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Macron’s global strategy in Africa and in the European Union

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Both Chirac and Sarkozy had five minutes to leave power, while François Hollande could even have five months to do so. In fact, at the time, eight Frenchmen out of ten approved his decision not to run for another term. As you may recall, part of President Hollande’s establishment did not accept automatically to lend a hand to Manuel Valls, the Prime Minister who wanted to join the “two Lefts”, the one resulting from Hamon’s  proposals for the primary election – a so-called gauche de la tradition –  and the one which was being shaped around Macron, with whom Valls had nothing in common at political level.

 Macron put together the moderate Left – the one of the old “American challenge” of Servan-Schreiber’s radicals – with the less archaic part of Socialism. At the beginning of presidential election, nobody knows how many  people will vote and, in particular, nobody knows the voting criteria yet.

 Nevertheless, for Emmanuel Macron – who was finally supported by  centrists, former non-voters and moderate leftists – politics is fully a marketing technique. We must always realize who does things; actions must be seen immediately. Finally we must perceive that a small advantage is directly linked to the leader’s choice.

 A product, not a program, is sold – and this is an eternal rule. The  founder of En Marche has focused his advertisement campaign on six factors  pertaining to his personality and only on three really referring to his political program.

 He is totally different from the political leaders who preceded him. He wants to reduce the number of Parliamentarians by a third. He  knows very well what needs to be done to redress the French economy because he is a technocrat who owes nothing to anyone. He can recognize good ideas regardless of the camp from which they come. He wants to make employment the engine of his country. He never attacks the other candidates and he always tells the truth. He has founded a brand-new movement of 240,000 members and finally France cannot afford to risk a future economic and social disaster.

 This is the paradigm of Macron’s political communication.

 A well-organized mix of messages such as “a technocrat to power”, “a leader setting great store by employment and the national economy”, the saviour of the country. In particular, he shows he is completely different from all his predecessors.

 If we analyse the electoral promises he made during the last French Presidential election, the real question we should ask is the following: can France still afford electoral political bargaining?

  Are there financial and productive margins to implement even a small part of the programs launched by all candidates in 2017?

 Since 2002 France has been experiencing full economic decline. Since 1980 it has had no steel industry (and certainly France is very interested in the outcome of the judicial and political disaster affecting ILVA steel plants in Taranto) nor sectors such as mechanical precision devices, boilers and thermodynamic grids, shipbuilding, agricultural machinery,  household appliances, textiles and ready-to-wear clothing.

 Since 2002 France has lost 865,000 jobs in the manufacturing industry, a quarter of all employees in a sector accounting for over 12% of the total jobs available.

 In 1980 the jobs in the industrial sector were 5.1 million; in late 2012 they dropped to 3 million and currently there are only 2.9 million jobs still available.

 The value currently produced by companies in France is 8%, the lowest rate in the European Union.

 Deindustrialization, but above all lack of productive specialization of the French value chains.

  Export is another sore point because France produces and sells mainly “low-end” products, which now have to face the direct competition of Chinese or, anyway, Asian items.

 34,500 robots have been installed in France since late 2011 – a  quarter of those operating in Germany and two times less than those already operating in Italy and Spain.

 Nevertheless, Macron’s project – which, indeed, cannot much change this economic state of affairs in France – has two other political and strategic factors: Italy’s strategic marginalization and its economic downturn and market shrinkage resulting from its political crisis.

 In 2011 Sarkozy started this beggar-thy-neighbour policy against Italy – at least politically and militarily – finally designed to weaken Italian small and medium-sized enterprises and privatize most of the oil industry and of what was left of the manufacturing industry.

 The operation made in Libya by the French neo-Gaullist leader was the seal on Italy’s strategic and, hence, geo-economic autonomy – and it is worth noting that Italy’s miserable “Second Republic” counts for not even one  tenth of  the First Republic.

Hence France will “steal” the Italian sector of high-end and luxury products, which is not as skilful as Italy in manufacturing.

 Despite how this may appear, Sarkozy’s choice of eliminating Gaddafi was not an irrational choice.

