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The Russian military doctrine

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The medal coined by the Hungarian State – after the powers of the Warsaw Pact had to return to their bases and to Russia, in particular, by March 31, 1991 – was very significant: on the front side the return of the Russian and Warsaw Pact soldiers, portrayed with the irony of comics, while on the back side of the coin the bottom of a Russian-Soviet general on which the shape of a big kick stands out.

That was the situation at the end of a political, military and economic system that encompassed the para-Soviet area in a very dangerous and economically unstable network.

While the Soviet technocratic wings theorized factor accounting, according to Leontief’s model – albeit with real prices – the ruling classes imposed an economic and military alliance based on the simple coordination of national economic plans.

It could not be long-lasting and, indeed, it did not last.

It is worth noting that China uses the Leontief’s public accounting model still today.

This was the first Eastern structural crisis, which started in the 1960s and later dragged on until the end of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR collapse.

It was not just a “planned” economy, it was a productive system for strategic and political purposes that could no longer be credibly maintained.

The fall in oil prices with the new North Sea production – that Margaret Thatcher did not fail to use politically – and the related  drop in the Middle East oil barrel price were the two factors which blocked the residual desires of revenge of the USSR and its allies.

Conversely, the strategic swan song was the “Euromissile battle” in Europe.

It was a Milan-based leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), often travelling to Moscow, who directly informed Helmut Schmidt of the explicitly offensive line of the Soviet SS-20 deployment in the Warsaw Pact areas.

Those missiles were more powerful and precise than Pershing II ones, but expensive and very heavy.

It took the strategic genius of Bettino Craxi and of Admiral Fulvio Martini, an unforgettable friend, and later of Francesco Cossiga, to block a series of operations, which we would currently call Information Operations, designed to delegitimize and block the parallel deployment of NATO  Cruise missiles.

What is happening today? Vladimir Putin says he must protect the “outer space” of the Russian Federation, otherwise it can implode.

The Russian President likes to repeat that the Russian Federation has only three bases outside its borders – but, indeed, they are approximately 30 –  while the United States has a military network of about 800 bases.

The Russian polemic is partially true.

NATO has Eastern borders which are already targets, but Russia has semi-populated areas or regions in which treacherous populations live. If these regions are penetrated, the nerve centres of Russian defense can be reached.

Hence currently the Russian Federation considers it to be a new great power, after its Soviet phase, through a powerful, up-to-date and world-leading military apparatus, attentive to seal both the homeland and the areas of primary strategic interest for Russia. We saw it in Syria and we will soon see it in Libya and the rest of Africa.

While, during the Cold War, the Soviet Armed Forces had to cross the Gorizia Threshold from Hungary and the German Threshold from the Baltic to Thuringia up to Passau, so as to later spread to Western Europe, today the Russian Armed Forces must project the Russian power onto Eastern European areas and protect their Southern flank between Georgia and Ukraine, as well as make the areas bordering on China safe.

A global project that is much different from the old bilateral confrontation with the United States and its allies, as it happened until 1989.

We cannot even rule out that the “fall of the Berlin Wall” was precisely a phase of the strategic confrontation and not its end.

In fact, in New Lies for Old, a book written by an important KGB defector, namely Anatoly Golytsin, and published in the West in 1990, it is maintained that all the major “opening” operations of the Soviet regime were managed by the Party’s nomenclature, with a view to playing for time and involving Westerners in solving the USSR structural economic crisis.

A crisis which has been lasting since the beginning of Bolshevik power and made one of the most brilliant Russian dissident intellectuals, namely Andrei Amalrik, write another revealing book, Will the Soviet Union survive until 1984?

Currently the Russian Armed Forces are one of the mechanisms with which the Federation itself survives; they are not a prohibitive cost that blocks the “Socialist” economic development.

Let us now better analyze how the Russian Armed Forces are constituted  and what their current rules of engagement are.

The risk matrices evaluated by the Kremlin are now well-known: Russia views the US policy of global spreading of democracy as a power projection in disguise, under the banner of altruism and noble feelings. This applies both to the “colour revolutions”, from the Balkans up to Georgia and Ukraine and to the “Arab Spring” in the former USSR Islamic republics.

Furthermore the Russian Federation fears jihadist Islam in North Caucasus and in the many Muslim regions across the nine time zones currently characterizing the country – not to mention the danger represented by Islamist radicalism in Afghanistan, which can easily spread also to the Russian territory.

