Nepal’s view on “Belt and Road Initiative”: Together it never fails
Authors: Himal Neupane & Wang Li
[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] I [/yt_dropcap]nternational relations seldom affords small states a worthy mention, as these entities predominantly lack the capabilities to pursue their interests and preoccupied with their survival than are the great powers. However, history also tells that there have been a number of small states which have taken advantage of their milieu to garner security and interests previously considered unattainable given their size or means.
Given this, the paper argues for the strategic dimensions of the formal memorandum (MOU) between Nepal and China which was signed on May 14, 2017, prior to the “Belt and Road Initiative” Forum in Beijing.
Geographically, Nepal is a landlocked central Himalayan country in South Asia and in modern history it was never colonized but served as a buffer state between Imperial China and Colonial India. After the independence of India from the British ruling and the establishment of the P. R. China in 1949, Nepal ended its isolation and forged amicable ties with both of its giant neighbors, China and India. Though much closer to India in terms of culture, ethnics and even military, Nepal never accepts external domination. Due to this consideration, Nepal established formal relations with China in 1955 and since then, Beijing has provided economic aid to Nepali infrastructure and economic aid. More than symbolically, Nepal has assisted Beijing in terms of curbing anti-China protests from the Tibetan diaspora.
According to the “5•14 MOU”, Nepal and China would work collaboratively with a view to promoting China’s investment in Nepali infrastructure, enhancing the regional stability and facilitating economic growth with all the neighbors. From the perspectives of the Nepali people, the formal MOU serves at least two points. First, it is a signal to India that Nepal is eager to maintain the strong bonds with China in light of the well-known doctrine of the balance of power. Despite India’s obvious concern, Nepal invited Chinese troops in April to hold their first ever joint military drill —Sagarmatha Friendship—2017, a move that has calcified a growing relationship between the Himalayan country and the great power in Asia. Yet, China’s media briefed that the military drill primarily focused on training Nepali soldiers in case of the hostage scenarios involving international terror groups. It is also clear that Nepal aims to send a message that this small land nestled in the Himalaya never want to depend only on India for the security reason. Due to this, Nepal has carefully cultivated its strategic partnership with other great powers, in particular with its northern neighbor China.
Second, Nepal is aware of its reality: as a developing country, it was ranked as the 144th on the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2016. Nepal not only struggles with the transition from a monarchy to a republic, but also needs to fight against its massive poverty. In view of the problems aforesaid, Nepal has made steady progress, with the government vowing its commitment to elevate the nation from least developed country status by the year of 2022 that neatly fits “the alleviation of poverty” program in China by 2020. As Chinese President Xi Jin-ping spoke at the Forum in May, “In the coming three years, China will provide assistance worth RMB 60 billion to developing countries and international organizations participating in the Belt and Road Initiative to launch more projects to improve people’s well-being and included are 100 poverty alleviation projects.” With this expectation in their mind, Nepali delegation arrived in Beijing for attending the BRI forum, at which China scaled up financing support for the “BRI” by contributing an additional RMB 100 billion to the Silk Road Fund. Nepal desperately needs to expand its infrastructure in the land, and in particular local people believe that with more than 100 billion investment into the countries involving “the belt and road initiative”, they will have opportunities to develop themselves and finally, be able to harness their vast potential sources —hydropower—for export.
Yet, Nepal is by no means to alienate its traditional relations with India. Due to inter-national and domestic considerations, Nepal stated that “May 14 MOU” regarding China is a “conditional understanding” which requires more specific efforts from both sides. According to Nepal’s Foreign Ministry, the cooperation between the two sides should be conducted in terms of the mode of China’s investment and the assurance of free trade under the BRI. Otherwise, it is hard for Nepal to accept the flow of investment from China. To that end, two more MOU were signed in Beijing on the occasion to set up border economic zones and its expansion, and to rebuild Chinese—Nepali transit road network agreements. It will help northern Himalayan areas get an alternative transit route and also facilitate the local economics. Since the BRI brings the investment into the wide areas, it will change the economic map of Nepal through developing local industries and improving the living standards of the low-income groups. Today China comes bearing the purse strings, and the Nepali governments welcome the Chinese with open arms. In 2016, a freight rail line was even completed linking Lanzhou, a heavy industrial city in the West of China through Xigaze in Tibet, down to Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal. This is truly a part of the grand “BRI” framework.
