Al Qaeda has stepped out of the shadow of Islamic State, promoting its brand of terror with a new leader and a comprehensive list of attack priorities.
Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son and heir, released a ten-minute video labeled “Advice for Martyrdom-Seekers in the West” on May 14. The video comes at an opportune time for al-Qaeda, after months of media coverage of the ever-shrinking ISIS hold in Syria and Iraq. Whether the video catalyzed attacks in Manchester or London is unknown, but it is expected to ratchet up the frequency of so-called lone wolf or inspired attacks in the West in coming weeks. Understanding this video and analyzing Hamza’s messages are key to countering the threats coming from the al-Qaeda (AQ), particularly at a time when AQ has been rebranding itself and widening its network among Salafist jihadi rings.
Hamza, born in 1984, is considered by core AQ cadre as the ‘Crown Prince of Terror,’ based on the letters confiscated from the raid of Osama bin Laden’s compound. Apparently, Osama was preparing Hamza to be his heir following the death of Hamza’s older brother, Saad, in 2009 by a U.S. drone strike. Clearly, step by step, Hamza is being prepared for the job. For Ali Soufan, a former FBI agent and expert on al-Qaeda, Hamza is “a poster kid for the Al-Qaeda … and for members of Al-Qaeda, who were indoctrinated with these propaganda videos, he means a lot to them.”
AQ top leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, formally anointed Hamza as an official member of the terrorist group on August 14, 2015, in an audio message in which Hamza bin Laden also called for attacks in Western capitals including lone-wolf attacks against the U.S., French, and Israeli targets. In another AQ video titled, “We Are All Osama,” Hamza threatened the U.S. on July 9, 2016 by promising revenge and warned Americans that “we will continue striking you and targeting you in your country and abroad in response to your oppression of the people of Palestine, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and the rest of the Muslim lands that did not survive your oppression.” The U.S. Department of State designated Hamza bin Laden as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT)” like his father used to be on January 5, 2017.
Hamza’s new video “Advice for Martyrdom-Seekers in the West” is critically important for several reasons, foremost of which is the way it showcases previous, legendary AQ attacks which are considered extremely successful by the terrorist group. Second, Hamza pointedly gives explicit references to al-Qaeda’s core ideology and its literature by frequently citing the Quran and Hadiths, thus paving a concrete ideological groundwork for future attacks. Furthermore, Hamza encourages al-Qaeda base to carry out attacks for the reasons he lists in an effort to justify violence and terror. He continues by listing the possible targets deemed as having priority by the terrorist organization and finishes the video by emphasizing the importance of conveying the al-Qaeda’s global message.
The video starts by honoring al-Qaeda legends who carried out critical attacks in the past by providing related background videos. They include Sayyid Nosair, an American of Egyptian descent, convicted of links to the New York City landmark bomb plot and who was accused but acquitted of the assassination of Meir Kahane, a Jewish right-wing Israeli politician on November 5, 1990; Sulaiman Khater, an Egyptian terrorist who shot dead seven Israeli tourists in Sinai, Egypt in 1985 whom Zawahiri praised as “an example to follow for the zealous and free in the Egyptian army“; Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; Arid Uka, an Albanian terrorist who shot and killed two U.S. airmen at Frankfurt Airport in 2011; Ayman Hassan, who killed Israeli soldiers and civilians. Adebolajo and Adebowale, who were murderers of Fusilier Lee Rigby, British Army soldier, on May 22, 2013, in London; and Mohammed Bouyeri, the Moroccan-Dutch terrorist, who killed the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh in 2004. Bin Laden gives special attention to Mevlut Mert Altintas, who shot and killed the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, Andrey Karlov, in front of the cameras in an art exhibit event on December 19, 2016, in Ankara, Turkey.  Fully one-third of Bin Laden’s video is dedicated to special effects and edited videos and the verbatim speech of Altintas.
These referenced names are accompanied by an audio track of chanting and related silhouette videos in the background, as the title enters briefly and the video starts with reference to “Sheikh Hamza Osama bin Laden” on the left side of the screen, citing regular spiritual praises while showing a screen grab from FOX NEWS about the attack by U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan, MD, MPH, who killed thirteen people and injured thirty-two others in the Fort Hood, TX mass shooting rampage on November 5, 2009. Hamza continues by addressing and greeting the “valiant heroes of Islam… in America, the West, and in occupied Palestine…” and goes on explaining the purpose of the video by stating “this is a legacy (will or advice) for anyone who intends to carry out a martyrdom operation.”
Hamza’s narrative continues with ample reference to scripture by encouraging the attackers in the West to “purify their intentions” and reminding them that “help comes from Allah” as long as the future attackers’ intentions are pure. He provides diverse supporting religious arguments with reference to Salafist literature to increase the morale of the potential suicide attackers. Hamza gives Salafist reasoning for terrorist attacks by asking his followers to “Trust in Allah, and do not fear…, ask your Lord for success, increase your remembrance of Allah; there is no help or power except from Allah.” Hamza justifies violence by referencing scripture and relies on Salafist teachings in an effort to persuade the AQ base that what they are doing is right based on AQ’s version of Salafist ideology.
Hamza then continues referencing the current conflict zones in the Middle East in an effort to explain AQ’s terror by citing worldly reasoning familiar to Arab tribal culture: “take your revenge for the sake of your religion, for your Prophet (peace be upon him), for the children of al-Sham, for the widows of Palestine, for the honorable women of Iraq, for the orphans of Afghanistan and with that get accepted to the highest grade (and gardens) of the paradise.”
After explaining why AQ members need to take their revenge, Hamza then explains to potential AQ supporters in the West how to carry out their attacks, priorities for their attention, how they should choose their targets and what kind of weapons they should use. He asks his followers to “accomplish your goals with utmost secrecy. Attain the highest level of perfection in your actions, exercise utmost care and caution and prepare diligently to inflict crippling losses on those who have disbelieved.” Hamza also requests possible attackers to benefit from the “Inspire Magazine” for their deeds and actions. He goes on asking the future AQ attackers to precisely and impeccably choose their targets to inflict the most damage. “Choose your weapons professionally. You don’t have to use a military weapon. If you can reach a gun, it is the best, if not, there are many other options.”
