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The Russian military doctrine

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The medal coined by the Hungarian State – after the powers of the Warsaw Pact had to return to their bases and to Russia, in particular, by March 31, 1991 – was very significant: on the front side the return of the Russian and Warsaw Pact soldiers, portrayed with the irony of comics, while on the back side of the coin the bottom of a Russian-Soviet general on which the shape of a big kick stands out.

That was the situation at the end of a political, military and economic system that encompassed the para-Soviet area in a very dangerous and economically unstable network.

While the Soviet technocratic wings theorized factor accounting, according to Leontief’s model – albeit with real prices – the ruling classes imposed an economic and military alliance based on the simple coordination of national economic plans.

It could not be long-lasting and, indeed, it did not last.

It is worth noting that China uses the Leontief’s public accounting model still today.

This was the first Eastern structural crisis, which started in the 1960s and later dragged on until the end of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR collapse.

It was not just a “planned” economy, it was a productive system for strategic and political purposes that could no longer be credibly maintained.

The fall in oil prices with the new North Sea production – that Margaret Thatcher did not fail to use politically – and the related  drop in the Middle East oil barrel price were the two factors which blocked the residual desires of revenge of the USSR and its allies.

Conversely, the strategic swan song was the “Euromissile battle” in Europe.

It was a Milan-based leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), often travelling to Moscow, who directly informed Helmut Schmidt of the explicitly offensive line of the Soviet SS-20 deployment in the Warsaw Pact areas.

Those missiles were more powerful and precise than Pershing II ones, but expensive and very heavy.

It took the strategic genius of Bettino Craxi and of Admiral Fulvio Martini, an unforgettable friend, and later of Francesco Cossiga, to block a series of operations, which we would currently call Information Operations, designed to delegitimize and block the parallel deployment of NATO  Cruise missiles.

What is happening today? Vladimir Putin says he must protect the “outer space” of the Russian Federation, otherwise it can implode.

The Russian President likes to repeat that the Russian Federation has only three bases outside its borders – but, indeed, they are approximately 30 –  while the United States has a military network of about 800 bases.

The Russian polemic is partially true.

NATO has Eastern borders which are already targets, but Russia has semi-populated areas or regions in which treacherous populations live. If these regions are penetrated, the nerve centres of Russian defense can be reached.

Hence currently the Russian Federation considers it to be a new great power, after its Soviet phase, through a powerful, up-to-date and world-leading military apparatus, attentive to seal both the homeland and the areas of primary strategic interest for Russia. We saw it in Syria and we will soon see it in Libya and the rest of Africa.

While, during the Cold War, the Soviet Armed Forces had to cross the Gorizia Threshold from Hungary and the German Threshold from the Baltic to Thuringia up to Passau, so as to later spread to Western Europe, today the Russian Armed Forces must project the Russian power onto Eastern European areas and protect their Southern flank between Georgia and Ukraine, as well as make the areas bordering on China safe.

A global project that is much different from the old bilateral confrontation with the United States and its allies, as it happened until 1989.

We cannot even rule out that the “fall of the Berlin Wall” was precisely a phase of the strategic confrontation and not its end.

In fact, in New Lies for Old, a book written by an important KGB defector, namely Anatoly Golytsin, and published in the West in 1990, it is maintained that all the major “opening” operations of the Soviet regime were managed by the Party’s nomenclature, with a view to playing for time and involving Westerners in solving the USSR structural economic crisis.

A crisis which has been lasting since the beginning of Bolshevik power and made one of the most brilliant Russian dissident intellectuals, namely Andrei Amalrik, write another revealing book, Will the Soviet Union survive until 1984?

Currently the Russian Armed Forces are one of the mechanisms with which the Federation itself survives; they are not a prohibitive cost that blocks the “Socialist” economic development.

Let us now better analyze how the Russian Armed Forces are constituted  and what their current rules of engagement are.

The risk matrices evaluated by the Kremlin are now well-known: Russia views the US policy of global spreading of democracy as a power projection in disguise, under the banner of altruism and noble feelings. This applies both to the “colour revolutions”, from the Balkans up to Georgia and Ukraine and to the “Arab Spring” in the former USSR Islamic republics.

Furthermore the Russian Federation fears jihadist Islam in North Caucasus and in the many Muslim regions across the nine time zones currently characterizing the country – not to mention the danger represented by Islamist radicalism in Afghanistan, which can easily spread also to the Russian territory.

It is worth recalling that Brzezinski decided that Central Asia should never fall under the Russian or Soviet hegemony and that the jihadist “small Satan” was needed to drive away the Soviet “great Satan” in Afghanistan – with the bad results which are before us to be seen.

