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The future strategy of the World Uyghur Congress

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] T [/yt_dropcap]he assessment of China’s “One Belt, One Road Initiative” is at the core of the political debate in the World Uyghur Congress and in the other Islamist networks within Xinjiang. More specifically, the Islamist Uyghurs compare Xi Jinping’s proposal with other previous initiatives, such as “Opening the Northwest” of 1992; “Western Development” of 2000; the forums on the development of Xinjiang held in 2010 and 2014, besides the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001.

All initiatives that the Islamist Uyghurs interpret only as acts to repress the insurgency in East Turkestan and particularly as factors for further controlling the local Muslim radicalism.

Besides slackening the Islamist tension in Xinjiang – often jointly with the Islamic countries – which would be controlled by both China and its new regional allies.

It is also worth noting that the internal or public documents of the World Uyghur Congress hint at a systematic and possibly violent reaction to the integration of the Chinese economy into the world market, which is notoriously the idea underlying the “One Belt, One Road Initiative”.

At geopolitical level, considering the geographical position of Xinjiang, the Uyghur Islamic insurgency could do much harm to the project of a new Silk Road – and we imagine that the platform of the Uyghur Islamism will be used by all the countries which see as a threat China’s competition and its new strategic presence in Central Asia, as well as the new global multipolar approach preached by Xi Jinping.

According to the various Uyghur movements, development is used by the Chinese authorities to further marginalize and control Islam in Xinjiang. It is not true at all – indeed the opposite is true – but the strategic fear of Uyghur Islam is to be encircled by China’s friends and, hence, by enemies of the violent and jihadist Islam.

Therefore, we can foresee a forthcoming sequence of terrorist attacks, demonstrations and psywar actions, targeted in this case to Westerners, who will accuse China of “repression”, but above all will create difficulties and slow down the practical activities associated with the One Belt, One Road Initiative.

If the Chinese project is completed in line with the envisaged time schedule, East Turkestan will become increasingly irrelevant, both economically and strategically. Conversely, if the One Belt, One Road Initiative is significantly slowed down by the Uyghur terrorists and their media policy towards the West, this will be the Uyghurs’ real great success. Hence the Uyghurs will become the key region for China’s economic development in the West, with a blackmail that is easy to imagine.

The same holds true for the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC), which envisages investment to the tune of 46 billion US dollars.

The Gwadar port – already bought by China – will be the starting point of the “Belt”, considering that the Pakistani port allows access to the Arabian Sea and above all avoids China’s having to pass through the Straits of Malacca.

China, in fact, is funding “wellbeing and welfare” – to use the Chinese terminology – in all the buffer zone between its State and the bordering countries – areas which have always recorded tensions with China’s central authorities.

The list includes also Xinjiang that, in the Chinese vision, must reach “moderate wellbeing” that would surely defuse the local Islam, both the permanent jihad and the “sword jihad” operations that, however, have already taken place in Xinjiang.

The traditional friendship between China and Pakistan has already great economic significance, considering that trade between the two countries currently amounts to 16 billion US dollars per year – not to mention the eight modern China-made submarines sold to Pakistan, praised for their technical features also by US experts.

If China creates a network of strong alliances with Islamic countries on its border, there are no longer guaranteed safeguards for the Uyghur militant Islam. In the near future Afghanistan will be stabilized by a joint action between China, India and Pakistan, while India is planning to become the true dominus of Afghanistan.

Even the Taliban will soon be silenced, as they were born of a rib of the Pakistani intelligence services and, without Pakistan, they would currently have neither weapons nor funds.

For the Uyghur radical Islamism, this, too, is a strategic closure of great importance. In fact, until now the Uyghur jihadists who fought in Afghanistan were approximately one hundred and some of them have already returned to Xinjiang.

In addition, China’s venture capital is booming, and shortly – also as a result of a Chinese political decision – it will also be the turn of selected areas in Xinjiang.

