Energy

Battle for Hydro in the War against Climate Change

Published

6 years ago

August 9, 2017

Propelled by the 2016 Paris Agreement there is global impetus towards clean renewable energy. The need now is to invest in ‘paradigm shifting technology’ to fuel clean development,and with the help of think tank reports and energy expert analysis we have clearer understanding of what the harbingers of this endeavour are: biomass, geothermal, wind power, solar, ocean energy, biofuel, and hydro*.

An asterisk (or parentheses) after hydropower alerts one about the numerous caveats surrounding this technology. Hydropower (other than small hydro) is not considered new or paradigm shifting. Indeed, the parentheses for small hydro being the lack of consensus of what it means; reports define it to be anywhere from <10 to <50 MW. Yet, it is this caveat that determines the future of investments into hydropower — and the future of the countries who rely on them–in our climate conscious world.

The investments into hydropower, especially in climate vulnerable developing countries, are complicated because they interlace with the Right to Development and the principle of climate justice. Radical arguments for starving investments from hydropower without consideration of historical and political complexity is a disservice against the fight to eradicate poverty and manage climate change.

Global Investments

In early April, a letter, addressed to the Board of Directors of the Global Climate Fund, and signed by 272 environmental organisations asked that no investments to be made on “large” hydropower. The letter highlighted three projects that were at in the GCF pipelines: Qairokkum Hydropower Rehabilitation (126 MW), Tajikistan; Tina River Hydro Project (20 MW), Solomon Islands; and Upper Trishuli-1 (216 MW), Nepal. The last of which was not up for the April review.

They argued that technology used in large hydros – regardless of whether its reservoir or run-off-the-river, as in the case of Upper Trishuli 1 – was not paradigm-shifting and its climate resilient reputation was doubtful.

GCF is the financial mechanism under the UNFCCC, which helps finance investment in climate-resilient development. The fund “helps developing countries limit or reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapt to climate change. It seeks to promote a paradigm shift to low-emission…taking into account the needs of nations that are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts.”

The question of whether hydro ought to be considered clean or not – or will continue to be considered clean – is an important one for investment starved countries like Nepal, Tajiskistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Solomon Islands (all countries either low or medium in human development). In countries with immense hydro potential, it is this sector that continues to be the most attractive for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The competition for access to infrastructure investment is already high. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asia needs to invest USD 26 trillion by 2030 to resolve a serious infrastructure shortage, to maintain growth and address climate change, i.e. an estimated demand of USD 1.7 trillion per year to meet its infrastructure gap. The gap is particularly wide in the power sector. Only a fraction of which is currently met, whether through international financial mechanism, through public-private investments or institutional investors. As demand for clean infrastructure increases and the supply of capital remains limited, the priority given to infrastructure investments – especially by international financial institutions — will change.

Hydropower plants, with huge political and environmental risks will be a financially treacherous.

The GCF board has given the go-ahead to Qairokkum Hydropower Rehabilitation, and Tina River Hydro Project. But the concerns about hydro are unlikely to die down. Protest against hydropower rage from Brazil to Kenya. Increasingly Green Chip investors in the developed markets are weary about the future of hydro. The climate and political risk continue to put them off as they find new and less capital intensive renewables in which to to invest. For instance, while investments in wind and solar have been rising, investments in small hydro –defined as <50 MW — has continued to decline since the 2010. It stands at USD 3.5 billion compared to USD 113.7 billion for solar and USD 112.5 billion for wind. The 48 percent decline in hydropower investment between 2015 and 2016 reflect the trend of shrinking interest.

Development Banks, a major backer of hydro, are cautious of adding large hydro to their portfolio. Compelling projects and governments to be more creative with capital generation in order to stay attractive to new classes to investors. Improved investments require a stable and conducive policy and an environment which ensures payment security. None of which is facilitated by environmental fear mongering over hydropower, making the task of these countries more difficult.

Case against hydro

To be certain, the case against certain hydropower projects, especially the reservoir type, is unflattering. Studies show that reservoirs emit methane, which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) estimates has a Global Warming Potential (GWP) of 34 – it has 34 times the impact of carbon dioxide on the atmosphere over a 100-year period. The GWP for a 20 year period is estimated to be more devastating at 84, before it decays into CO2. Further, hydro projects endanger fish from migrating, alter ecosystems, and destroy carbon sinks. Additionally, there is the problem that climate change itself is altering river flows and making it harder to sustain hydro projects. A 2012 study, in the journal Nature Climate Change, concluded that emissions from hydropower, especially in tropical regions, were often underestimated and could exceed those of fossil fuel for decades. The study also makes the case that Clean Development Mechanism should stop helping fund large dams without considering their carbon footprints.