 Apart from the recovery in election polls for the new Franco-Hungarian Napoleon, as well as the fear of having to pay the loans due by him to the Libyan Rais and the ongoing hypothesis of a Libyan Gold Dinar that was to wipe the CFA franc out, the neo-Gaullist President knew the Colonel wanted to leave power quickly.

 Six months at most – with a guaranteed role as “Father of the Nation”, as well as new democratic elections that would make his smart son, Saif al-Islam, rise to power.

 Nevertheless Sarkozy’s “private” and personal oil in Benghazi (where the jihadists’ “democratic revolt” began, since Cyrenaica was the region with the largest share of Afghan Mujahedin in the total Islamic population) and the loans owed to the Rais that it was better not to repay, as well as a  strange assassination, were all factors that made Sarkozy think he could  make it easily.

 Hence Macron knows that – as the members of the Organisation de l’Armée Sécrète (OAS) used to say – France’s geopolitical role can be built only in Africa.

 If this is true, thanks to the structural destabilization of Libya, the strategic project will be to integrate the whole system between Tripoli and Benghazi into the new Françafrique, from which Italy – and maybe even Great Britain – will be excluded.

 Where, in Africa or elsewhere, has Italy its key strategic point? Has no one really thought about it?

 Certainly, in Egypt, we have been fooled and replaced exactly by France – after the badly managed Regeni’s affair; we are virtually irrelevant in Morocco, despite the internal political tensions (King Mohammed VI would need Italy’s help rather than a heavy French favour); we take very limited action in Algeria and we have no say in the matter in the Horn of Africa.

 If, indeed, there is no European geopolitics without an African policy (except for Germany, which is obviously focused on the Slavs), Italy has none.

 Apart from the latest French economic and business acquisitions in Italy, which are still being developed and finalised, currently France controls 185 Italian companies which are worth 50 billion Euro, while Italy owns or controls 97 French companies totalling 7.5 billion Euro.

 7% of the Milan Stock Exchange capitalization is in the hands of French companies, while Italy controls a mere 0.9% of the Paris Stock Exchange.

 Why? One of the reasons is certainly the extreme fragmentation of the Italian production system, as well as Italian politicians’ scarce perception of the phenomena that appear to be “market” ones, but are not at all so.

 Nothing is more pleasing than looking at politicians – staunch supporters of public ownership, if not para-Soviet advocates of State-controlled centralism – who believe that any business transaction between companies has no political and strategic relevance.

 “It is the market …”. Not at all. It is the political and strategic wisdom, which we do not see in action today.

 Both in the case of SXT-Fincantieri and in the other economic negotiations between France and Italy, a serious Italian government would have reacted vigorously and with harsh countermeasures – by also perceiving the inevitable geopolitical aspects and responding credibly, in Africa as elsewhere.

 Another key factor of Macron’s new foreign policy and his specific relationship with Italy – currently regarded by France as a punching ball – is migration.

 Macron stated he would not accept any “economic migrant” coming from the border with Italy, while the State Police authorities are informing us that many migrants already living in France and without documents are forced to cross the Ventimiglia border and get on Italian trains.

 When there is massive migration, both as a result of wars (a few, in today’s Africa) and of consumerist induced psychosis (in many cases), as well as of the youth bulge – as happened throughout Africa precisely thanks to a semblance of economic development – every country chooses the best migrants for itself.

 The large German companies go to the Turkish refugee camps to hoard Syrian physicians, engineers and technicians.

 Italy, mired in an old-style and old-fashioned ideology, is still working on the wrong assumption that we can welcome everybody.

 This means that the cost of useless, sick, unfit-to-work and socially dangerous immigrants will be borne by the countries that have also lost this globalization game – and it will be a heavy drain on the deficit/GDP ratio.

Conversely, the cost of skilful, active, dynamic and well-trained  immigrants will improve the overall productivity of countries that – unlike Italy – have won the globalization fight.

 As is the case with Germany, Macron will choose the best immigrants.

 Furthermore, considering that mass immigration is an indirect strategy technique, the fact of filling a competing country, albeit a EU Member State, with “half-devils and half-children” – as Kipling said – means  blocking it with unproductive spending and draining its share for investment in businesses and new technologies, as well as barbarizing and Africanizing it.