As the old Chinese Marxist-Leninists know all too well, if there are no longer poor people, there is no fuel for any religious or social insurgency.

Meanwhile, the WUC-related web networks much publicizes a list of some people who should be freed from the Chinese “repression” thanks to the EU pressures.

It is the case of the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Liu Xiaboo; of the Uyghur economist, Ilham Toti and of Wang Quanzhang, a lawyer linked to the Falun Gong movement, a sect that was particularly active at the time of the events in Tiananmen Square, as well as of some feminists.

Combining very different offences and behaviours is a classic psywar technique and Europeans always take the bait.

Furthermore, ever more often the Uyghur movement uses the radical-libertarian areas of European politics – which are traditionally more sensitive to Tibetan issues – to defame China and above all to impose a link between China’s economic openings vis-à-vis the rest of the world and the traditional theme of “human rights”, which place purely ideological demonstrations and violent political actions on an equal footing.

The new law on non-governmental organizations, enacted by the Chinese government in 2015, is mainly designed to avoid Western soft power, which historically incites minorities against the political leadership, but also underlines the great usefulness and the great appreciation enjoyed by some NGOs within the Chinese government.

Moreover, as early as its foundation, the “National Endowment for Democracy”, a CIA-linked NGO, has been backing the World Uyghur Congress financially, while the Soros Foundation maintains relations with the Uyghurs through its network in Kyrgyzstan.

It is also worth recalling that Dolkun Isa, the Secretary of the World Uyghur Congress, based in Munich, is registered in the Interpol files as the perpetrator of “assassination by means of explosives” and currently enjoys German citizenship.

The news comes from the request for inspection No. 4-07585, which has been pending in the Italian Senate since May 25, 2017 – a request made by a well-known former judge, namely Felice Casson.

The document clarifies that a request to INTERPOL is still pending in relation to Dolkun Isa, aimed at tracing and subsequently arrest him on charges of “murder perpetrated by using explosives”. By granting him citizenship, Germany clearly wanted to carry out an anti-Chinese political act, possibly to meet demands coming from overseas countries.

It seems now obvious that the inevitable link between WUC and the Uyghur jihadist networks may be Dolkun Isa himself.

If, as it seems now certain, Turkey is eventually accepted in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which currently seems to be a primary strategic goal for Turkey, China will certainly ask the Turkish government to stop any support for the Uyghur movement – a request we anticipate will be quickly accepted by Turkey. Once again the scope for coverage, funding and international legitimacy for WUC and the Uyghur Islamic movements will shrink.

Recently Western sources, extensively reported on the WUC-controlled websites, make reference to the arrest of 22 Uyghur religious at the beginning of Ramadan to protect – as reported by the Chinese government – students’ health and avoid religious propaganda, to which Ramadan is equated.

It should also be noted that on May 22 and in late June 2014 violent demonstrations were staged by the Uyghurs, with 43 victims in the former case and a harsh terrorist action in the latter. The Turkestan Islamic Party has its command centre in Pakistan – and once again the Chinese government will ask Pakistan for a favour that the Pakistani Islam cannot refuse, without risking breaking off the economic negotiations linked to the new Silk Road.

Even the US strategic analysts believe that, in the future, the Uyghur network is bound to be turned into an organization similar to Al Qaeda.

Moreover, it is in Berlin that, on May 29, 2017, Uyghur intellectuals and professionals gathered to reorganize the activities of WUC and of other ethnic or Islamic associations of East Turkestan, considering that the real item on the agenda is to oppose China’s new geopolitical role and support the Western media who speak of “Chinese repression” in Xinjiang, as well as to counter the new Chinese Silk Road currently at information level and later at operational level.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs "La Centrale Finanziaria Generale Spa", he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group and member of the Ayan-Holding Board. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d'Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: "A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title of "Honorable" of the Académie des Sciences de l'Institut de France

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East Asia

Twists and Turns in US -China Trade War

Gen. Shashi Asthana

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US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s stopover at Beijing on 08 October may not have been a pleasant experience, more so in the backdrop of accusation of US Vice President Pence about  China attempting to interfere in U.S. elections. The agenda of North Korean denuclearisation, where US and China were broadly agreeing earlier, seems to have taken a back seat, and improvement of relations doesn’t seem to be realistic in near future. The ongoing trade war continues as both sides dig their heels despite being the biggest trading partners of each other, because it is also linked with global dominance, strategic and military posturing, diplomatic and information offensive.