However, in the framework of Global Strategy, alchemy rules – in which  “like cures like” – do not apply.

With specific reference to China, the current Russian National Strategy  theorizes that there are never enemies in the East. Nevertheless some groups in the Kremlin think that the danger of Russia as China’s junior economic partner needs to be avoided and they are not even sure that China can never collide – for its own security – in central Asian areas or on maritime borders with Japan and Taiwan.

As to defense spending, in 2016 Russia reached its peak since the USSR collapse.

Moreover, in 2015, defense spending reached 52 billion US dollars, equal to 4% of GDP.

A reasonable figure for a global and nuclear power.

The main project on which the Chiefs of Staff are currently focusing is the strategic armament program for rearmament from 2011 until 2020, for an estimated value of 19.4 trillion rubles (285 billion US dollars), with 31% of the Fund spent in the first 5 years (2011-2015) and 70% to be used from 2016 to 2020.

Furthermore, in 2017, defense spending, has fallen by 30% compared to the previous years so as to avoid the military budget blocking economic growth, which is still heavily dependent on the oil cycle, which – as is well-known – is now characterized by permanently low oil barrel prices.

Oil drilling and extraction in Saudi Arabia is not expensive – hence the country is not afraid of falling oil prices – but pumping oil and gas in Central Asia or even in Siberia has a very high cost.

Again at doctrinal level, the Russian official texts tell us that future wars  will be characterized by a quick initial “destructive period” – an old legacy of Soviet doctrines – which will be decisive for the continuation of war operations.

Speed, accuracy and quantity of non-nuclear weapons are decisive just as in the case of nuclear weapons – and this, too, is a legacy of the USSR doctrinal tradition.

Hence Russia theorizes the right to a nuclear response when there is also a conventional attack endangering the very existence of the State.

Therefore preventive strikes and deep attacks are always possible, with or without nuclear weapons that, for Russia, can also be used to de-escalate the conflict.

Another tenet of the Russian national doctrine is “non-nuclear deterrence”.

The issue lies in calculating the minimum amount of operations to make the damage inflicted on an opponent obviously unacceptable for the enemy.

For Russia, “strategic deterrence” is currently the mix of military, diplomatic, economic, spiritual, cultural and technological operations capable of stabilizing and blocking the opponents’ actions and showing the dissuasive resolve of the Russian elites.

An overview that is very different from the current NATO doctrines, which are developed in a very sectoral way, by paying little attention to the cultural and political significance of the operations planned.

Moreover, with specific reference to the C4ISR network (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), Russia has a highly-centralized structure, directly into  Vladimir Putin’s hands, but also particularly scattered over the Russian Federation’s huge expanses. This structure is obviously redundant, safe and reliable, designed for the worst-case scenario and for the maximum threat to the network security.

Compared to the Soviet tradition, the current Russian military doctrine is much less focused on ground forces and their deployment, while there is more room for the strategic forces of the Navy and the Air Force.

The Russian nuclear Triad is currently composed of three groups of intercontinental ballistic missile systems, based on the old, but always well-functioning SS-18 and SS-19 missiles.

Conversely the SS-25 is an ICBM system moving on roads or railways and  an expansion and renewal of these networks, too, is foreseen in the future.

Two new submarine classes – at least ten units – have been included in planning, both nuclear-powered and equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Russian Aerospace Force has many bombers which make up the Long Range Aviation Command, while new aircraft models are being introduced in this area of the nuclear triad.

 Again at theoretical level, all the Triad forces are programmed to be used in three main scenarios: preventive strike, counter-strike before the enemy nuclear salvo and retaliation nuclear salvo.

It is worth noting that the new START agreement signed by Russia and the United States on April 8, 2010 provides for a maximum of 1,500 warheads for each platform and for both countries, as well as up to 800 ICBM and SLBM launchers and up to 700 operational strategic systems for both countries.

Currently, the latest Russian statistics on the START agreement tell us that 1,765 warheads on 523 missile, marine, land and aircraft carriers are available on the Russian Federation’s territory.

 Together with the indirect, cyber and intelligence strategies, this is Russia’s effort to become a global power in a multipolar and post-American world.

Conversely, in Europe, the Armed Forces are experiencing their worst phase, with few men, few and obsolete means, a vast distance from their respective ruling classes and a doctrinal level that is often borrowed – with some simplifications – only from the one used by the US Armed Forces, which have different interests and strategies, as well as increasingly different goals from those of the European military systems.

The new Russian defense doctrines mark the end of the old neo-positivistic military tradition, such as that of the US field manuals describing the amount of bullets needed to shoot a specific target down.

