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Testing Solutions for Intelligence and Security Professionals in Fighting ISIS in the Encrypted Social Media Space

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Authors: Lorand Bodo, M.A. & Anne Speckhard, Ph.D.

Telegram currently is, for a plethora of reasons, the favorite encrypted social media app employed by ISIS.[1] As such, Telegram has become the subject of deep controversies in the West. While government officials demand for Telegram to store and hand over user information of those promoting terrorism, Telegram’s executives have responded with an adamant refusal to comply.

This conundrum between governments wanting to balance security against encrypted social media executives arguing in behalf of the rights to free speech and surveillance-free communications—particularly in authoritarian regimes—has led researchers at ICSVE to question if it’s possible to assist law enforcement in identifying nefarious users on Telegram without demanding the assistance of the app itself. This article reports on our researchers’ successful attempts to test a few potential approaches that show promise.

Background

There is no doubt that ISIS has been the most successful tech-oriented terrorist organization in history that not only understands how to use the Internet for communication purposes but also has learned to do so while hiding their messaging and identities. ISIS cadres use the surface web, deep web, dark web, social media and encrypted messaging apps, such as Telegram, to disseminate their propaganda, recruit new members, inspire or even direct their followers to carry out terror attacks which all cause serious concerns for law enforcement, intelligence and security professionals tasked with staying one step ahead in fighting the group[2]. It bears noting that ISIS also surfaced at a time when social media’s feedback mechanisms were developed enough to allow ISIS to distribute their slick propaganda to global audiences and then hone in on those who show interest. By virtue of a retweet, like, or other endorsement of their products they are able to personally contact those who show interest.[3] In recent years Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and other web-based social media apps have cracked down on ISIS’s presence on their platforms making it harder to carry out intensive grooming and recruiting on these web-based apps. This however, resulted in ISIS using fleeting accounts on mainline web-based apps like Twitter, YouTube and Facebook to quickly attract the attention of those interested in their propaganda and then migrate potential recruits onto encrypted apps such as Telegram where they may then engage with them on a much more intensive level and for a longer time period without disruption—to motivate and direct some into carrying out actual attacks.

While we can monitor most of ISIS’ activity on the web-based Internet (i.e. YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) through web crawlers and search engines, law enforcement and intelligence agencies struggle when it comes to intercepting valuable intelligence that could support in preventing and disrupting terror attacks on messaging apps, such as Telegram that are encrypted and thus prevent such efforts.

In response to these very real security issues, Russia’s FSB (security service) announced on June 26 (2017) that terrorists had used Telegram to coordinate and plan a deadly suicide bombing on Russian soil by providing “terrorists with the opportunity to create secret chats rooms with a high degree of encryption”[4]. As a result, Russian officials increased their pressure upon Telegram to provide security-related information to Russian security services. In response, Telegram’s founder, Pavel Durov, agreed for his firm to be registered in Russia, but insisted on not sharing any private data with the Russian government, stating that he does not want to undermine the privacy of the six million Russian Telegram users currently registered on the app.[5] Indeed, this is not a simple dilemma, as it pits the rights of free speech and surveillance-free communication in an authoritarian regime against the need for security concerns about potential terrorist attacks. This underlying problem of cooperation between counter-terrorism (CT) officials and any tech-company is what we call the “business-security” dilemma.

The “business-security” dilemma describes a situation, in which tech companies, such as social-media or encrypted messaging apps, have to choose between two options, each that have negative consequences for both parties. Companies that cooperate with law enforcement and intelligence agencies by providing access to private data hopefully address security threats from terrorism, but by doing so, demonstrate their failure to value and protect the privacy and free speech of its users—which is particularly harmful to encrypted social media apps which exist precisely for that purpose. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies also lose if tech-companies cooperate, as many users—both benign and nefarious—will stop using the app and download another. On the other hand, if the social media app executives do not cooperate, bad press inevitably follows, framing the company as a ‘terrorist supporter’. Thus, with either choice—compliance or refusal, the company faces negative consequences, from its customers or the security sector, as does the CT-community.

Social media companies, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube face a similar dilemma, costing them time and resources which do not directly support their products in efforts at surveillance and takedowns which may also turn away users. Their dilemma is less severe however, as their apps do not depend solely on being able to provide encrypted communications. In the case of these web-based, open source social media there are also web-crawlers and business applications that could be used by these companies to detect and take down a lot more ISIS content than is currently being taken down at present.[6] And, it should not be forgotten that social media companies are masters in collecting data on users for targeted advertising purposes. Perhaps for them, it would be advisable to use existing technology and modify it to identify violent extremist online propaganda?