 China Braving Threat to its Vulnerabilities

China is putting a brave front despite being badly hit at some of its most vulnerable spots in the tit-for-tat trade war with both sides spiralling the slapping of tariffs on a wide range of each others’ trade items. Taiwan, which is another sensitivity of Beijing is witnessing visit of US officials after Taiwan Travel Act was signed by President Trump, with a promise to arm it further with latest weaponry. US continued military posturing in South China Sea, along with the appearance of UK warship ignoring Chinese repeated warning is another concern.   A recent injection of over $110 billion by China into its banks and hardly any financial benefits coming out of BRI partners incapable to repay anything is tightening its financial freedom for global dominance. Some of its BRI partners want to get out of the ‘Debt Trap’ by refusing/reducing Chinese investments is adversely affecting Chinese dream project (BRI), after five years of its announcement like Philippines.

Not a Smooth Sail for US

US on the other hand cannot be celebrating either, with China digging it heals and refusing to give up either in trade war or South China Sea. On North Korean front, the policy of good optics continues with Kim managing to get a lot of goodies from South Korea (presumably at their cost), during the last summit of North and South Korea. Kim in fact has been an outright winner, managing to get another Summit with President Trump, which helps him in convincing his countrymen of his sound leadership, as well as boosting his status internationally. US sanctions on paper continue, but after the chest thumping at Singapore Summit, his friends like China automatically relaxed the sanctions on North Korea, without any worthwhile denuclearisation/reduction in his nuclear/missile arsenal. US realises that knocking out China financially is the key to its global dominance; hence is unlikely to soften up to China. US also faces another challenge of keeping its allies like Japan and South Korea satisfied while negotiating with North Korea and asking ASEAN to make choices of partners, besides continuing with CAATSA hurting some of its strategic partners who could be helpful in balancing China.

It will take some time to see that whoever has greater resilience to withstand the economic stand-off and appetite to take setbacks will have an upper edge, which seems to be US at this point of time. As per IMF assessment, China’s GDP size will be 1.6 per cent lower in 2019 than it otherwise would be, if the US slaps tariffs on all Chinese imports.

How is India affected?

The Indian economy has survived some global slowdowns earlier and should be able to sail through the present one. The bigger problem is the sanction under CAATSA in dealing with Russia for urgently needed military hardware like S-400 and Iran for cheaper crude oil being paid in rupee terms, for which India has adequate refineries. The US option of buying shale oil does not suit India as it does not have adequate refineries and will have to purchase finished product in dollar terms. The port of Chabahar is also crucial for India for connectivity to Afghanistan and CAR. The silver lining is that US being our strategic partner will like to have well equipped Indian Forces to balance China and Indian connectivity to Afghanistan, in case Pakistan does not serve their strategic interest. On both counts I am hopeful that US will find a way out not to hurt its strategic partner.

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East Asia

The talks held in September 2018 between Kim Jong-Un and Moon Jae-In

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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In less than one year three meetings have been held between the North Korean Leader and the South Korean President, Moon Jae-In.

In the initial meeting the two leaders had decided to put an end to the state of war between their two countries. They had also reaffirmed the goal of denuclearization of the entire peninsula, with the consequent destruction of the nuclear potential of South Korea and of the United States, in particular. They also decided to create an inter-Korean Liason Office between the two sides of the Demilitarized Zone and to bring together the families dispersed between the two Koreas. Finally, the idea was to create new communication infrastructure – railway lines, in particular – a project by which Russia has always set great store.

