[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] T [/yt_dropcap]he outgoing President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, won re-election in the first round by garnering over 56% of the vote. Rouhani won with 14,619,848 votes on a total number of voters equal to 25,966,729 accounting for 53,6% of total votes.
The difference between the two figures is related to the so-called panachage, namely voting for candidates from different parties instead of those from the set list of a party, and the votes cast for his regional lists.
However, the main loser is Ebrahim Raisi, an eminent cleric of the Shiite clergy.
In addition to Raisi, the other challengers – initially 1,636 candidates had decided to run for election, but they were soon reduced to six, after the vetting and approval of the Guardian Council – were Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the mayor of Tehran who dropped out of the race before the opening of the polling stations; the former Minister of Culture, Mostafa Agha Mirsalim; the former vice-President of the Republic, Mostafa Hashemitaba, and the current vice-President, Eshaq Jahangiri.
They are complex and, anyway, remarkable figures: besides being mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf was Chief of Police from 2000 to 2005 and formerly Commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ Air Force from 1997 to 2000.
Qalibaf holds a Ph. D. in political geography and was also Managing-Director of Khatam al-Anbia, an engineering firm directly owned and controlled by the Pasdaran, namely the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
He had run also in the previous presidential elections, but his project – today as at that time – was to federate all conservative oppositions under his leadership and propose the creation of the Ministry for Foreign Trade.
Proposing a new Ministry to solve a problem is never the right solution.
Subjecting foreign policy to the economy is his most common trait, even in the propaganda of his group, namely the “Progress and Justice Population of Islamic Iran”.
Mostafa Mirsalim got only 1.17% of the votes.
He studied and had a long professional career as an engineer in France. He returned to Iran at the outbreak of Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution, thus becoming Chief of the National Police in 1979. He was proposed by the then President Banisadr as a candidate for Prime Minister as a compromise candidate acceptable to both Banisadr and the Majilis, namely the Parliament, dominated by the Islamic Republican Party.
A political story halfway between the pro-Western “Shiite Republic”, the offspring of Banisadr and the nationalistic-modernizing thrusts present in the 1979 revolution, and the identity-based and Shiite restoration – all the more so that Mirsalim was later adviser to Ali Khamenei for long time.
He served as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guide from 1994 to 1998. His tenure was characterized by a strongly conservative Islamist direction, aiming to stave off the “cultural onslaught of Western culture” in Iran. He was later appointed to the Expediency Discernment Council, a body set up to resolve differences or conflicts between the Council of Experts and the Parliament.
Besides being vice-President, Hashemitaba is Minister of Industries and Head of the Iranian Olympic Committee.
He is described as having “centrist” views – as we would say in the West – and he is co-founder of the “Executives of Construction Party”, a grouping linked to Rafsanjani.
During the election campaign Hashemitaba focused mainly on environmental protection and agricultural reform.
Jahangiri was the first vice-President of Rouhani’s government and also served as Minister of Industries and Mines between 1997 and 2005 under President Khatami. Formerly he had been Governor of Isfahan Province and a member of Parliament for two terms.
He graduated in physics and later also acquired a Ph. D. in Business Management.
Having garnered many reformist votes in the 2013 elections, he decided to run again for Presidency, in connection with the area close to Rafsanjani, Khatami and to the current winner of the election.
Raisi is a Shiite cleric, as well as custodian and Chairman of the Astan Quds Razavi foundation, the Bonyad or autonomous charitable foundation managing the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad – a foundation worth 210 billion US dollars a year.
Raisi served in several positions in Iran’s judicial system and is also a member of the Assembly of Experts from South Khorasan Province.
He run for Presidency in the 2017 elections as leader of the “Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces”, a recent alliance founded in 2016 by twenty-five groups of the conservative spectrum.
Since 1979, however, all Iran’s Presidents have been re-elected and Rouhani can boast two clear successes: inflation, which has fallen from 40% to 10%, and the GDP growth, which is currently equal to + 4.6%.
For the re-elected President the current problematic issues are above all the P5 + 1 agreement, which has been implemented only partially and with the old sanctions still largely in place, as well as the new tension with President Trump, who aims at playing the Sunnis off against the Shiites for a possible new conflict marginalizing Iran. Finally another problematic issue is Iran’s strategic stability, with conflicts in Khuzestan and attacks on Pakistan’s border.
