pristina has to be overcome, Summit‘s participants jointly concluded, said Thaci to the journalists in Berlin. Thaci stated that, even though there will be no border exchange, he will advocate that Preshevo Valley becomes part of Kosovo. Kosovo’s President expressed dissatisfaction because for Kosovo has not been abolished visas, and reminded that Kosovo fulfilled all the requirements for visa liberalization.

Prime Minister of self-proclaimed Kosovo Ramush Haradinaj pointed out that the recognition by Serbia is the first step towards the progress, but not the final one. Haradinaj stressed that it is unacceptable to change the borders, because if the borders change, it would lead to new ethnic divisions and maybe violence.

It is particularly interesting to point out that on the summit in Berlin, Bosnia and Herzegovina was represented by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina Denis Zvizdic, and if Denis Zvizdic has no legitimacy. Namely, Denis Zvizdic is currently in a technical mandate until the new Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is elected, while Milorad Dodik, chairman of Bosnia’s tripartite Presidency, is the only legal representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, since Milorad Dodik is a Serb and publicly declares that Kosovo is a southern Serbian province, Denis Zvizdic was called. And Zvizdic, on summit, pointed out that every country in the Balkans has internationally recognized borders and that the basic EU principal is not to change the existing ones. This statement primarily refers to Republika Srpska, which accounts for 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina and wants to be independent. But Denis Zvizdic, like all other Bosniak politicians, supports an independent Kosovo.

Prime Minister of Croatia Andrej Plenkovic said that the key messages were directed at the attempt to unblock Belgrade – Pristina Dialogue. Together with his Slovenian colleague Marijan Sarec, Plenkovic was the only other leader of an EU country present at the meeting, apart from Merkel and Macron.

Prespa Agreement was once again pointed out as a model for successful resolution of bilateral disputes. Prime Minister of North Macedonia Zoran Zaev emphasized the importance of normalizing the relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and urged the EU to recognize the progress achieved by his country by opening accession negotiations in June.

Concluding Thoughts

The main objective of the summit in Berlin was to send a clear message that the demarcation between Serbia and Kosovo will not be allowed, and to exert additional pressure on the Serbs. At this summit, Germany and France also clearly stated that it was completely unacceptable for them to change the boundaries along ethnic lines. Also, the European Union makes it clear that they want to resolve the Kosovo issue.

However, the fact that there are no representatives of the United States in the negotiations does not reflect the real situation. Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj has recently publicly stated that Kosovo has no foreign policy, but that the foreign policy of Kosovo is lead by the United States. The only reason why the United States is not officially present in the negotiations is that it could be a reason for Russia to engage in negotiations.

And the change in the format of negotiations and the entry of Russia into the new format of negotiations would be the strategic interest of Serbia. Unfortunately, the current Serbian government does not open that question. Exactly opposite, President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic led secret negotiations with Hashim Thaci and Federica Mogherini, illegally arranging demarcation between Serbia and self-proclaimed Kosovo. Aleksandar Vucic, together with Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic, has already done a great deal of damage to Serbian interests in Kosovo. Signing the Brussels Agreement,  Vucic and Dacic agreed to the abolition of Serbian institutions in Kosovo. So now there are border crossings between Serbia and Kosovo, in northern Kosovo which is  predominantly inhabited by Serbs now is established Kosovo Police. And Serbian judges  now take an oath to President of self-proclaimed Kosovo Hashim Thaci, who is considered a terrorist in Serbia.

Serbian authorities strongly lobby in Russia that official Moskow accept the plan of demarcation between Serbia and Kosovo. Recently, Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic was in Moscow, while the Serbian President recently met in Beijing with the President of Russia. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov have repeatedly made clear that Russia supports any agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, which is within the framework of the UN Resolution 1244. That is a very smart position of Russia, supported by an absolute majority of Serbian citizens.

Because if the plan of current Serbian authorities was accepted, that would result in an independent Kosovo, against which is the absolute majority of Serbian citizens. An independent Kosovo would soon be united with Albania, which is a member of the NATO alliance, and Kosovo would automatically become a NATO territory. All this would result in Serbia’s accelerated path to NATO and EU, as well as the introduction of sanctions against Russia.

First published in our partner International Affairs

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