Therefore Emmanuel Macron, who is already a skilful international banker, is the point of arrival for a reconstruction of France arising from a well-defined intellectual background.

 It is the background of Jacques Attali, a banker of Mitterand origin, who is at the forefront of a project that has much to do with the recent American CEO capitalism: to make everything that traditionally has no real economic value productive and economically useful.

 When the production of industrial or material value decreases – and for many years – it must be offset by the creation of symbolic and communicative value.

 In fact, the American CEO capitalism appears to be the universe of free “content” on the Web, but – as the professionals of the sector say – “when you have nothing to buy, it means that you are the one whom has already been bought”.

 Advertising, personal data, business preferences, profiling – even at political level – networking and relations – everything is sold by naïve  users without them even realizing it and – keep in mind – without them having anything to gain.

 This is a lot of money, as is demonstrated by the magnificent budgets of many seemingly “service” companies such as Facebook.

 Hence Attali’s idea points to selling the genetic heritage, even life, so as to turn all that today is not included in the old capitalist paradigm into economy.

 Therefore, reverting to Macron’s new Françafrique project, France will soon expand its traditional area of influence in Central Africa northwards and later to Fezzan, Chad and Niger up to Libya.

 The project is to reunite the new French Africa with Egypt.

 The above-described actions will be supported by a new political-military union with Germany, with which it will even be possible to plan together at least part of their respective Armed Forces.

 That is the reason why General De Villiers left.

 Hence France commanding from the North up to the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, in a region which could provide France with many advanced raw materials and a huge mass of workforce to be used locally, as well as an immense power of negotiating and interfering in global affairs.

 In Macron’s opinion, the agreement between Khalifa Haftar – the leader of the Libyan “Operation Dignity” and strong man of the local regime, not only of  Cyrenaica – and al-Sarraj is the strategic link for doing two things: avoiding, as long as possible, Libya’s partition and fragmentation – which, indeed, France does not fear – and also getting Italy and any other Western player out of the way.

 Trump wanted to take quick action in Libya and found the French President willing to support him.

  Italy should have done it, but there was no way.

Minister Minniti, a serious and brilliant intelligence expert, reached agreements with the sixty primary tribes out of the over one hundred tribes present there – and indirectly with the various internal armed gangs. ENI and our intelligence Services did a good job, but when there is no strategic mastermind, they remain mere disconnected sensory organs.

 It is worth repeating that the agreement between the two Libyan governments, one existing and the other merely surviving thanks to the good will of a “useless entity” – as Francesco Cossiga dismissed the United Nations – is targeted against Italy which, except for Minister Minniti’s abilities, has not shown any idea or reaction in this respect.

 Probably – as already appears – also the agreement brokered by Emmanuel Macron will last l’espace d’un matin since Libya cannot be led and run as a condo board meeting and we shall soon choose a strong and credible leader – as SISMI did, in a hotel of Abano Terme, by selecting Sirte’s young Colonel, Muammar al-Gaddafi.

 Furthermore an agreement needs to be reached between the Berbers and the Tuareg, who can blow up any deal and have the possibility of managing very strong alliances with the other tribes.

 Hence the game is open and we could even get back in it, but no rational solutions are perceived in Italy.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Revisiting the Bosnian War

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Genocide is not an alien concept to the world nowadays. However, while the reality (and the culprit) is not hard to profile today, history is ridden with massacres that were draped and concealed from the world beyond. Genocides that rivaled the great warfares and were so gruesome that the ring of brutality still pulsates in the historical narrative of humanity. We journey back to one such genocide that was named the most brutish mass slaughter after World War II. We revisit the Bosnian War (1992-95) which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 100,000 innocent Bosnian citizens and displaced millions. The savage nature of the war was such that the war crimes committed constituted a whole new definition to how we describe genocide.

The historical backdrop helps us gauge the complex relations and motivations which resulted in such chaotic warfare to follow suit. Post World War II, the then People’s Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the then Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina became one of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia in 1946 along with other Balkan states including Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. As communism pervaded all over Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina began losing its religion-cultural identity. Since Bosnia-Herzegovina mainly comprised of a Muslim population, later known as the Bosniaks, the spread of socialism resulted in the abolition of many Muslim institutions and traditions. And while the transition to the reformed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963 did ease the ethnic pressure, the underlying radical ideology and sentiments never fully subsided.