Indeed, Russia is betting many of its cards on a reunification between the two Koreas, capable of enabling it to keep its excellent relations with South Korea – which are essential for the economy – and to also support North Korea, which is Russia’s unavoidable strategic goal.

Now the two Koreas are dealing on their own, without the US brokerage and intermediation with respect to South Korea, although President Donald J. Trump has recently stated that President Moon Jae-In is his official “delegate” for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The United States is scarcely interested in the internationalization of the North Korean economy. It only wants denuclearization, while Kim Jong-Un wants denuclearization to develop his country’s economy and maintain its geopolitical and national autonomy.

A serious problem – both in talks and in the final or working documents – is also to define an effective mechanism to check denuclearization.

Indeed, between September 17 and 19, 2018, the signing of the Joint Declaration of Pyongyang has not fully clarified the mechanism of checks on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Kim Jong-Un’s idea is to organise these checks with a series of “experts” appointed by the friendly powers, while the South Korean idea is to accept the maximum possible denuclearization to start the long process of reunification.

The two respective Defence Ministers, however -namely Song Young Moo for South Korea and Rho Kwang Chul for North Korea – have just signed a separate document from the rest of agreements.

In that text confidence-building measures between the parties are put first, with North Korea’s acceptance of dismantling a launch pad and a site for checking jet engines, with the presence of yet unspecified, but friendly international experts. From IAEA? We have some doubts, in this case.

Subsequently North Korea could also dismantle the Nongbyon site, if the United States does the same in South Korea.

It should also be recalled that most North Korean missiles are built to be launched by mobile vehicles, not from fixed bases.

In short, North Korea wants the United States to remove the nuclear umbrella protecting South Korea and Japan while, in the recent talks with North Korea, the United States thinks of a bilateral treaty regarding only the Korean peninsula and, at most, some classes of North Korean missiles.

In the US mind, the planned reduction of North Korean long-range missiles could be even equivalent to a nuclear and conventional decrease of its troops stationed in Guam.

On the basis of a new future agreement, both Koreas (and God only knows how and to what extent the North Korean conventional military potential would be useful for a South Korea unified with North Korea) would also define maritime and land buffer zones, as well as a no-fly zone over the old border, with a view to avoiding clashes or accidental air battles.

This is already partially clear, but much work shall be done to define all the details.

There would also be plans to cover or reduce artillery batteries along the coast.

Obviously, should these talks run aground, the only concrete political result would be the progressive divergence between South Korea and the United States, precisely on the problem of the peninsula’s denuclearization.

Furthermore, over and above the aforementioned sites, North Korea will dismantle the site of Dongchang-ri, in addition to the site of Yongbyon, while Kim Jong-Un is also very interested in the building of fast railway links between South and North Korea.

The two Koreas will get the industrial site of Kaesong back in shape and the old tourist project concerning Mount Kumgang back in track, besides planning new joint economic and tourist areas.

The inter-Korean agreement regards also collaboration for medical and environmental issues, as well as for the protection from epidemics.

In other words, both Koreas think of an economy of compensation between them, which could also develop at a later stage and become a need for the development of both countries.

An economic-political symbiosis that could get the United States out of play and later reinstate Russia, which is increasingly interested in the South Korean economy, as well as finally favour China, which has no intention of leaving the Korean peninsula to the hegemony of North Korea alone.

At the end of the Treaty, there is also the project of a joint participation in the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games and a joint candidature for the 2032 Olympics.

A few days ago, North Korea also expressed its intention to join the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – a sign that the internationalization of the North Korean economy is now a certainty.

Hence it is a de facto peace treaty between the two Koreas.

If North Korea continues along this line, it is very likely that South Korea will gain a tactical advantage over the sea while, if the relations between South Korea and the United States remain as they currently are, there should be no significant changes in bilateral relations between the USA and South Korea.

However, what is the current state of relations between the United States and North Korea?