Encrypted apps are another story and cannot be crawled in this manner. In either case, extremist content is spreading, versus decreasing, on social media and law enforcement simply can’t keep up while social media companies, for reasons unknown, have not yet opted to use available technologies for more comprehensive and speedy takedowns. As a result, we are failing in countering extremist content online. However, as a recent Guardian article argued: “Counter-terrorism was never meant to be Silicon Valley’s job”.[7]

Moreover, due to growing concerns of consumers about hacking, as well as anxieties raised about government surveillance (particularly following Edward Snowden’s shocking revelations), a large number of mobile phone users have turned to encrypted messaging apps. In 2016, Telegram was downloaded 49,28 million times, followed by Wickr-Me with 3.8 million, Signal with 3.62 million, and other encrypted messaging combined with 0.35 million downloads[8]. When we look at these numbers, we have to ask ourselves, if our citizens value privacy more than they value security from terrorist threats? Do the costs of losing privacy, free speech and surveillance-free communications outweigh the benefits? Indeed, the number of terrorists compared to the vast majority of Telegram (and other encrypted app) users who are benign and have no intention to commit an act of terror is very low. If all Telegram users were in fact terrorists, we should see terror attacks every single day. But, fortunately, we don’t.

Nevertheless, we should not give up on chasing terrorists and shutting down their activities in the encrypted space; but instead of demanding the encrypted apps cooperate with government, it may be more useful to independently develop creative methodologies to gain valuable intelligence on those individuals engaging with and distributing ISIS propaganda as well as recruiting and directing terrorist attacks. In particular, with ISIS relying so heavily on Telegram, we need at present to find ways to fight ISIS without demanding any help of Telegram, whose executive leadership refuses in any case, to release encrypted information needed to fight jihadists using their messaging app. [9]

Identifying Nefarious Telegram Users without the Help of Telegram

So, how can we deal with this very tiny fraction of Telegram users who support and share ISIS content? To this end, we were interested in two questions: first, can we learn if pro-ISIS Telegram users employ information security (InfoSec) measures, such as virtual private networks (VPNs), to protect their identity and if not, are they identifiable? Second, is it possible to identify ISIS endorsing Telegram users communicating via private messaging without any help from Telegram, to make it possible for the law enforcement or intelligence community to do the same?

ISIS, as well as other militant jihadi groups have long been concerned with promoting information security to their members to enable them to evade law enforcement and intelligence. Among the many InfoSec groups ISIS promotes to their members, one known as “Horizon” has published manuals in multiple languages on topics like VPNs, secure browsers and the deep and dark web. In 2015, researchers discovered that ISIS had been using a 34-page operational manual that demonstrates just how tech-savvy ISIS really is. This manual was written in 2014 by a Kuwaiti cyber-security firm for journalists and activists in Gaza, but it was also found in ISIS chat rooms. Topics that are covered range from how to use Twitter, with a focus on protecting identity, to using encrypted Internet browsers and keeping telecommunications private.[10] At ICSVE, our researchers have been monitoring pro-ISIS Telegram channels for quite a while and we have also come across several Telegram channels that serve solely one purpose, namely educating pro-ISIS individuals in information security. Fig.1 shows a screenshot of a pro-ISIS channel that shares free tools, such as anti-virus software or VPN tools on a daily basis. According to Alkhouri, “such advice is what helped many jihadists bypass scrutiny and operate online with ease”.[11]

Given the dissemination of these manuals and ISIS’ intent of educating its followers about the importance of information security, we were keen to test if Telegram users operating in ISIS space actually are actually savvy enough to have implemented these InfoSec measures or if they fail to pay attention. To this end, we conducted a small experiment on Telegram, which was comprised of two approaches. Concerning our methodology, we have decided not to reveal it here as it was used to learn the identities of pro-ISIS Telegram users and we do not wish to further educate them in terms of information security. In this respect, it must be highlighted that this methodology should not be perceived as a ‘silver-bullet’, but more as a ‘cause for thought’ to develop better and more effective approaches. At ICSVE, we strongly believe that any effort to fight ISIS on the digital battleground is better than doing nothing—particularly as ISIS loses territory and increasingly promotes and directs homegrown attacks via the Internet.