The Bosniaks started to emerge as the majority demographic of Bosnia and by 1971, the Bosniaks constituted as the single largest component of the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina population. However, the trend of emigration picked up later in the decades; the Serbs and the Croats adding up to their tally throughout most of the 70s and mid-80s. The Bosnian population was characterized as a tripartite society, that is, comprised of three core ethnicities: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. Till  1991, the ethnic majority of the Bosniaks was heavily diluted down to just 44% while the Serbian emigrants concentrated the Serbian influence; making up 31% of the total Bosnian population.

While on one side of the coin, Bosnia-Herzegovina was being flooded with Serbs inching a way to gain dominance, the Yugoslavian economy was consistently perishing on the other side. While the signs of instability were apparent in the early 80s, the decade was not enough for the economy to revive. In the late 80s, therefore, political dissatisfaction started to take over and multiple nationalist parties began setting camps. The sentiments diffused throughout the expanse of Yugoslavia and nationalists sensed an imminent partition. Bosnia-Herzegovina, like Croatia, followed through with an election in 1990 which resulted in an expected tripartite poll roughly similar to the demographic of Bosnia. The representatives resorted to form a coalition government comprising of Bosniak-Serb-Craot regime sharing turns at the premiership. While the ethnic majority Bosniaks enjoyed the first go at the office, the tensions soon erupted around Bosnia-Herzegovina as Serbs turned increasingly hostile.

The lava erupted in 1991 as the coalition government of Bosnia withered and the Serbian Democratic Party established its separate assembly in Bosnia known as ‘Serbian National Assembly’.  The move was in line with a growing sentiment of independence that was paving the dismantling of Yugoslavia. The Serbian Democratic Party long envisioned a dominant Serbian state in the Balkans and was not ready to participate in a rotational government when fighting was erupting in the neighboring states. When Croatia started witnessing violence and the rise of rebels in 1992, the separatist vision of the Serbs was further nourished as the Serbian Democratic Party, under the leadership of Serb Leader Radovan Karadžić, established an autonomous government in the Serb Majority areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The vision and the actions remained docile until the ring of independence was echoed throughout the region. When the European Commission (EC), now known as the European Union (EU), and the United States recognized the independence of both Croatia and Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina found itself in a precarious position. While a safe bet would have been to undergo talks and diplomatic routes to engage the Serbian Democratic Party, the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović failed to realize the early warnings of an uprising. Instead of forging negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosniak President resorted to mirror Croatia by organizing a referendum of independence bolstered by both the EC and the US. Even as the referendum was blocked in the Serb autonomous regions of Bosnia, Izetbegović chose to pass through and announced the results. As soon as the Bosnian Independence from Yugoslavia was announced and recognized, fighting erupted throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Bosnian Serbs feared that their long-envisioned plan of establishing the ‘Great Serbia’ in the Balkans was interred which resulted in chaos overtaking most of Bosnia. The blame of the decision, however, was placed largely on the Bosniak president and, by extension, the entire ethnic majority of the Bosniaks. The Bosnian Serbs started to launch attacks in the east of Bosnia; majorly targeting the Bosniak-dominated towns like Foča, Višegrad, and Zvornik. Soon the Bosnian Serb forces were joined by the local paramilitary rebels as well as the Yugoslavian army as the attacks ravaged the towns with large Bosniak populations; swathing the land in the process. The towns were pillaged and pressed into control whilst the local Bosniaks and their Croat counterparts were either displaced, incarcerated, or massacred.

While the frail Bosnian government managed to join hands with the Croatian forces across the border, the resulting offense was not nearly enough as the combination of Serb forces, rebel groups, and the Yugoslavian army took control of almost two-thirds of the Bosnian territory. The Karadžić regime refused to hand over the captured land in the rounds of negotiations. And while the war stagnated, the Bosniak locals left behind in small pockets of war-ravaged areas faced the brunt in the name of revenge and ethnic cleansing.

