Connect with us

Europe

The smallest Orthodox Church in Europe converted into a “test-ground” for Ankara’s political technologies

Published

on

[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] A [/yt_dropcap]s the April constitutional referendum in Turkey approaches Recep Erdogan has promised to “hold Europe accountable” for the unjust attitude towards Turkish emigrants. So now the referendum has taken place. Despite the statements of European observers and politicians about violations during the vote Turkish president celebrates his victory.

But anyway, he has no time to relax: the hype in liberal circles about violation of human rights in Turkey grows bigger while the voters are expecting to see the results of the given promises. Supporters (51,4%) want to see the enemies of Ankara defeated by “the mighty hand of their leader” while the others (48,6%) with even greater impatience anticipate a fail of the government on the international scene which will give them an opportunity to crash AKP on the pretext of their ineffective policy and inability to solve the problems of the nation.

What response will come from Mr. Erdogan? For now we can only observe an exchange of mutual threats between Brussels and Ankara without actual actions: Erdogan threatened to open European borders for emigrants, in exchange Brussels threatened to stop negotiations about Turkey’s membership in the EU, and Turkey finally claimed that it had no big need in that… However there are signs that go unnoticed to the mainstream mass media but they prove that Ankara is confident and ready to start to act.

Erdogan’s hidden leverage surprisingly is Patriarch of Constantinople – Bartholomew, who has a “first among equals” position in the Orthodox world. A “battleground” to try this leverage in action opened in Czech and Slovak republics. The ultimate target for Bartholomew was the autonomous and autocephalous Czech and Slovak Orthodox Church (the CSOC).

Back in 2013, the Constantinople Patriarchate (CP) tried to introduce its two archbishops into the Holy Synod of the CSOC on the pretext of assistance in solving some internal problems and misunderstandings in the CSOC. When this attempt failed, CP tried another strategy: during meetings with CSOC bishops in January and May 2016 CP demanded certain amendments in the CSOC charter that will bring it closer to the “Tomos of autocephaly of CSOC” issued by CP in 1998. It turns out that unlike the Tomos given to CSOC in 1951 and unrecognized by CP (the Russian Orthodox Church Tomos) the CP Tomos of 1998 gives autocephaly to CSOC on certain conditions. In particular, CP demanded guaranties that in case some inner misunderstanding should arise in CSOC they would ask CP for advice and help because CP was their “Mother Church”. A bunch of other amendments implied formal independence for CSOC while placing it under total control of CP.

So, CSOC summoned a special Synod commission that met with CP representatives in Wien on 8-9 March 2017. Then Metropolitan Rostislav (Patriarch Bartholomew settled his conflict with Rostislav before Crete Council and admitted his position of the Primate of the Church in January 2016) appointed an extended Synod meeting on the 5th of April 2017 in Bratislava (Slovenia). It was dedicated to implementation of the new amendments in Tomos of autocephaly in the Church’s charter.

Taking into account that believers of CSOC make only 1% of the population in their countries, the whole event should have gone unnoticed. This is the way of a prudent manager to test a new strategy without taking a big risk in case of failure. And really, still we don’t see the results of the April Synod meeting in Bratislava.

The Holy Synod was to accept the new amendments secretively and thus create predispositions for a future intervention of CP in the affairs of another autocephalous church. In perspective – CP supporters will bring to light any problems and mistakes of CSOC bishops and escalate the situation – this will be a handy tool for manipulating the church under control of protégés bishops from CP “Mother Church”.

However Ankara’s Czech and Slovak “project” of taking control over a foreign religious entity faced a strong push-back from the local bishops and parishioners. Some sort of “CSOC independence” movement started to draw public’s attention to the possible problems of changing the Church’s charter according to CP plans. In response, groups of anonymous activists supporting the changes started to distribute agitation materials criticizing CSOC leadership and claiming that CSOC problems won’t stop without CP’s intervention and help. Thus we see that charter changes are not some trivial standard procedures and the above mentioned amendments are not a simple precaution in case of problems – these are steps of Ankara’s plan of intervention in CSOC with a political interest.