In fact, while the inter-Korean relations are all in the framework of effective confidence-building measures, the clear purpose of the fourth round of talks between the two Korean leaders is to preserve a strong US engagement in the whole negotiation process.

Kim Jong-Un wants to engage the United States for his global economic projection and he certainly does not want to remain tied to a regional economy, albeit open and “reformed” according to China’s rules.

For North Korea, the procedure is simple: at first, bilateral talks with the US support for South Korea; later peace between the two Koreas and finally what is only interesting for the USA, namely denuclearization.

It is not even unlikely that the United States does not accept this timing, but it is also unlikely that it realizes the strategic and economic aspects of this timing.

North Korea wants a fundamental agreement with South Korea because: a) it is an unavoidable asset for the modernization of its economy; b) it is the fundamental strategic factor to have the support of both Russia and China, who want to avoid North Korea’s hegemony over the peninsula, but also want to keep it as a rampart for US forces in South Korea; c) it is only through South Korea that North Korea will eventually be in a position to be connected to the Chinese maritime economic and strategic system and reach up to the Mediterranean.

In fact, if the relations between the United States and North Korea improve further, the site of Yongbyon could be dismantled definitively.

Hence currently Kim Jong-Un wants to thoroughly test the US goodwill, rather than South Korea’s goodwill, in developing a long or very long-term peace policy.

In Kim Jong-Un’s mind, there is in fact a key factor: the US behaviour in the phase in which Muammar Gaddafi accepted its proposal to dismantle his nuclear project.

Kim Jong-Un thinks that not even the story of Saddam Hussein is a guarantee for the US long-term reliability and for the stability of its leaders’ word of honour.

This is the real important factor in the strategy of the North Korean Leader.

Moreover, the US immediate reactions to the last meeting between the two Korean leaders have been fast and positive, both by President Trump and by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

And North Korea’s autonomous foreign policy has been seen also recently, with the 70th Anniversary military parade.

North Korea’s military parade and its important national celebration, was attended by Li Zhansu, ranking third in the internal power hierarchy of the Communist Party of China (CPC); by Valentina Matviyenko, President of the Russian Federal Council, the third elected office in the Russian Federation; by a very significant figure, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, President of Mauritania, and finally by Hilal al Hilal, deputy-General Secretary of the Syrian Baath Party.

With peace, North Korea will significantly develop its already multiple economic and political relations with Africa, which will be essential for its new economic development.

At the military parade staged on September 9, there were also authorities from Iran, South Africa and Singapore – which is the never forgotten model of the Chinese “Four Modernizations” -as well as other 60 delegations from “friendly” countries.

At economic level, in August, shortly before the big military parade of the 70th Anniversary, there was the International Fair of Razon, which hosted as many as 114 companies of which 52 North Korean ones.

The North Korean product lines mainly included pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs, textiles, electronics and cosmetics.

However, there were many Chinese large companies selling their products in North Korea despite the UN sanctions.

As from September 17, there was also the Autumn Fair which brought together 320 commercial companies from Russia, New Zealand, Australia and China.

This is in fact the new paradigm of North Korea’s foreign policy.

The dollar has also grown in the exchanges with the North Korean currency, both on the official and on the “parallel” markets.

If all goes well at geopolitical level, the North Korean project will be to further improve its light industry, in addition to the diversification and quantity of products, with a view to trying its own autonomous way on the market world, as was the way of the nuclear system.

It should be recalled that this was also Kim Il-Sung’s project.

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China’s Imprint underneath the Pyongyang Joint Declaration

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On September 18, the leaders of two Koreas met each other in Pyongyang, the capital of the DPRK. The world media focused on the meeting during which the two sides issued the “Pyongyang Joint Declaration”. If we see the Panmunjom Declaration serving as the cornerstone of the dialogue between two Korea, it is necessary to say that this joint declaration took a substantial step to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula that is vital to the regional peace and beyond.