The first approach was OSINT-informed and had the objective to identify the social media accounts of pro-ISIS Telegram users that in turn provides us with valuable intelligence about the actual identity of the person and his or her wider network. By employing our techniques, we were able to gain the actual identities of 3 users in a private chatroom, however, we will only highlight one case herein as the method is the same. In this regard, it is also necessary to emphasize that corroborating our results was one of the main challenges of this approach, however, after analyzing the whole case, we were quite confident in our judgements as the evidence was overwhelming.

In the first approach, we focused on private chat rooms as they allow us (not always) to see the actual group members in terms of numbers and profiles. In this case, we explored a private chat room, which primarily disseminates official ISIS propaganda.

In this case, a profile caught our eyes for several reasons (that we don’t explain here as it would reveal our methods). We were keen to find one of the target’s social media accounts which might revel his or her real identity. Generally, we assumed, that even though individuals employ encrypted-messaging apps for privacy for their terrorist-engaging purposes, they still have active social media social media accounts registered in their own real identities. And, in this particular case, we were right).

In fact, we were quite surprised how easy it was to identify this particular Telegram user. However, it should be mentioned that this approach does not work with any Telegram user, but it is definitely worth a try for the purpose of gaining valuable intelligence.

A quick scan of the pictures which were posted on this individual’s Facebook account, reveals more about the individual. Especially the knife picture caught immediately our attention, as in Telegram the same individual was endorsing and sharing violent ISIS propaganda material that causes us to view him as radicalized and potentially considering engaging in violence. To learn if his knife picture was unique to him we searched the same image on the surface web and found out that this picture was posted repeatedly on other websites. In other words, the individual simply copied and pasted the picture, which also implies that the target is most probably not in possession of that particular knife. Yet his Telegram activity makes clear he may be considering enacting violence. To be on the safe side we passed our information, including his identity, on to the relevant security authorities for them to determine whether or not he constitutes an actual terrorist threat.

Our second approach tested whether or not pro-ISIS Telegram users employ information security measures, such as VPNs or a Proxy, to disguise their IP-addresses. We need to emphasize that we were also aware of the fact that individuals could use a Tor browser, public Wi-Fi or similar tools. In these cases, we would not be able to know if the IP address ties to that individual or not. Likewise, we were aware of the fact that identifying someone’s IP address would not give us his or her real name, exact location, or anything like that. In general, we assumed that most individuals use Telegram on a daily basis, meaning that whenever they have time to check out the latest posts, they would use their mobile phones to have a quick look. Furthermore, we assumed that these individuals would probably not use a VPN or Proxy every single time they access Telegram, even if installed, because it often slows down the Internet speed and individuals may just forget about activating the VPN when anxious to view new posts.

With all these assumptions in mind, we again went back to one of the private chat rooms to carry out a small experiment. Our experiment was exploratory in nature as we haven’t come across a similar approach in the literature or on the Internet, however, we are aware that many intelligence agencies have been using the same or similar techniques. Overall, we needed four attempts to gather a sample of three out of all of the 138 group members that we then studied for their use of a VPN or Proxy. From these three individuals, two have not used a VPN or Proxy as in contrast to the third individual who used a Proxy Server (located in Cyprus). In this respect, it is paramount to highlight that these results should be interpreted carefully as the method used is not 100% accurate. Furthermore, those two individuals identified could have also used a Tor Browser or public Wi-Fi, for example. So, how reliable is the method then?

To be on the safe side, we have also used the same method to disguise the IP addresses of friends who use Telegram on a daily basis. We conducted this experiment in three rounds. Round one gave instructions on using a VPN or Proxy. Round two gave instructions on not using any of the InfoSec measures. Round three tested our method in the “Secret Chat” that uses end-to-end encryption, leaves no traces on Telegram servers, has a self-destruct timer and does not allow forwarding, by telling our friends not to use a VPN or Proxy. Overall, we were successful in disguising the IP-addresses (Round 2 and 3) and most importantly, to detect the Proxy or VPN (Round 1). With this in mind, we were confident that our results with the small pro-ISIS sample was similarly successful.

Conclusion

ICSVE’s brief exploratory incursions on Telegram tell us two things. One that it is possible to penetrate ISIS Telegram chat rooms and inside them find the social media accounts, and thus identities, of those who appear to be serious ISIS devotees. Likewise of these we were able to find, we learned that some do not take the precautions of using a VPN or Proxy network, despite ISIS’s instructions to do so. Most surprisingly, we found out that our method even works in the Secret Chat, a special service that makes Telegram so famous for being secure. Our small experiments should be seen as an attempt of exploring and discovering creative ways to identify pro-ISIS Telegram users. Most importantly, we want to demonstrate that there are ways to fight ISIS in encrypted messaging apps, even though Telegram itself is refusing to cooperate.