And here some new details came to light – they affect not only Orthodox believers but all people in Czech Republic. Particularly, you should know that after CSOC loses its autonomy and falls under Patriarch Bartholomew, CP will get access to the money that Czech government gives to the Church according to the “restitution law”. By the way, this law is already a subject for social discussions and complaints of taxpayers. The situation will only escalate in case of new obligations to donate money to foreign religious authorities.

Thus, it stands clear that CP (that is experiencing a crisis because of ambiguous attitude of its sponsors – Greek and US business elites – towards Donald Trump) will get a big financial profit by taking control over CSOC: it’s commonly known that Czech government promised to give a symbolic sum of 3 billion Euros back to religious organizations by year 2030. It’s symbolic, because the EU promised to pay Ankara 3 billion Euros as financial assistance for accommodating refugees. That’s not all, Czech Republic also plans to give churches 2,5 billion Euros for unrecoverable property (earlier taken from them or destroyed).

In case of a successful realization of the Ankara’s plan CP will gain not only money but also “reputation points”. CP is already imposing the idea of its sole leadership and ultimate power in the Orthodox world, in fact Patriarch Bartholomew aspires to become an analogue of Pope in “the Orthodox variation”. After CSOC this scheme may be used to partially or totally take control over the following Churches: Church of Greece (about 97% of country’s population), Romanian Church (74%), Albanian Church (25%) and Polish Church (1.5%). Together they amount to a large community that can be used as a political power in Europe, with this leverage Erdogan will be able to exert pressure on the leaders of the countries in question and other EU members. For example: the Orthodox and Catholic parishioners can unanimously claim a better policy towards refugees and the politicians will have to open all boarders. Or another scenario: Orthodox and Catholics will unite to provoke national hatred among local people against migrants saying that migrants are a threat to the Christian identity of Europe. This, in its turn, will lead to a further marginalization of refugees and destabilization of the situation…

No doubt, Turkish president is an experienced politician and plans to set a big political game, predict the future dynamics “on the field”. We see that the present situation with CSOC has a long pre-history. But that’s only a probe of power. Whether it will be successful and set a start to a series of “coups” organized by Constantinople to take control over independent autocephalous Churches of the Orthodox world – this also depends on the actions of EU politicians, relationships of CP sponsors with new US President and believers’ attitude towards all this. Time will tell how effective Erdogan’s plan is and if he succeeds in “punishing” eurobureaucrats this way.

Continue Reading
Comments

Europe

Dayton Peace Accord 23 Years On: Ensured Peace and Stability in Former Yugoslavia

Published

on

For the past twenty-three years life has been comparatively peaceful in the breakaway republics of the former Yugoslavia. The complicated civil war that began in Yugoslavia in 1991 had numerous causes and began to break up along the ethnic lines. The touching stories and the aftermath effects of the breakaway republics of Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia and in Kosovo are still unfolding. Though the numbers of deaths in the Bosnia- Herzegovina conflict in former Yugoslavia are not known precisely, most sources agree that the estimates of deaths vary between 150,000 to 200,000 and displaced more than two million people. During the conflict a Srebrenica a North-eastern enclave of Bosnia once declared as a United  Nations  (UN ) safe area” saw one of the worst atrocity since second world war.

