With reference to the Third Commandment, the original text reads as follows: “Thou shalt not take the name of Yahweh (thy God) in vain (saw), because Yahweh does not let go unpunished those who use His Name in vain”.In ancient times the Name was not a simple sign. The Name indicated the Substance of the person named forever, thus identifying him/her among the Many others.
It also separated him/her from Evil or, in any case, from the Indistinct.
It is also worth noting that, apart from the Decalogue of the burning bush, Yahweh is named only in a passage of Exodus (23:1), reading as follows “Thou shalt not utter a false report” (sema saw).
False oath was evidence that you should not “swear by a false god” (see Psalm 24:4; Hosea 10).
You should not call Him, He is always everywhere. If you call Him, it means you do not really believe in Him.
Again in the Leviticus, Yahweh stated “Thou shall not swear on my Name deceitfully”.
The Truth of the One is reflected naturally on the objective truth of the things about which men speak.
Furthermore saw is a word used by many prophets of Israel against the worship of idols.
Probably saw was originally the word used to identify the “evil magic”, which therefore had nothing to do with the evocation of God, the Lord of Good, who drove the evil out of the Pardes, the place where, in the End Times, the “second Adam” would return to Truth and Grace.
Based on “The Golden Legend” (Legenda Aurea) by the blessed Jacobus da Varagine – a collection of the legendary lives of the greatest Saints of the medieval Church, which was to revolutionize the life of St. Ignatius of Loyola – Piero della Francesca painted the “Legend of the True Cross” in the Basilica of San Francesco in Arezzo.
According to the tradition of Jacobus da Varagine, Adam asked his son Seth to go to the Garden, the Pardes, to get the oil of mercy to pass away serenely and attain Eternal Life.
Archangel Michael gave to Seth a twig of the Tree of Life, which Solomon found again while he had to build the First Temple.
The King of Israel did not manage to use the tree, which opposed and resisted his workers.
An initiatory theme, also considering to what extent the construction of the Temple and the search for the “password” count in the “primitive scene” of modern Freemasonry.
Furthermore the wooden beam on which Jesus Christ was crucified was buried by a Jew named Judah, who was later thrown into a pit by the Mother of Constantine to make him confess.
Finally workers decided to place the wood on a river, so as to make it a walkway – another obvious symbol.
After the Battle of the Milvian Bridge against Maxentius – in which the Holy Cross appeared together with the well-known message in hoc signo vinces – Constantine sent his mother to Jerusalem to search for the True Cross. St. Helena determined which cross was the true Cross of Christ by laying the wood on the coffin of a dead man, who was instantly brought back to life.
Here there is also the wisdom of Saint Paul, using and overthrowing the Pharisaic and later Cabbalist tradition: certainly, “cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree”, but this is precisely the reason why – as Saint Paul said in his Letter to the Galatians (3:13), “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Law, having become a curse for us – for it is written, “Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree” – in order that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles, so that we would receive the promise of the Spirit through faith”.
This is what St. Paul said about “wood” and its infinite paradox.
Those who walk away will move close, those who come close will be pushed away.
A paradox of Faith that is inconceivable in Islam.
That is the paradox the Islamic theological world has not solved at all, namely the relationship between Evil and Faith.
In fact, if God is the One who orders, commands and decides everything, why does He commands evil and make it win over holiness?
Once again it is Job’s problem. Satan asked: “Doth Job fear God for nought?” (Job 1:9), but Job’s rebellion – which, in fact, creates modern civilization, is targeted against an anthropomorphic God, an Entity that is the projection of our fears and universal desires.
As Psalm 126:3 reads: “The Lord has done great things for us…”, but this must not be shown and His rationale is never the same as men’s.
Therefore, in Islamic theology, there is no way out of the separation between Good and Evil – just think of the absolute uniqueness and, hence, total unknowability of Allah that creates and destroys worlds we do not even know were possible.