It is worth recalling that Brzezinski decided that Central Asia should never fall under the Russian or Soviet hegemony and that the jihadist “small Satan” was needed to drive away the Soviet “great Satan” in Afghanistan – with the bad results which are before us to be seen.

However, in the framework of Global Strategy, alchemy rules – in which  “like cures like” – do not apply.

With specific reference to China, the current Russian National Strategy  theorizes that there are never enemies in the East. Nevertheless some groups in the Kremlin think that the danger of Russia as China’s junior economic partner needs to be avoided and they are not even sure that China can never collide – for its own security – in central Asian areas or on maritime borders with Japan and Taiwan.

As to defense spending, in 2016 Russia reached its peak since the USSR collapse.

Moreover, in 2015, defense spending reached 52 billion US dollars, equal to 4% of GDP.

A reasonable figure for a global and nuclear power.

The main project on which the Chiefs of Staff are currently focusing is the strategic armament program for rearmament from 2011 until 2020, for an estimated value of 19.4 trillion rubles (285 billion US dollars), with 31% of the Fund spent in the first 5 years (2011-2015) and 70% to be used from 2016 to 2020.

Furthermore, in 2017, defense spending, has fallen by 30% compared to the previous years so as to avoid the military budget blocking economic growth, which is still heavily dependent on the oil cycle, which – as is well-known – is now characterized by permanently low oil barrel prices.

Oil drilling and extraction in Saudi Arabia is not expensive – hence the country is not afraid of falling oil prices – but pumping oil and gas in Central Asia or even in Siberia has a very high cost.

Again at doctrinal level, the Russian official texts tell us that future wars  will be characterized by a quick initial “destructive period” – an old legacy of Soviet doctrines – which will be decisive for the continuation of war operations.

Speed, accuracy and quantity of non-nuclear weapons are decisive just as in the case of nuclear weapons – and this, too, is a legacy of the USSR doctrinal tradition.

Hence Russia theorizes the right to a nuclear response when there is also a conventional attack endangering the very existence of the State.

Therefore preventive strikes and deep attacks are always possible, with or without nuclear weapons that, for Russia, can also be used to de-escalate the conflict.

Another tenet of the Russian national doctrine is “non-nuclear deterrence”.

The issue lies in calculating the minimum amount of operations to make the damage inflicted on an opponent obviously unacceptable for the enemy.

For Russia, “strategic deterrence” is currently the mix of military, diplomatic, economic, spiritual, cultural and technological operations capable of stabilizing and blocking the opponents’ actions and showing the dissuasive resolve of the Russian elites.

An overview that is very different from the current NATO doctrines, which are developed in a very sectoral way, by paying little attention to the cultural and political significance of the operations planned.

Moreover, with specific reference to the C4ISR network (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), Russia has a highly-centralized structure, directly into  Vladimir Putin’s hands, but also particularly scattered over the Russian Federation’s huge expanses. This structure is obviously redundant, safe and reliable, designed for the worst-case scenario and for the maximum threat to the network security.

Compared to the Soviet tradition, the current Russian military doctrine is much less focused on ground forces and their deployment, while there is more room for the strategic forces of the Navy and the Air Force.

The Russian nuclear Triad is currently composed of three groups of intercontinental ballistic missile systems, based on the old, but always well-functioning SS-18 and SS-19 missiles.

Conversely the SS-25 is an ICBM system moving on roads or railways and  an expansion and renewal of these networks, too, is foreseen in the future.

Two new submarine classes – at least ten units – have been included in planning, both nuclear-powered and equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Russian Aerospace Force has many bombers which make up the Long Range Aviation Command, while new aircraft models are being introduced in this area of the nuclear triad.

 Again at theoretical level, all the Triad forces are programmed to be used in three main scenarios: preventive strike, counter-strike before the enemy nuclear salvo and retaliation nuclear salvo.

It is worth noting that the new START agreement signed by Russia and the United States on April 8, 2010 provides for a maximum of 1,500 warheads for each platform and for both countries, as well as up to 800 ICBM and SLBM launchers and up to 700 operational strategic systems for both countries.

Currently, the latest Russian statistics on the START agreement tell us that 1,765 warheads on 523 missile, marine, land and aircraft carriers are available on the Russian Federation’s territory.

 Together with the indirect, cyber and intelligence strategies, this is Russia’s effort to become a global power in a multipolar and post-American world.