Since the international reality in which many uncertainties remain ever, the shared interests and mutual mistrust have existed simultaneously. Considering the asymmetry between Nepal and China, it is natural for small states like Nepal to join the BRI with concerns and hesitation. Caution is thereby required to both sides. Like many predecessors in history, huge FDI will facilitate the rapid economic growth that then leads to create new opportunities and challenges as well. As a result, local people wonder what the exact purposes of China’s BRI are. As it is reiterated, the BRI is the core part of the grand strategy of China’s good—neighbor policy initiated by the Beijing elite in 2013 with a view to building a community of shared destiny. This requires Nepal and China to perceive if their ends are compatible. As a rising power and a developing country at once, China does have much to learn in international affairs, and then to think smartly and to act responsibly. For instance, the BRI will follow the current rules of the world businesses, or China entertains the desire of a great power aspiring to make the new regulations to the existing global order.
Here it is necessary to identify the potential issues affecting the relationship between Nepal and China. First, geopolitically India will be the first to feel uncomfortable if not insecure. Although India is unable to contain China economically and diplomatically, it is able to curb the rise of China through its political and social influence in South Asia. Consequently, Nepal, Sri Lanka and even Bangladesh would be involved into the great powers’ game that leads to the regional instability. China does not want to see it happened for it has concentrated all efforts on its great national rejuvenation. As a small country lying between the two giants, it is unwise for Nepal to side with any giant and then loses the flexibility to serve its core interests.
Geo-economically, like any foreign companies, Chinese state-owned companies (SOEs) also work for two priorities: making profits while protecting their national interest. No country can be exempted. In terms of the strategic areas of infrastructure, transport, communications, energy and technology, they are in the hands of the companies run by the Chinese owners or Chinese state. These enterprises have interests in the land and also have the resources to “dictate” the local government. To that end, corruptions and mismanagement of the projects occur accordingly. For example, Nepali people are frustrated by a few large projects which were given to Chinese companies but were not completed effectively or efficiently. In the case of West Seti Hydropower Project, the government of Nepal and CWE Investment Corporation, a subsidiary of China Three Gorges Corporation (CTGC), signed a memorandum of understanding in 2012. But the project was delayed and mismanaged from time to time. The similar cases are also found in the Pokhara International Airport, Gautam Buddha International Airport in Bhairahawa and Kathmandu’s ring road expansion projects.
Social-psychologically, Chinese business community feels the local security inefficient to protect their safety, therefore they have required employing their own security staff. The high investment in infrastructure protection is reasonable but also results in different opinions and even opposite conclusion of the issues. Furthermore, the western and Indian media often reported Chinese behavior from political and strategic perspectives. For example, more serious disputes are involved with the environmental degradation and the protestation from the local communities. They lashed at China’s model and the manner in dealing with the environmental issues. Given all the issues, Chinese companies have been prudent and responsible in the infra-structure projects related to the BRI in Nepal. At this point, China did indeed learn the hard lessons from their rapid but costly economic development over the past decades.
In closing, the central issue faced by Nepal and China actually help to advance the two sides’ working together more constructively. As Chinese President reiterated at the recent forum, China liked to work with all states no matter whether they are located along the new silk roads or not. Because of this, China does have the significant advantages: a rising power with the second largest GDP in the world and an impressive ancient civilization on the earth. Now China seeks its own glory on the world stage. Whether the Chinese approach will be any more successful than those of the West or India is still uncertain. Yet, the quid pro quo of China’s BRI in Nepal is that the leaders in Beijing need to know rightly how to win the hearts of the people rather than to hold the purse strings.
Chinese MFA Report 2023: American hegemony and its risks around the world
An official report issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on: “Criticizing the concept of American and Western hegemony and democracy, and defending other and new forms of democracy in the world according to the circumstances of each country around the world,” emphasizing on:
Criticism of the United States of America intensifying its efforts to stir up divisions around the world by organizing the so-called “summit for democracy”, inciting confrontation between the authoritarian and democratic camps according to its ideology, and attempting to transform other sovereign states in the American style in order to serve the special American strategy.