As Bosniaks and Croats formed a joint federation as the last resort, the Serbian Democratic Party established the Republic Srpska in the captured East, and the military units were given under the command of the Bosnian-Serb General, Ratko Mladic. The notorious general, known as the ‘Butcher of Bosnia’, committed horrifying war crimes including slaughtering the Bosniak locals captured in violence, raping the Bosniak women, and violating the minors in the name of ethnic cleansing exercises. While the United Nations refused to intervene in the war, the plea of the helpless Bosniaks forced the UN to at least deliver humanitarian aid to the oppressed. The most gruesome of all incidents were marked in July 1995, when an UN-declared safe zone, known as Srebrenica, was penetrated by the forces led by Mladic whilst some innocent Bosniaks took refuge. The forces brutally slaughtered the men while raped the women and children. An estimated 7000-8000 Bosniak men were slaughtered in the most grotesque campaign of ethnic cleansing intended to wipe off any trace of Bosniaks from the Serb-controlled territory.

In the aftermath of the barbaric war crimes, NATO undertook airstrikes to target the Bosnian-Serb targets while the Bosniak-Croat offense was launched from the ground. In late 1995, the Bosnian-Serb forces conceded defeat and accepted US-brokered talks. The accords, also known as the ‘Dayton Accords’, resulted in a conclusion to the Bosnian War as international forces were established in the region to enforce compliance. The newly negotiated federalized Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted 51% of the Croat-Bosniak Federation and 49% of the Serb Republic.

The accord, however, was not the end of the unfortunate tale as the trials and international action were soon followed to investigate the crimes against humanity committed during the three-year warfare. While many Serb leaders either died in imprisonment or committed suicide, the malefactor of the Srebrenica Massacre, Ratko Mladic, went into hiding in 2001. However, Mladic was arrested after a decade in 2011 by the Serbian authorities and was tried in the UN-established International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). The investigation revisited the malicious actions of the former general and in 2017, the ICTY found Ratko Mladic guilty of genocide and war crimes and sentenced him to life in prison. While Mladic appealed for acquittal on the inane grounds of innocence since not he but his subordinates committed the crimes, the UN court recently upheld the decision in finality; closing doors on any further appeals. After 26-years, the world saw despair in the eyes of the 78-year-old Mladic as he joined the fate of his bedfellows while the progeny of the victims gained some closure as the last Bosnian trail was cased on a note of justice.

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Greece And Yugoslavia: A Brief History Of Lasting Partitions

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Prior to the 1992-1995 Balkan war, the European Community delegated the British and Portugese diplomats, Lord Carrington and Jose Cutileiro, to design a suitable scheme for ethno-religious partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in February 1992 they launched the Lisbon Conference, with the aim of separating Bosnian ethno-religious communities and isolating them into distinct territories. This was the initiation of the process of partition, adopted in all subsequent plans to end the war in Bosnia. However, such a concept was stipulated by Carrington and Cutileiro as the only available when there was no war to end, indeed, no war in sight; and, curiously, it has remained the only concept that the European Community, and then the European Union, has ever tried to apply to Bosnia.

Contrary to the foundations of political theory, sovereignty of the Bosnian state was thus divided, and its parts were transferred to the three ethno-religious communities. The Carrington-Cutileiro maps were tailored to determine the territorial reach of each of these communities. What remained to be done afterwards was their actual physical separation, and that could only be performed by ethnic cleansing, that is, by war and genocide. For, ethno-religiously homogenous territories, as envisaged by Carrington and Cutileiro, could only be created by a mass slaughter and mass expulsion of those who did not fit the prescribed model of ethno-religious homogeneity. The European Community thus created a recipe for the war in Bosnia and for the perpetual post-war instability in the Balkans. Yet, ever since the war broke out, the European diplomatic circles have never ceased claiming that this ‘chaos’ was created by ‘the wild Balkan tribes’, who ‘had always slaughtered each other’. There was also an alternative narrative, disseminated from the same sources, that Russia promoted the programme of ‘Greater Serbia’, which eventually produced the bloodshed in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Facts on the ground, however, do not support either of these narratives. All these ‘tribes’ had peacefully lived for centuries under the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, until nationalist ideas were imported into Serbia and Greece at the beginning of the 19th century. On the other hand, Russia’s influence in the Balkans could never compete with the influence of the Anglo-French axis. The latter’s influence was originally implemented through the channels of Serbian and Greek nationalisms, constructed on the anti-Ottoman/anti-Islamic and anti-Habsburg/anti-Catholic grounds, in accordance with strategic interests of the two West European powers to dismantle the declining empires and transform them into a number of puppet nation-states. In these geopolitical shifts, nationalist ideologies in the Balkans utilized religious identities as the most efficient tool for mobilization of the targeted populations and creation of mutually exclusive and implacable national identities.