It has been estimated that more than 8,000 Muslim Bosniaks were massacred in Srebrenica and it was one of the most brutal ethnic cleansing operations of its kind in modern warfare. The US brokered peace talks revived the a peace process between the three warring factions in Bosnia- Herzegovina. For Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina a United States (US ) -brokered peace deal reached in Dayton on 21st November 1995. In a historic reconciliation bid on 14 December 1995 , the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in Paris, France, between Franjo Tudjman president of the Republic of Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic president of the Federal Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When conflict in Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia ended, the reconciliation began between ethnically divided region. The US played a crucial role in defining the direction of the Peace process. In 1996, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) -led 60,000 multinational peace enforcement force known as the Implementation Force (IFOR)) was deployed to help preserve the cease-fire and enforce the treaty provisions. Thereafter, the Court was established by Resolution 808 and later, Resolution 827 of the United Nations Security Council, which endorsed to proceed with setting up of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to try crimes against humanity . International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was the first United Nations (UN) war crimes tribunal of its kind since the post-second world war Nuremberg tribunal.

In the late 1990’s, as the political crisis deepened a spiral of violence fuelled the Kosovo crisis between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Yugoslav forces. Unlike the Bosnia- Herzegovina, Kosovo was a province of Serbia, of former Yugoslavia that dates back to 1946, when Kosovo gained autonomy as a province within Serbia. It is estimated that more than 800,000. Kosovos were forced out of Kosovo in search of refuge and as many as 500,000 more were displaced within Kosovo.

Subsequent t hostilities in Kosovo the eleven week air campaign led by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) against Yugoslavia in 1999 the Yugoslavian forces pulled troops out of Kosovo NATO. After the war was over, the United Nations Security Council, under the resolution 1244 (1999) approved to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo, known as the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Nevertheless UNMIK regulation No 1999/24 provided that the Law in Force in Kosovo prior to March 22, 1989 would serve as the applicable law for the duration of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

In this  context reconciliation is a key to national healing of wounds after ending a violent conflict. Healing the wounds of the past and redressing past wrongs is a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future. Over the years in Serbia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia and in Kosovo the successful peace building processes had happened. The success of the peace building process was possible because of participation of those concerned, and since appropriate strategies to effectively approach was applied with all relevant actors. The strengthening of institutions for the benefit of all citizens has many important benefits for the peace and stability of former Yugoslavia. Hence, the future looks bright for the Balkan states of Serbia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo.

Continue Reading

Europe

Hungarian Interest, Ukraine and European Values

Published

on

Diplomatic conflicts that have recently arisen between Hungary and its neighboring countries and the European Union as a whole most clearly show the new trend in European politics. This trend is committing to national and  state values of a specific  European country, doubting  the priority of supranational  interests within the European Union. Political analyst Timofey Bordachev believes that “the era of stale politics and the same stale politicians, who make backstage decisions based on the“ lowest common denominator,” are finally coming to an end. Politicians with a new vision of the world order come to power, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Austrian Federal Chancellor Sebastian Kurtz, or the new head of the Italian Interior Ministry, leader of the right-wing League of the North Party, Matteo Salvini ”.

It is not the first year that Hungary is trying to protect the interests of its citizens and the state from external influence, to protect the Hungarians in the territory of neighbouring states  by establishing for this  a special position (Commissioner  for the development of the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine), to determine relations with other countries on the basis of their attitude to the rights of Hungarians. This is how conflicts with the European Union arose, after Hungary refused to let migrants into the country, in the same manner, a conflict  arose with Ukraine, which is trying to build a state ideology, based on nationalism, which a priori does not provide for the proper level of realization and protection of the rights of non-titular nations.

In relation to Hungary, Ukraine follows the same policy as in relation to Russia – to initiate various accusations, to call for punishment, to talk about the inconsistency with European values of the Hungarian policy under the leadership of  Orban. Doing so Kiev has its multifaceted interest: cooperation with NATO and the EU, support  for any decisions of Brussels, the anti-Russian course, domestic policy based on the nationalist  ideology. And in all these areas  Hungary poses  a problem for Ukraine. In the description of relations with Hungary  Kiev even  uses the word “annexation“.

Hungary is hardly planning to seize any Ukrainian territory, but on what  grounds Ukraine falsely accuses Hungary of its annexation intentions in relation to Transcarpathia?  The Ukrainian side highlights several positions:

Issuing Hungarian passports  to Ukrainian citizens (ethnic Hungerians)

This  is an old story, it has come to light again recently due to the growth of Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover,  there are concerns about the implementation by Hungary of the “Crimean scenario” in relation to Transcarpathia.