Hence Evil is ubiquitous and, above all, unintelligible for human beings, who always interpret it incorrectly or, anyway, in an earthly way.
We revert once again to Job, who encountered the Face of God just when he opposed Him and precisely when God was openly an enemy to him – “My ears had heard of you, but now my eyes have seen you. Therefore I despise and repent in dust and ashes” (Job 42:5).
“Do you believe in Me because I am powerful and simply because I am?”
Here is the great theological, political and sapiential limes breaking the continuity between Islam and the other monotheistic religions.
Once again this is the deep theological sense of contemporary jihad.
I can convince God I am right – I only need to interpret His words literally.
Not even the Quran has this logic.
Furthermore, also in Islam, the primary theological problem is the link between Faith and works, as in the Reformation.
Here the link is between Iman and Islam, namely inner faith and exterior practice.
In this case, however, it is the Prophet himself who, in the struggle against the Kharijites – the usual purist sect arising after any religious reform – theorized, in the Dicta, that also a conversion for evident fear was fine.
Hence we revert to jihad, the acceptance of any form of formal adaptation to the rule of the Sacred, which is never the Sacred.
“Have you opened His chest to see whether all that He was saying was true?” asked the Prophet Muhammad ironically. In the case of contemporary jihad, based on Islamic law, it is precisely the “holy war” that creates many problems.
As in the tradition of the True Cross, jihad is a war that must brought us back to the initial peace.
In fact, according to the Quran, imbalance is the natural trait of the visible world – and this imbalance is precisely represented by war, initial and legal violence.
Hence, the true translation of God’s warning on the Sinai – probably near the current wonderful St. Catherine’s Monastery – is more or less the following: “Do not use the Name of God bending it to your will and whim.”
This does not mean never name it, as is the case with the medieval esoteric sects, or to consider it an objective presence in everyday life – another anti-unitary heresy.
Job, however, could afford it, because he was looking for Him and loved Him, even in the fight against Him, but we certainly not.
In the transcendent original Tradition, Jehovah means “ever greater” – in fact, God is immeasurable because He always grows, while we cannot do other than stand still.
Just think about the revealing metaphor of yeast …
If we look at the traditions of monotheistic religions, born after the first rebellion of Abraham against his father’s idols, we realize that, in any case, Faiths and, above all, ethno-cultural identities must always be preserved.
Copts (10% of the Egyptian population) and, in Jordan and in the Palestinian Territories, the Syrian Christians spread across Turkey, Jordan and the Lebanon, not to mention the Syrian Orthodox Churches and the Syrian Catholic ones, as well as Maronites, Assyrians, Chaldeans and Armenians.
Then Shiites – almost always believing in the Twelfth Imam, as in Iran – even though the Houthis in Yemen and in other Persian Gulf areas are supported by Iran, without theological preconceived ideas, in many regions of the Middle East.
There are also the Zaydis, again in Shiite areas, the Ishmaelites – linked to Agha Khan – as well as the Druids, heirs of Pythagoras, and many others.
Without the map of the religions in the Persian Gulf, nothing can be understood about its policy.
And it is worth reiterating that the sword jihad is a substantial anomaly, which – in fact – rooted itself into the Iraqi-Syrian system when it was convenient for Saudi Arabia and its allies.
As we previously said, identity is a primary criterion.
While there are currently global authorities capable of interpreting, selecting and reforming this huge melting pot of creeds, beliefs and ideas, we certainly cannot avoid thinking of the Catholic Church and the Slavic and Greek Orthodox.
Obviously we can no longer change the past, even though those who do so by profession are called “historians”, but today we can certainly create the present which can build a new future.
There is no need to cry over spilled milk – as Baudelaire said, “One can only forget about time by making use of it”.
Hence currently the real challenge will be freedom of religion and freedom of belief and opinion, in a world in which finally the present is free to build the future.
Obviously after the victory of Assad, as well as of Syrians and Russians in Syria.