Even notwithstanding the debate about the exactitude of climate changes impact on hydropower generation (or hydropower generation’s impact on climate change) consider a list of other climate findings: Nepal’s contribution, for instance, to global climate change is negligible, its CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) are at mere 0.2 versus 11.7 of Norway, 37.8 for Qatar, and 16.4 for the USA. IEA reports suggest Nepal’s per capita electricity consumption is at 128 kwh/capita versus the Asian average of 918. Yet it suffers tremendously from climate change – a problem for which it has no historic blame. The stats are similar for countries like Tajikistan with a CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 0.44, and Kyrgyzstan is at 1.72 metric tons.

Methane as reported in CO2 equivalent over 100 years conversion period is at 5,408 for Tajikistan, and 1,449 for Solomon Island versus 499,809 for the US, and 106,847 for Canada. Then there is a question of atmospheric trade offs. Studies of life cycle assessments show that majority of life cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emission estimates for hydropower – run off the river- cluster between about 4 and 14 g CO2eq/kWh, whereas the figures for coal, across all technologies, was at 979 g CO2e/kWh. Natural gas weighed in at 450g CO2e/kWh. The figures of coal and natural gas are important. In the lack of stable renewable sources much electricity being produced or imported into these growing economies comes from these energy sources.

For instance, Nepal is economically burdened by the import of petroleum and LPG, choked by the haze of black carbon, and reduced to buying coal-fuelled electricity from India. This despite having the potential to produce and export enough hydroelectricity for its own needs and then some for a growing economy like India. Lack of institutional investments and continued obstructionism intensely harms economic and environmental health of this climate vulnerable country. How environmentalists can recommend obstructing international investments to develop hydropower in Nepal seems incomprehensible. As historian and environmentalist Martin W Lewis writes, “Environmental opposition to such plans and projects is understandable, as they all come at a big cost to nature. But the huge atmospheric trade offs must also be acknowledged.”

If the argument of right to develop, climate justice and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility are to have any validity then rants against investing in countries in need of capital must stop. This is not to argue that countries that have been historic non-polluters should have a pass to develop irresponsibly. Reform in the hydropower sector, and investing criterion calls for intense environmental and social impact assessments into project feasibility. And governments and international institution that stand as guarantees are increasingly responsive and open to such consideration. Risk screening for project financing include an increased emphasis on climate change impacts and natural disaster risk, with both the World bank and IFC working to make projects climate smart and resilient.

Then there is the issues of human rights. Land, often belonging to indigenous people is allocated and flooded with little consultation or just compensation. And even when there is stakeholder engagement it is often limited, not particularly inclusive and alienating. The issue of resettlement is an important one, and is of intense consideration during project impact studies. Hydro sector has come a long way to acknowledge and systematically address many complex issues. Stakeholder engagement, consultation, impact assessment and resettlement programs are legally mandatory. Any project that damages human settlement without stakeholder consultation, timely and just compensation or grievance redress mechanisms is a non-starter. Could project developers, funders and governments do more when these protocols are violated? Of course. But to suggest that they haven’t tried or regardless of attempts to move towards implementing ever rigorous standards hydro is inherently as condemnable as fossil fuels is disingenuous.

Any argument that seeks to limit access to finance for hydro in countries with untapped potential must be accompanied by an argument for transfer of technology, increased finance for improved grid connectivity, and other renewables. For now other forms of renewables cannot meet the growing demand — regardless of how carefully the demand side is managed. Without any acknowledgment of trade-offs or the potential of these investments to lift millions out of poverty, limiting access to finance in hydropower rich but energy poor countries is fighting the wrong fight.

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Energy

Seeing Japan – Indonesia Collaboration in Energy Transition Cooperation

Published

6 days ago

March 25, 2023

I Gusti Ngurah Krisna Dana

Holding the G7 presidency, Japan is increasingly active in establishing relations with several countries. One of them is Indonesia. The relations that have existed so far between Indonesia and Japan are widely visible on the surface. One of them is in the energy transition sector. Indonesia is in need of a large investment to achieve net zero emissions in 2060. An investment of more than 500 million US dollars is needed to make this happen. This is indicated by the great effort to reduce energy that uses fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) in people’s lives. Including efforts from Japan to cooperate with Indonesia or vice versa in achieving net zero emissions.

Abundant Natural Resources: A Privilege for Indonesia

The abundance of natural resources owned by Indonesia is an important point for the continuation of cooperation between Japan and Indonesia. Natural resources such as hydrogen, geothermal are important values to be further developed into renewable energy. This is a breath of fresh air for Indonesia, which is trying to achieve net zero emissions by 2060.

