Authors: Wang Wei, Edward Lai
The concept of the “BRIC” began to affect the audiences in 2001 when economist Jim O’Neill first used the term referring to the emerging countries like Brazil, China, India and Russia combined. And later it was added with South Africa. The argument go that the relative size and share of the BRICs in the world economy would rise exponentially and gradually imply for the G-7, which is regarded as the economic hegemony of the West, to make a rearrangement of the world order.
In 2003 scholars like Dominic Wilson echoed the same thesis in the report on “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050” that in all likelihood by 2025 the BRICs could account for over half of the size of the G-7 in terms of GDP. And in less than 40 years the BRICs’ economies together could be larger than the G-7. Although controversial as it was, the key underlying idea behind all discourses is that China and India will arise as the world’s principal suppliers of manufactured goods and services, while Brazil and Russia will become similarly dominant as suppliers of raw materials. In addition, what the BRICs have in common is that they all have an enormous potential consumer market, complemented by access to regional markets and to a large labor force. It argues that three key issues that BRICs have to embrace for their partnership development are as follows: inclusive growth, sustainable solution and foreign policy, and the post-Western world.
In the long run, China as the second largest economy of the world has more expectation on the role played by the emerging powerhouses. During the 2017 G-20 Summit in Germany, the leaders of the BRICS nations held informal meeting reaching key consensus on building an open world economy and improving global economic governance. As scheduled to holding the rotating presidency of the BRICS bloc during September of 2017 in China, President Xi Jinping lost no time to reiterate that the member states would establish an open world economy, maintain a multilateral trade system and advance inclusive, balanced and win-win economic globalization. Only in so doing, is it possible to make the fruits of economic growth accessible for all people. Why has the BRICS nations highlighted the tenets of inclusiveness and multiple world order in their further work towards a common vision on critical international issues?
The BRICS nations are important not just because of their recent and current rapid development, but because of the predicated changes that are going to transform the global economy and even change the balance of global economic power. The 2007-2009 financial crises, regarded by many economists as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression in 1929, were relatively well withstood by the BRICS economies. As a result, this crisis reinforced the view that, though debatable, international economic institutions had to be reformed to reflect shifting economic power. Brazil and India had long demanded reform of international economic institutions as well as seat on the United Nations Security Council. So do China and Russia, although they have demanded from different perspectives. Little progress with UN reform were made since then, but considerable change occurred within the WTO, with Brazil and India becoming members of the inner negotiating circle, also being well-known as “new quad” along with the US and EU. For many, a major symbolic step occurred with the creation of the G-20 in 2008. As Andrew Hurrell put it, “The G-20 was a major symbolic of how the structure of global governance were shifting in response to the new geometry of power, and a sign of what the future would bring about.” Obviously, all the BRICS nations are now the members of the G-20. At the time of economic globalization, the bargaining power of the BRICS nations’ vis-à-vis U.S.-dominated global institutions is growing.
Second, there is no doubt that the BRICS member-states also have their own internal challenges and external divergences on many issues. The central point of the role of the BRICS nations in the world affairs is not where world order is now, but where it was going to in the next decades, to say by 2050. Building on the idea that “a shared voice is stronger than a single voice”, the emerging powers realize that they need to cooperate in order to push forward their own agendas. Given this, the new forms of multilateralism led by today’s emerging and regional powers—China, India, Brazil and Russia as well—have put the idea of globalism firmly back on the political and intellectual map. In his latest speech in Hamburg, President Xi highlighted the importance of the G-20 and in particular the BRICS in boosting international economic cooperation and improving global governance. At the same time, he also encouraged the BRICS nations to play a leading role in the support of developing countries, especially African ones in terms of infrastructure, mining and energy industries, since this is the practical way to help them make progresses in the highly interconnected world. Thanks to the growing clout of the BRICS nations, the leaders of the bloc agreed that they would keep the good momentum of deepening cooperation on politics, economy and people-to-people exchanges in order to push forward more substantial programs among the BRICS members, for example, the multilateral exchanges of culture and education.