Hence the cards Raisi could play during the electoral campaign were precisely security, the Shiite national and religious unity, as well as the sense of defeat looming large on Iran considering the probable future failure of the P5 + 1 nuclear agreement.
Hence, in a country where the average age is 31 and over 50% the population was born after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, young voters have not chosen the identity-based, nationalistic and anti-Western platform of Raisi, a man of Khamenei and his likely successor as Supreme Leader.
At electoral level, the struggle was between the front supporting continuity of relations with the West and the front of close-mindedness, which is witnessing Trump’s new policy in the Middle East.
An old-fashioned policy aiming at confrontation with Iran managed by the Sunnis and Israel, with a likely “small war” between Israel and Hezbollah in the coming months and a major clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the coming years.
It is no coincidence that during the electoral campaign Raisi criticized the cutting down to size of the Iranian nuclear system and pointed an accusing finger at “Westerners’ untrustworthiness”.
As already said, however, Rouhani can boast his economic achievements: in addition to the data and statistics already reported, the “reformist” presidential system (indeed, we still use these silly definitions) has led economic growth to 12.5% and has reduced youth unemployment to 30%.
The outgoing President showed some signs of weakness last Sunday when the presidential car was stoned by angry miners due to an accident that had killed 42 of their workmates. However, one-third of the Iranian voters live in cities where Rouhani is still very popular and where the electoral turnover is 40%.
In smaller cities, where the Shiite clergy is still very powerful, the electoral turnover rises to 90% and tends to favour the religious and conservative right parties.
The Revolutionary Guards, which are partly a group of conscripts, have certainly favoured Raisi, but this does not necessarily mean that the policy line, based on anti-Western and revolutionary purity and opposed to the JCPOA nuclear agreement, is fully shared by the Pasdaran.
On their press they have already defined Raisi as “Ayatollah” and there are pictures of Iranian soldiers in Syria who praise the cleric of Mashhad. Meanwhile, however, Rouhani has included many members of the intelligence services in his staff and has “purged” many elements coming from the Pasdaran.
Khamenei has strongly favoured Raisi, also during the election campaign, but here the real issue is another: what is the electoral and economic value of the JCPOA and can it solve Iran’s productive and hence political crisis?
The Conservatives, who, in some of their regions – like it or not – have accepted the P5 + 1 and the JCPOA agreement are posing one single question: while it largely solves our economic problems, what is the cost of the lack of security resulting therefrom?
Moreover, if the agreement had no decisive impact on the Iranian economy, only the geopolitical and strategic damage to its security would remain.
Nevertheless, apart from the fact that paradoxically the Revolutionary Guards’ companies have much benefited from the JCPOA, the real problem is the natural and obvious low pace of its effects on the Iranian economy.
In the six months following the signature of the nuclear agreement, Iran regained access to 4.2 billion US dollars of frozen funds abroad and increased its exports by approximately 7 billion US dollars.
Again in the period following the JCPOA agreement, oil exports increased by 400,000 barrels/day, with 5 billion US dollars of revenue gains.
Moreover the government’s economic plan, voted early this year, envisages 30 billion new foreign investment, as well as other foreign direct investment and domestic investment, while it is worth noting that only 4 billion US dollars were available for investment at the time of sanctions.
It should also be recalled that Iran has acquired a 2.8% shareholding of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Banks, however, are the real weak point of Iran’s economic system.
The central bank’s scarce liquidity – for obvious anti-inflationary reasons – many non-performing loans, non-homogeneous banking practices, corruption and, in short, a banking system which remained isolated from the rest of the world for many years and currently has no longer the faintest idea of the extent to which finance and banking have changed.
Just think that in 2012 all the thirty Iranian banks were disconnected from SWIFT, and still today, after the partial lifting of sanctions, many Iranian credit institutions face difficulties in using the system of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications.
Furthermore, for the sole purpose of upgrading the extractive industry, Iranian experts deem it necessary to invest over 100 billion US dollars.
Hence, if it goes on like this, amidst objective difficulties and the Saudi and Sunni rearmament, the Iranian population who, according to opinion polls, initially strongly supported the JCPOA (42.7%) will see its enthusiasm dampen, as is currently the case (22.3%).