To understand how American-dominant democracy operates globally, we will find that the United States classifies other countries for several degrees according to its criterion, that is, its proximity or distance from the concept of democracy, and Washington asks those countries to apply to fill out the “test papers” for democracy issued by the United States of America and its government.
Those American actions in and of themselves are undemocratic, contradict the current trend, and contravene the will of the majority of the members of the international community, and will inevitably lead to a complete and abject failure.
Here, the United States must realize that if it does not completely abandon the theory of “the superiority of American democracy”, and if it does not change its behavior of domination and bullying, which often imposes “American democracy” on others, you will find mockery of it in history books and records.
China, like most countries in the world, searches for the path of development in the first place, not the path of democracy and the policies of hegemony and liberalism in the American way. Therefore, as an affirmation by the Chinese leaders of China’s adoption of the high-quality development model, Chinese Premier “Li Keqiang” presented the Chinese government’s work report at the opening session of the first session of the Fourteenth National People’s Congress, in which it was emphasized that China would follow a development model. A democracy with socialist characteristics in line with China’s real conditions. China has pushed the process of democracy on the basis of national development by taking development as a task of highest priority. Followers agreed, so here remains the final conclusion to evaluate any democratic system around the world, by asking: whether the quality of life of citizens has improved and whether the people are satisfied with the societal situation? It is clear that the model of democracy with socialist characteristics adopted by the Chinese government has succeeded. Chinese socialist democracy is a real democracy, represented by the government’s interest in serving the people, and it has nothing to do with the political system represented by one-party rule or multi-party rule in the American and Western style, which recent experiences have proven to fail to achieve the well-being and prosperity of its people, unlike the ability of the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders to achieve a well-off society model and a high-quality development in all Chinese provinces and cities.
Therefore, the report on the work of the Chinese government came, which was presented by “Li Keqiang”, Premier of the Chinese State Council, on behalf of the State Council of China, at the opening session of the first session of the 14th National People’s Congress. The sessions of the 14th session of the National People’s Congress this year 2023 are of special importance, as the model of socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics succeeded in outperforming many Western democracies through the success of many delegates in the National People’s Congress in forming many of the main institutions of the Communist Party and the state. They also tightened control over the bodies supervising the financial sector and scientific and technological work in the Chinese state, with an agreement to “strengthen party work” in private companies, in order to preserve the interests of the Chinese people and achieve a high-quality development model.
Therefore, the Chinese government’s 2023 action plan is based on adhering to the general basic business idea of making progress by maintaining stability, comprehensively applying China’s new development thinking, accelerating the establishment of a new development pattern, comprehensively deepening reform and opening up, and adhering to development, which is driven by innovation, and the high-quality development.
Here, we must refer to the report of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued on Monday, February 20, 2023, regarding American hegemony and its dangers, with the aim of exposing the United States’ abuse of hegemony in various fields, and attracting the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the attention of the international community for a greater understanding of the dangers of American practices to peace. And stability in the whole world, by interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, causing subversion and international chaos, deliberately waging wars and harming the entire international community.
The United States of America has also developed a book on hegemony to organize “color revolutions” and incite regional conflicts and even wage wars directly under the guise of promoting democracy, freedom and human rights, and Washington has sought to impose rules that serve its own interests in the name of supporting a “rules-based international order”, which is itself is far from it.
There have been many cases of US interference in the internal affairs of other countries, under the guise of “promoting democracy”, such as the American incitement to “color revolutions” in the Eurasia region, and the “Arab Spring” revolutions in West Asia and North Africa to spread chaos, which led to chaos and vandalism and destruction in many countries in which Washington intervened.
The United States practices double standards in international rules, as the United States put its self-interest first and moved away from all treaties, charters and work mechanisms of recognized international organizations and placed its domestic law above international law.
The United States has also been issuing arbitrary judgments regarding assessing the level of democracy in other countries, and fabricating false narratives about “democracy versus authoritarianism” to incite estrangement, division, competition and confrontation. On December 2021, the United States hosted the first “summit for democracy”, which was met with criticism and opposition from many countries because it mocked the spirit of democracy and worked to divide the world.