It is held that the BRICS has primarily confined itself to economic issues, but political problems are also being discussed increasingly by the bloc leaders. This is because global issues like climate change, terrorism and growing inequality in the world are high on the agenda of each member-state. Particularly as China is about to become the largest economy of the world by replacing the US, Russia has stabilized economically and decreased its debt while India and Brazil have comparatively high GDP and a large middle class to uphold economic growth. Therefore, the common vision, coordination and cooperation have facilitate the BRICS to be more proactive and constructive on international political issues ranging from war on terrorism, and the Israeli—Palestinian conflict to more topical subjects like Syria, Afghanistan and the Iranian nuclear question and Africa.
The key concern remains how to validate the BRICS nations as a functional grouping rather than just a forum? Globally, it is vital for the BRICS to become a knowledge base for other developing countries in view of substantial and sustainable aid. Technically they should take up some areas like solar energy, ethanol, urban landscape, slum-alleviation, special economic zones, and biotechnology and share its best practices with southern countries. As different from the G-7, World Trade Organization and other Western institutions which are deemed to retain economic hegemony over the vast developing lands, the BRICS nations are committed to multilateralism and human development and social welfare in accordance with the outlines of the United Nations.
For sure, the BRICS still have long way to go in terms of massive education and technology innovation, not to mention the hidden concerns with China’s economy towering over the rest of the BRICS states, particularly India and Russia. However, they have already advanced with huge strides in the multilateral direction. The disagreements remain between them, but all are aware that BRICS should not break as long as they stand together.
(*) Edward Lai, Lecturer at Dalian Maritime University, China
Importance of peace in Afghanistan is vital for China
There are multiple passages from Afghanistan to China, like Wakhan Corridor that is 92 km long, stretching to Xinjiang in China. It was formed in 1893 as a result of an agreement between the British Empire and Afghanistan. Another is Chalachigu valley that shares the border with Tajikistan to the north, Pakistan to the south, and Afghanistan to the west. It is referred to as the Chinese part of the Wakhan Corridor. However, the Chinese side of the valley is closed to the public and only local shepherds are allowed. Then there is Wakhjir Pass on the eastern side of the Wakhan corridor but is not accessible to the general public. The terrain is rough on the Afghan side. There are no roads along the Wakhjir Pass, most of the terrain is a dirt track. Like other passages, it can only be accessed via either animals or SUVs, and also due to extreme weather it is open for only seven months throughout the year. North Wakhjir Pass, also called Tegermansu Pass, is mountainous on the border of China and Afghanistan. It stretches from Tegermansu valley on the east and Chalachigu Valley in Xinjiang. All of these passages are extremely uncertain and rough which makes them too risky to be used for trade purposes. For example, the Chalagigu valley and Wakhjir Pass are an engineering nightmare to develop, let alone make them viable.
Similarly, the Pamir mountain range is also unstable and prone to landslides. Both of these routes also experience extreme weather conditions. Alternatives: Since most of the passages are risky for travel, alternatively, trade activities can be routed via Pakistan. For example, there is an access road at the North Wakhjir that connects to Karakoram Highway.
By expanding the road network from Taxkorgan in Xinjiang to Gilgit, using the Karakoram Highway is a probable option. Land routes in Pakistan are already being developed for better connectivity between Islamabad and Beijing as part of CPEC. These routes stretch from Gwadar up to the North.
The Motorway M-1, which runs from Islamabad to Peshawar can be used to link Afghanistan via Landi Kotal. Although the Karakoram highway also suffers from extreme weather and landslides, it is easier for engineers to handle as compared to those in Afghanistan.
China is the first door neighbor of Afghanistan having a common border. If anything happens in Afghanistan will have a direct impact on China. China has a declared policy of peaceful developments and has abandoned all disputes and adversaries for the time being and focused only on economic developments. For economic developments, social stability and security is a pre-requisite. So China emphasizes peace and stability in Afghanistan. It is China’s requirement that its border with Afghanistan should be secured, and restrict movements of any unwanted individuals or groups. China is compelled by any government in Afghanistan to ensure the safety of its borders in the region.