Replacing fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas to renewable energy requires extra effort, Indonesia which is rich in energy resources requires a lot of money in terms of exploration of natural resources. renewable energy resources, such as hydrogen, geothermal. renewable in Indonesia. One of them is through a funding scheme through the Asian Zero Emission Community (AZEC). Through this funding, Japan, which is known to be very generous in helping developing countries in terms of energy, is expected to be able to bring change to the renewable energy transition in a country rich in energy resources, Indonesia. This transition certainly requires a short and gradual process.

State Electricity Company of Indonesia abbreviated as PLN, states that dependence on new coal will decrease in 2030. This is due to the presence of power plants from renewable energies such as geothermal, solar, hydrogen and nuclear and wind (Kompas, 2023).

Japan’s Investment to Indonesia

Indonesia, with all its abundance of energy resources, is considered capable of developing an energy transition. The development of electricity from geothermal, water and biomass are the main sector. This was conveyed by the Government of Japan through Deputy for International Affairs, Ministry of Economy and Industrial Development of Japan Izuru Kobayashi. He stated that his party was ready to assist Indonesia in achieving net zero emissions in 2060 with an environmentally friendly funding and technology assistance scheme.

The above was also supported by another Japanese party, namely from Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC). Quoting from IJ Global, SMBC has financial assistance to Asia Pacific countries for clean energy projects through Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group of US$1.5 billion, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group of US$1.2 billion, and Mizuho Financial Group of US$1.2 billion. 1 billion US dollars. In Indonesia alone, as of September 2022, SMBC had invested US$221 million.

Various forms of support by Japan as donors and companions for Indonesia to develop renewable energy should be appreciated. According to the author opinion, this is a challenge for the Government of Indonesia and all of stakeholders inside, to create an investment environment that is safe, good and useful for Indonesia’s future. The use of fossil fuels such as coal for power generation needs to be slowly substituted using renewable energy. The Jokowi administration’s policy of subsidizing electric vehicles for the public can be an entry point for the continuation of Indonesia-Japan collaboration in realizing the energy transition.

Energy

The Maneuvering Of Gas Commodities As Securitization Of Russia’s Geopolitical Position

Published

2 weeks ago

March 18, 2023

Luky Yusgiantoro

Authors: Luky Yusgiantoro and Tri Bagus Prabowo

In 2012, the Yakutia-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas pipeline project was redeveloped under The Power of Siberia (News Ykt, 2012). Putin legalized Gazprom (contractors: Gazprom Transgaz Tomsk). The idea named “Power of Siberia” represents the power of gas pipelines to shape and influence Russia’s geopolitical and geoeconomic situation. A new identity will be launched, conveying the Yakutia-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas pipeline and gaining international prominence. The Power of Siberia project is an integrated form of GTS (Gas Transmission System) that will bring the Irkutsk gas region in the fertile eastern part of Russia to the Far East and China. The pipeline location is located in the “Far East,” incredibly close to the border with China, and generally in the Asia-Pacific region. Initially, this gas pipeline was built to facilitate gas trade with China and reduce China’s dependence on coal (Pipeline Journal, 2022). What is the value of this project for both countries to become global concerns?

Furthermore, they have the ability or range to carry gas communications for approximately 4000 km. Due to its geographical proximity and shared economic interests, China is Russia’s most progressive partner in terms of a multifaceted regional and international strategy. Russia and China are known as close partners. The aftermath of Russia’s political alliance was to regain global power, status, and influence lost after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, which was the driving force behind the end of the Cold War (Oualaalou, 2021 ). Russia has articulated a vision of rebuilding its global reputation using energy, military might, intelligence, and diplomacy. Russia wants to play a crucial role in the global multipolar system because the West rejects Russia’s vision for a new geopolitical order. They saw many important events related to Russia’s moves in the international order, including its response to the actions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to try to dominate the nations of the world. The former Soviet Union (East), the failures in the Middle East, the annexation of Crimea, and one of Moscow’s recent invasions of Ukraine mark the military as a turning point in Russian geopolitical politics, especially during the Putin era. Russia has three strategic initiative points, including the ability to deploy and interconnect the means (intelligence, diplomacy, military, cyber, and energy) to gain influence and extend Russia’s global footprint. There is.