After providing tactics, he encourages his followers by asking them to “follow the footsteps of the previous martyrdom-seekers before you. Continue from where they left.” Important to note is that he explains how effective, one-person operations in the West have outweighed in impact numerous operations in the East. The implication should be grasped by security planners in Europe: expect more attacks in the EU zone or the United States. Hamza, in order to emphasize the importance of the attacks in the West, states that AQ followers who already live in the West don’t need to migrate, because carrying out attacks on Jews and Crusaders where they live in the West is more worrisome and severe for the enemy.
After underlining and highlighting the importance of the attacks in the West and providing the ideological reasoning for the proposed attacks, Hamza prioritizes the types of targets as follows:
- Transgressors against our religion and Prophet,
- Look out for Jewish interests,
- if not available, target the American interests,
- if not available, target the NATO countries’ interests,
- If not available, target Russian interests as they had forgotten what they tasted in Chechnya and Afghanistan.
He then continues by strongly advising his followers to convey a clear message to the media and to explain the reasons behind their attacks also by stating “it is absolutely imperative that people should understand the objective of your operation.”
He again lists the messages that AQ emphasizes and urges the importance of conveying the following messages to the West:
- Our religion and our Prophet are the red lines. (Remember Charlie Hebdo?)
- Palestine is a cause of our Islamic Hence, anyone who supports Jewish occupiers shall never dream of peace.
- Sham is a cause of our Islamic Ummah, where our people are facing genocide. Anyone involved in operations against our people or aid to Bashar [Assad] and his allies shall not escape punishment.
- Our holy lands (Mecca and Medina) are occupied. We shall continue to target the occupiers until they withdraw their forces from the Arabian Peninsula.
- Our airspace is violated; our wealth and resources are expropriated. Thus we shall deal with you reciprocally until you stop interfering in our affairs.
After listing the messages that need to be conveyed, Hamza starts to talk about important tactics needed to be considered before and during the attacks. He says, for example, “’Once you select your target, investigate carefully’, ‘gather as much as information you can and adopt appropriate cover to disguise yourself’, ‘know your target inside out, so that you may inflict damage far beyond anything the enemy has ever imagined’, ‘take care of yourself, take time to relax before the operation so that your performance is optimal and your alertness level high.’” As Hamza lists these qualities and tactics, the video screen shows the video recordings of a Turkish police officer murdering the Russian Ambassador to Turkey by citing “the lion, Mevlut Mert Altintas killed the Russian Ambassador to Turkey.” This segment showcases this attack and presents the attacker as a model for the rest of the AQ members. Hamza continues to emphasize the qualities and tactics by stating: “’make appropriate use of the element of surprise, take lead in inflicting losses’; ‘the most important gains are acquired in the first attempt of the attack’; ‘make sure of the best use of your weapons’; ‘having read these instructions, be self-assured, composed, and hope for the best.’”
Finally, at the end of his speech, Hamza asks his followers to “put your trust in Allah, be generous with your life (don’t think of saving yourself)” basically asking future terrorists to commit suicide or consider dying during their attacks, as this life is not worth anything compared to the hereafter. He then prays for the future attackers by invoking scripture: “’May Allah give you victory, assist you, guide you,’ ‘the final meeting is in the Paradise.’”
The video lasts ten minutes and twelve seconds. It is professionally cut and edited. As it was released, it was translated into numerous languages and rereleased with embedded subtitles. AQ members shared this video in different social media platforms, particularly in their telegram-application chat rooms or private channels. The video is still available on the internet, including in the YouTube and other social media platforms. One may assume that all AQ supporters around the world have watched this video since it was narrated by Osama bin Laden’s son and conveys essential messages.
A reasonable conclusion is that Hamza is being fronted as the next world leader of AQ. Based on the sequence of the events, including Osama bin Laden grooming Hamza as his heir, Ayman al-Zawahiri introducing him in a widely-spread video and finally Hamza by himself addressing AQ’s support base and followers and asking them to carry out attacks in the West, strongly indicates that Hamza bin Laden is being groomed for AQ leadership in the near future, at least after the death or retirement of Ayman al-Zawahiri. However, there is no doubt that he has already an esteemed and respected position in the hierarchy of the terrorist organization. Undeniably, Hamza has the advantage of being the son of the founder of al-Qaeda and through his father, he has unquestionable authority over the terrorist organization.
Hamza in his address openly spoke to the AQ base without distinguishing sub-groups operating under AQ. Al-Qaeda has become the world’s largest Salafist jihadi terrorist group, functioning as an umbrella tied to several regional AQ sub-groups and affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent and in addition to many other indirect affiliates including Fatah al-Islam, Turkistan Islamic Party and Jemaah Islamiyah. Additionally, organizations such as the al-Nusra Front or Jabhat al-Nusra (formerly al-Qaeda in Syria or al-Qaeda in the Levant), or with its new name after July 2016 “the Jabhat Fateh al-Sham,” a critical player in Syria, will also submit to the orders of Hamza, even if they claim they are distancing themselves from the AQ core, which is more like rebranding the al-Qaeda in Syria and a tactic established for the aftermaths of the fight against ISIS.
Additionally, it is worth noting that AQ has been taking advantage of the attention and heat that ISIS has drawn around the world and broadening its base around the world without getting much attention and getting ready for the near future basically for the aftermaths of ISIS’s defeat. There is no doubt that the AQ affiliates will try to fill the space emptied by ISIS. It should also be expected that AQ most probably will invite and accept defecting ISIS fighters to its cadres. Considering the fact that many ISIS fighters fleeing the battlefields of Syria do not have many options, joining AQ might become one of the viable considerations not only for ideological reasons but also to save their lives. There are rumors that AQ has already ordered its commanders to accept ISIS fighters (not senior level ISIS members or leadership) in an effort to increase their presence in the regions where they shelter and the number of the fighters they hold at bases.
There is no doubt that many al-Qaeda members and sympathizers will take this call seriously by attempting to carry out attacks. There will be two implications.