Also, “American military dominance has caused human tragedies. The wars and military operations launched by the United States in the name of fighting terrorism have claimed the lives of more than a million civilians and displaced tens of millions”.
The United States of America also seeks to deter the scientific, technological and economic development of other countries through the exercise of monopoly power and measures of repression and technological restrictions in the areas of high technology. The United States monopolized intellectual property in the name of protection, and reaped huge profits through this illegal monopoly.
The United States has also used disinformation as a weapon to attack other countries, and for this it has recruited groups and individuals who fabricate stories and spread them around the world to mislead world public opinion with unlimited American support.
Therefore, all forms of American hegemony and power politics must be opposed, to refuse to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, to force them to abandon their hegemonic and tyrannical practices around the world.
Here, It becomes clear that the Americans are victorious in a clear way for the pragmatic philosophy in theory and practice, and that their segment of the intelligentsia (intellectuals and intelligence) adopts the principle of “the end justifies the means”. Perhaps the French thinker “Alexis de Tocqueville” explained this in a practical way in his book published in two volumes in 1840, entitled (Democracy in America) and its summary: (Democracy in the United States of America can be as tyrannical as dictatorship when voters decide to vote for themselves with money).
And (American democracy) did not stop at these characteristics only, because its sources are basically built philosophically at the hands of European philosophers who went to the United States, because they found in it the right soil for ideas and strategies that are based on plunder, occupation, siege, sanctions, overthrowing governments, and most importantly neglecting real and free popular choices to build the country and the human being, these thinkers came to it to perpetuate this behavior based on individualism, power and domination, and this is what is actually happening now.
In this context, it was natural for President “Biden’s” American Summit for Democracy to be a disgrace and an intellectual, political, and moral defect, as half of the peoples of the earth were absent from it, and China did not invite to it, and the text of the peoples and systems of the world was absent from it, so the summit’s democracy was synonymous with American arrogance, and it raised issues: (Tyranny- corruption- human rights) in it is a purely political proposition far from promoting the values of dialogue, peace, and friendship between peoples, framed by the previous ideas of the theorists of American hegemony and unipolarity, and whoever is not with us is against us, so the American Democracy Summit 2022 focused blatantly in its functional attack on the Chinese experience and on different in this respect. In my belief, what happened by Washington will not result in the emergence of any new and stable world order, with those in charge of the American administration adhering to the same old concepts and mentality of hegemony, control, and steering the helm of the world according to their interests.
China’s “Two Sessions” and the return of one-man rule
In this essay, I try to demystify the recently concluded “Two Sessions” in China by giving a brief historical context, as the country slides back into the peril of one-leader-centered politics, reminiscent of a bygone era.
With the conclusion of the first annual session of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC) of China on March 13, Xi Jinping has secured a norm-breaking third term as President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in a “unanimous” vote, just five months after he was “re-elected” as the General Secretary of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the third time in a row. The NPC, which is elected for a term of five years, is a largely ceremonial unicameral national legislature of China and “the highest organ of state power” as per the PRC’s Constitution. It also happens to be the largest law-making body in the world on paper.
Since the foundation of the People’s Republic under the leadership of Mao Zedong in October 1949, mainland China has been under the sole rule of the CCP. The deputies (members) of the NPC, elected from the thirty-five electoral units of China, usually won’t go against CCP-endorsed policies, but rather merely rubber-stamp them.While this has been the case for long, there are eight “legally-sanctioned” minor parties in China, on paper, that exists by playing second fiddle to the CCP without posing any serious challenge to its unrestricted authority.
These parties are given a voice to raise their concerns and suggestions through the so-called Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a national-level political advisory body that meets once in a year parallelly during the annual session of the NPC. About 60.8 per cent of the total membership of CPPCC belongs to non-CCP parties, along with representation from various sectors of the society and the economy, specialised professions and social groups.
Together, these two annual meetings – the NPC and the CPPCC – are referred to as the “Two Sessions” or Lianghui in the Chinese language. This year, it took place between March 4 and 13, with 2977 deputies attending the NPC session and 2,172 members attending the CPPCC session from all over China.