The Hungarian government has created the position of  “Commissioner  for the development of Ukraine’s Transcarpathian region and the program for the development of kindergartens in the Carpathian region”.

Ukraine demanded an explanation. A note of protest was delivered to the Hungarian Charge d’Affaires in Ukraine, and the Foreign ministers of Ukraine and Hungary had a telephone conversation on the problem. Hungary continues to ignore the requirements of Kiev.

Ukraine fears further disintegration processes

At the same time, in Kiev there is no understanding  of the fact that combining the ideology of nationalism with the country’s national diversity and European integration is hardly possible.

Ukrainian experts note the growth of separatism in the Transcarpathian region, as well as the “strange behavior” of the governor, who plays on the side of Hungary. They also complain that “pro-Ukrainian ideology”(?) is not being сonsolidated in Transcarpathia, and this region is not controlled and monitored by  the Ministry of information. In a word, the state is losing control over the territory, which it neither develops nor controls. Such behavior of the governor and the region’s residents may indicate that the state is not sufficiently present in the lives of residents of Transcarpathia, and this a financial and humanitarian drawback they compensate with the help of Hungary, – experts believe.

Apparently, Ukraine is unable to reach an agreement with Hungary as relations are tense. In response to the Ukrainian law on education, adopted in the fall of 2017, which infringes the rights of national minorities, Budapest blocked another, the third, Ukraine-NATO meeting. Ukraine witnessed this embarrassing  situation  in April 2018.  At the same time elections were held in Hungary, in  which Viktor Orban’s party won a majority in the parliament. Such a tough stance of Budapest in relation to the Ukrainian educational policy Kiev considered to be just a sign of electoral populism. However, this was a mistake.

Viktor Orban’s victory in spring 2018 was convincing, and a convincing victory means obvious support of his migration policies as well as his support  for compatriots abroad. The party of Orban – Fides – not only won a majority but a constitutional majority – 133 of the 199 seats  in the National Assembly of Hungary.

There is no doubt  that Hungary has become Ukraine’s another serious opponent in the process of its European integration. And it is unlikely that either  country  will take a step back: there will be presidential elections in Ukraine soon, and in Hungary, the victory won by Orban, apparently, confirms the  approval of his independent  foreign  policy  by  the citizens.  So the conflict is likely to develop.

First published in our partner International Affairs

Continue Reading

Europe

Belt and Road Alternatives: The European Strategy

Published

on

The European Union (EU) has put forward a plan for enhancing connectivity within Asia, which has been dubbed as the Asia Connectivity Strategy.

The EU does not want to give an impression, that the Asia Connectivity Strategy (ACS) is a counter to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Yet, senior officials of the EU, while commenting on the broad aims and objectives of the project, have categorically stated, that the primary goal of the Asia Connectivity Strategy, is enhancing connectivity (physical and digital) while also ensuring, that local communities benefit from such a project, and environmental and social norms are not flouted (this is a clear allusion to the shortcomings of the BRI). There are no clear details with regard to the budget, and other modalities of the project (EU member countries are likely to give a go ahead for this project, before the Asia-Europe Meeting in October 2018). EU has categorically stated, that it would like to ensure that the ACS is economically sustainable.

Other alternatives to BRI 

It is not just the EU, but even the US, along with Japan and Australia. which are trying to create an alternative vision to the BRI.

The US alternative to the BRI, is being funded by the recently created United States International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) (an organization which will merge Overseas Private Investment Corporation and other Development Finance Programs) which came into being after the passing of the BUILD  (Better Utilization of Investments leading to Development) Act recently.