There is also still the matter of social media giants such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter using available technologies to take ISIS content and accounts down faster so that there is not the opportunity to engage and be seduced off the open source web-based social media into the encrypted social media apps that are harder to track. However our short experiment demonstrates that tracking is possible even when not having Telegram’s cooperation. And this was just the beginning.

Note to readers: Our expertise and methodology is freely available to law enforcement and intelligence agencies upon request.

Reference for this article: Lorand Bodo, M.A. & Anne Speckhard, Ph.D. (July 15, 2017) Identifying Nefarious Telegram Users without the Help of Telegram Itself: Testing Solutions for Intelligence and Security Professionals in Fighting ISIS in the Encrypted Social Media Space. ICSVE Research Reports. http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/identifying-nefarious-telegram-users-without-the-help-of-telegram-itself-testing-solutions-for-intelligence-and-security-professionals-in-fighting-isis-in-the-encrypted-social-media-space/

 [1] Yayla, Ahmet S and Speckhard, Anne (2017). Telegram: The Mighty Application that ISIS Loves, available at: http://www.icsve.org/brief-reports/telegram-the-mighty-application-that-isis-loves/ (29.06.2017)

[2] Callimachi, R. (2017). Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All: How ISIS Guides World’s Terror Plots From Afar, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/asia/isis-messaging-app-terror-plot.html (29.06.2017).

[3] Speckhard, A., Shajkovci, A. & Yayla, A. S. (2016). “Defeating ISIS on the Battle Ground as well as in the Online Battle Space: Considerations of the “New Normal” and Available Weapons in the Struggle Ahead”. Journal of Strategic Security 9, no.4, p.1-10.

[4] Reuters (2017). Russia, Upping Pressure on Telegram App, Says It Was Used to Plot Bombing, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2017/06/26/technology/26reuters-russia-telegram-security.html (29.06.2017).

[5] Reuters (2017). Telegram App Agrees to Register in Russia, but Not to Share Private Data, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2017/06/28/technology/28reuters-russia-telegram-security.html (29.06.2017).

[6] See for example: GIPEC (2017). Who we are: GIPEC, available at: http://www.gipec.com/who-we-are/ (30.06.2017).

[7] Solon, O. (2017). Counter-terrorism was never meant to be Silicon Valley’s job. Is that why it’s failing? available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/29/silicon-valley-counter-terrorism-facebook-twitter-youtube-google (29.06.2017).

[8] Roberts, J. J. (2017) Here Are the Most Popular Apps for Secure Messages, available at: http://fortune.com/2017/01/17/most-popular-secure-apps/ (29.06.2017).

[9] The Times (2017). Message app used by Isis refuses to fight jihadists, available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/message-app-used-by-isis-refuses-to-fight-jihadists-jrddv7c93 (30.06.2017)

[10] Murgia, M. (2015). Islamic State uses detailed security manual, revealing its cyber strategy, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/12007170/Islamic-States-detailed-security-manual-reveals-its-cyber-strategy.html (29.06.2017). (You can also find the manual here)

[11] Alkhouri, L. (2017). How Cyber-Jihadists Protect Their Identities and Their Posts, available at: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column/private-sector/how-cyber-jihadists-protect-their-identities-and-their-posts-1092 (29.06.2017).

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Intelligence

Ethnic War a Newfangled Pakistani Forward-policy for Afghanistan

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According to the intelligence information, Pakistan’s ISI is trying to start ethnic and maneuvering war again in Afghanistan, of which distinct objective is to refurbish the age-old enmity between the Achakzai and Noorzai tribes in the southwest zone. Besides, they want to start an ethnic war among Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns across Afghanistan, and between the northern and southern directions, thus, the prominent leaders of the Taliban, who are led by the ISI, have been entrusted with the task. As in the east and north of Afghanistan, Pashtun Taliban militants are oppressing other Non-Pashtuns, raiding their homes; however, no high-ranking Pashtun Taliban officials are preventing them because the ISI network leads this strategy. In order to revamp a civil war in Afghanistan, score of influential figures have been summoned by the Pakistani military establishment. 