A brief history
The NPC and the CPPCC are rubber stamp bodies that simply pass the laws or approve the policies that have been already decided upon by the CCP. While the NPC dates back to 1954, when the first Constitution of China was promulgated, the CPPCC traces its origins back to the foundation of the PRC in 1949 when the CCP invited all friendly political parties to engage in discussions on the road to the proclamation of the new CCP-led People’s Republic in Beijing by replacing the nationalist Kuomintang party-led Republic of China at a time when its victory in the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) was almost certain.
The first CPPCC of 1949 served effectively as the Constituent Assembly of China for drafting and framing the PRCs first Constitution. The meeting approved the “Common Programme”, which was akin to an interim Constitution and Mao Zedong was chosen as Chairman of the Central People’s Government. The PRC was proclaimed soon after the end of the conference in October 1949.
In the following years, the first permanent Constitution of the PRC was drafted. Exactly five years after the passage of the “Common Programme”, in 1954, the first NPC was convened, which unanimously approved the new Constitution. This was the PRC’s first Constitution since its founding. Later, in 1975 and 1978, two intervening versions of the Constitution were promulgated and the current Constitution came into effect in 1982. However, despite these four Constitutions and other political mechanisms of visible separation of power, the CCP had kept the whole of China, except the island of Taiwan, under its control without any opposition for the last seven-and-a-half decades.
Xi Jinping and his coterie of loyalists in the party-state apparatus who were appointed through last year’s 20th Party Congress and the recently concluded annual session of the NPC, represents the fifth generation in the line of succession of Chinese political leadership since Mao Zedong. China has seen the worst of authoritarianism under the Mao era (1949-1976), whose disastrous policies and initiatives such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-62) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) led to the death of more than 65 million Chinese people – either by forced famines, imprisonment or execution.
Following Mao’s death in 1976, his close aide and designated successor Hua Guofeng followed the policy of “Two Whatevers” (liang ge fanxi), which basically meant “whatever policy decisions Mao made and whatever instructions Mao gave” and rejected all calls for reforms. But a breakthrough occurred two years later during the third plenary session of the eleventh CCP Central Committee held in December 1978, when reform-minded Deng Xiaoping emerged as China’s new paramount leader.
Deng, often regarded as the “Architect of Modern China”’, denounced Mao’s hardline policies and set China on a new course of far-reaching economic reforms, even though he has ruthlessly quelled democratic upheavals during his tenure such as the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.
Moving away from Deng’s “collective leadership” approach
Having seen the worst face of complete centralisation of power in the hands of one leader, Deng initiated key changes in China’s governance system such as the setting of a two-term limit for higher state officials, including the President, Vice-President, and the Premier of the State Council. He never held any post other than chairing two key bodies of power – the Central Military Commission and the now-defunct Central Advisory Commission that existed between 1982 and 1992. Even though the position of CCP General Secretary, the de facto leader of China, has no term limits, there were orderly transitions of power every ten years between 1992 and 2018, in the two generations of leadership (Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) that followed Deng Xiaoping.
In 2018, when Xi Jinping was re-elected as China’s leader, he removed the term limits for Presidency that were put in place during the Deng era, thereby allowing him to rule for life. He then forced senior leaders into early retirement and incorporated his eponymous ideology, called the Xi Jinping Thought, to the party and state Constitutions, the first leader since Mao to have such an honour while in office. During President Xi’s first two terms, there existed a bare minimum balance of power between the party and the state as Premier Li Keqiang represented a rival faction within the CCP (the Tuanpai or the Youth League Faction).
Xi and his coterie of loyalists’ blur party-state thin line
While the NPC have traditionally tried to maintain an internal balance of power in a way to accommodate the interests of different political factions, now the Xi Jinping faction is the only active faction with exercisable power in the party-state apparatus. The thin line between the Party and the government has been blurred, reminiscent of the pre-1976 era. Xi and his “yes-men” in key positions of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee and the PRC’s State Council have completely abandoned the “collective leadership” model pioneered by Deng Xiaoping and all the rival factions within the Party have been sidelined.
Xi has now consolidated his position as the most powerful leader the PRC has seen since Mao, with a firmer grip of control on the party, the government and the military. But, unlike the pre-1976 era, Xi Jinping is leading a more powerful China, which is the second largest economy in the world with a rapidly modernising military. Moreover, China’s humungous industrial base forms the core of global manufacturing and supply chains.