27% of the Iranian population thinks that Rouhani’s bad management is one of the causes of the economic crisis, while 45% of the Iranian population blames the external conditions that are not under the new President’s direct control.
Furthermore, the increase in oil exports has been largely neutralised by the fall in the oil barrel price.
The non-oil Iranian product, however, will rise by less than 3% a year, while Rouhani’s primary goal is to cut inflation – hence he will not support the State’s deficit spending, which is largely direct or hidden welfare.
Hence, at mass level, the psychological and propaganda mechanism which has emerged in the presidential election is increasing pessimism about the JCPOA economic effects and the feeling of strategic weakness in the face of new threats to Iran’s security, over and above mistrust of the way in which the West seems to want to do everything to destabilize, marginalize and impoverish the Iranian people.
Rouhani has found the Iranian masses still relatively optimistic about economic growth and Iran’s opening to the rest of the world, but if this did not happen the Conservatives would regain power quickly.
The question is rhetorical: hence, what is in our interest, both in Italy and in Europe?
Back to Strategic Hedging and Mediation in Qatar Foreign Policy after the Gulf Reconciliation
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt ended the land, air and sea blockade on Qatar last January. While the way how the crisis ended revealed the control of the Saudi and Emirati decision-makers on the evolution of the issue, the process of isolation by its GCC neighbors reconstructed Qatar foreign policy within a loss of trust mode and directed the Qatari decision-makers to question the country’s hedging strategy in the region. Following the reconciliation in January 2021, Qatar seems to practice its mediation policy again at the regional conflicts beside bringing back to the hedging strategy towards Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The blockade, which lasted three years and half, since the June 2017 increased the level of distrust of the Qatari decision-makers to the regional states, and to realize the significance of strengthening Qatar’s regional security standing and international status. While economic wealth helped the country to utilize the outcomes of the blockade for political purposes, it pushed the country to establish, or strengthen, relations with alternative allies and economic partners, particularly Iran and Turkey.
Strategic hedging, as a concept developed after the Cold War period in contrast to the bandwagoning, balancing or buck-passing, has been the major foreign policy tool of Qatar as a small state aware of its security needs. It illustrated the Qatar’s aim of finding a middle ground while insuring the potential security risks of the regional actors to its national security. By hedging the risky adversaries,namely Saudi Arabia and Iran, in the region, Qatar avoided a security dilemma and minimized the risks of being threatened.The Qatar foreign policy discourse revealed not only cooperative elements but also the confrontational ones which gradually paved the way forSaudi Arabia and the allies to build a rationale to imply blockade on the country in June 2017.
Prior to the 2017 crisis, hedging strategy helped Qatar to compensate its smallness and offset the potential security threats from Iran. Qatar had signed a security cooperation agreement with Iran in December 2010 including the exchange of specialized and technical committees, expand cooperation in training and naval exercises, as well as conducting joint campaigns against terrorism and insecurity in the region. Beside cooperating with Iran at the security and economy fields, Qatar avoided to challenge Saudi Arabia and shared the common regional security worries of the GCC towards Iran. It aimed at balancing its relations between these two regional powers and at the same time remaining neutral as much as it can by employing a discourse of mediation as a foreign policy tool.
While simultaneously positioning itself alongside the GCC, Qatar decision-makers gave credits to keeping ties with Iran. Qatar allowed Turkey to open a Turkish military base in its territory even before the crisis. While already securing its national security through a US military air base, Qatar’s decision for opening a Turkish military base was highly criticized by its GCC neighbors and its removal became one of the demands of Saudi Arabia and the allies to end the blockade. Qatar’s decision to boost domestic defense capabilities was understandable to enhance its security during the crisis. Resuming its dialogue with Iran helped Qatar to maintain the peaceful development of the natural-gas fields of Qatar shared with Iran. Moreover, getting militarily, economically and politically close to Turkey allowed the country to diversify its military dependency from the US and the Europe. At the domestic sphere, the economic wealth helped Qatar to survive and keep the Qataris more attached to the regional desires of the country, during the crisis, all of which worked for breaking free from the Saudi influence on the foreign policy decisions of Qatar.