Moreover, the Fallacies and Western Ties strategy contradicts America First foreign policy tenets (unipolar) and impulsive decisions as a security threat. Russia wants to maintain its lack of regional interests in certain Baltic states (those still under Russian control) and the Balkans (Cooley, 2017). The Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, and Serbia) have been the cornerstones of great power rivalry for centuries. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the EU (European Union) used the momentum of Yugoslavia’s dissolution in the 1990s to integrate the Balkans as geopolitical hotspots on the Western Front (European Policy). War analysts say the ongoing Ukraine conflict is a way for Russia to raise its stakes in the Balkans and reassert its regional influence (McBride, 2022).

In 2020, natural gas will still be the world’s third-largest primary energy requirement for the global community. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2019, demand for natural gas increased by 5.3% to 4 trillion cubic meters (TCM) in 2021 (BP, 2022). In 2021, Russia’s total natural gas production will be 701.7 billion cubic meters, the second largest globally, contributing to the strong demand in the global energy market. Russia is essential in the natural gas market (Sonnichsen, 2022). The climate crisis is the most obvious obstacle in the global gas market model. It originates from burning carbon with materials derived from fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal. However, natural gas is acceptable during the energy transition as it burns the least carbon dioxide (CO2) and pollutants of these three substances (EIA, 2022). It is easier than supplying a gas infrastructure that does not provide infrastructure. Operationally, it is optimal. Talks about climate protection, the climate crisis, and the energy transition are being shaped by Western countries as a way of highlighting Europe’s dependence on gas from Russia, which is geographically accessible and still has gas in other gas reserves. The decision to stop sourcing natural gas from Russia continues to cause European controversy. The pipeline network actively built between Russia and Europe is an essential aspect of why this relationship is used as a tool for Russia to apply pressure—on territorial Europe. Europe uses a climate scenario, and Russia uses a gas-dependent scenario. Efficiency and effectiveness will not be achieved if Europe suddenly has to look for other reserves or switch entirely to this energy mix. Then, with Russia’s eloquence in exploiting the situation and the status quo, natural gas pipelines were used as a form of Russian energy diplomacy to dominate its (European) neighbors. Recognizing that the Western natural gas market is no longer preconditioned, moving target consumers to the Asia-Pacific region is one of the most effective energy plans for Russia’s fossil fuel expansion.

Siberia’s first electricity will cost 770 billion rubles, and the investment in gas production will cost 430 billion rubles. The 1,400 mm natural gas pipeline capacity will increase to 61 billion cubic meters (2.2 trillion cubic feet) of natural gas annually. The pipeline lets the world see natural gas as one of the fossil fuels and does not pollute the air with the carbon and other substances of the climate crisis. , through the capital Beijing and down to Shanghai. According to state media, the intermediate phase will go online in December 2020, with the final southern section expected to start delivering gas in 2025 (Cheng, 2022). Through this agreement, Russia aims to extend its power beyond Mongolia into Siberia 2 in 2030 (IEA, 2022). Conditions for Europe to get 40% of natural gas from Russian pipelines. Germany, in particular, sources about half of its natural gas from Russia (Baldwin, 2022). Despite international media reports of embargoes and sanctions, the crisis has hit Europe hard. Europe must adapt its economic policies to politically justified policies and coordinate them with each other. However, this is a geopolitical struggle, and we must ensure that the country retains its absolute superiority. Russia chooses to invest in and plan for natural gas markets in regions that require or depend on natural gas in the energy sector, i.e., Asia-Pacific via China. China, influencing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plan, is reshaping the geoeconomic position of Russia’s Siberia 1 and Siberia 2 power markets (Lukin, 2021). “Geopolitics is all about leverage” is one of Thomas Friedman’s influential geopolitical maxims. If a country cannot expand its influence, it remains a loser. Nevertheless, Russia is far from this analogy, as mentioned earlier. Russia continues to secure its geopolitical position. It is the embodiment of growing confidence in the reliability of natural gas. Russia still wants to become a major player in natural gas.

Energy

Remapping the EU’s Energy Partners to Ensure Energy Security and Diversification

Published

2 weeks ago

March 15, 2023

Dr.Ceyhun Osmanli

Energy security has been a buzz word in Brussels for a few decades but since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, followed by sanctions, Russian gas cut-off and physical destruction of North Stream pipelines, forecasts on strained EU energy production due to drought, the stakes have gotten much higher. This was confirmed on March 10^th by a joint statement by the US President Joe Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, reiterating both parties’ determination to “build clean energy economies and industrial bases”, including clean hydrogen and continue to work together “to advance energy security and sustainability in Europe by diversifying sources, lowering energy consumption, and reducing Europe’s dependence on fossil fuels”.

Last week, the EU energy chief Kadri Simson encouraged all Member States and all companies to “stop buying Russian LNG, and not to sign any new gas contracts with Russia. The EU has pledged to quit Russian fossil fuels by 2027 and replaced around two-thirds of Russian gas last year.