Literally speaking, the Pyongyang joint declaration highlighted the key issues as follows. First, both sides are determined to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Second, they will work together to improve their relations with a view to the existing state of war, as the defense chiefs from the DPRK and ROK earlier signed a comprehensive agreement aiming to reduce tensions on the peninsula. Third, they will promote the peace talk process of the Korean peninsula. Given that Kim pledged to work toward the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”, it would be seen as a political declaration that would mark a starting point for peace negotiations. If all goes well, a peace treaty would be sealed and then comes normalization of DPRK-US relations after it achieves complete denuclearization.

As a close neighbor to the Korean Peninsula, China always supports the DPRK and ROK as well in improving their relations through dialogue and consultation and promoting reconciliation and cooperation. This is the consistent and persistent position of Beijing, which has been playing a responsible role in politically resolving the Korean Peninsula issue and achieving the long-standing peace of the region.

In effect, prior to the leaders of two Korea met each other this week in Pyongyang, they have closely contacted their respective allies or strategic partners. Among them is China, dealing with both sides – Pyongyang and Seoul – in a unique way. It is true that China is the largest trading partner of the ROK while it is equally the only legal ally of the DPRK as well as its largest ideological partner now. If we review the bilateral relations between China and North Korea since last March, Kim Jr. has paid three significant, though unofficial, visits to President Xi of China. For example, during his March 25-28 visit, both sides vowed to continue their traditional solidarity in terms of their shared ideologies and common strategic interests. Xi especially proposed to strengthen the close ties between the two ruling parties. As he said to Kim, “party-to-party and state-to-state relations are the common treasure to both sides. And safeguarding, consolidating and developing China – DPRK relations are unswerving guidelines for China’s foreign policy and security strategy.

During his second meeting with Xi in Dalian summer resort, Kim vowed to terminate all the nuclear tests and to follow denuclearization if the United States took corresponding measures with good wishes. Then following his meeting with Trump in Singapore on June 12, Kim came to Beijing again on 19 to meet his Chinese counterpart. Xi confirmed China’s “3-no change” policy towards the DPRK, that is, political solidarity between the two parties remains unchanged, the friendship between the two peoples remains unchanged, and China’s support of a socialist Korea remains unchanged. Essentially, they serve as the foundation of the strategic consensus between Beijing and Pyongyang. In return, Kim reiterated his permanent shutdown of all nuclear tests and facilities if the US would respond sincerely and responsibly.

Given all the analysis above, it is understandable to conclude that China’s long-standing adherence to the goal of denuclearization of the Peninsula through dialogue and consultation is fully reflected in the Pyongyang Declaration. Meanwhile, China’s stance remains evident since it claims that the Korean issue must be resolved eventually by the Korean people rather than any external power. Therefore, peace not force is the only acceptable way. Also, as China and Russia have repeated that no coercive change of the regime by outside power is tolerated, North Korea can be confident and comfortable to proceed the permanent shutdown of the missile engine test site with international experts observing; and then a complete denuclearization is not too far in the future.

Here is necessary to argue that China has never claimed to play an exclusive role in the Korean Peninsula. Instead of that, China has always encouraged the DPRK to talk to the United States and other relevant parties. Since Kim has agreed to make a trip to Seoul for further talks and to meet the US high-ranking officials in Pyongyang soon, the summit between Kim and Moon marks a leap forward toward peace.

Yet, as the lessons in history show, it is better to approach realistically the Korean issue simply because it has involved too complicated concerns and memories and the overlapped interests. Therefore, we should be ready to accept trial and challenges lying ahead. China has insisted on diplomacy which means that all parties concerned should be brought to the negotiating table under the mandate of the UN Security Council.

Now, Beijing has navigated the course of denuclearization proactively to protect two sides’ common core security stakes when Kim reportedly promised to give up his nuclear program if the United States and South Korea respond to his proposal with good will. Due to this reason, China will do what it can to help ensure “no change of regime by force and denuclearization at the same time in the Korean Peninsula”. This is China’s influence or Beijing’s imprint on the Korean denuclearization issue and the regional peace.

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