Currently this is the real challenge and this holds true for Cardinal Parolin, who will pay a visit to Russia next August to speak with Patriarch Kirill and President Putin.
The correct strategic logic of Cardinal Parolin and Pope Francis is one only: to eliminate any pseudo-controversy with Islam and accept the support of Russia and its religious institutions to recreate the natural pluralistic equilibrium of Christian, Orthodox, Shiite and Sunni communities, as well as of many other faiths which, for the Church of Rome, must be rescued also – and above all – with the support of the Slavic and Greek Orthodox Church.
As early as 2013, Russia had already guaranteed its citizenship to 50,000 Christians in Qalamoun, and in August 2013 the Russian Church had donated 300,000 US dollars to the Patriarchate of Antioch.
The void left by France – ever more naively “secular” – has also left huge room for the Russian orthodoxy in the Greater Middle East.
In Syria 80% of Catholics and, however, Christians, were destroyed in their homes and in their cities.
This is the real acid test for evaluating ecumenism and, above all, the ability to defend Faith.
And today defending creeds also regards the passionate protection of the freedom of religion, the freedom from fear – which is always a bad advisor – and the freedom from the will of leaders.
No more subornation of the poor; enough with the offense to the “little ones”.
Sinite Parvulos …
This, too, must be a point of contact between Cardinal Parolin and his Russian counterparts, including Putin.
Hence it is here – and not in the baroque issue of the Holy Sites – which we can place the new relationship – that we hope will be very effective – between the brilliant Cardinal Pietro Parolin and Patriarch Kirill but, above all, with Vladimir Vladimirovic Putin.
However, let us revert to the Holy Theology that Cardinal Parolin knows better than me and many others.
Who is holy? The answer is simple and can be found in Leviticus 17-26, “You shall be holy, because I, the Lord, am holy who make you holy”.
While interpreting the Covenant between God and men, Jesus simply highlights what the Jews believe without thinking about it: but it is Incarnation which makes the Law effective (also in the legal sense) – and once again there is a contrast with Islamic theology.
If only a cultivated and wise dialogue between the Catholic theology and the Jewish theology could currently be achieved!
Much of the Middle East daily political problems would be solved in a moment.
The Son made flesh creates a filial relationship with the believers, namely he keeps and pursues the “royal law” (James 2:8), which is also the “perfect law that gives freedom” (James 1:25) – hence it is precisely Jesus who almost literarily fills the space of the future and hence the sense and meaning of the present.
Here, in a still new wisdom-based context for the two Churches, the East and the West, there will certainly be room for an initiatory and sapiential world, which has so far been able only to ensure pluralism – certainly a very noble aim which, however, from now on shall speak in re and not only about profane and pluralistic rules.
Therefore we must thank Cardinal Parolin, who will certainly be able to provide excellent theological, political and strategic substance to a relationship with the Patriarchate of Moscow that could become the true and only peace process in Syria and in the rest of the Middle East.
Context and Practice of International Politics: Experience in 2022 and Expectations from 2023
The dramatic events of 2022, centred on the military-political conflict between Russia and the West over the Ukrainian issue, are a vivid example of the interaction of context and practice in international politics. The global context, within which one cannot help but consider the most acute manifestation of the current clash of interests, is the end of a period which saw the relative monopoly of Western countries in world politics and economics, their ability to determine what the international order should be.
The practice of world politics is determined by the still-colossal resources of the United States and Western Europe, on the one hand, and by the obvious insufficiency of the forces that are their main opponents – China and Russia – insufficient for a real fight. As a result, if the objective factors in the development of international politics and the world economy speak in favour of the inevitable retreat of the former leaders to new positions, then the subjective qualities of their opponents, and indeed of the powers of permanent status, are such that the advent of a new international order looks like a completely uncertain prospect.
The change in context, which is very likely to be one of the factors underpinning Russian resolve, is quite obvious. First, it is easy to see this in the voting in the UN General Assembly on the resolutions adopted by Western countries as part of their anti-Russian campaign.