As widely expected, Li Qiang, a long-term ally of Xi Jinping and the former party chief of Shanghai who oversaw the controversial “zero-Covid” policy, was appointed as China’s new Premier in place of Li Keqiang at the recently concluded NPC. With other loyalists such as the new Vice President Han Zheng in the State Council and two other allies being appointed to head the NPC and the CPPCC, Xi Jinping has effectively removed all the rival centres of power within China’s party-state apparatus.
Xi Jinping’s previous two terms were characterised by fueling hyper-nationalism at home and upping the ante on regional disputes and engaging in a global strategic competition with the United States. This is expected to be continued, while some experts believe that the new Premier Li Qiang, having a pro-business image, can exert a moderating influence on Xi, who had placed stricter controls on industries and businesses, during his second term in particular. However, the extent of such an influence remains to be seen.
During the closing session of the 14th NPC, Xi emphasised security as “the bedrock of development, while stability is a pre-requisite for prosperity” and called for building the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a “Great Wall of Steel” that safeguards national security, sovereignty and developmental interests of China.
The address reflected similar concerns shared during the 20th CCP Congress held in October 2022, when Xi used the word “security” 91 times. Similarly, an often-repeated phrase is “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, citing China’s “century of humiliation”, and projecting the CCP as the country’s only saviour, especially from external enemies and threats. All these rhetoric is aimed at invoking revanchist sentiments within the Chinese population and thereby using it to sustain its continued legitimacy at home.
After the conclusion of NPC, Chinese state-run media Xinhua wrote, “The (NPC) session called on the Chinese people of all ethnic groups to rally more closely around the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, to hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, follow the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and fully implement the guiding principles of the Party’s 20th National Congress…”
In other words, the Party “guides and leads” everything and now there is a singular source of power for the Party and the government, which seems to look like a return of China to one-leader-centered politics after nearly five decades. Hope, the PRC’s evolving political dynamics won’t take a perilous turn, particularly in the foreign and security policy fronts, which is increasingly witnessing conflictual turn of events in the recent past.
Organizational structures in formulating China’s decisions to manage international affairs Under Xi Jinping
Chinese President “Xi Jinping” sent several clear messages, in his closing speech on Monday, March 13, 2023 in the capital, Beijing, in front of the meetings of the two sessions or sessions of the annual “Lianghui” that takes place in March of each year, with the participation of the National People’s Congress of China, that is, The Chinese Parliament or Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Council, all of which focus on the fact that China is coming. China also expressed its vision in the management of international affairs, through the words of Chinese President “Xi Jinping” himself, by affirming: “China believes that all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community”. Their internal affairs do not bear any external interference, their sovereignty and dignity must be respected, and their right to choose social systems and development paths must be adhered to independently and justly.
Chinese foreign policy is generally based on the principle of (Tao Guangyang Wei), meaning “building capabilities and waiting for time”, to make Chinese foreign policy more active and resolute. China’s foreign policy agenda is witnessing a major shift in institutional power from the ministries that used to lead the traditional diplomacy process to specialized units as a result of the development and intensity of China’s external activity. China is the ruler in setting public and foreign policy, but also supervises the extent of its implementation, but this is done officially independently of the government, unlike most other countries. Likewise, the political decision in China is taken by the supreme political leadership of the party and the state as a center, but after extensive studies carried out by the competent agencies in the state and the party and specialized research centers to study and discuss all available options for implementation.
We find here the pivotal and vital role of the “Political Planning” Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to understand and formulate China’s foreign policy decisions internationally, which undertakes tasks: conducting studies of comprehensive and strategic issues of international situations and international relations, developing policies and plans in foreign affairs, preparing drafts of important diplomatic documents, and raising awareness of policies Foreign affairs, coordinating research and studies work, and carrying out work related to studies of the history of diplomacy for the new China. We note the role of Chinese foreign policy research centers, as well as academic and university research institutions to contribute and are closely linked to the government, the army and the party partly due to the fact that they enjoy reliable licensed channels to convey their advice to the supreme leadership, and are closely linked to the government, the army and the party, partly due to the fact that they enjoy licensed channels Reliable to pass on her advice to the top leadership of the Chinese state.