Taliban has ensured china that, its territory will not use against China and will never support any insurgency in China. Based on this confidence, China is cooperating with the Taliban in all possible manners. On the other hand, China is a responsible nation and obliged to extend humanitarian assistance to starving Afghans. While, the US is coercing and exerting pressures on the Taliban Government to collapse, by freezing their assets, and cutting all economic assistance, and lobbying with its Western allies, for exerting economic pressures on the Taliban, irrespective of human catastrophe in Afghanistan. China is generously assisting in saving human lives in Afghanistan. Whereas, the US is preferring politics over human lives in Afghanistan.
The US has destroyed Afghanistan during the last two decades, infrastructure was damaged completely, Agriculture was destroyed, Industry was destroyed, and the economy was a total disaster. While, China is assisting Afghanistan to rebuild its infrastructure, revive agriculture, industrialization is on its way. Chinese mega initiative, Belt and Road (BRI) is hope for Afghanistan.
A peaceful Afghanistan is a guarantee for peace and stability in China, especially in the bordering areas. The importance of Afghan peace is well conceived by China and practically, China is supporting peace and stability in Afghanistan. In fact, all the neighboring countries, and regional countries, are agreed upon by consensus that peace and stability in Afghanistan is a must and prerequisite for whole regions’ development and prosperity.
Shared Territorial Concern, Opposition to US Intervention Prompt Russia’s Support to China on Taiwan Question
The situation around the island of Taiwan is raising concerns not only in Chinese mainland, Taiwan island or in the US, but also in the whole world. Nobody would like to see a large-scale military clash between China and the US in the East Pacific. Potential repercussions of such a clash, even if it does not escalate to the nuclear level, might be catastrophic for the global economy and strategic stability, not to mention huge losses in blood and treasure for both sides in this conflict.
Earlier this week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Moscow continued to firmly support Beijing’s position on Taiwan as an integral part of China. Moreover, he also underlined that Moscow would support Beijing in its legitimate efforts to reunite the breakaway province with the rest of the country. A number of foreign media outlets paid particular attention not to what Lavrov actually said, but omitted his other remarks: the Russian official did not add that Moscow expects reunification to be peaceful and gradual in a way that is similar to China’s repossession of Hong Kong. Many observers of the new Taiwan Straits crisis unfolding concluded that Lavrov’s statement was a clear signal to all parties of the crisis: Russia would likely back even Beijing’s military takeover of the island.
Of course, diplomacy is an art of ambiguity. Lavrov clearly did not call for a military solution to the Taiwan problem. Still, his remarks were more blunt and more supportive of Beijing than the standard Russia’s rhetoric on the issue. Why? One possible explanation is that the Russian official simply wanted to sound nice to China as Russia’s major strategic partner. As they say, “a friend in need is a friend indeed.” Another explanation is that Lavrov recalled the Russian experience with Chechnya some time ago, when Moscow had to fight two bloody wars to suppress secessionism in the North Caucasus. Territorial integrity means a lot for the Russian leadership. This is something that is worth spilling blood for.
However, one can also imagine that in Russia they simply do not believe that if things go really bad for Taiwan island, the US would dare to come to its rescue and that in the end of the day Taipei would have to yield to Beijing without a single shot fired. Therefore, the risks of a large-scale military conflict in the East Pacific are perceived as relatively low, no matter what apocalyptic scenarios various military experts might come up with.
Indeed, over last 10 or 15 years the US has developed a pretty nasty habit of inciting its friends and partners to take risky and even reckless decisions and of letting these friends and partners down, when the latter had to foot the bill for these decisions. In 2008, the Bush administration explicitly or implicitly encouraged Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili to launch a military operation against South Ossetia including killing some Russian peacekeepers stationed there. But when Russia interfered to stop and to roll back the Georgian offensive, unfortunate Saakashvili was de-facto abandoned by Washington.