The GCC crisis was an opportunity for Iran to present itself as an alternative ally to Qatar than the GCC members which was observed in the enhancement of the Iranian export to the country as well as Iran’s decision to allow the Qatar airways to operate by Iranian airspace. In 2017, the Iranian exports to Qatar was $250 million,$225.25 million in 2018, and $214.17 million in 2019, according to the United Nations database. China also upgraded its security partnership including selling military technical exports, major importer of LNG of Qatar.
As a result ofregionally being isolated, Qatar had a break from hedging strategy in the region while callingSaudi Arabia and the allies for a diplomatic dialogue to solve their problems. The crisis raised the sense of respect to state sovereignty at Qatar foreign policy, and eventually increased the loss of trust at the perception of the Qatari decision-makers towards the GCC members. Ironically, the chronicsecurity threat perception of Qatar towards Iran was replaced with the distrust to Saudi Arabia and the Emirates at security realm.
The crisis enabled Qatar to gainmore security and influence in the region than before as a small state. As the regional conjuncture does not promise to go back to the conditions in pre-Gulf period giventhe more multifacedregional threats, Qatar became aware of the fact that it cannot rely on the GCC or the US alone military and economically. Hence, it announced the resume of its dialogues and cooperation with Iran which signaled the continuity of the hedging strategy of the Qatar foreign policy. Despite this strategy can be considered as part of escaping the possibility of new threats from Iran,it works for undermining the regional power of both Saudi Arabia and Iran through economic, diplomatic and institutional instruments.
In post-reconciliation period, it seems that Qatar manages to gain a high degree of freedom of sovereign action within the GCC. This helps Qatar to maintain its strategic interests and decide with whom to cooperate at the times of crisis or peace. Qatar is more aware of the impact of the structural features of power in domestic politics and regional security, hence pays importance to build counter alliances towards its neighbors at the same time cooperating with them, and without challenging them rhetorically or materially. The Gulf reconciliation did not weaken the Iran’s potential ally status to Qatar, in contrary, Qatar announced that it will keep Iran in the game and, moreover, willing to mediate with Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Qatar is not anymore looking for minimizing threats to its stability and survive in the multipolar dynamics of the region. The decision-makersarenow motivated to pursue the Qatar’s own strategic interests, and mediate Saudi Arabi and Iran, Iran and the US, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Qatarwould to like to achieve the rewards of its bilateral military and economic establishments during the blockade over the changing attitude of the Gulf neighbors towards its rights as a sovereign state beside strengthening its regional status and international standing. As the al-Ula GCC summit in January was far from directly addressing the major roots of the Gulf crisis, it is exposed to give birthto the new conflicts at the foreign policy and regional security perception of the states at different shapes, and pave the way for the Qatari decision-makers to present the country as a mediator of the region again.
A little acknowledged clause may be main obstacle to revival of Iran nuclear accord
A little acknowledged provision of the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program explains jockeying by the United States and the Islamic republic over the modalities of a US return to the deal from which President Donald J. Trump withdrew.
The provision’s magic date is 2023, when the Biden administration if it returns to the agreement, would have to seek Congressional approval for the lifting or modification of all US nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.
Both the administration and Iran recognize that Congressional approval is likely to be a tall order, if not impossible, given bi-partisan US distrust, animosity, and suspicion of the Islamic republic.
As a result, the United States and Iran have different objectives in negotiating a US return to the accord.
The Biden administration is attempting to engineer a process that would allow it to sidestep the 2023 hurdle as well as ensure a negotiation that would update the six-year-old deal, limit Iran’s controversial ballistic missiles program and halt Iranian support for non-state actors in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.
A pro-longed negotiation would allow President Joe Biden to focus Congress on his domestic legislative agenda without Iran being a disruptive detraction.
Mr. Biden “needs something to get beyond 2023. So, he wants a process that would take a number of steps that could take…a number of years to accomplish. During that time, the United States could ease some sanctions… These small things along the way could happen in a process but the key is going to be to have a process that allows the Biden administration to draw this out for some time,” said former State Department and National Security Council official Hillary Mann Leverett.
An extended process would, moreover, make it easier for Mr. Biden to convince America’s sceptical Middle Eastern partners – Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – that a return to the deal is the right thing to do.
Mr. Biden sought to reassure its partners that, unlike Mr. Trump, he would stand by the US commitment to their defence with this week’s missile attack on an Iranian-backed Shiite militia base in Syria. The strike was in response to allegedly Iranian-backed militia attacks on US targets in Iraq as well as the firing of projectiles against Saudi Arabia reportedly from Iraqi territory.