The first is that the AQ leadership is going to order the cells they control around the West to carry out attacks through an effort to prove that Hamza bin Laden’s orders are being followed. The second is the fact that many individuals who believe in AQ or have ties to its ideology will feel called to carry out attacks based on the Salafist teachings. The first lesson AQ fighters or Salafist jihadi terrorists receive is “to hear and obey” and the second lesson they study is “carrying out the orders of their leaders regardless of the conditions.” After combining these two principles, it is highly likely that there will be several new attacks attributed to Hamza bin Laden.
Additionally, Hamza did not openly ask for suicide attacks but rather asked his followers to consider their options by asking them to carry out attacks with weapons if possible as their first choice, therefore providing endless possibilities for his followers. Also, it is possible that we might see some attacks which will be carried out without the central hierarchy of the AQ. If the attackers cannot successfully convey their messages as Hamza asked, and if the perpetrators successfully hid their ties with any AQ affiliates, the law enforcement and counter-terrorism officers might have hard times to tie some attacks to AQ.
Hamza clearly listed the enemies. Particularly, the law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the West must consider the enemy list very seriously and prioritize the protection of listed targets. It is essential that obvious targets are warned about the true nature of possible threats and local law enforcement establish communication mediums with possible targets in an effort to reduce risks or to reach out to each other as soon as possible when needed. While the target list might be wide, in most cases local law enforcement and intelligence agencies can produce prioritized local threat lists and in this case protection of those targets become more important particularly in the upcoming days as the execution of possible attacks could start anytime based on what Hamza asked and prioritized.
Finally, security officials should note that the video highlighted the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey by Mevlut Mert Altintas, a Turkish police officer. The video segments dedicated to this assassination accounted for three minutes, one-third of the whole video. Evidently, AQ gave great importance to this attack. We can also understand this by the fact that only Mevlut was referred to as the “lion” of al-Qaeda in the video whereas all other attackers in the past were referred to with their names. Undoubtedly, the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Ankara and the assassin have risen as stars of al-Qaeda’s legend.
Interestingly, the Turkish Government furiously denied the involvement of AQ in this attack. This video certainly refutes the regime’s denials and efforts to link Mevlut to other groups. It is also essential to acknowledge that, particularly after the July 2016 coup attempt, AQ and some other Salafist-jihadi radical groups have found refuge in the Turkish bureaucracy. For example, Nurettin Yildiz, a preacher known for his close ties with the Erdogan regime, who also had an association with the assassin has a large base of supporters, most of whom are government officers. Similarly, Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) a Turkish NGO with close ties to Erdogan, has been linked to several Salafist jihadi groups. In fact, the IHH was investigated by the Turkish National Police because of its ties to the AQ and because it was providing logistical support to al-Qaeda members in Syria. The police raided IHH warehouses in Kilis Turkey during an operation in 2014. Consequently, the current thick presence of al-Qaeda in Turkey and Turkey’s somewhat favorable approach to this terrorist organization increases the risks, particularly towards the European countries.
First published in MD’s partner International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism
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Chinese Private Security Companies Along the BRI: An Emerging Threat?
When documenting China’s security footprint abroad, the PLA and the PLAN often get the spotlight. But under the hood, a relatively newer force is entering many conflicts ridden zones along China’s land based and maritime Silk Roads. These are up and coming Private Security Companies (PSCs) that are seeking to expand out of domestic Chinese markets and capitalize on growing Chinese businesses throughout the BRI. As the BRI continues to expand into countries with a weak state and ongoing conflicts, BRI businesses need security and protection. On the maritime front, increasing worries about sea piracy have created a demand for armed escorts for merchant ships. As was the case in Pakistan, on ground local government forces have repeatedly failed at providing adequate protection. This is where Chinese PSCs come in. With foreign forces failing to secure BRI projects, businesses are approaching Chinese companies. China’s entry into the international Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) market marks a significant departure in a space that continues to be dominated by American and British contractors. These westerns PMSCs have had decades to develop in the international sphere. During this tenurethey havealso managed to create a whirlwind of criticism around the field. It is in this space that Chinese PSCs, one of Asia’s strongest powers,are trying to leave a mark. Thus, it will be valuable to assess their scope, what they might evolve into, and their connection to the Chinese state.
The Current International Chinese PSCLandscape
Chinese Private Security Companies are a relatively new entry on the international scene. Beginning in the early 2010s, violent incidences – including abductions, killings, brawls, piracy, etc. – involving Chinese individuals in countries such as South Sudan, Pakistan, and Mali experienced an uptick causing concern in Beijing. The wake-up call came in 2010 when separatists from the Baloch Liberation Army in Pakistan attacked the Zaver Palace Continental Hotel situated near the Gwardar port hoping to target Chinese investors.In 2014 ten Chinese individuals working on a Cameroonian construction site run by a state owned company were kidnapped. In 2015, Chinese citizens were kidnapped again in Nigeria and several more died in a car bomb explosion in Somalia. Beijing has responded to these concerns through two step, first by deploying the PLA and the PLAN where possible and secondly by allowing domestic security organizations to go abroad. Allowing PSCs to operate instead of PLAN can actually be the better choice in some situations. China is acutely aware of rising international fears around the potential of a hegemonic China, especially among developing nations. In other cases, using military resources would simply be excessive. In such situations, PSCs can provide a viable middle ground alternative.