The era of the cultural, technological, intelligence and political war has begun – the kind of conflict that was indicated by the Soviet intelligence defectors who, in the United States, were very surprised that no one studied Sun Tzu, the Thirty-Six Stratagems or the cultural and psychological aspects of what we now call – by using Russian terminology – the “hybrid war”.

Those who will reform our European nations – after this difficult and gloomy phase of economic, social and cultural demobilization – shall   immediately pursue the material, spiritual and doctrinal rearmament of our Armed Forces.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Biden forces Russia to retake all of Ukraine, and maybe even Lithuania

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Image source: kremlin.ru

The Soviet Union had included what now are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

There is no indication that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin had intended on February 24th anything more than to add to Russia the extremely pro-Russian former Donbass region of Ukraine. Russian troops were, however, sent also to surround Ukraine’s capital Kiev only in order to prevent Ukrainian troops there going south and joining Ukraine’s troops who already for eight years had been and still were in Donbass, so that Ukraine could then reinforce its Donbass troops against Russia’s invasion. Once Russia determined that its forces and the (highly pro-Russian) local Donbass Government forces in Donbass were clearly on the path toward victory there, the Russian troops surrounding Kiev became withdrawn southward toward Donbass. The clearer that it has since become that Russia would succeed in its Donbass operation, the more that America and its allies supplied weapons to Ukraine, and the less willing, to negotiate with Russia, this made Ukraine’s Government. That encouragement to Ukraine’s Government, from the U.S. and its allies, caused Ukraine’s Government to commit itself to victory at any cost against Russia (even promising to invade Crimea to retake it). The negotiations between Russia and Ukraine therefore collapsed.

Biden seems to have made some sort of deal with Ukraine’s President Zelensky that if Ukraine would do that (resist Russia all the way), then America and its allies would commit to Ukraine all the way up to World War III, but not by sending troops, only weapons and economic aid, which total so far this year the U.S. has been authorized in an amount of $54 billion. America’s allies have donated far less. Basically, the deal is between Biden and Zelensky, to fight Russia all the way to a “victory” by Ukraine (actually by America) against Russia.

However, now that Ukraine is losing its war, Biden and his allies are allowing the war to expand closer and closer to WW III. Ukraine has several times bombed nearby cities in Russia, though constantly promising that it won’t.  And now, Lithuania, which is part of America’s alliance, has closed Russia’s rail traffic through Lithuania into Russia’s province of Kaliningrad. Analogous would be if an anti-U.S. Canada were to block U,.S. rail traffic between the lower 48 states and the American state of Alaska. That sort of thing violates international law and is the international-law equivalent of a declaration of war, which Lithuania has now done (though not yet formally declared), with the approval of the U.S. and of America’s other allies, all of which are thereby daring Russia to enforce its own international-law rights by Russia’s bombing any Lithuanian-or-allied forces that would attempt to enforce the U.S.-and-allied blockade against Kaliningrad.

An excellent discussion of the ramifications of this situation can be found here.

where the reasons why this pushes Russia, to retake all of Ukraine, plus to retake Lithuania, are well explained. Whether Putin will decide to do that, however, is not yet known. What is known is that if Russia is forced to either go to war against the U.S. and its allies, or else to continue to allow this international-law violation by Lithuania being backed-up by America, against Russia, then either Putin will back down and Biden will win, or else Biden will back down and Putin will win, or else we all will experience WW III no longer in just its proxy-war (Ukrainian battlefield) stage (such as has been the case), nor in any other merely traditional-war stage, but finally as an all-out nuclear exchange, which will be completed within less than an hour and doom everyone.

Biden has already decided to bring on a global recession or even depression in order to defeat Russia, but whether he will go all the way to WW III in order to force Russia to become just another ‘U.S. ally’ (but it would be the biggest one of all, since Russia is by far the world’’s biggest country, even without its former partners in the Soviet Union), isn’t yet known.

As Russia’s Government has said on many occasions, what is at stake for Russia in this matter is “existential,” namely whether or not Russia will continue to exist as a free nation, since it will not accept becoming yet another U.S. colony. However, for America, as America’s own Government has said on many occasions, what is at stake is continuation of U.S. hegemony over the world, or else there coming to be no hegemon. That fixed objective of the U.S. Government has been stated in many ways, but perhaps the clearest of all being by President Barack Obama on 28 May 2014, when addressing America’s future generals:

The United States is and remains the one indispensable nation. That has been true for the century passed and it will be true for the century to come. … Russia’s aggression toward former Soviet states unnerves capitals in Europe, while China’s economic rise and military reach worries its neighbors. From Brazil to India, rising middle classes compete with us, and governments seek a greater say in global forums. … It will be your generation’s task to respond to this new world.