During the Ukrainian conflicts of 2013-14, the Obama administration enthusiastically supported the overthrow of the legitimate president in Kiev. However, it later preferred to delegate the management of the crisis to Berlin and to Paris, abstaining from taking part in the Normandy process and from signing the Minsk Agreements. In 2019, President Donald Trump promised his full support to Juan Guaidó, Head of the National Assembly in Venezuela, in his crusade against President Nicolas when the government of Maduro demonstrated its spectacular resilience. Juan Guaido very soon almost completely disappeared from Washington’s political radar screens.
Earlier this year the Biden administration stated its firm commitment to shouldering President Ashraf Ghani in Afghanistan in his resistance to Taliban advancements. But when push came to shove, the US easily abandoned its local allies, evacuated its military personal in a rush and left President Ghani to seek political asylum in the United Arab Emirates.
Again and again, Washington gives reasons to conclude that its partners, clients and even allies can no longer consider it as a credible security provider. Would the US make an exception for the Taiwan island? Of course, one can argue that the Taiwan island is more important for the US than Afghanistan, Venezuela, Ukraine and Georgia taken together. But the price for supporting the Taiwan island could also be much higher for the US than the price it would have paid in many other crisis situations. The chances of the US losing to China over Taiwan island, even if Washington mobilizes all of its available military power against Beijing, are also very high. Still, we do not see such a mobilization taking place now. It appears that the Biden administration is not ready for a real showdown with Beijing over the Taiwan question.
If the US does not put its whole weight behind the Taiwan island, the latter will have to seek some kind of accommodation with the mainland on terms abandoning its pipe-dreams of self-determination and independence. This is clear to politicians not only in East Asia, but all over the place, including Moscow. Therefore, Sergey Lavrov has reasons to firmly align himself with the Chinese position. The assumption in the Kremlin is that Uncle Sam will not dare to challenge militarily the Middle Kingdom. Not this time.
From our partner RIAC
Russia-Japan Relations: Were Abe’s Efforts In Vain?
Expanding the modest elements of trust in the Japan-Russia relationship, talking through reciprocal concerns before they lead to conflict, avoiding bilateral incidents, and engaging in mutually beneficial economic cooperation is the way forward.
One year after the end of Shinzo Abe’s long period of leadership, Japan has a new prime minister once again. The greatest foreign policy challenge the new Japanese government led by Fumio Kishida is facing is the intensifying confrontation between its large neighbor China and its main ally America. In addition to moves to energize the Quad group to which Japan belongs alongside Australia, India, and the United States, U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration has concluded a deal with Canberra and London to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines which in future could patrol the Western Pacific close to Chinese shores. The geopolitical fault lines in the Indo-Pacific region are fast turning into frontlines.
In this context, does anything remain of the eight-year-long effort by former prime minister Abe to improve relations with Russia on the basis of greater economic engagement tailored to Moscow’s needs? Russia’s relations with China continue to develop, including in the military domain; Russia’s constitutional amendments passed last year prohibit the handover of Russian territory, which doesn’t bode well for the long-running territorial dispute with Japan over the South Kuril Islands; and Russian officials and state-run media have been remembering and condemning the Japanese military’s conduct during World War II, something they chose to play down in the past. True, Moscow has invited Tokyo to participate in economic projects on the South Kuril Islands, but on Russian terms and without an exclusive status.
To many, the answer to the above question is clear, and it is negative. Yet that attitude amounts to de facto resignation, a questionable approach. Despite the oft-cited but erroneous Cold War analogy, the present Sino-American confrontation has created two poles in the global system, but not—at least, not yet—two blocs. Again, despite the popular and equally incorrect interpretation, Moscow is not Beijing’s follower or vassal. As a power that is particularly sensitive about its own sovereignty, Russia seeks to maintain an equilibrium—which is not the same as equidistance—between its prime partner and its main adversary. Tokyo would do well to understand that and take it into account as it structures its foreign relations.