Conversely, in Europe, the Armed Forces are experiencing their worst phase, with few men, few and obsolete means, a vast distance from their respective ruling classes and a doctrinal level that is often borrowed – with some simplifications – only from the one used by the US Armed Forces, which have different interests and strategies, as well as increasingly different goals from those of the European military systems.

The new Russian defense doctrines mark the end of the old neo-positivistic military tradition, such as that of the US field manuals describing the amount of bullets needed to shoot a specific target down.

The era of the cultural, technological, intelligence and political war has begun – the kind of conflict that was indicated by the Soviet intelligence defectors who, in the United States, were very surprised that no one studied Sun Tzu, the Thirty-Six Stratagems or the cultural and psychological aspects of what we now call – by using Russian terminology – the “hybrid war”.

Those who will reform our European nations – after this difficult and gloomy phase of economic, social and cultural demobilization – shall   immediately pursue the material, spiritual and doctrinal rearmament of our Armed Forces.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

Russia

Reigniting the Civil War in Donbas: Reminiscence of the Crimean Annexation

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Source: MSC / Kuhlmann

Europe has been the stage of calamity since the yesteryear’s shenanigans stirred by regional powers and political deadlocks. Coupled with the havoc subjected by the covid pandemic, the region continues to struggle with a health emergency laced with economic turmoil. Focusing on Eastern Europe, Belarus was the centre of attention following the rigged general election in August ensuing mass protests in capital of Minsk. However, while the internal conflict raging throughout the country posed instability, the region was never near an escalation as severe as the turn of events at the borders of Ukraine.

As the Pro-Russian factions are gripping in Eastern Ukraine, primarily in the region of Donbas, Ukraine fears a repeated episode of the War of Donbas of 2014 when the Russian intervention and subsequent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in the south resulted in chaos and heavy casualty in the echelons of the Ukrainian military. While the Russian administration continues to veil its position by explicitly denying any inducement of the Pro-Russian voices in Eastern Ukraine, the sinister momentum is continually picking pace with heavy movements of Russian troops along the border of Donbas in the east and Crimea in the south. The timing and placement allude to a significantly graver possibility extrapolating from the notorious annexation not even a decade earlier.

Ukraine is an East European country bordered by Belarus to the North, Hungary, and Poland to the adjoining West, and Romania to the South. The Southern periphery is lined by the Black Sea while Russia stretches the borders in the North and Northeast. The region is scattered with the post-Soviet rendition of Eastern Europe: the countries conflicting and colluding which once stood as the mighty Soviet Union of the 20th century. Albeit Ukraine functioned as the pillar of the Soviet’s flourishing economy throughout the yester century, the country as an independent nation has been at an impasse, unlike its regional counterparts.

Unlike the ex-Soviet nations of Latvia and Lithuania, which incline towards the Western alliance and exist as one of the 30 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Ukraine struggles with a bifurcation of factions: one aligning with the European Union (EU) and the United States whilst the other jumping the bandwagon of Russia. While the former faction advocates joining hands with major Western powers, the latter opposes the active involvement of NATO in Ukraine, pushing for a Russian-backed government instead. This divide led to the annexation of Crimea in the South: marking Russia as an ever-looming threat to the sovereignty of the ex-Soviet countries deviating from the objectives of the Kremlin.

In 2014, mass demonstrations against the Pro-Russian Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, led to a dramatic turn of events. The revolution erupted in defiance to the abysmal economic policies of President Yanukovych that quickly erupted into an anti-Russian narrative bustling the streets of the capital city of Kyiv. While the President repeatedly tried to resolve the economic disparity by factoring in his alliance with Russian President Vladimir Putin, his acts were perceived in the light of deception, especially by the Pro-European faction in Ukraine. The rage-fuelled protests eventually managed to topple the government of President Yanukovych, forcing him to step down and flee into exile to Russia. The falling-out of the Russian narrative, however, did not bode well in the echelons of the Kremlin.

In the months following the ousting of President Yanukovych, Russia started to tighten the screws against the surging opposition in Ukraine. While the primary objective was to reinstate the government of President Yanukovych, President Putin had other views. Quoting to his cabinet members, he stated: “We [Russia] must start working on returning Crimea to Russia”. Within days, Russia started to implement its scheme by systematically provoking the Pro-Russian rebels against their Pro-European counterparts.  Russia supported the rebels in East Ukraine as well as Crimea in the South to take over the state infrastructure and grapple for power to induce chaos.