To be a “hegemon” is to be the only nation that is indispensable — all others are, according to that view, dispensable. Russia’s Government is now being tested to determine whether it will accept being dispensable, or else continue as it has been at least since 1991, as a free country, no mere colony of some foreign government.

In order for the U.S. to win this conflict, the entire world will have to accept rule by America’s Government (i.e., being a U.S. ‘ally’). In order for Russia to win this conflict, the U.S. Government would have to change what has been its overriding objective ever since, actually, 25 July 1945: hegemony.

NOTE: Officially, the term “hegemony” is merely a synonym for “domination.” The reason dictionaries lie about it is: a term that means domination over all other countries conveys a Hitlerian image, and the U.S. Government wants to avoid being viewed as Hitlerian. The fact is that no country can be a hegemon unless it dominates over all other countries — leads an all-inclusive global empire (even if never officially declared to be an “empire” at all). The correct usage of the term “hegemon” therefore is exclusive (“the hegemon”), not not merely one of several (“a hegemon”). In any case, Obama made the point unambiguously clear by asserting that “The United States is … the one indispensable country.” Hitler felt the same way about Germany. This is the challenge that Russia faces. America ideologically switched sides right after WW II. But Russia remains (and passionately) anti-nazi. So, if Russia will have to retake all of Ukraine, and also Lithuania, in order to continue its own independence, it will do that, because Russia has remained anti-nazi. How Biden would respond to that is unknown.

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Why the Russian Invasion to Ukraine is a Miscalculation on the Feasibility of Conquest

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In the midst of a recovering world from the pandemic, a war in Europe is the last thing anybody would ever wish for. The conflict has been boiling down since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and Russia’s troop buildup outside of the Ukrainian borders has been happening since February 2021, when it announced a large troop deployment for a ‘large scale exercise’. By December in the same year, Russia made an 8-point wish list amidst rising tensions and on February 24th 2022, Russia started its invasion of Ukraine under the guise of what Putin says is a ‘special military operation’. The following day, heavy Russian artillery marches towards Kyiv expecting an easy path, however they were met by heavy resistance from the Ukrainian military and civilians.[1] Within the following months, the struggle to take over Kyiv has proven Russia’s miscalculation on what Van Evera terms as the ‘feasibility of conquest’. But in order to fully understand where miscalculation lies, it is important to note the background and sources of insecurity between all parties involved.

In Putin’s worldview, the legitimacy of the Ukrainian identity and statehood is a precarious issue. He has long stated and emphasized on Eastern Slav unity between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, suggesting that the political destiny of the three nations is inseparable with one another. This “unity paradigm” as coined by Zenon Kohut, or the commitment to the believe that Eastern Slavic states encompasses an “all-Russian” people and thus part of Russia’s sphere of influence (as suggested by the conception of the Ruskii miir)) is what lead to Russia’s primary source of insecurity in recent years. The denial of the Ukrainian identity and statehood by Russia is engrossed within the long historical narratives of Russia’s imperial tradition, and thereby perceiving Ukraine’s desire to separate from Moscow’s influence as a product of “external forces”. As a growing Ukrainian identity is eventually established due to the three-decade process of ‘Ukranization’, calls for integration with the European Union and NATO is a hard pill to swallow for the Kremlin. Should Ukraine adopt a ‘western European identity’ and join NATO, Russia is faced with a reality of a disintegrated Eastern Europe community. In haste, Russia attempts to bring Ukraine back into its arms through military force, under calculations that ethnic Russians living on the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine still holds post-imperial consciousness and pro-Russian sentiments.[2] Therefore, a pro-Western and anti-Russia Ukrainian statehood who potentially could be holding a NATO base is the greatest source of insecurity for Russia.

Another view is that Russia’s motivation in Ukraine is based on its identification as a great power state. But its slow growing economy, old population, and security problems within its vast territory makes it not resemble like one. Hence, Russia’s great power status undeniably rests on three things; membership in the UNSC, its nuclear weapons, and its position as the largest state in Eastern Europe. But all these have been challenged before by Western Europe and the US allies, noting the intervention in Iraq and the 2008 recognition of Kosovo which it perceives as efforts to undermine its position in the UNSC. Growing numbers of NATO bases in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland and the Czech Republic, have also threatened Russia’s edge on its nuclear ability. The idea to admit Ukraine and Georgia into NATO as reiterated by Bush’s administration in 2008 also became a threat to its relevance in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Russia saw Ukraine moving away from its reaches when it proposed the signing of the EU association agreements.[3] All of this have fueled to become Russia’s primary source of insecurity and motivations as to why it is so adamant in ‘reacquiring’ its neighbor back. [4] This further explains why Russia justifies the invasion under two narratives; one, as a reaction to the encroachment by NATO and the West and two, as a historically justified view that Ukraine belongs to Russia.[5]