The territorial dispute with Russia is considered to be very important for the Japanese people, but it is more symbolic than substantive. In practical terms, the biggest achievement of the Abe era in Japan-Russia relations was the founding of a format for high-level security and foreign policy consultations between the two countries. With security issues topping the agenda in the Indo-Pacific, maintaining the channel for private direct exchanges with a neighboring great power that the “2+2” formula offers is of high value. Such a format is a trademark of Abe’s foreign policy which, while being loyal to Japan’s American ally, prided itself on pursuing Japanese national interests rather than solely relying on others to take them into account.
Kishida, who for five years served as Abe’s foreign minister, will now have a chance to put his own stamp on the country’s foreign policy. Yet it makes sense for him to build on the accomplishments of his predecessor, such as using the unique consultation mechanism mentioned above to address geopolitical and security issues in the Indo-Pacific region, from North Korea to Afghanistan. Even under Abe, Japan’s economic engagement with Russia was by no means charity. The Russian leadership’s recent initiatives to shift more resources to eastern Siberia offer new opportunities to Japanese companies, just like Russia’s early plans for energy transition in response to climate change, and the ongoing development projects in the Arctic. In September 2021, the annual Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok did not feature top-level Japanese participation, but that should be an exception, not the rule.
Japan will remain a trusted ally of the United States for the foreseeable future. It is also safe to predict that at least in the medium term, and possibly longer, the Russo-Chinese partnership will continue to grow. That is no reason for Moscow and Tokyo to regard each other as adversaries, however. Moreover, since an armed conflict between America and China would spell a global calamity and have a high chance of turning nuclear, other major powers, including Russia and Japan, have a vital interest in preventing such a collision. Expanding the still very modest elements of trust in the Japan-Russia relationship, talking through reciprocal concerns before they lead to conflict, avoiding bilateral incidents, and engaging in mutually beneficial economic cooperation is the way forward. The absence of a peace treaty between the two countries more than seventy-five years after the end of the war is abnormal, yet that same unfinished business should serve as a stimulus to persevere. Giving up is an option, but not a good one.
From our partner RIAC
Maximizing Nickel as Renewable Energy Resource and Strengthening Diplomacy Role
Authors: Nani Septianie and Ramadhan Dwi Saputra* The development of the times and technology, the use of energy in the...
To Prevent a Nuclear War: America’s Overriding Policy Imperative
Abstract: Though current US defense policy centers on matters of conventional war and terrorism, other problems remain more existentially worrisome....
Gender Mainstreaming and the Development of three Models
The field of gender mainstreaming plays a central role in the debate of critical feminist International Relations (IR) theorists. Reading...
No safe harbour: lifting the lid on a misunderstood trafficking crime
The crime of harbouring, in which victims of human trafficking are accommodated or forced to stay in a specific location,...
Why specific Muslim community bothering Indian BJP government
India, a place with a strong political history governed and ruled by Muslims and colonial powers during their regime setup....
Conditions worsen for stranded migrants along Belarus-EU border
At least eight people have died along the border between Belarus and the European Union, where multiple groups of asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants have been...
Renewable Energy Jobs Reach 12 Million Globally
Renewable energy employment worldwide reached 12 million last year, up from 11.5 million in 2019, according to the eighth edition...
Science & Technology3 days ago
China beats the USA in Artificial Intelligence and international awards
Middle East3 days ago
North Africa: Is Algeria Weaponizing Airspace and Natural Gas?
Russia4 days ago
Russia, Turkey and the new geopolitical reality
Defense4 days ago
The Road Leading Nowhere
Defense2 days ago
American submarine mangled in the South China Sea
Middle East3 days ago
Breaking The Line of the Israel-Palestine Conflict
South Asia4 days ago
Changing complexion of “militancy” in the occupied Kashmir
Americas3 days ago
Iran poll contains different messages for Biden and Raisi