Despite the fact that, from the point of view of formal international law, condemning Russia would not be a problem for it, an increasing number of countries prefer to exercise moderation, by abstaining or avoiding voting on such resolutions. Of course, this contributes to the infrastructure of institutions created over the past couple of decades that are not oriented towards the West and are not subject to its will – BRICS, the SCO and the Eurasian Economic Union. But first of all, many countries simply do not feel the need to unconditionally support the West in its campaign against Moscow. It does not meet their interests or their main goals of development; these states do not have their own claims against Russia. In general, it should be noted that the reaction to Russian actions since February 2022 has been extremely mild. For example, in 2003, the Indian Parliament passed a special resolution condemning the US and allied invasion of Iraq, which is now unimaginable outside of the West in relation to Russia.
Second, the change in context is underlined by the failure of the US and its allies to build a sustainable broad-based coalition against Russia early in the conflict. Now the list of states that initiate measures of economic war against Russian interests is limited to permanent members of the military-political blocs of the West – NATO and the European Union, with the involvement of Japan and Australia, which have strong bilateral allied relations with the United States. All other countries of the world, with the exception of the microscopic clients of the United States in Oceania or the Caribbean, only enforce “sanctions” at the state or corporate level under pressure. In other words, the circle of those whom the United States and the European Union do not have to force to carry out their decisions regarding Russia turned out to be extremely narrow. This means that relations between the West and the rest of the world are now based on a repressive policy of coercion, which in itself does not mean anything good for the global positions of the United States. First, because it inevitably forces a significant number of countries to strive to extricate themselves from American influence for purely practical reasons. The need to fear Western reprisals is gradually shifting relations with the West from factors that promote development to those that hinder it. Thus, we cannot have serious doubts that the context – the objective development of the international environment – is now very friendly for Russia and its main interests.
This allows Moscow and Beijing to look to the future with relative confidence and to assume that they are on the “right side of history”, while their opponents in the West resist inevitable changes. However, it is worth recognising that a favourable context is an important, but not the only condition for the survival of states in a chaotic international environment. No less significant is the ability of states to respond to current challenges that arise during critical historical periods. The fact is, what we are experiencing now represents just such an era.
Therefore, in addition to the realisation of its selfish interests, the whole world is closely watching the ability of Russia to survive and succeed in various aspects of its conflict with the West. In particular, attention is drawn to the ability of the Ukrainian forces to continue active resistance, especially in the context of a fairly stable supply of weapons from the West. Whether we like it or not, the pace at which Russian goals are being realised on the territory of Ukraine is becoming a factor that influences the behaviour of friendly states. In addition, the apparent concentration of Moscow’s efforts in one direction creates numerous temptations for third countries to solve their problems with less regard for Russian preferences. For example, we see the behaviour of Azerbaijan in its difficult relations with Armenia; it shows signs of haste, caused by the understanding that Russia is not ready for sufficiently decisive action in the South Caucasus. We find less striking examples in Central Asia, where the political regimes perceive the course of Russian operations in Ukraine as an incentive to achieve their own short-term goals. In short, Moscow’s justified delay in resolving the most important aspects of the Ukrainian problem creates nervousness in its environment, which would be better avoided. In a more favourable position is China, which has not yet joined the direct confrontation with the West. Despite the fact that the problem facing the leadership of the PRC is no less significant, as Taiwan is a constitutional part of Chinese territory, Beijing is still showing restraint. This helps to buy time, but increases the world’s fears that the Chinese authorities are behaving this way not because it is part of their long-term strategy, but because of the inability to act more actively. At the same time, one must understand that restraint is good for the time being: for example, the United States 105 years ago chose the moment to enter the war with the Central Powers, and did not experience fears about its consequences. Although, of course, every historical comparison is an oversimplified vision of the situation due to the change in that very context.