Currently there are thousands of Chinese PSCs operational within the country which are providing risk assessment services, surveillance equipment, private security, etc. Much of these functions transfer on to international operations as well. As the domestic market saturatessome companies are looking abroad to expand their business. Consequently, the international footprint of Chinese PSCs is expanding. According to work done by Tsinghua University, Beijing, the top 10 PSCs in China with an international footprint are:
- Control Risks
- Beijing Dewei Security Service
- ZhongguoAnbao China Security Industry
- HuaxinZhongan (Beijing) Security Service (HXZA)
- Shanghai Zhongchenwei Security Service Group
- Beijing DingtaiAnyuan Guard & Technology Research Institute
- ShengzhenZhongzhouTewei Security Consultant
- Beijing Guanan Security & Technology
- Shandong Huawei Security Group
These companies represent a very minor fraction out of a range of domestic PSCs. The reason for the small footprint abroad is manifold. Legally the Chinese government poses several restrictions on domestic PSCs that make it harder to operate abroad. The 1996 “Law of the PRC on Control of Guns” states that only the PLA, the police, and the militia can legally possess weapons andthose who possess arms overseas may face imprisonment for their crime. This is clearly a significant hurdle for PSCs that wish to operate in conflict prone areas. In a 2010 law passed by the Ministry of Commerce concerning the operation of PSCs, the government added several strict criteria for firms looking to operate abroad. These included providing security training to their employees before sending them abroad, set up security management systems and mechanisms for emergency response. Providing security systems and training to employees of firms going abroad provides one avenue for PSCs to enter the international market. While the 2010 lawopens up some paths for PSCs looking to expand, these existing regulations still prove to be a major hurdle for all but a few PSCs. Most do not have the resources to fulfill these basic requirements and cannot afford to set up bases abroad. These concerns are reflected by the Wu Guohua, Executive chairman of the “Overseas Security Guardians” which operates Zhong Jun Jun Hong Security Group. He states that while since 2011 companies, small and large, have jumped at the chance to expand abroad, many smaller companies don’t have the resources to negotiate with foreign governments or local forces, educate their personnel thoroughly on local laws to the same level that bigger companies can. Additionally, major companies that do operate abroad, like the HuaxinZhongan Security Service (HXZA) and the Zhong Jun Jun Hong, also boast a range of international certifications to bolster their bid internationally. Many other security organizations are unable to acquire them. Thus, regulatory requirements in the future must reign in these elements and bring smaller companies into the fold as well.
Scope of Current PSC Tasks
Considering that Chinese PSCs are not permitted to carry arms abroad, PSCs often diverge into a range of other security services that do not require its personnel to be armed. These include training personnel, providing logistical assistance, serving as guards in factories, etc., and collaborating with armed local officials for providing protection to Chinese citizens abroad. The only service where Chinese PSCs have been allowed to use arms has been while escorting Chinese vessels through water bodies like the Gulf of Aden or the straits of Malacca. Maritime escorting is a rising field for many PSCs. Most major PSCs provide multiple, if not all, of these services. One of the largest is HuaxinZhongan(HXZA) Security Service that provides all of these above-mentioned services. HXZAis also recognized for their ability to communicate and cooperate with local authorities and PSCs for support. Another major PSC is the Overseas security Guardians Association, which is part of the Zhongjun Junhong group that operations other domestic security subsidiaries. The association is perhaps the most explicit in its connection to the BRI. The organization aims at “safeguarding the promotion of national ’one belt, one road’ strategy” and “building the great wall of steel” to guard the “overseas economic development and the safety of oversea China-invested enterprises and compatriots”.
Maritime escorting is slowly growing as a prominent service amongst organizations. This usually involves PSCs providing protection to merchant ships or fishing vessels in piracy prone areas of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. While the affair is expensive, PSCs can find a relative niche for themselves in the work that sets them apart from the PLAN which frequently serves this purpose. In the Sohu Military Observer, Mr. Wu wrote that using PSCs for escorting services is often more cost effective then a PLAN deployment and PSCs tend to be better matched in force as well. The scale of piracy is also smaller than one would expect. Most piracy operations are not large scale and involve the use of small and fast boats, and light weapons. This strength of force can be proportionally dealt with by well-armed PSCs without the need for large scale investment of troops or equipment from the navy. Additionally, PLAN deployments carry the risk of sending a political statement, whether that was intended or not. Here too the commitments to bolstering the BRI arein both practice and rhetoric. In 2015, HXZA made headlines for escorting a Chinese sailor, Zhai Mo, who was took a 10,000 Nautical Mile journey retracing the ancient Maritime Silk Road.
These modes of engagement however are still limited due to few key restrains. Firstly, the inability of PSCs to use arms restricts their independent operations. Many organizations continue to provide logistical services. Like stated earlier many smaller companies do not have the connections to work with local PSCs or authorities to find local forces that can help provide the muscle. HXZA is one of the few companies that has been authorized to carry arms abroad. This also puts PSC employees into severe danger themselves. In Juba, the capital of South Sudan, Chinese security forces from DeWei Security Services found themselves stuck in an active shooting incident that was occurring between local warring factions. Unarmed and underprepared, the security workers and the employees of its client that it was sent to rescue were trapped in an insecure building awaiting government forces to evacuate them. Secondly, PSC operatives often have limited foreign language abilities, be that inEnglish or the native language in the area of deployment. This creates a barrier between locals and the PSC which makes collaboration even harder. In many BRI locations, local population are distrustful if not outright hostile to Chinese presence as demonstrated above. Lingual barriers can add on to this sense of division between locals and the Chinese guests in addition to posing obvious administrative difficulties.
PSCs and The Chinese State
For the longest time, the Chinese state and the domestic legal framework was not friendly to the establishment of Chinese PSCs abroad. However, over the past decade the ice has started to melt as ministries have eased legal restrictions and HXZA operatives were even allowed to carry arms. Chinese firms will perhaps slowly but surely continue to expand into these new markets. Increasing foot print of Chinese agencies that are actively engaged in security operations, risk assessment, provision of security equipment (as in the case of HXZA) etc., brings with it concerns about their connection to the Chinese state and if they can be fully autonomous in their operations. Many Chinese businesses, such as Huawei, have been subject to these fears thus is it logical to worry if PSCs will function as an extension of the PLA or even the Chinese state. The evidence insupport for this is currently weak. PSCs are still mostly engaged in services like anti-piracy operations, resolving kidnapping incidents, guarding Chinese citizens and infrastructure abroad, etc. This relatively narrow range of services is still quite niche and Chinese PSCs are yet to go fully mainstream. Additionally, while some successful PSCs may have connections with their domestic state clients, it may not necessarily translate into serving as an arm of the state abroad. Thus, today the verifiable connections between PSCs and the state are quite limited.
Perhaps as the industry grows and come of its own, the Chinese state will take greater cognizance of its potential uses for state aims. It is not entirely novel for PSCs or PMCs to take government provided tenders. Afterall, the precedent for this was already set by western PMSCs who provide their own government forces, or even foreign governments, with logistical services among other facilities. Thus, it would not be wise to erase the possibility of state influence altogether either. There are few possible avenues for state influence toseep in through. First, Private Security Companies in china often hire ex-PLA and ex-PAP (People’s Armed Police) officers into their ranks. Many higher-ranking positions within PSCs are also occupied by ex-military or former public security personnel. Second, there are reports that Chinese officials are actively pressuring Chinese enterprises abroad to hire PSCs of Chinese origin.