On the contrary, Ukraine’s greatest source of insecurity is its unpredictably aggressive and large neighbor who views their sovereignty as illegitimate. As a smaller and developing state compared to Russia, Ukraine views Russia’s meddling in its political affairs as an unwanted intervention. The decoupling of the Russian and Ukrainian identity has started since long ago from laws regarding using the Ukrainian language as the national language and establishing a Ukrainian Orthodox Church. As Ukraine’s political outlooks diverge from Russia, its insecurity lies in its stubborn neighbor refusing to acknowledge their distinctiveness as a sovereign and legitimate state.[6] The 2014 annexation of Crimea has further spurred concerns over its territorial integrity and without being part of any official security alliances, Ukraine is faced with the reality that a war with Russia means fighting on the battlefield alone.

Despite this, the concern over Ukrainian security is not an exclusively Ukrainian agenda, but also a concern for the Western European states and the Atlantic alliance. Russia’s invasion has proved itself as a predatory state with blatant disregard to existing notions of sovereignty and its behavior risks tipping the international security collective, noting that some Eastern European states like Poland—who is a member of NATO and borders Russia and Ukraine—are in close range with the on-going war. Hence, for most of the international community, the primary source of insecurity is the anarchic state of the international system that allows the violation of sovereignty norms, kickstarting worries of their own sovereignties in the face of predatory states. Furthermore, the war has undermined the geopolitical stability of the European continent since the last World War II. As most of these countries identify themselves as ‘democratic adherers to freedom and liberty’, as well as being geographically situated within the region of the conflict, an unsettled Europe risks destabilizing the region’s development as a whole.

As the war has led to the further decoupling of Europe, Ukraine’s resilience (with the help of Western governments support) has taken Russia by surprise. According to Van Evera, the concept on ‘feasibility of conquest’—or in other words, why states would initiate invasions and wars—is shaped by four factors such as military technology, geographic factors, social and political factors, and the nature of diplomacy in relations to the conflict.[7] In hindsight, Russia’s military technology and power outnumbers Ukraine as the former spends 10 times as much on their defense spending than the latter. It has three times the artillery of Ukraine and 10 times as many aircrafts[8]. But the miscalculation lies on the emphasis on its military prowess, forgetting other factors like geographical feasibility, social-political leadership and solidarity, and the diplomatic context of the conflict. To be fair, Russia seems to have thought its military campaign against Ukraine would be a three-day march to takeover Kyiv without much resistance. Therefore, it was left unprepared towards fighting a war that has lasted up to almost 5 months. This is just as Van Evera has written; aggressive operations can penetrate enemy defenses but a reckless operation will expose one’s own defenses.[9]

Russia is not prepared to fight this war. Not only did it did not have a long-term plan on how its invasion was going to play out, Russian forces were underequipped; riding on old armored vehicles, facing gas, food, and water shortages leading to a generally disorganized war effort. This might also be caused by two factors; firstly, its political system and secondly, due to the lack of information among its troops. Russia is known to maintain elite loyalty by profiting off government provisions within procurement systems—including military procurement—which led to widespread corruption. The corruption with the military procurement has left Russian troops fighting in Ukraine with inadequate supplies causing them to loot civilian homes in an attempt to fulfill their water and food needs. Energy shortages has also left many Russian tanks and armored vehicles unable to move any further and are left disregarded on the sides of Ukrainian streets. Furthermore, despite its overwhelming numbers, the Russian air force has failed to dominate the skies due to the lack of tactical strategy.[10]  Additionally, it seemed that the invasion was kept under wraps amongst military officials which led to a lot of the Russian troops losing morale quickly as they do not understand why they are fighting a war in a country where many of them have familial ties.[11]

Meanwhile, the Ukrainians have opted to capitalize on Russia’s strategic failure. Since the 2014 Crimean annexation, it has received weapons supply from western nations. In 2016, Ukraine and NATO did a training program for the Ukrainian special forces, but never truly expecting that the training would be put to test so soon.[12] Amidst the current war, the US and its allies in NATO and the EU have committed to sending weaponry such as Javelin antitank missiles, machine guns, sniper rifles, and stinger surface-to-air missiles.[13] The Ukrainians have adopted a strategy to wear down the Russian offense by sticking into the defense position. This is due to Ukrainian’s consciousness of its own military prowess; power-wise, Ukraine understands its limitations and optimizes what is has effectively. The weapons shipment from the West have also helped it strengthened its defense, as military technology that focuses on lethal firepower and mobility are best suited for defense.[14] The geographical factor definitely falls into the Ukrainian’s favor, as local knowledge on its geography has created an effective environment for its guerilla warfare. Many Ukrainian troops have opted to fortify cities instead of engaging with the Russians out in the open as seen in the struggle in Mykoliv city in order to save their military supplies and engage with Russians in the most efficient manner possible. Russia’s initial strategy to seize and encircle Kyiv through the Hostomel airfield had failed as the Ukrainian forces defense-dominant strategy have managed to holdout the Russian air and missile strikes and prevented them from further advancing towards Kyiv.