The latest examples are as follows: Two days ago, the Pashtun Taliban killed the former police chief and an influential tribal leader in Mandol district of Nuristan province, which caused many emotions against Pashtuns especially about southwest zone of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, in order to afresh the years of hostility between the Noorzai and Achakzi tribes in the southwestern region of Afghanistan, the ISI network raised the issue of a mass grave by several leading Taliban militants, especially by the current governor of Kandahar province and Noorzai tribe leading leader, Haji Mohammad Yousef Wafa.

Qari Aslam Noorzai call for by Pak security forces

At a time when the former leader of the Noorzai tribe, the leading smuggler of drugs and heavy weapons in Central and South Asia, and the financial supporter of the first Taliban regime, Haji Bashar Noorzai was released from the US prison in Guantánamo. The Noorzai tribe once again became twice as strong and dominant in Afghanistan, especially in the southwest zone.  Resulting threats towards the Achakzai people, on the other hand, ISI has started rapid efforts to recommence the years of enmity between these two tribes.

Hajee Feyzullah Khan Noorzai meets Pak military Intelligence

Recently, Pakistan’s intelligence network ISI, with the help of some leading social media and high-ranking Taliban officials, has kept the issue of finding a mass grave in Kandahar province in the southwestern zone of Afghanistan broiling, namely by inducing  the blame-game. Meanwhile, local tribal leaders and residents of Spin Boldak district claim that such a grave is the grave of those who were taken out of their homes by the Taliban after August 15.  Since, they were connected to Achakzai tribe and on the other hand, they served in the security departments of the overthrown Islamic Republic of Afghanistan that is why the Taliban night raided their houses, and massively killed them.

Moreover, mass murdering Hazaras at their educational institutions via suicide bombing and meantime blowing up the worship places of Sufi-Muslims, who preach the non-violent form of Islam, while calling for De-weaponization and De-politicization of Islam.

Consequently, by applying such a forward-policy, Pakistan will achieve its fancied strategic-depth in Afghanistan, while subjugating the Afghan Nation.

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Pakistani Intelligence Agencies ignite Tribal Conflicts in Pak-Afghan Region

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According to the intelligence information, Pakistani intelligence community supported by some international rings want to once again spread dispute and disharmony among the tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan; subsequently the centuries-old evils and wars between the tribes will once more take a new color and become fresh. Recently, rumors of the discovery of a mass grave in Kandahar province in the southwestern zone of Afghanistan are spreading; the blame for this mass murder falls on the former police chief of Kandahar province and the former leader of the Achagzai tribe, General Abdul Razaq Achagzai.  In order to afresh raising the reaction of the Norzi tribe against the Ackzai and anew the evil and war between these two tribes. Even though the current governing body of Afghanistan is completely under the control of the Noorzi tribe, because most of the high-ranking leaders of the Taliban, including the leader of the Taliban, Sheikh Haibatullah, are related to the Noorzi tribe, so there is a greater threat posed to the Achakzi tribe.

Even now, in spite of such menaces, more than 6000 Achakzi families live in Kandahar province, whose members served in the security departments under the command of General Abdul Razaq Achakzi, a staunch opponent of the Taliban.  Currently, in such a tense situation that the Taliban administration has control over Afghanistan and the head of this administration is connected to the Nurzi tribe, the harsh criticism of General Abdul Razaq Achakzai’s mass killings is logical, which can cause international and internal outcries.  As a result, the major victims will be the youths and leading tribal leaders of the Achakzai tribe.

By the advent of Taliban on August 15, 2021, in the first four months, more than 600 youths and tribal leaders from the Achakzi tribe were killed in the southwest zone of Afghanistan, while applying night operations or raids by the Taliban. The most famous case happened to the family of Haji Fida Mohammad Achakzai in Spin Boldak district. Haji Fida Muhammad Achakzai, known as Haji Fida Aka, is a leading leader of the Achakza tribe of Spin Boldak district and had close relations with the family of General Abdul Razaq Achakzai.

 When Kandahar province fell to the Taliban before August 15, the two young sons of him were killed by the Taliban on the first night, unfortunately none of the Taliban officials took any action to prevent the tragedy. Nevertheless, this time, there is a plan going on at the international level to renew the age-old differences between the Achakzai and Norzai tribes, which the international media warmly supports.  If this time the internal differences and conflicts between the Achakzai and Norzai tribes in Afghanistan get sturdier, then it will have damaging effects not only in Afghanistan, but also, serious negative measures will be taken against the Norzai under the leadership of Mahmoud Khan Achakzai, the head of the Achakzai tribe, in the Pakhtunkhwa provinces of Pakistan.