The Chinese Private Security industry is still as its initial stages. However, it is likely that it will stay given government pressure over overseas enterprises and enthusiasm by Chinese PSCs to establish operations overseas despite the dangers. Little work has been done to study the nature of Chinese PSCs in depth, but as they grow in number and prominence it will become increasingly important to understand their ins and outs and monitor their relationship with the Chinese state. It will also be interesting to consider how, if at all, the role of the PLA might change given the emergence of these new security actors. Granted the PLA will be the most immediate and the strongest projection of Chinese national power, however this poignant power projection is not always desirable. In such scenarios PSCs may become a viable replacement in low intensity missions. Before any of this can happen however, the Chinese government would have to loosen regulation on PSC activities and develop a framework for their operation. For now, prospects are relatively limited, and existing organizations are acting in conjunction with local authorities and companies. However, the international PMSC industry is already under heavy scrutiny for acting eerily like modern mercenaries for hire. The same could happen for Chinese companies as well.
Tackling the Illicit Drug Trade: Perspectives From Russia
The Afghan drug trade supplying the Russian market has fuelled conflict, corruption, and instability in the region, provided financial support to terrorist organisations and led to a devastating addiction and HIV epidemic in Russia. How can this fight be won? While strengthening cooperation with its Central Asian neighbours will be crucial to stemming the flow of drugs, Russia needs to complement law enforcement with a softer approach for the demand side of the drug trade at home.
“The Afghan drug threat is one of the worst problems for Russia’s national security,” said Alexei Rogov, deputy director of the new challenges and threats department of the Russian foreign ministry on November 26, 2019. He thus effectively captured Russia’s persistent drug problem since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Accounting for one-fifth of the world’s opium market estimated at USD 65 billion, Russia is the world’s largest heroin consumer, all of it flowing from Afghanistan through Central Asia.
The Afghan drug trade supplying the Russian market has fuelled conflict, corruption, and instability in the region, provided financial support to terrorist organisations and led to a devastating addiction and HIV epidemic in Russia. Russia has around four to six million drug addicts and a drug-related mortality rate of 10.2 per 100 000 persons. This far surpasses the rate of its European neighbours. The UK, despite being Europe’s largest cocaine consumer, has a drug-related mortality rate of 3.7 per 100 000 persons. With a death toll of around 30 000 per year, it is no wonder Russia has marked the drug trade as a major national security threat.
How can this fight be won? The words of Alexei Rogov perfectly illustrate Russia’s heavily securitised approach to the problem. Russia’s response has focused primarily on the security aspect of the drug trade, such as policing and border control. While regional cooperation is crucial to stemming the flow of drugs, initiatives between Russia and its Central Asian neighbours are short-term and poorly coordinated. Regional organisations’ anti-drug potential could be further exploited, as could cooperation with the EU, which is also affected by the Afghan drug trade. At home, the high mortality rates are explained by the draconian legislation on drug consumption and the lack of comprehensive drug policies. Faced with increasing drug-related mortality, complementing law enforcement and regional initiatives with a softer approach at home is the next logical step.
A Threat to National and Human Security: Developments and Continuities in the Afghan Drug Trade
Drug trafficking in Russia is far from being a recent problem. The drastic rise of organised crime in the tumultuous years that followed the fall of the USSR, as well as the newly opened and poorly controlled borders with former Soviet states, has facilitated the transnational smuggling of opium produced in Afghanistan (which accounts for 90 per cent of the world’s heroin output). Travelling through the Northern route, the drugs are smuggled to Russia through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. While Afghanistan might be the Colombia of Central Asia, the Central Asian drug market presents different characteristics from its well-known Latin American counterpart. It is not organised in mega-cartels with the power of a small state, but in smaller more disparate criminal groups. These groups can extend their influence in the region more thanks to poor border security, lack of transnational cooperation, and rampant corruption among law enforcement and local officials than to their own strengths and ingenuity.
Pointing fingers at borders and even at the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which saw Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan integrated into a free trade zone with Russia in 2015, is highly misleading. While greater connectivity and opened borders make the region an ideal transit route for illicit trade, it is complicity and impunity that explain why less than 5 per cent of the drugs passing through Tajikistan are seized. The widespread corruption and poverty that lead many to resort to drug trafficking are the root causes of the drug trade in Central Asia.
Regarding Afghanistan, the ongoing conflict (2001-2020) and political instability make it a breeding ground for drug trafficking. The drug trade has led to many disagreements between the U.S. and Russia, with the two parties failing to reach a coherent anti-drug strategy. The possibility of a NATO-Russia cooperation was briefly evoked but has been eliminated by U.S. withdrawal from the country following the U.S.-Taliban peace agreement signed on February 29, 2020. This recent development will risk affecting the anti-drug fight. With 61 per cent of the Afghan population deriving its income from agriculture, the impossibility of cultivating traditional crops amidst conflict, and a new power vacuum, Russia will need to step up to make sure drug production does not explode. Moreover, Afghanistan’s new dabble into the mass production of synthetic drugs, notably methamphetamines, which is cheaper than heroin, is increasingly worrying. A booming market largely driven by the rise of the Russian Hydra darknet, the quantities of synthetic drugs seized by Russian authorities have multiplied by twenty over the 2008-2018 period.
Given the growing availability and affordability of drugs on the Russian market, the security dimension of the Central Asian drug trade naturally dominates the drug discourse and, to some extent, justifies Russia’s militarised approach. With a 7 644 km-long shared border with Kazakhstan and hundreds of tonnes of drugs flowing in each year, drug trafficking has severe implications beyond the social costs of addiction and directly threatens Russia’s security. This is all the more worrying considering that Islamic terrorist groups like the Taliban use the drug trade to finance their operations. The crime and terrorism nexus operating in the region thus makes Central Asia a priority for Russian policy.