And the most prominent formations of the organizational structure, which contribute to drawing the decisions and policies of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and thus contribute to shaping the external decisions of China, as follows:
(Office of the Ministry “Diwan”- Political Planning Department- Asia Department – Western Asia and North Africa Department- Africa Department- Eastern Europe and Central Asia Department- Europe Department- North America and Oceania Department- Latin America Department- International Organizations and Conferences Department- Arms Control Department- Treaties and Laws Department- Information Department- Protocol Department – Consular Department (Consular Protection Center)- Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Affairs Department- Translation Office- Coordination Department for Foreign Affairs- External Security Affairs Department- Retired Cadres Department- Cadres Department- Administrative Affairs Department- Financial Department- Committee Ministry of the Communist Party of China (Department of Party Affairs Committee of the Ministry and Diplomatic Missions Abroad)- Office of the Leading Team on Inspection Work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Archives Department- Service Office of Departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Diplomatic Missions)
Special interest groups or groups play a crucial role in China’s external decision-making. They provide relevant input and a more specialized viewpoint in all political areas ranging from internal land reform in the Chinese state to relations between the United States of America and China. These groups consist mainly of government institutions. Centralization and state-owned enterprises, the results of politics in China are often the result of centralized bureaucracies and provincial-level governments.
China also works within the framework of a long-term strategic plan, which is reviewed at the National Congress of the Communist Party, which is held every five years. Here, the Central School of the Communist Party of China carries out the process of political and party education at the level of all diplomats and representatives of the foreign policy of the state, including state employees, leading and executive officials, from the level of ministers and agents and below, as each of them devotes himself to different periods, varying according to the degree of official, from one month To a year, to study, train and learn in the Central School of the Party.
Within the framework of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, China has concluded agreements with more than forty countries around the world, including the economic corridor agreement between Mongolia, Russia and China, the economic corridor between China and Pakistan, work to develop the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, a port in Sri Lanka and another in Myanmar, and the construction of a railway High-speed rail between Hungary and Serbia, and between Addis Ababa and Djibouti. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which China called for, is developing projects in several Arab countries, including the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Negotiations are also taking place between China and Israel at the present time to establish a free trade zone between them, despite the American refusal to do so. A railway has also been established between China and Laos, and between China and Thailand, and between Jakarta and Bandung. China’s military, naval and diplomatic endeavors have also expanded as part of the “Pearl String Strategy”, which secures China’s strategic positions in the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait regions.
China also put forward its vision in the management of international affairs, by emphasizing the issue of adhering to the principle of (indivisible security and the commitment to take seriously the legitimate security concerns of all countries), stressing that “humanity is an indivisible security community”, and that “the security of one country should not come at the expense of the security of other countries”. With the continuous Chinese warning that the misuse of long-term unilateral sanctions does not solve any international problem, but rather creates more difficulties and complications for everyone, China’s invitation to participate in the formulation of a new international peace program also came.
China makes its foreign policy based on three pillars: (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Liaison Department, and the United Front Work Department). Each of these institutions plays a supportive role for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, led by President “Xi Jinping”, who ultimately has the authority to make the final decision and determine Beijing’s position on various global issues. We find that since the establishment of the Chinese President “Xi Jinping” of the Central Foreign Affairs Committee of the Communist Party in 2018, the Communist Party and President “Xi” have a major role in influencing the course of the management of international Chinese affairs, within the framework of personal and partisan influence on the making of China’s foreign policy. This is through what is known as the “International Liaison Department” within the Central Committee of the ruling Communist Party, which empowers the Chinese leadership and its ruling party to make political decisions and promote a separate foreign policy agenda for China.
The priorities of Chinese foreign policy can be understood through the words of former Chinese Foreign Minister “Wang Yi”, who identified “five major priorities for Chinese diplomacy”, which are:
(fully serve domestic development, resolutely safeguard national interests, constantly deepen partnership with other countries, staunchly defend international multilateralism, and broaden the base of China’s international cooperation more actively in international affairs)
After the spread of the Corona pandemic (Covid-19), Chinese diplomacy continued to carry out its various functions and roles actively and effectively despite the crisis, by employing modern technology and communications, and it turned to the “cloud diplomacy” mode, through phone calls, exchange of correspondence, and international video conferencing.