In summary, as conflict grows over the structure of the future international order, the tension between context and practice can grow as much as it shrinks. However, in any event, it will be the most important systemic characteristic of the confrontation, which we had the opportunity to observe throughout 2022 and will continue to do so. In this sense, 2023 may turn out to be, in a certain sense, a turning point – the opposing sides will begin to run out of accumulated reserves and the question will arise of mobilising the resources that they originally planned to save for the purposes of future development. In this regard, it will be important for Russia to use a favourable context not only as a confirmation of its strategic rightness, but, first of all, as a source of resources for its own stability. This means making relations with the World Majority a central part of our foreign economic relations and making real efforts.
from our partner RIAC
The Status of Crimea between Russia and Ukraine: The Reason Why China Stands to Neglect
The status of Crimea is a contentious issue between Russia and Ukraine. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine, a move that was widely condemned by the international community. The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution that affirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty over Crimea, and many countries, including the United States and European Union, have imposed economic sanctions on Russia in response to the annexation.
Since then, Russia has been controlling the region and has been accused of human rights violations and suppression of the Crimean Tatar minority by several countries and international organizations. Ukraine, on the other hand, considers Crimea as an integral part of its territory and has not recognized the annexation. The issue remains unresolved and is a source of ongoing tension between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between Russia and the international community. However, it’s worth noting that China has not taken a clear stance on the issue and has been trying to maintain good relations with both Russia and Ukraine.
China has not taken a clear stance on the issue of the status of Crimea between Russia and Ukraine for a few reasons:
Diplomatic strategy: China is known for its “non-interference” policy in the internal affairs of other countries, and it may choose not to take a clear stance on the issue to avoid offending either Russia or Ukraine, with whom it has important economic and political ties.
Strategic Interests: China has a strong economic and trade relationship with both Russia and Ukraine, and it may not want to risk damaging those relationships by taking a clear stance on the issue.
International politics: China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and it may not want to isolate itself from other members by taking a clear stance on the issue.
While China not taking a clear stance on the status of Crimea may help it maintain good relations with both Russia and Ukraine and avoid isolation from other members of the international community, it could also pose potential threats for the countries in the international borders. Some of the potential threats include:
Escalation of tensions: If China’s non-interference policy is perceived as support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it could further escalate tensions between Russia and Ukraine, and potentially lead to more aggressive actions by Russia in the region.
Loss of trust: If China is perceived as not standing up for its own principles, especially when it comes to international law and sovereignty of other countries, it could lead to a loss of trust among other countries, and make it harder for China to achieve its foreign policy goals.
Economic sanctions: If China’s non-interference policy is perceived as support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea, other countries may impose economic sanctions on China, which could hurt its economy and trade relationships.
Loss of reputation: If China is seen as not standing up for the international laws and principles, it could harm its reputation as a responsible stakeholder in the international community.
Military Conflicts: If tensions between Russia and Ukraine escalates, China might be forced to take a side, and it could lead to military conflicts in the region which might have an impact on China’s own security and stability.
The issue of the status of Crimea between Russia and Ukraine is a complex and longstanding one that has not yet been resolved. A few possible solutions to this issue could include:
Diplomatic negotiations: Both Russia and Ukraine, with the support of the international community, could engage in diplomatic negotiations to find a solution that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries.
International mediation: An international mediator, such as the United Nations, could be brought in to facilitate negotiations and help find a peaceful solution to the issue.
Economic sanctions: Economic sanctions against Russia, imposed by the international community, could be used to put pressure on Russia to withdraw from Crimea and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Military intervention: Military intervention could be used as a last resort if diplomatic efforts fail to resolve the issue, but this would likely lead to a much more serious and prolonged conflict.
As for China, it could play a role in resolving this issue by:
Supporting International Laws: China could support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and respect the international laws and principles.
Mediating: China could act as a mediator in resolving the issue, by bringing both Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table, and help find a peaceful solution.