Barriers and fortifications are put up by destroying bridges and highways to prevent tanks from mobilizing. A strategy of the Ukrainians is to destroy the Russian convoy with artillery shells and antitank missiles whenever the vehicles were on the open highway. This relates to Van Evera’s point on strong fortification and human made obstacles like urban sprawls that are essential in the creation of a strong defense.[15] This can be seen in how Kyiv has been barricaded with large concrete blocks, sandbags, tires, and tanker trucks. Similarly, trenches have been dug out surrounding the city of Irpin as Russia’s lack of knowledge around Irpin has left their tanks stuck in small streets, making them easy targets for the Ukrainian military.[16] It should be noted that local knowledge is not simply limited in the geographical sense, but can also be sourced from civilian intel. Residents in several Ukrainian cities who were either unable to get out or refuse to leave have helped provide intel on Russian movements using their cellphones. [17] The war has further consolidated Ukrainian solidarity and Zelenskyy’s leadership when he opted to stay and fight in the capital alongside his countrymen. The charismatic leader’s popular government has garnered the ability to raise its citizens loyalty and organize them for effective guerilla resistance.[18] This can be seen in how voluntary Ukrainian citizens have joined in taking up arms in defending their cities via guerilla warfare. Many citizens have participated in building Molotov cocktails in the frontlines and even farmers are contributing by towing away Russian armored vehicles. [19] Furthermore, smaller arsenals are distributed amongst guerilla fighters noting the usefulness of assault rifles, machine guns, light mortars, and mines for defensive powers, which reaffirms the Ukrainian fighters’ commitment to defend instead of attack. [20]

This just goes in line with Van Evera’s writing on the usage of local knowledge which can hinder conquest. Similarly, Van Evera also states that when states do not have the adequate critical resources, conquest can also be hindered.[21] He also noted that the diplomatic factor that influences conquest feasibility are within these three arrangements; collective security systems, defensive alliance, and balancing behavior by neutral states.[22] The latter is most true in the context of Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts in garnering international support and sympathy towards its side of the war. Despite not being part of a collective security system or a formal defensive alliance, Ukraine has managed to gain the support of states like the US and EU members to play the role as ‘neutral balancers’, or those who join the weaker party in order to balance the more powerful party. Though they do not fight within the war directly, they are fighting in proxy by sending weaponry and supplies to Ukraine and imposing severe economic sanctions. Ukraine, for its part, is helping its ally states by stalling the war in order to make Russia suffer from the brunt of its sanctions. Furthermore, the involvement of balancing parties—who are also a part of a security collective like NATO—makes Russia’s aggression limited towards Ukraine, since expanding its aggression towards the balancing parties would enlarge the scale of the war. But this situation is also made feasible due to the political regimes within the balancing states involved which have strong willingness to intervene in preventing the expansion of regional hegemonies.[23] Should these states pursue isolationist policies; the war situation would be a completely different story.

The city of Lysychansk is likely to become Russia’s next target as it has been bombarding the city with airstrikes. In the other side of the river separating Lysychansk with the city of Severodonestsk, the street fighting and ground assaults has made humanitarian assistance to enter very difficult in the Luhansk region. Meanwhile, the struggle in Kharkiv continuous as Russia’s ground assaults to the northeast pushes’ Ukrainian troops away from Russian-occupied frontiers near the Russian border.[24] Amidst it all, there is no denying that the invasion to Ukraine for Russia’s part is a heavy miscalculation on the feasibility of conquest since it only focused on assumptions on its military powers. It neglects the other factors that should have been utilized to serve its own goals and is now being capitalized by the Ukrainian forces in holding out against the aggression. From differing perceptions of threat that have led to different security concerns for both parties—and to an extent, to balancing parties as well—there is one salient takeaway within this war. It is undeniable that the Russia-Ukraine War marks a rise in concerns regarding a state’s national security, noting the existence of predatory behavior within the international system. But security itself is an issue of specific context in which actors have different interpretations on what they deem as threatening and secure. In an international arena that is now buzzing with security concerns, a diverse spectrum of security concerns in relation to the Russia-Ukraine War has emerged. For some it might be concerns on how the war is impacting the slow-going post-pandemic recovery with rising food and oil prices that are predicted to cause instability in volatile regions like Africa and the Middle East, as well as straining developing and emerging economies in Asia and Latin America whilst Central and South Asian states risks getting their share of aid diverted to the Ukrainian cause.[25] For others, it might be the threat on the breach of sovereignty norms and the reminder of the constant precarity within the international life due to the existence of predatory behavior. Time can only tell how the Russia-Ukraine War will play out, but in the meantime, there is no denying that everyone is on the edge of their seats in following its development. Therefore, the Russian invasion in Ukraine has become one of the most pressing security issues in the 21st century.