In this context, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), delivering Azerbaijani gas through (Trans-Anatolian Pipeline) TANAP and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to the EU, plays a key role in current diversification efforts. The EU increased gas imports via pipelines from Azerbaijan from 8.1 bcm to 11.4 bcm last year. Only two years after its completion, the expansion of the Corridor seems to be likely as the EU and Azerbaijan stroke a deal in July 2021 to double the volume of gas delivery to 20 bcm by 2027 in addition to plans to tap into Azerbaijan’s renewables potential, such as offshore wind and green hydrogen. While encouraging Azerbaijan’s accession to the Global Methane Pledge, the deal aims at collecting natural gas that would otherwise be vented, flared, or released into the atmosphere.

With the opening of the interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB), at least 11.6 bcm of gas is expected to be delivered from Azerbaijan to the EU this year. The IGB has been dubbed as a game-changer for the EU’s energy security, especially as it enabled supplies to Bulgaria and Romania. A Memorandum of Understanding on gas supplies between Azerbaijan and Hungary was also signed this year, which shows that more interconnectors will be needed in the EU if TANAP would be expanded from 16 to 32 bcm and TAP from 10 to 20 bcm.

Moreover, investments will be needed to increase gas production in existing and new gas fields (Shah Deniz, Azeri Chiraq Guneshli, Absheron, Shafaq-Asiman, Umid-Babek, etc.), especially considering growing energy demand in Azerbaijan and its neighbours. Since the Russia-Ukraine war, 10 European countries turned to Azerbaijan to increase existing supplies or to secure new supplies. To meet such growing demands, Azerbaijan is poised to increase cooperation with neighbouring states, such as Turkmenistan, which is home to 50 trillion cubic metres of gas reserves – the world’s 4th largest reserves.

Following the Azerbaijani-Turkmen decision to jointly develop the formerly disputed Dostluq gas field, a trilateral swap deal between Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, and the 2018 Convention on the status of the Caspian Sea by all the littoral states; Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey stated that they were looking “to form a coordinated and multi-option system for delivering energy resources to global markets” on December 14^th last year.

These developments could be harbingers of a new Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP), a 180-mile under-sea pipeline that could be integrated into the SGC. Labelled as an EU Project of Common Interest, which could also be eligible for funding under the 2019 US European Energy Security and Diversification Act, this strategic under-sea pipeline project could bring an end to the EU’s energy crisis by securing a cheap source of natural gas, whose price is independent of LNG prices while counterbalancing Chinese, Russian and Iranian influence in Central Asia and beyond. On the other hand, Azerbaijan began the transit of oil from Kazakhstan this year in addition to Turkmenistan, which highlights the potential to use the Middle Corridor for hydrocarbons.

During the 9th Southern Gas Corridor Advisory Council Ministerial Meeting and 1st Green Energy Advisory Council Ministerial Meeting in Baku in February, EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson stated “Azerbaijan can potentially become the exporter of renewables and hydrogen to the EU”. At the end of last year Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary agreed to establish a green corridor to supply the EU with around four gigawatts of electricity generated by windfarms in Azerbaijan with the support of the European Commission.

Over the last several months, Azerbaijan signed documents that will provide investments to create 22 gigawatts of renewable sources of energy, both onshore and offshore. In April 2021, the World Bank started funding the offshore wind development in Azerbaijan, which has a potential of 157 GW. In addition to the Caspian Sea, which ranks second in world for its wind energy potential, Azerbaijan has an estimated 27GW in wind and solar power onshore.The current construction of wind and solar plants in Alat (230 MW), Khizi and Absheron (240 MW) and Jabrayil (240 MW) as well as new investment plans, including in Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, are expected to further boost renewables production in the Caspian state all by living up to its vast green potential. While the country, with a population of 10 million, accounts for only 0.15% of total global greenhouse gas emissions, it defines green growth as a key priority for 2030. The EU supports the implementation of Baku’s Paris Agreement commitments through the EU4Climate initiative.

The Russia-Ukraine war may create a window opportunity for the EU to engage in concrete actions rather than high-flying buzzwords, pushing the bloc to do more strategic and visionary planning regarding future projects linked to its energy security, such as TCGP, and finally diversify away from Russian energy sources for good. Azerbaijan has proved to be a stable partner in these challenging times, which manifested the vulnerability of certain EU states against Russian economic and political pressure due to Gazprom’s immense infiltration of their gas markets for the past several decades. Now it’s the time to play fair game by a new playbook and to remap the European energy partners while investing in a stable, predictable, affordable, and sustainable energy future for the EU.