Once the mayhem was too hard to follow, Russia invaded the Crimean Peninsula whilst blocking the Eastern Ukrainian territory to impede any Western assistance to the Ukrainian military. The EU slammed sanctions over the Russian oil and banking sectors, the US warned of dire consequences and the UN denounced the invasion as an act of ‘Barbarianism’. However, it didn’t hinder the annexation of Crimea: separating it as the ‘Republic of Crimea’ before eventually signing a treaty of accession to incorporate the peninsula as a part of the Russian Federation. Despite the unabating US and UN allegations of war crimes and subsequent sanctions whilst deeming the annexation as ‘Illegitimate’, Russia controls the Crimean Peninsula except for the northern areas of Arabat spit and Syvash which still fall under the contested control of Ukraine.

Unlike Crimea, however, the Donbas region gives way to a different story altogether. Though an identical Pro-Russian sentiment follows through both Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the foresight differs significantly. A 2014 referendum in Russia casted a colossal 96.7% voter count in support of subsuming Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation: which ultimately led to the accession of the Crimean Peninsula to Russia despite the UN deeming the vote illegal. Similarly, the perspective of the fate of the Donbas region was on congruent levels during the Crimean annexation. However, the narrative has loosened ever since. The Donbas region, comprising of the major revolt cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, enjoys a popular narrative in Russia to be liberated from Ukraine as independent states: Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR) and Luhansk Peoples Republic (LPR) respectively, instead of joining the Russian Federation. While the opinion of incorporating the Donbas cities within Russia has diluted since the war of 2014, the narrative supporting a unified Ukraine remains the most unpopular opinion in Russia.

Eastern Ukraine has remained a reminder of the Crimean annexation; the stalemate in the Donbas region has tallied over 13000 fatalities including the Pro-Russian rebels but primarily comprising of the Ukrainian troops ambushed in Northern swathes of Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that a total of 50 troops have perished in Donetsk and Luhansk in 2020 alone. The simmering tensions and the prolonged standoff has multiple roots. President Zelensky is a renowned Pro-European leader ad one of the major critics of the Kremlin intervention in the ex-Soviet countries including Ukraine. He has been crushing the clout of Pro-Russian militants in the pockets of Eastern Ukraine, incessantly blaming Russia for providing militaristic assistance to the rebels. Moreover, President Zelensky has been one of the primary proponents to peddle the cause of gaining NATO membership for Ukraine to put an ultimate end to the unremitting capitulation to Pro-Russian fighters and the Kremlin.

The strengthening of Ukraine-NATO relations has always irked the Kremlin regime: close movement and deployment of NATO forces along the Russian borders has been one of the most contentious and controversial aspects of diplomacy. This has established a grey zone between Ukraine and an official membership of the NATO: an accession that could likely lead to escalation through provocation and, dictated by Article 5 of the NATO charter, would mandate an armed retaliation by other members of NATO against Russia. The resulting devastation could not be even fathomed.

On the counter-side, President Putin is reeling through a tough tenure of his decades-long premiership. Covid fatalities run rampant and mass opposition blooms against the Kremlin in the aftermath of the incarceration of a popular Kremlin Critic, Alexei Navalny. Moscow requires a series of events to turn the stride in favor of President Putin.  While President Putin’s recent stretch of tenure being extended further has done little to appease the raucous Russians backing Navalny, a conflict with a long-despised Ukraine should set his presidency back to a stable trajectory. Russia’s actions in Crimea pulled the popularity of President Putin to a phenomenal rating of 86% in 2014. Given how his government was rattled by the opposition back then and how the annexation instantaneously notched up his image in Russia, moving in tandem, an active intervention in Ukraine could again turn things in favor of the desperate Kremlin.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Ruslan Khomchak, estimated a total of 35000 Russian-backed rebels in Eastern Ukraine. However, he estimated a tally of 50000 Russian troops lining across the border in Eastern Ukraine as well an additional 50000 troops lining the southern periphery in Crimea. While Kremlin has refused to be preparing for an invasion, a vague intent was implied by the Russian Presidential Spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, stating that: “Nobody is planning to move towards the war. However, Russia has always said that it won’t remain indifferent to the fate of the Russian-Speakers in South-eastern Ukraine”. The statement is laced with a threat that led Ukraine to pry for assistance, specifically from NATO. However, despite constant US warnings as well as an invitation to a Summit extended to President Putin by President Biden to ‘Discuss the full range of issues’, Russia continues to claim the deployment as a routine military exercise. However, with expedited NATO movements along the Eastern Ukrainian borders, the US marines infiltrating the Black Sea and Ukraine historically close to obtaining the NATO membership, an invasion could most likely be on cards. The gravity of the ground reality could be gauged by the recent statement of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky: “Of course. We know it from 2014, we know it [Russian invasion] can be each [and any] day”.