The pivotal among these nationalist ideologies has been the Serb one,  built on the grounds of Orthodox Christianity, with its permanent anti-Islamic and anti-Catholic agenda. The existence and expansion of Serbia was always explicitly backed by London and Paris – from a semi-autonomous principality within the Ottoman territory in the 1830s and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1882, through the 1912-13 Balkan wars and World War I, to its expansion into other South Slavic territories in the form of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), promoted at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919.

Eventually, the Serbian elites – supported by the Anglo-French axis, again – used the dissolution of the communist Yugoslavia as an opportunity for implementation of the 19th-century ‘Greater Serbia’ programme, that is, Serbia’s expansion in all the Yugoslav territories populated by the Orthodox Christians. However, this time ‘Greater Serbia’ was used as a catalyst in a bigger geopolicial reshuffling advocated by the UK and France – the simultaneous implementation of four ethnnically homogenous greater-state projects, including ‘Greater Serbia’ (transferring the Orthodox-populated parts of Bosnia, plus Montenegro and the northern part of Kosovo, to Serbia), ‘Greater Croatia’ (transferring the Catholic-populated parts of Bosnia to Croatia), ‘Greater Albania’ (transferring the Albanian-populated parts of Kosovo and Macedonia to Albania) and ‘Greater Bulgaria’ (transferring the Slavic parts of Macedonia to Bulgaria).

Since 1990s, ethno-religious nationalisms in the Balkans have served only  this geopolitical purpose – creation of ethno-religiously homogenous ‘greater’ states, including the disappearance of Bosnia and Macedonia, whose multi-religious and multi-ethnic structure has been labelled by the British foreign policy elites as “the last remnant of the Ottoman Empire“ that needs to be eliminated for good. The only major foreign power that has opposed these geopolitical redesigns is the US, which has advocated the policy of inviolability of the former Yugoslav republics’ borders. Yet, the US has never adopted a consistent policy of nation-building for Bosnia and Macedonia, which would be the only one that could efficiently counter the doctrine of ethno-religious homogeneity promoted by the UK and France and supported by most EU countries.   

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Failed Diplomacy: A hot tension between Spain and Morocco

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An unexpected diplomatic wrong move on the part of the Spanish government through its interference in the Moroccan territorial sovereignty caused diplomatic tension, which may reach a high degree of suspending all diplomatic and strategic partnerships between the two neighboring countries. This diplomatic strain came after Span refused to give any facts to the Moroccan government regarding the reception of the Ibrahim Ghali Leader of separatist of Polisario Front in Spain’s soil under the so-called humanitarian and health reasons. Unfortunately, Irrational justifications from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs didn’t react to true cooperation with Morocco to make a peaceful resolution with their Northern border.

Ghali’s illegal entry to Spain has questioned Madrid’s about the principle of good neighboring agreement, and more importantly the credibility and independence of the Spanish judiciary, and the extent of its actual involvement in promoting the principle of non-impunity, the Spanish government found itself in an awkward position in front of domestic and international public opinion. Thus, Concerning this issue puts the Spanish status of “democracy” and “human rights” to a real test.

In diplomacy, “consensus” signifies the accepted context in which the adjustment of conflicts through negotiation is only the rightful way. The Moroccan-Spanish tension was created by the Algerian government to disrupt Moroccan foreign policy in the North African arena. This crisis is a clear sign that shows the diplomatic contradiction between the Spanish foreign affairs decisions and statements in the name of strengthening relations with a strategic partner “ Morocco ” with which he brings together a set of common interests and priorities, whether it is linked to migration issues, preventing terrorism or pledging unmannerly actions and policies that contradict the requirements of strategic partnership and good friendship.