The War on Drugs at the Regional Level: Results and Future Perspectives
A relentlessly creative and adaptable market, with a myriad of new ways to conceal and smuggle narcotics every year, the illicit drug trade is truly a transnational problem and requires intense cooperation between the affected states. However, the anti-drug potential of regional organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Sino-Russian led security alliance, or the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), is not fully exploited and is limited in terms of capacity and political will.
Russia has been promoting collective security with its Central Asian neighbours through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Created in 2001 and composed of eight member-states (India, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), it plays a major role in stemming the Afghan drug trade. The SCO’s 2018-2023 anti-drug strategy marks the creation of an effective anti-drug mechanism within the organisation. The SCO often collaborates with the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, a military alliance between six former Soviet states (Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), and the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for combating the illicit trafficking of narcotics (CARICC).
Most of Russia’s effort in the region has focused on strengthening the governments in place, such as investing in the state structure or their military. Russia has maintained a steady military presence in the region, one likely to increase after U.S. withdrawal. However, regional cooperation has mainly focused on short-termed joint operations and border security, such as operation spider web in July 2019, which led to the seizure of 6 422 kg of narcotic drugs and 3 241 arrests. The porous borders, explained in part by the geographical difficulty of border control in such mountainous terrain, the lack of training and equipment of security forces are certainly worth paying attention to, but they are also short-term solutions to a much more endemic problem. 6 422 kg might seem like a big win, but it is nothing compared to the hundreds of tonnes of heroin crossing the border each year. This purely militarised and short-term response, both from Russia’s part and in its engagement with its neighbours, is necessary but insufficient. Fighting the illicit drug trade will require a long-term strategy and a much greater political will to tackle its systemic causes. At the moment, the drug trade is 30 per cent of Tajikistan’s GDP, with an increasing amount of people turning to drug trafficking to survive. Fighting corruption, implementing institutional reforms and providing economic benefits to the region are as crucial as border policing.
In light of this, international assistance could prove useful, notably from the EU. While Central Asia is not a priority for Brussels, there is still a strong case for cooperation here. Afghan heroin and meth production is not only Russia’s problem. The drug trade in Central Asia might not be a security issue for Europe in the way it is for Russia, but opium trafficking along the Northern and the Balkan route also reaches Europe and the black sea route via Turkey is rapidly emerging as a prominent smuggling corridor. In July 2019, Ukraine intercepted 930 kg of Afghan heroin destined for Western Europe. Europe’s role in Central Asia is limited compared to Russia’s, and its focus on democracy promotion tends to clash with Russia’s priority of supporting the regimes in place to strengthen their capacity to fight the drug trade. But overcoming those differences and finding ground for cooperation would be a positive step towards fighting the drug trade.
The War at Home: the Grim Reality of Drug Addiction in Russia
Draconian legislation criminalising drug use has characterised Russia’s domestic war on drugs for the past three decades. While the dominance of the security discourse in Russia’s anti-drug strategy is somewhat justified, tackling the illicit drug trade purely from a national security perspective does not diminish the social threat posed by drug consumption. Drug use is a pervasive domestic issue, but it has yet to become a policy issue. Underdeveloped drug policies and politicians’ refusal to address it largely explain the high mortality rate.
With 100 000 jailed in 2018 (one in three convicts), Russia has the highest number of people per capita imprisoned for drug crimes in Europe, most of them convicted under Article 228 of the Russian penal code which treats drug possession as a criminal offence. Such harsh legislation not only leads to more risky forms of drug use (the use of dirty needles for drug injection has directly contributed to the HIV epidemic currently affecting 1.16 million people in Russia, one of the fastest-growing HIV rates in the world), but prevents access to treatment. With such large fines and lengthy prison sentences, (for possession of 2.5 grams of meth, users can go to jail for up to ten years) as well as the social taboo around drugs and HIV, users do not seek treatment and are further marginalised.
This addiction and HIV crisis in Russia is largely homegrown and will reach endemic levels in the next few years if it continues to be swept under the rug. The peculiarity and pervasiveness of the drug trade is its creation of a steady base of consumers and addicts. Criminalisation has not and will not diminish the demand for drugs, hence the need to work on demand much as supply reduction. While the legalisation of soft drugs is unlikely to appear as a convincing solution anytime soon in Russia, a softer approach to drug use is needed. At the moment, no long-term treatment or harm reductions services are available, and opioid substitution therapy remains forbidden.
Drug trafficking is a complex issue that must be fought on multiple fronts. Russia’s drug policy needs to involve a wider concept of security that not only encompasses the threat to national security, but also the human and social threat of drugs. Intense cooperation with Central Asia and Afghanistan through the SCO and CSTO is essential, as is strict border policing and law enforcement. Nonetheless, this no-tolerance policy for the supply side of the drug trade needs to be complemented with a softer approach for the demand side at home. To dwell on the social and economic consequences of drug use would be a truism, and Russia has every interest in decreasing the influence of drug trafficking on its population’s health and security. Developing more robust social policies seems at the moment more feasible than tackling the systemic causes of the drug trade in Central Asia. The latter will require a solid long-term strategy that goes beyond anti-drug operations and border control. Russia must step up its fight both at home and abroad.
From our partner RIAC
Central Asian Jihadists’ Use of Cryptocurrencies in Bitcoin
On August 13, 2020, the US Justice Department announced that it seized $2 million in Bitcoin and other types of cryptocurrency from accounts of three Salafi-Jihadi extremist groups, including al Qaeda and the Islamic State, relied on to finance their organizations and violent plots. According to their statement, the U.S. authorities seized over 300 cryptocurrency accounts, four websites, and four Facebook pages all related to Sunni-Jihadi militant organizations. Indeed, the disclosed criminal case documents indicate that this was the largest-ever seizure of cryptocurrency by US intelligence agencies in the context of terrorism.
US counterterrorism agents analyzed transactions of cryptocurrency on the blockchain, a secure form of public ledger for the online funds, and employed undercover operations as well as search warrants on email accounts to establish a money trail of Sunni terror groups that was detailed in an 87-pages of the Washington DC federal court report
The revealed papers indicate, in some instances, al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups in Syria acted under the cover of charities ‘Al Sadaqah’ and ‘Reminder for Syria’. In this regard, it should be noted that some al Qaeda-linked Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups also have frequently acted under the umbrella of the charity ‘Al Sadaqah’ for bitcoin money laundering and have solicited cryptocurrency donations via Telegram channels to further their terrorist goals.