[1] Reuters, “A Timeline of War as Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Enters Third Month,” Hindustan Times, April 23, 2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/a-timeline-of-war-as-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-enters-third-month-101650699536819.html.

[2] Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict,” www.csis.org, April 22, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-war-ukraine-identity-history-and-conflict.

[3] Ruth Deyermond, “What Are Russia’s Real Motivations in Ukraine? We Need to Understand Them | Ruth Deyermond,” The Guardian, April 27, 2014, sec. Opinion, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/27/russia-motivations-ukraine-crisis.

[4] Kristen de Groot, “Putin’s Motivation behind the Attack on Ukraine,” Penn Today, February 24, 2022, https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/putins-motivation-behind-attack-ukraine.

[5] Sebastian Shindler, “Opinion – Russian Motives in Ukraine and Western Response Options,” E-International Relations, February 28, 2022, https://www.e-ir.info/2022/02/28/opinion-russian-motives-in-ukraine-and-western-response-options/.

[6] Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict,” www.csis.org, April 22, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-war-ukraine-identity-history-and-conflict

[7] Van Evera, 1998, p.16

[8] Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict,” www.csis.org, April 22, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-war-ukraine-identity-history-and-conflict

[9] Van Evera, 1998, p.18

[10] France 24, “Five Reasons Why Ukraine Has Been Able to Stall Russian Advance,” France 24, March 8, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220308-five-reasons-why-ukraine-has-been-able-to-stall-russian-advance.

[11] Zack Beauchamp, “9 Big Questions about Russia’s War in Ukraine, Answered,” Vox, March 30, 2022, https://www.vox.com/22989379/russia-ukraine-war-putin-zelenskyy-us-nato-explainer-questions.

[12] Sudarsan Raghavan, “How Kyiv’s Outgunned Defenders Have Kept Russian Forces from Capturing the Capital,” Washington Post, March 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/15/ukraine-kyiv-russia-war/.

[13]France 24, “Five Reasons Why Ukraine Has Been Able to Stall Russian Advance,” France 24, March 8, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220308-five-reasons-why-ukraine-has-been-able-to-stall-russian-advance.

[14] Van Evera, 1998, pp.16-17

[15] Van Evera, 1998, pp.16-19

[16] Van Evera, 1998, p.20

[17] Sudarsan Raghavan, “How Kyiv’s Outgunned Defenders Have Kept Russian Forces from Capturing the Capital,” Washington Post, March 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/15/ukraine-kyiv-russia-war/.

[18] Van Evera, 1998, p.20

[19] Sudarsan Raghavan, “How Kyiv’s Outgunned Defenders Have Kept Russian Forces from Capturing the Capital,” Washington Post, March 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/15/ukraine-kyiv-russia-war/.

[20] Sudarsan Raghavan, “How Kyiv’s Outgunned Defenders Have Kept Russian Forces from Capturing the Capital,” Washington Post, March 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/15/ukraine-kyiv-russia-war/.

[21] Van Evera, 1998, p.20

[22] Van Evera, 1998, pp.21-22

[23] Van Evera, 1998, pp.21-22

[24] The Washington Post, “Latest Russia-Ukraine War News Updates,” The Washington Post, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/18/russia-ukraine-war-putin-news-live-updates/.

[25] IMF, “How War in Ukraine Is Reverberating across World’s Regions,” IMF Blog, March 15, 2022, https://blogs.imf.org/2022/03/15/how-war-in-ukraine-is-reverberating-across-worlds-regions/.

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Corporate Business and Career Development in the Higher Education System in Russia

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Far ahead of the special session that thoroughly reviewed and discussed Russia’s education and the employment market at the 25th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), Russian legislators have, on May 25, launched a Telegram survey on the future of higher education and the Bologna system in Russia.

Russia’s State Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin wrote on his Telegram channel calling for a new higher education system in the country based on the best contemporary and Soviet practices. “We would be right to create an effective national higher education system based on today’s and Soviet practices,” Vyacheslav Volodin wrote on his Telegram channel. “The existing higher education system needs change, as per 90% of the respondents,” Volodin reported, saying that more than 413,000 people had been surveyed.