Taking a clear stance: China could take a clear stance on the issue, and this would show that it is a responsible stakeholder in the international community and that it respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries.
It’s worth noting that resolving this issue will require a coordinated and multilateral effort from the international community, and China could play a key role in resolving the issue of the status of Crimea, by being a responsible stakeholder in the international community, and taking a clear stance on the issue. China is also known to follow a policy of “One country, two systems” which means it would not like to interfere with other countries internal affairs thereby China has been trying to maintain good relations with both Russia and Ukraine and avoid taking sides on this issue. It would evidently mean that China is not able to exert any direct influence on the situation in Crimea, and it may be perceived as not standing up for its own principles, especially when it comes to international law and sovereignty of other countries.
Asia, Eurasia and the European Crisis: Results of 2022
The military-political crisis in Europe has created demand for the most important quality of the vast majority of the countries of Asia and Eurasia — the comparative autonomy of their political systems, free from external interference and control to a much greater extent than what is typical, for example, of Western or Eastern Europe, or, for that matter, Latin America, or small countries in Oceania or the Caribbean. This means that with the exception of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, all countries in this vast region have the ability to conduct a foreign policy based primarily on their own selfish interests or ideas of justice or injustice within the existing international order. As a result, practically all the states of Asia and Eurasia have ended up in that Global Majority — the totality of countries that make up 85 percent of the world’s population — which are not allies of the West in its struggle against Russia.
However, at the same time, most of the countries of the region are faced with a serious challenge that will test the sustainability of their socio-economic systems and development policy instruments in the coming years. We are talking about the problems that the economic war of the US and Europe against Russia creates for the functioning of globalisation in the form we are used to. Almost all countries in Asia and Eurasia are growing economically with varying degrees of intensity, and focused on inclusion in the global trade and production chains. The keys to these ties and the main existing mechanisms for managing them are in the hands of the United States and its European allies. Therefore, now the countries of this vast region, which makes up a large part of the Russian neighbourhood, must look for ways to combine the preservation and strengthening of their political autonomy, on the one hand, and involvement in the system of economic ties that bring them obvious benefits, on the other.
We see that most of the countries of Asia and Eurasia behave with a great deal of restraint within the framework of international organisations; they do not initiate anti-Russian “sanctions” and they only comply with the requirements of the supervisory institutions of the United States and the European Union in this area under heavy pressure. This creates conditions for the gradual formation of a new infrastructure for trade and economic cooperation between Russia and its Asian and Eurasian neighbours. In the coming years, the important features of such an infrastructure may become its independence from the institutions of the West, including such areas as insurance of trade operations and transportation, transition to settlements in national currencies or creation of regional exchanges for trading those goods, where Russia will remain an important player in Asian markets, and it will also be able to oust Western suppliers from there.
As a result, the comparative political autonomy of the countries of Asia and Eurasia has turned out to be the most important factor to undermine the efforts of the West to exclude Russia from the world economy. It turned out to be fruitless in 2022.
Although here, too, the ability of Russia itself to remain open to foreign economic relations, as well as to act objectively as a supplier of critical goods, is of paramount importance.
At the same time, in 2022, serious factors arose compelling a change in the nature of Russia’s policy to develop relations with the countries of Asia, which received the generally accepted name “pivot to the East”. Now there are reasons to believe that this sphere of foreign economic policy has become a matter of prime necessity for Moscow, rather than mere choice. It had been precisely the problem of historical dominance, and the profitability of trade and economic ties with the West, primarily with Europe, that had been the most important hindrance to Russian efforts to develop ties with Asia over the past 15 years. Moreover, against the background of the advantage that the Russian economy received in the markets of the West, even the most interesting plans for cooperation with the states of the former Soviet space faded. Not to mention the gradual establishment of relations with Asian states located at a considerable geographical distance from Russia.