The US attack also served notice to Iran that it was dealing with a new administration that is more committed to its international commitments and multilateralism as well as a revival of the nuclear agreement but not at any price.
The administration has reinforced its message by asking other countries to support a formal censure of Iran over its accelerating nuclear activities at next week’s meeting in Vienna of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) board of governors.
The United States wants the IAEA to take Iran to task for stepping up production of nuclear fuel in violation of the nuclear accord and stalling the agency’s inquiries into the presence of uranium particles at undeclared sites.
While risking a perilous military tit-for-tat with Iran, the US moves are likely to reinforce Iranian domestic and economic pressures, in part in anticipation of the 2023 milestone, to seek an immediate and unconditional US return to the accord and lifting of sanctions.
Pressure on the Iranian government to secure immediate tangible results is compounded by a public that is clamouring for economic and public health relief and largely blames government mismanagement and corruption rather than harsh US sanctions for the country’s economic misery and inability to get the pandemic under control.
The sanctions were imposed after Mr. Trump withdrew from the nuclear accord in 2018.
The pressure is further bolstered by the fact that recent public opinion polls show that the public, like the government, has little faith in the United States living up to its commitments under a potentially revived nuclear deal.
The results suggest that neither the government nor the Iranian public would have confidence in a process that produces only a partial lifting of sanctions. They also indicated a drop of support for the deal from more than 75 per cent in 2015 to about 50 per cent today.
Two-thirds of those polled opposed negotiating restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program as well as its support for regional proxies even if it would lead to a lifting of all sanctions.
Public opinion makes an Iranian agreement to negotiate non-nuclear issues in the absence of a broader effort to restructure the Middle East’s security architecture that would introduce arms controls for all as well as some kind of non-aggression agreement and conflict management mechanism a long shot at best.
Among Middle Eastern opponents of the nuclear agreement, Israel is the country that has come out swinging.
The country’s chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, last month rejected a return to the deal and signalled that Israel would keep its military options on the table. Mr. Kochavi said he had ordered his armed forces to “to prepare a number of operational plans, in addition to those already in place.”
Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Gilad Erdan, suggested a couple of weeks later that his country may not engage with the Biden administration regarding Iran if it returns to the nuclear agreement.
“We will not be able to be part of such a process if the new administration returns to that deal,” Mr. Erdan said.
By taking the heat, Israel’s posturing shields the Gulf states who have demanded to be part of any negotiation from exposing themselves to further US criticism by expressing explicit rejection of Mr. Biden’s policy.
To manage likely differences with Israel, the Biden administration has reportedly agreed to reconvene a strategic US-Israeli working group on Iran created in 2009 during the presidency of Barak Obama. Chaired by the two countries’ national security advisors, the secret group is expected to meet virtually in the next days.
It was not immediately clear whether the Biden administration was initiating similar consultations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
In a confusing twist, Israel has attracted attention to its own officially unacknowledged nuclear weapons capacity by embarking on major construction at its Dimona reactor that was captured by satellite photos obtained by the Associated Press.
Some analysts suggested that Israel’s hard line rejection of the Biden administration’s approach may be designed to distract attention from upgrades and alterations it may be undertaking at the Dimona facility.
“If you’re Israel and you are going to have to undertake a major construction project at Dimona that will draw attention, that’s probably the time that you would scream the most about the Iranians,” said non-proliferation expert Jeffrey Lewis.
Will the New Interim Government Lead Libya Out Of A Long-Standing Crisis?
Last week, February 17, Libyans celebrated the 10th anniversary of the revolution that ousted the long time leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The decade that followed the violent change of power has not brought Libya any closer to the desired outcome. Instead, the country plunged into endless wars and economic turmoil, the consequences of which did not cease to plague Libya until recently.
In June 2020, after the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the forces loyal to the Government of National Accord (GNA) de facto established a ceasefire, the United Nations intensified its peacekeeping efforts to resume the political process. Jump started by Stephanie Williams, interim head of the UN Support Mission in Libya, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum paved the way for a step-by-step solution to the impasse in which Libya has found itself after almost a year and a half of non-stop hostilities. From the first meeting in Tunisia in early November of 2020 up to the last one held in Geneva this February, 75 forum members representing the Libyan society in its entirety have been working to determine the fate of the war-weary nation.