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Russia lacks sufficient number of migrants to fulfill its ambitious development plans

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Despite various official efforts, including regular payment of maternal capital to stimulate birth rates and regulating migration policy to boost population, Russia is reportedly experiencing decreasing population. According to the Federal State Statistics Service, Russia’s population currently stands at approximately 144 million, down from 148.3 million.

Experts at the Higher School of Economics believe that regulating the legal status of migrants, majority of them arriving from the Commonwealth of Independent States or the former Soviet republics, could be useful or resourceful for developing the economy, especially on various infrastructure projects planned for country. These huge human resources could be used in the vast agricultural fields to boost domestic agricultural production. On the contrary, the Federal Migration Service plans to deport all illegal migrants from Russia.

Within the long-term sustainable development program, Russia has multibillion dollar plans to address its infrastructure deficit especially in the provinces, and undertake megaprojects across its vast territory, and migrant labor could be useful here. The government can ensure that steady improvements are consistently made with the strategy of legalizing (regulating legal status) and redeploying the available foreign labor, majority from the former Soviet republics rather than deporting back to their countries of origin.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has been credited for transforming the city into a very neat and smart modern one, thanks partly to foreign labor – invaluable reliable asset – performing excellently in maintaining cleanliness and on the large-scale construction sites, and so also in various micro-regions on the edge or outskirts of Moscow.

With its accumulated experience, the Moscow City Hall has now started hosting the Smart Cities Moscow, international forum dedicated to the development of smart cities and for discussing about changes in development strategies, infrastructure challenges and adaptation of the urban environment to the realities of the new normal society.

Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that Russia lacks sufficient number of migrants to fulfill its ambitious development plans. He further acknowledged that the number of migrants in Russia has reduced significantly, and now their numbers are not sufficient to implement ambitious projects in the country.

“I can only speak about the real state of affairs, which suggests that, in fact, we have very few migrants remaining over the past year. Actually, we have a severe dearth of these migrants to implement our ambitious plans,” the Kremlin spokesman pointed out.

In particular, it concerns projects in agricultural and construction sectors. “We need to build more than we are building now. It should be more tangible, and this requires working hands. There is certainly a shortage in migrants. Now there are few of them due to the pandemic,” Peskov said.

Early April, an official from the Russian Interior Ministry told TASS News Agency that the number of illegal migrants working in Russia decreased by 40% in 2020 if compared to the previous year. It also stated that 5.5 million foreign citizens were registered staying in Russia last year, while the average figure previously ranged between nine and eleven million.

On March 30, 2021, President Vladimir Putin chaired the tenth meeting of the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations via videoconference, noted that tackling the tasks facing the country needs not only an effective economy but also competent management. For a huge multinational state such as Russia, it is fundamentally, and even crucially important, to ensure public solidarity and a feeling of involvement in the life, and responsibility for its present and future.

At this moment, over 80 percent of Russian citizens have a positive view on interethnic relations, and it is important in harmonizing interethnic relations in the country, Putin noted during the meeting, and added “Russia has a unique and original heritage of its peoples. It is part of our common wealth, it should be accessible to every resident of our country, every citizen, everyone who lives on this land. Of course, we will need to review the proposal to extend the terms for temporary stay of minors of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation.”

President Vladimir Putin has already approved a list of instructions aimed at reforming the migration requirements and the institution of citizenship in Russia based on the proposals drafted by the working group for implementation of the State Migration Policy Concept of the Russian Federation for 2019-2025.

“Within the framework of the working group for implementation of the State Migration Policy Concept of the Russian Federation for 2019-2025, the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation shall organize work aimed at reforming the migration requirements and the institution of citizenship of the Russian Federation,” an official statement posted to Kremlin website.