In the meantime, the decision of the Pakistani government to hand over the Pashtun areas in Pakhtunkhwa provinces to the Taliban was approved and supported by the Nurzi tribe, conversely, this action of the Pakistani government was strongly condemned by Mahmoud Khan Achakzai and PTM leader Manzoor Pashtun.

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Afghan Zarqawi is shot dead in Panjsher valley of Afghanistan

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According to intelligence information, the leading Taliban commander Maulvi Habibullah Sheeran, who was known as Zarqawi, a resident of Zhrhai District, Kandahar Province, in the southwestern zone of the Taliban was killed in Panjsher battle.

Meantime, the intelligence report indicates, Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, the general military officer of Panjshir and Andrab and the deputy of the Ministry of National Defense, was injured in Panjshir on Friday, September 16 at 3:25 p.m.

Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, who is considered one of the leading and influential war commanders in the southwest zone of the Taliban, has the support of about 4,000 low-ranking and high-ranking Taliban fighters. He is one of the Taliban military commanders who, during the first mobilization of the Taliban, formed the Taliban group with the support of Mullah Muhammad Omar Mujahid, the founder of the Taliban, and attracted hundreds of young men from Helmand province to the Taliban group.

When the Taliban came to power for the second time in Afghanistan, due to internal differences among the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir left the Taliban for a short time and went to his native Kajki district of Helmand province. However, due to the many efforts of the Taliban, especially Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir’s assistant and the current head of security of presidential palace  Mullah Mutaullah Mubarak, He joined the Taliban again and was appointed as the Deputy Minister of Defense.

Taliban leaders made more efforts to reunite Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir with the Taliban, because he was an influential military leader, and on the other hand, Taliban leaders were receiving reports that Mullah Qayyum Zakir wants to join ISIS against Taliban. Nevertheless, when he joined with the Taliban leaders for the second time, he was assigned the position of Deputy Minister of Defense, So, for a period, he cooperated with the Minister of Defense Maulvi Yaqoub as a military advisor in the Ministry of Defense.

 When the rumors of the fall of the northern part of Afghanistan were spread and the fighting between the NRF or the National Resistance Front and the Taliban in Panjshir and Andrab intensified, Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, based on the special permission of Sheikh Haibatullah, Appointed General Military Officer of Northern Afghanistan. In addition, from September 9, under his leadership, a special military operation named Al-Fath began in Panjshir and Andarabs to clear and liberate northern Afghanistan from the fighters of the National Resistance Front.

As a result of the operation, from September 9th to September 16th, dozens of NRF fighters were also killed but the casualties of Taliban fighters are methodically shown below, although scores of Taliban fighters were destroyed.

  • The bodies of 60 to 70 Taliban fighters who were killed in the battle of Panjshir have been transferred to Uruzgan province.
  •  The dead bodies of 50 Taliban fighters have been transferred to Kandahar Province.
  • The dead bodies of 33 Taliban fighters have been transferred to Helmand Province.
  •  The dead bodies of 22 Taliban fighters have been transferred to Ghor Province.
  • The dead bodies of 11 Taliban fighters have been transferred to Takhar province.
  • The dead bodies of 6 Taliban fighters have been transferred to Kunduz Chahar Dara.
  •  The dead bodies of 12 Taliban fighters have been transferred to Zabul province.
  • The dead bodies of nine Taliban fighters have been transferred to Wardag Province.
  • The dead bodies of 10 Taliban fighters have been transferred to Dandi Ghori in Baghlan province.  

Last Friday, September 16, in the bloody battle, Mullah Qayyum Zakir, the military officer in charge of Panjshir and Andrab, was seriously injured and eight of his bodyguards, who were residents of Helmand and Uruzgan provinces, were killed. Mullah Qayyum Zakir was transferred to the 400-bed hospital in Kabul at 10 o’clock in the evening on September 16, and former Taliban doctor Atiqullah was invited to Kabul from Al-Khair Hospital of Balochistan province of Pakistan for treatment.

There is a bloody war going on in the north of Afghanistan and around 300 al-Fatih forces are going to Panjshir from Kabul tonight and may reach tomorrow. Meanwhile, in Vienna, the plan for the formation of a new military and political movement was announced in a three-day meeting of the anti-Taliban political officials of the former government of Afghanistan. Moreover, based on that military plan, after dividing Afghanistan into five major parts, the political and military leaders of each zone will start preparing their organizations against the Taliban, and they will use such political and military tactics as the Taliban used against the government of the Republic of Afghanistan during the last 20 years of resistance.

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