But that doesn’t mean that Islamist terrorist groups from the post-Soviet space raised funds precisely through this charity ‘Al Sadaqah’ of al Qaeda, whose accounts were seized by the US Justice Department. It has become a tradition in the Islamic world that charity organizations and foundations widely give to themselves the names ‘Al Sadaqah’ and ‘Zakat’, as the Quranic meaning of these words (Quran 2:43; 63:10;9:103)exactly corresponds to the purposes of “voluntary charity”. Analysis of the finance campaigns of al Qaeda-affiliated Central Asian militant groups demonstrates that they frequently raised cryptocurrency donations through charities called ‘Al Sadaqah’ and ‘Zakat’.
In order to explore the scale of the Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi Jamaats’ crowdfunding campaigns, we analyzed their social media activities where they raised Bitcoins, dollars, Russian rubles and Turkish lira over the past two years.The methods and sources of the Uzbek and Uighur Islamist militants’ crowdfunding campaigns in bitcoins are about the same as those of their parent organizations, the global Sunni terrorist groups ISIS and al Qaeda.Due to the inclusion in the list of terrorist groups, they carry out sophisticated cyber-operations for solicitation of cryptocurrency donations.
Before “mastering” the complex technology of cyber-tools in order to raise bitcoin funds in cyberspace, Central Asian jihadists used the simple ‘hawala’ money transfer system (informal remittance system via money brokers).Sometimes they have resorted to conventional ‘hand-to-hand’ cash transfer channels, where trust, family relationships or regional affiliations play an important role.
According to a UN report, Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi terrorist group Katibat Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ), Katibat Imam al Bukhari (KIB) and the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) leading jihad in Syrian Idlib province have close financial ties with its cells in Afghanistan. The UN Security Council’s Sanctions Monitoring Team states that “regular monthly payments of about $ 30,000 are made to Afghanistan through the hawala system for KTJ.”
The UN report asserts that “similarly to KTJ, KIB sends financial assistance, from its cell in Istanbul, through the hawala system to Afghanistan. Funds are brought in by informal money exchangers for Jumaboi from Maymana, the capital of Faryab. The original source of this income is the smuggling of fuel, food and medicine from neighboring Turkmenistan.”According to the UN report, “suffering material losses, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)and Tajik militant group JamaatAnsarullah (JA) are forced to engage in criminal activity, including transportation of drugs along the northern route in Afghanistan.”For the Uighur jihadists of Turkestan Islamist Party (TIP) from China’s Xinjiang province operating under the umbrella of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria, “funding comes primarily from the Uighur diaspora” in Turkey, Central and Southeast Asia.
Dark Web & Bitcoin: New Endeavor of Central Asian Terrorists
With the development of digital cryptocurrencies as Bitcoin, Central Asian jihadists actively began to exploit this innovative financial transaction system to support their attacks and other terrorist activities. It is known that al Qaeda-backed Salafi-Jihadi groups of the post-Soviet space are seeking to purify Islam of any innovations (Bid’ah) and strictly following the Sharia law. They live similarly to how the Islamic prophet Muhammad and his companions lived in the seventh-century and always oppose any form of Bid’ah, considering it to be shirk and heresy. However, the Uzbek and Uighur Wahhabis did not shy away from using bitcoin innovation.
The first advertisements of Central Asian terrorist groups crowdfunding campaigns accepting bitcoin for Jihadi purposes in Syria appeared on the Telegram channel in 2017. In November of that year, a self-proclaimed charity group al-Sadaqah began a fundraising campaign on the internet from Western supporters to help the Malhama Tactical, the first private military contractor team from Central Asia working exclusively for jihadist groups in Syria.Al-Sadaqah in English on Telegram, explicitly relying on the English-speaking western sponsors, called on them to make bitcoin donations to finance the Malhama Tactical and the Mujahedeen fighting against the Assad regime in northeastern Syria.
As we have previously analyzed, Malhama Tactical is a private jihadi contractor operating in the Idlib-Aleppo region of Syria. The group, founded by an Uzbek jihadist Abu Salman (his real name is Sukhrob Baltabaev) from Osh City of Southern Kyrgyzstan in May 2016, is closely allied with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the strongest militant factions in northern Syria. The Malhama Tactical is known to have regularly conducted military training for jihadists of HTS, Ahrar al-Sham, Ajnad al Kavkaz and the Turkistan Islamic Party.After the death of Abu Salman in August 2019, Ali Ash-Shishani, the native of Russia’s North Caucasus became the new leader of Malhama Tactical.
In 2017-18, al-Sadaqah charity on Telegram called on followers to donate via a “Bitcoin wallet anonymously and safely for the Mujahedeen brothers of Malhama Tactical”. The charity group urged potential cryptocurrency contributions to benefit from “the ability to confuse the trail and keep anonymity”.
We do not know how much bitcoin money al-Sadaqah managed to raise for the activities of the Central Asian Muhajireen. But according to Malhama Tactical’s report on the internet, crowdfunding has been “fruitful.” In an effort to explain how donations were spent, Malhama Tactical has advertised extensively to followers on 17 October 2018, in a video posted on Telegram, that a new training camp had been built and purchased airsoft rifles, night vision devices and other modern ammunitions.
Since 2018, Uzbek and Uighur militant groups KTJ, KIB and TIP have begun an agitation campaign to fundraising bitcoin money on the Internet. Judging by the widespread call for Bitcoin donation online, their need for anonymous, secure, and hassle-free funding streams have made cryptocurrencies of some potential value to them. These properties are the anonymity of fundraising, the usability of remittance and transfer of funds, the security of attack funding, acceptance of funds, reliability, and volume of web money.
And every time they announced a crowdfunding campaign, they clearly declared for what purpose the collected bitcoins would be used. For example, al Qaeda-linked KTJ’s most recent call for bitcoin appeared on Telegram in May 2020 as a banner that asks to “Equip a jihadist”. The poster showed a masked jihadist and the exploitation of the Quran’s Hadith in Uzbek, calling on the believers to prepare and equip a fighter going on a raid for the sake of Allah.