In addition, the president ordered the Government, the Interior and Foreign Ministries, the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Justice Ministry alongside the Presidential Executive Office to make amendments to the plan of action for 2019-2021, aimed at implementing the State Migration Policy Concept of the Russian Federation for 2019-2025.

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Nobody Wants a War in Donbass

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image source: euromaidanpress.com

Any escalation is unique in its own way. Right now there’s a combination of unfavorable trends on both sides, which are leading to an escalation of the conflict. This combination creates additional risks and threats that weren’t there before.

On the Ukrainian side, the problem is that the president is losing his political position and becoming a hostage of right-wing and nationalist forces. Many of the reform initiatives that he came to power with have stalled. Political sentiments are changing within his faction. They’re saying that with his recent steps, in particular the language law and the closure of television stations that Kyiv dislikes, he’s starting to stray towards the agenda of his predecessor, Poroshenko. And this means a weakening of his position. Probably, he’s already thinking about re-election and how he will look during the campaign. Here, the trend is unfavorable.

On the other hand, there’s the arrival of Biden, who will always be more attentive to Ukraine than Trump. There’s an expectation that the U.S. will be more consistent and decisive in its support for the Ukrainian side in the event of a conflict. This invigorates the forces that are looking for an escalation.

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh also played a role. They said there was only a political path to resolving the conflict, but in Karabakh [the Azerbaijanis] used force and made real progress. This motivates the people who think that military force can resolve a conflict. Moreover, Ukraine is carrying out defense cooperation with Turkey, so there may be hopes that the balance of forces will shift in Kyiv’s favor.

There’s also a radicalization of the political leadership of the DNR and LNR. They say that [full-scale] war is, if not inevitable, than very likely—and Russia must intervene. The idea that the DNR and LNR should join Russia is gaining popularity once again. This is facilitated by Russia’s actions. In the last two years, the mechanisms for granting Russian citizenship to residents of the LNR and DNR have changed. Hundreds of thousands of LNR and DNR residents are already citizens of the Russian Federation, and Russia has—or at the very least should have—some obligations towards its citizens. This gives hope to [the residents] of the LNR and DNR that if an escalation begins, Russia won’t remain on the sidelines and we will see large-scale intervention. Without Russia, the conflict will not develop in the favor of the republics.

As for Russia, our relations with the West continue to deteriorate. There’s Biden’s statement about Putin being a killer, and relations with the European Union. We are witnessing an accumulation of destabilizing trends.

I don’t think anyone wants a real, big war, since the costs of such a conflict will exceed the political dividends. It’s difficult to predict what such a conflict might lead to, given that the stakes are very high. But an unintended escalation could occur.

Hopefully, all of those involved have enough wisdom, determination, and tolerance to find a positive solution. So far, we are far from a serious conflict, but we’re closer than at the beginning of April 2020 or 2019. Unfortunately, we’re headed downhill, and it’s difficult to say how long it will go on.

To prevent a [full-scale] war from starting, the situation in Donbass needs to be stabilized. That’s the first task. In recent weeks, the number of ceasefire violations has been increasing, and the number of victims is growing. We need to return to the issues of the withdrawal of heavy weapons, the OSCE mission, and monitoring the ceasefire.

The second task is to discuss issues of political regulation. The main uncertainty is how flexible all the parties can be. The Minsk agreements were signed a long time ago, [but] it’s difficult to implement them in full, there needs to be a demonstrated willingness not to revise them, but to somehow bring them up to date. How ready are the parties for this? So far, we aren’t seeing much of this, but without it we will not advance any further.

The third issue is that it’s impossible to resolve the Donbass problem separately from the problem of European security as a whole. If we limit ourselves to how we fought in Donbass, Kyiv will always be afraid that Russia will build up its strength and an intervention will begin. And in Russia there will always be the fear that NATO infrastructure will be developed near Voronezh and Belgorod. We have to deal not only with this issue, but also think about how to create the entire architecture of European security. And it isn’t a question of experts lacking imagination and qualifications, but of statesmen lacking the political will to seriously deal with these issues. Because if you reduce everything to the requirements of the formal implementation of the Minsk agreements, this is what we’ve been fighting about for seven years already.

I think that Ukraine will now try to increase the political pressure on Moscow and get away from the issue of the Minsk agreements. And going forward a lot depends on what the position of the West and U.S. will be. To what extent and in what format will they provide support in the event of an escalation? This is still an open question. And, I think, even Biden doesn’t know the answer to it.

From our partner RIAC

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