Here, on Tuesday, February 21, 2023, China issued the (Global Security) initiative, which was proposed by Chinese President “Xi Jinping”, through which it aims to eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, foremost of which is the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which is “aggravated and out of control”. According to the assurances of the current Chinese Foreign Minister, “Chen Gang” in his statement that his country is “extremely concerned” and Beijing will work to “promote peace dialogue between the parties to the conflict.” Also, during the launch of the new “global security” initiative within the vision of President “Xi Jinping”, President “Xi” himself affirmed to continue to strengthen peace dialogue and work with the international community to consolidate dialogue and consultation, address the concerns of all parties, and strive to achieve common security among all.
The (global security) initiative, which was formulated in a 10-page document, is based on 6 main principles that China announced its international adoption. The essence of this new vision of security is the call for the concept of common security, respect and protection of the security of every country, and the adoption of a comprehensive approach to maintaining security in Both traditional and non-traditional areas, strengthen security governance in a coordinated manner, commit to cooperation and achieve security through political dialogue and peaceful negotiations, and strive to achieve sustainable security and resolve conflicts through development and eliminate the breeding ground for insecurity.
Here, Beijing denounced what it described as “false accusations” made by the United States of America stating that “China is considering arming Russia in its war against Ukraine”. Through the statements of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, “Wang Wenbin,” that “we do not accept the United States pointing fingers at Sino-Russian relations, let alone coercion and pressure”, accusing Washington of “spreading false information”. He warned the United States of America of its actions, and to do more to improve the situation and promote peace and dialogue instead of stirring up grudges and conflicts, and to stop evading responsibility and spreading false information about China regarding its relations with Russia. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stressed that “China’s approach on the Ukrainian issue can be summed up in one sentence, which is to urge peace and promote dialogue”.
The Chinese statements regarding its relations with Russia came in response to the United States of America, after accusing US Secretary of State “Anthony Blinken” in an interview with the American “CBS” station, that China is “now considering providing lethal support” to Moscow, ranging from “ammunition and weapons themselves”. Blinken also made similar statements in a series of interviews while he was in Germany, participating in the Munich Security Conference.
And through the vision of Chinese think tanks to study the equations of the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and its existing and expected transformations at various political and economic levels for China, by drawing the features of a new international system in a way that leads to reorienting China’s foreign agenda to new geopolitical areas according to the principle of “outward displacement” and networking, flexibility with “potential allies”, according to the new Chinese vision, following the study of the results of the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on China.
And the most important thing here remains China’s lack of interest in the nature of the ruling political regimes in the context of its relations with the world, unlike the United States of America and the West, and it does not seek to promote its ideology abroad, and it agrees with many countries of the world in its view of American and Western liberal and democratic calls, as they are tools of states. Western only and should not apply to everyone.
China aspires to secure the greatest amount of security stability in the region after conducting the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation process as a Chinese security involvement of deep significance in the region to protect the security of sea lanes and straits, as a major requirement for Beijing’s economic development through its Belt and Road initiative, so that Beijing can launch programs to create and modernize Roads, railways, ports, communication systems and free trade cities throughout the region under a stable security environment. Such a Saudi-Iranian agreement, sponsored by China, is a blow to US influence in the Middle East. On a personal level, the words of Chinese Professor Wang Ewei, director of the Institute of International Studies at Renmin University, i.e. the Chinese people, stopped me for a long time, saying: “The Saudi-Iranian deal confirms the fact that Chinese mediation solves problems that Western mediation cannot solve”.
Hence, we increasingly understand the new approach of Chinese diplomacy towards foreign policy issues, especially in light of the Beijing government’s current endeavor to redraw maps of its political influence, by activating economic and political tools to expand and acquire more new geopolitical spaces. So, in line with the increasing breadth and depth of Beijing’s foreign policy agenda, Chinese policymakers expanded their thinking beyond geopolitical understanding of foreign affairs, and therefore many central government institutions specialized in economic policies and domestic industry are now involved in setting China’s foreign policy agenda.
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