It would be pertinent to point out, that the US which has been accused of lacking a cohesive vision to counter China’s BRI has in recent months spoken, on more than one occasion, about greater the dire need for robust connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In July 2018 US Secretary of State while speaking at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum committed an amount of $113 million for U.S. initiatives to support projects related to digital economy, energy, and infrastructure. The Secretary of State, while speaking about close links between US and Indo-Pacific, also spoke about the need for greater private sector involvement in projects in the Indo-Pacific. Pompeo off late, has also been reaching out pro-actively to a number of countries in South East Asia, and visited Malaysia, Indonesia in August 2018.

It would be pertinent to point out that OPIC  (now part of USFDC) has already signed with the overseas finance development arms of Japan and Australia, and is in talks with India to work jointly. Some of the areas being explored for joint investments are energy, infrastructure.

It is not just the US, even Japan has come with it’s own alternative, Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI), to the BRI.

Potential Appeal of the Asia Connectivity Strategy

So the question then arises, why would countries seeking an alternative to China, not come on board the US’ connectivity initiative. The ‘Asia Connectivity Strategy’ may be especially acceptable to leaders, who do not want to be seen as blindly following US diktats, but who are also uncomfortable with Beijing’s economic policies, and want to avoid falling into what has been dubbed as Beijing’s ‘debt trap’ diplomacy. A perfect example being Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammad who scrapped projects worth 40 Billion USD, and also referred to the rise of a ‘new colonialism’ being promoted by China. The Malaysian PM has not shared a particularly cordial relationship with the US in the past. While addressing the United Nations General Assembly (unga), Mahathir made some interesting points, saying that Malaysians want a Malaysia, which seeks relations based on ‘mutual respect’ and a Malaysia, that is ‘neutral’ and ‘non aligned’

EU itself trying to strike a balance

EU Chief, Jean Claude Juncker, has been pitching for a more pro-active response to Trump’s insular policies, as well as China’s BRI. Given the fact, that EU has taken a divergent stand from US on the Iran issue, and has proposed a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which will ensure that trade with Iran continues, even before the impending US sanctions to be imposed on Iran in November 2018. The SPV was announced, jointly with Russia and China, on the sidelines of the UNGA.

At the UNGA, French President, Emmanuel Macron disagreed with Trump’s views with regard to Iran, and supported the 2015 Vienna Accord. Said Macron: We know that Iran was on a nuclear military path but what stopped it? The 2015 Vienna accord.”

While it remains to be seen, if the SPV set up by EU works or not, but a number of countries which do not want to be part of the Chinese or American orbit would be attracted towards the EU, in spite of all the problems it is facing, due to it’s capacity to take an independent stand.

Asia Connectivity Strategy is not only about competition

It remains to be seen whether the Asia Connectivity Strategy can gain traction. In terms of connectivity, there may even be strong overlaps with the ‘Indo-Pacific vision’. France, which has strengthened strategic ties with Australia and India, is already seeking to play a pro-active role in the Indo-Pacific.

French President Emmanuel Macron had referred to the need for a strong Paris-Canberra-New Delhi axis, during his Australia visit, as a counter to China’s increasing assertiveness.

Interestingly, while there is a realization, that Asian Connectivity Strategy has a competitive element, and there are some clear differences between EU’s strategy and BRI, there are also some who believe, that there is space for collaboration between the Asia Connectivity Strategy and BRI. This point has been put forward by some policy makers and strategic commentators in EU, as well as sections of the Chinese media. Wang Wen Wen in an article for the Global Times, argues:

‘Asia needs Europe as much as it needs China. Since the EU and China are the two largest economic entities in Eurasia, it is vital that they steward the continent’s economic development agenda. Some programs in the BRI have carried out cooperation with the European side on technology and equipment procurement.’

In conclusion, the Asia Connectivity Strategy is an interesting idea. A lot will depend upon available resources and the response of potential stakeholders. But EU going ahead with such an initiative in spite of numerous problems within is truly laudable.

Continue Reading

Latest

Trending

Copyright © 2018 Modern Diplomacy