Another picture shows a jihadist with a Kalashnikov AK-74 in his hand, over whose head enemy planes and helicopters fly. The picture gives a symbolic meaning about the empty-handed jihadists in Syria, fighting against the Russian and Syrian powerful military aircraft to protect the Islamic Ummah. Then goes on with KTJ’s call to make donations in bitcoins and rubles to purchasing equipment and ammunition for the Central Asian Mujahedeen in Syria. On the bottom it was displayed the long address of the virtual wallet for Bitcoin donations along with KTJ’s Telegram and web contacts promising the anonymity of potential donors.
On June 18, 2020, KTJ militants published the opinion of the well-known ideologue of modern jihadism Abu Qatada al-Falastini in Telegram from whom they asked whether the crowdfunding campaign of Bitcoin for the purposes of Jihad contradicts Islam. As it is known, there are still ongoing disputes among the world’s top Islamic scholars about whether cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, are deemed Sharia-compliant.
Abu Qatada from a religious point of view justified the acceptability of using Bitcoin to protect the Islamic Ummah and wage holy Jihad, but at the same time warned against full confidence in Bitcoin. In his opinion, the enemies of Islam can destroy this cryptocurrency in the future, and if it loses its current value, and then the devout Muslims who have invested their savings in Bitcoin could go bankrupt. Abu Qatada al Falastini is a greatly respected Salafi thinker among Central Asian jihadists and he gave a pep talk to KTJ when it pledged bayat (Oath of Allegiance) to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in 2015.
On June 25, 2020, KTJ posted another Crypto Crowdfunding campaign announcement on its Telegram channel to provide Uzbek jihadists with modern military gear and equipment. For clarity, the group published a picture entitled “Perform jihad with your property” in Uzbek, which indicates the prices for military clothing and weapons. For example, the AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle costs $300, unloading vest for AK-47 cartridges – $20, Field Jacket – $50, Military Combat Boots – $30.In total, $400 will be needed on the full provision of one Mujahid with weapons and uniforms. On the upper side of the picture is a Hadith quote about “He who equips a fighter in Allah’s path has taken part in the fighting.”
A month later, the group’s Telegram channel reported that it had managed to raise $4,000, for which 8 sets of weapons and uniforms were purchased for the Uzbek Mujahedeen. Also, KTJ’s media representative announced that the group is stopping the fundraising campaign for this project.
Other projects of the Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups were the Bitcoin crowdfunding campaign for the purchase of motorcycles for Inghimasi fighters (shock troops who penetrate into the enemy’s line with no intent to come back alive), cameras, portable radios, sniper rifles and night vision devices. For each project, a separate closed account was opened on the website of jihadist groups in Telegram, after which the Bitcoin and Monero accounts, as well as contact information, were closed.
Another crowdfunding project posted on January 29, 2020, in Telegram, called ‘Helping captive Muslim sisters’ and claims to raise money to free Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek ISIS women hold in the al-Hol refugee camp in northeast Syria controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces. The KTJ jihadists posted pictures of Central Asian women with their children holding posters “We need help” in Kyrgyz, and asked the fellow Muslim believers to raise money to ransom them from the captivity of the Kurdish communists. It was not clear to us how much money was raised as a result of the crowdfunding campaign since this channel was later blocked by the Telegram administrator.
The annual largest crowdfunding project for the Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups is being implemented on the eve of the Muslim holidays of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, during which believers pay Zakat (obligatory tax) and Sadaqah (voluntary alms).According to the Quran, recipients of the Zakat and the Sadaqah include the poor and needy, debtors, volunteers in jihad, and pilgrims.
The websites of the Central Asian Jihadist Jamaats revealed that their crowdfunding campaign to raise funds for the jihad was particularly active during Ramadan. Ramadan is known as a holy and generous month, but this year was especially generous to notorious al Qaeda-linked Central Asian extremist groups. KTJ, KIB, Uighur’s TIP and Russian-speaking North Caucasian militant group Liwa al Muhajireen wal Ansar (LMA), that pledged allegiance to HTS, have boosted their military budget during Ramadan.
To avoid the risk of being blocked or tracked, they created a temporary mirror group called ‘Zakat’, where the donation money was received. Zakat’s wallet received donations from Central Asian labor migrants in Russia in the amount of $150 to $220 each time to purchase livestock, which was then slaughtered in sacrificial prayer on behalf of the donors. After Ramadan and the holidays of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, the ‘Zakat’ mirror group in Telegram was closed.
The Central Asian Islamist extremist groups have asked their supporters to make Bitcoin donations mainly at the following two virtual wallet addresses:
Our analysis confirmed that multiple transactions were made to these bitcoin addresses. In addition, other transactions were made in digital currencies, the addresses of which were blocked on Telegram.
In conclusion, the significance of the crowdfunding campaigns in bitcoin should not be given exaggerated importance, even though they have improved the position of the Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups in Syria and Afghanistan, and boosted their budget. Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi terrorist groups’ technical abilities are not currently suited to bypass the financial controls of international counterterrorism organizations and discreetly conduct money laundering.
The history of their activities has shown that small Uzbek, Uighur and Russian-speaking Islamist extremist groups from the post-Soviet space and China have been assimilated with more powerful global Sunni terrorist organizations such as ISIS, al Qaeda and HTS. And accordingly, their potential for crowdfunding campaigns in bitcoin should be viewed through the prism of their global parent organizations.
In any case, the governments of Central Asia and Russia do not have sufficient mechanisms and leverage to combat illegal cryptocurrency transactions on the dark web by global Salafi-Jihadi movements waging jihad in the Middle East. As noted at the beginning of this article, such opportunities to monitor and investigate jihadist crowdfunding activities are available to the US government and financial institutions. For example, the U.S. Treasury“ has access to unique financial data about flows of funds within the international financial and commercial system,” which is invaluable for tracking illicit flows of money.
Consequently, Central Asian governments must rely not only on Moscow but also actively cooperate with Western counter-terrorism and financial institutions to disrupt the Salafi-Jihadi group’s external crypto crowdfunding sources.
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