In effect, this is what the crisis has flamed the diplomatic difficult stages that the relations between the two countries have gone through in recent years. It also brings to mind the Leila Island crisis, which flared up in 2002. When The Kingdom of Morocco determined to delineate its maritime borders, the Socialist Party, which leads the Spanish government, showed its rejection of this move, and in the aftermath of it. Former US President Donald Trump issued a republican decree recognizing the Moroccan Sahara, and Spain openly stated its annoyance with the issue, and its Secretary of State confirmed its rejection of what she labeled as “unilateral trends in international relations”, but she admitted that her country had contacts with the current US president. Joe Biden to push him to change this decision, which caused a great shock in Moroccan public opinion.

Accordingly, many of the Spanish trends in recent decades have raised concerns about any Moroccan military development, and also the breakthrough in the Moroccan Sahara dispute that supports Morocco’s regional and international position, which adds a degree of uncertainty to the relations between the two states, and brings to the international understanding the case future of the occupied cities of Ceuta and Melilla and several other islands particularly the Canary.  

In line with these circumstances, Morocco has retained that the Spanish authorities are responsible for worsening diplomatic relations by accepting an adverse person. The humanitarian reasons that justified the reception of the Polisario Front leader Ibrahim Ghali put Spain in a position of a discrepancy, given its denial of the human suffering of many of its victims, and its preference for the security approach in dealing with migration cases. Meanwhile leaving behind a legacy of the human crimes committed by the colonial army in northern Morocco, especially those related to the use of toxic substances, and the resulting destruction in the framework of the  Spanish colonial campaign that targeted Morocco in the last of twenties century, it is related to human genocide that falls within the war crimes. Many studies and reports carried out by researchers and non-governmental organizations have shown the prevalence of lung cancer among the population of the region, far exceeding the national rates recorded in this regard, which demands Spain to acknowledge these crimes that do not have a statute of limitations and bear the responsibility for their remnants and consequences.

Certainly, nothing is easy in the field of world politics as the realists argue what Morocco and Spain need from each other are their mutual geopolitical and geo-economical interests? This type of approach is reasonable and also skeptical. Indeed, historically the Kingdom of Morocco and Spain had been on good terms for a few centuries, and during the French colonial era, Spain acted as a natural buffer state between Morocco and colonial France.

Strategically speaking, the Kingdom of Morocco wants to sustain its border areas peaceful and stable in light of its “Strategy on Borders Demarcation” that means while Morocco tries to combine its entente partnership with Spain on the North and pacifying its East coast, it necessarily aims to maintain the convention on border demarcation plans to the West and the maritime route to the South. This is the key of the  “SBD” plan initiated by the Moroccan Kingdom since his Majesty Mohmed VI took power. Consider Spain’s strategic setting and political stability, Morocco is sure to endorse the bilateral relations as the two previous Mediterranean partners were signed in Rabat including to reconstruct Morocco—Spain The good neighborliness principle agreements. It will help northern frontiers areas get an alternative transit route and also ease the local economics, as much an important part of the SB as the economic corridor between Morocco and Spain.

Given the Spanish domestic opinion, there is still a positive attitude about long-term cooperation on a strategic partnership among the kingdom of Morocco and Spain, even considering some temporary problems between the two in irregular migration. For instance, at the first Morocco-Spain Immigration and Security meeting on November 20, Spain’s Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska remarked that despite the disputes at the moment, Madrid has a long-standing relationship with Rabat and the current politics would not harm that, because it’s a political situation. 

To conclude, diplomacy is a key process based on negotiation, persuasion, and compromise. On the one side, a static and steady Morocco-Spain Strategic relationship is decisive for both and the globe as a whole. To that end, the Kingdom of Morocco has shown its motivation to share with Spain its development experiences, practices, and inclusive security governance approaches. In doing so, geopolitical features should never be the hindrances to Rabat-Madrid strategic cooperation. Rather, Spain could serve as a dynamic bridge between Morocco and EU countries, and Morocco and North Africa.

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Iran and elections have not been two synonymous terms. A regime whose constitution is based on absolute rule of someone...

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Development15 hours ago

New Financing to Help Indonesia Achieve a Deeper and More Resilient Financial Sector

The World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors today approved a loan of US$400 million to support reforms that will help...

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