Now the “pivot to the East” seems to many observers, as well as the Russian state, to be the most important way to overcome a significant proportion of the negative consequences of economic aggression from the West. Indeed, over the past 10 months of the crisis in Europe, trade between Russia, on the one hand, and the countries of Asia and Eurasia, on the other, has consistently increased. To a large extent, this was due to the immediate reorientation of Russian exporters to new markets, and in part to the development of parallel imports, which made it possible to compensate for the cessation of deliveries to Russia of some goods from Western countries. The latter also leads to an objective increase in Russia’s trade with some of its closest neighbours, among which, of course, Turkey ranks first, but the countries of Central Asia also play an important role.
Russia is yet to realise that countries of the Global Majority, represented by Asian and Eurasian states, are not subjective, but objective allies of Moscow in its conflict with the West.
This means that their actions are not dictated by their leaders’ political preferences or special ties to Russia. The latter concerns, among other things, the countries of such an important region as Central Asia. The policy of the states of Asia and Eurasia is based on their natural desire to overcome the qualitative gap in development that remains between them and the leading industrial economies of the West. It is quite obvious that it is impossible to fully catch up after several centuries of colonial dependence in a short period of time. However, right now conditions have arisen when a change in the structure of the international order creates a higher chance of obtaining greater benefits from participation in globalisation, a revision of established practices that Russia defines as neo-colonial dependence, and the removal of the economy from Western control. To a certain extent, this can also occur due to the weakening of the main formal institutions of globalisation, where the West plays a dominant role.
However, such an objective coincidence of the interests of the countries of Asia and Eurasia with Russia, as a rule, does not lead to their readiness to join Russia in its conflict with the West. It would probably be a mistake to think that states which remain poorly endowed with everything except demographic resources and are solving the problems that come with the attempt to eliminate mass poverty would be ready to sacrifice their development goals for the sake of abstract strategic constructions. Russia, as a country that is fully self-sufficient in food and energy resources, can hardly understand the complexity of the position of even economically successful Asian countries, not to mention closer neighbours in Central Asia, where the political systems themselves are not fully established and are constantly exposed to serious internal and external challenges. It seems that in the future Russia will treat with understanding the fears of its Asian and Eurasian partners, taking into account their concerns and not making demands, the fulfilment of which could be detrimental to their interests.
Take India, which has a colossal population and economic potential, actively trades with Russia despite Western pressure, but is in no hurry to support Moscow in matters of international politics or the Ukrainian crisis. This is partly due to the Sino-Indian rivalry for the position of the leading Asian power. On this issue, the United States and, to a minimal extent, Europe remain India’s natural situational allies, since their pressure on China makes it behave more restrained than its economic and military capabilities allow. But to an even greater extent, this is true because India itself has not yet been able to gain the weight to talk with the West on an equal footing and put pressure on it where it is of strategic importance. In all other respects, India in 2022 has taken shape as one of the most independent centres of power in international politics, and this, of course, contributes to the realisation of Russian interests.
An exception in this regard is China. Over the past two decades, Sino-Russian relations have gone through an objective convergence of interests, both at the tactical level and in terms of a long-term vision of the international order. Now this allows the parties to cooperate very intensively on global platforms and, moreover, to cultivate positive expectations within themselves about the position of the partner and the future of bilateral relations. At the same time, Beijing itself is subjected to constant pressure and provocations from the United States, which has forced the Chinese leadership to behave with restraint even in its move to resolve the Taiwan problem, which is so important.
Summing up, we can say that the opportunities provided by cooperation with the countries of Asia and Eurasia amid an acute Russia-West conflict, have become the most important foreign policy discovery of the last year for Russia. At the same time, we have no reason to think now that the overall positive dynamics here can be slowed down by something other than internal Russian factors. For Russia, 2023 will be a period of strengthening relations with its natural partners outside the hostile West and forming with them a new infrastructure of international cooperation, which is necessary in the process of building a more just world order.
From our partner RIAC
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