The Duma speaker said this and other issues would be discussed at a parliamentary session on June 27, with Science and Higher Education Minister Valery Falkov, as well as representatives from the country’s universities and education experts expected to attend.

At the St. Petersburg forum, its traditional face-to-face format for the first time in two years after coronavirus pandemic, during a special discussion entitled ‘How to Provide the Russian Economy with the Qualified Personnel?’ and looked at the question of the ‘qualification pit’ – the mismatch of skills and competencies of employees with the needs of employers is becoming more acute by the year. At the same time, according to the Ministry of Education, today more than 60% of schoolchildren choose secondary vocational education. Is it not enough? And what measures should be taken by the state and business to solve the current problem? 

There were more questions on aspects of education. How to attract employers to active, meaningful cooperation with educational organizations? How can business contribute to a better quality of personnel training? How can we increase employers’ satisfaction with the level of secondary vocational graduate training? How can the right conditions for mastering fundamentally new professional skills and competencies be created? How can we reduce the time necessary for the adaptation of new personnel in production and increase the efficiency of the process?

Some experts have argued that the integration of creative industries into the educational process is becoming an important trend and necessity of the 21st century. Thus getting involve in educating and training of furture professionals should be viewed as an integral part of any sector of the economy from the nuclear industry to agriculture and construction. 

Deputy CEO of the Roscongress Foundation and Director of the social platform of the Roscongress Foundation – the Innosocium Foundation Yelena Marinina explained at the session at St. Petersburg forum that the future and the trajectory of its development depend on the values, knowledge, and aspirations of today’s young people. 

There are new opportunities and the new horizons that are opening up in all areas are in high demand. It makes it imperative effectively utilizing the potential of graduates to accelerate economic growth. This explains the need to understand the relationship between employers and employees, and to stimulate cooperation, especially in a rapidly changing world, between business and educational institutions, Marinina asserted in her presentation.

Speaking at the SPIEF plenary session, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin strongly urges big business representatives to link their families’ future with Russia. “Recent events have only confirmed what I kept saying earlier: it’s safer at home. Those who didn’t want to hear this obvious message lost hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars in the West. This is how the supposedly safe haven for capital turned out,” the Russian leader stressed.

“Today I would also like to address our leaders, large companies owners, our major entrepreneurs and managers. Dear colleagues, friends, real, lasting success, a sense of dignity and self-respect come only when you connect your future, your children’s future with your Motherland,”  Putin reiterated.

Putin carefully noted that he has been in contact with many CEOs and company owners for a long time and knows their sentiments. It is, indeed, important to understand that business is much more than making a profit. It involves changing the life around, contributing to the development of your hometown, region, country as a whole is an extremely important thing for self-realization. Nothing can replace service to people and society. This is the meaning of life, the genuine meaning of work.

During several ocassions of award ceremonies of young talented entrepreneurs in the Kremlin, Putin has, long ago, supported the implementation of the strategic socio-economic initiative entitled Professionalism. The initiative is aimed at complex reset of the whole system of secondary vocational education. 

The key task is to ensure the training of specialists in professions that are truly in demand in a shorter period of time. This will provide a possibility to build a new sectoral model of personnel training, synchronized with the demands of the labor market. It will help stipulate employment for graduates and, as a consequence, give a new impetus to the development of regional economies.

As of 1 September 2022, 150,000 students will be involved in training at educational production centers. The primary focus is on key working professions and specializations in areas such as metallurgy, pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, and transportation. The new approach that lies at the heart of the project will help solve the issue of targeted training for the priority sectors of the economy under the conditions of import substitution.

New documents were signed by Alexander Stuglev, Chairman and CEO of the Roscongress Foundation, Elena Chernova, First Vice Rector of St. Petersburg State University, Ivan Lobanov, Rector of Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, and Marina Buntova, CEO of TALENTI. These documents stipulate joining forces in implementing state policy aimed at improving the socio-economic sector, creating conditions meant to assist students and young professionals in professional orientation and successful employment. 

Under the agreement, the Roscongress Foundation will be involved in forming a database of the main beneficiaries of the projects, organizing classes and events held as part of these joint projects. In addition, the agreements provide for cooperation between the parties in conducting joint internships, theoretical classes and training seminars for young people, including using ‘Country’s Potential’ digital platform.

According to the organizers’ website information, about 2,700 business representatives from 90 countries were expected to attend – far below the 13,500 participants from 140 countries previous years. Some business leaders had concerns about attending the forum due to the sanctions against Russia. Under the chosen theme ‘New Opportunities in a New World’ that reflects the changing global situations, the conference runs from June 15 to June 18 and it is the 25th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) since its establishment. 

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