Finally, to the great surprise of many foreign observers familiar with the Libyan agenda, the forum participants managed to agree with little effort on the lists of potential candidates for positions in a transitional government, which is supposed to replace both rival administrations in Tripoli and Al-Bayda. By doing this, the representatives actually accomplished two main tasks: filling in the vacuum of legitimacy of the GNA conditioned by the expiration of the Skhirat agreement, as well as ending the vicious struggle for power, putting the implementation of reform under international supervision.
Its worth noting that the winning list of candidates comprised of the chairman of the Presidential Council (PC), his two deputies, and prime minister, appeared to be starkly different from the expectations of many. The vote gave victory to politicians with little fame not only among foreign pundits, but even Libyans themselves. Muhammad Younis Al-Manfi, a former diplomat, became the head of the PC, while Abdullah Al-Lafi and Musa Al-Quni took over as his deputies. In turn, Abdelhamid Al-Dabaiba, a prominent Libyan businessman hailing from an influential family of the city of Misurata, was appointed as prime minister. Al-Dabaiba is supposed to oversee the appointment of ministers and the formation of the so-called government of national unity, which will lead Libya to the national elections scheduled for December 24.
Holding general elections is the primary mission of the new government, along with the reform of the armed forces, which mainly implies their unification, as well as the disarmament and elimination of illegal armed groups. In order to fulfill this ambitious task, something their predecessors failed to do since 2015, the current leaders of the interim government should make every effort, keeping in mind that any manifestation of bias or flirtation with foreign powers at the expense of the aspirations of the nation can annihilate all achieved progress and spark the conflict anew.
These considerations must at all times remain at the top of the agenda of the transitional authorities, since many influential domestic players appear to be not fully satisfied with the current distribution of power and the appointment of undesirable persons to senior positions. Among these undesirables is a native of Misurata Abdelhamid Al-Dabaiba. After the 2011 revolution, the city exploited the seaport and ready access to the state budget to achieve a virtual independence, building an army of numerous and well-equipped militias. It is generally accepted that it was the Misurati groups that made a deciding contribution to lifting the blockade on Tripoli in 2020 and forcing Khalifa Haftar to withdraw his troops from western Libya. The election of Al-Dabaiba was only logical, as it represents an outcome of the conflict that ended in favor of a coalition where Misurata played a key role.
There is another circumstance that could potentially cause a démarche of the elites in eastern Libya, who still remember the bitterness of defeat. The Al-Dabaiba family has close ties with the Turkish leadership and personally President Erdogan. In particular, Ali Al-Dabaiba, cousin of the new prime minister Abdulhamid Al-Dabaiba and once mayor of the city of Misurata (1989-2011), who headed the Organisation for Development of Administrative Centers (ODAC) and granted Turkish companies 19 billion dollars in Libyan construction contracts during his tenure. The issue of Turkeys involvement still constitutes a main obstacle for normalizing relations between parties to the conflict. Ankara actively supported the GNA in the fight against the LNA, sending thousands of mercenaries, military equipment and advisers to Libya. The LNA repeatedly listed the withdrawal of the Turkish forces as a condition for national reconciliation. In addition, Ali Al-Dabaiba has almost succeeded in subversion of the work of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in Tunisia, after he attempted to bribe its participants to make them vote for his cousin. This incident provoked uproar from the Libyan public, forcing the UN to open an investigation into the forum members.
In this regard, Prime Minister Abdelhamid Al-Dabaiba along other officials of the newly formed government will face a difficult challenge of meeting the expectations of the Libyan people and the international community. Although the recent reforms of governmental organs did not actually change the balance of power, keeping those loyal to the established allies of the GNA within the leadership structure, they sidelined the existing differences between the warring parties, allowing to prolong the fragile truce and relaunch the political process.
In the nearest future Libya’s current leaders should make it their priority to minimize the dictate of Turkey or the West, and, if possible, prevent their further interference, as well as maintain the transparency of the interim government before the general elections. Even the slightest retreat from neutrality and independence, two principles the new head of Presidency Council Mohammed Al-Manfi appear to be keen on upholding, may entail catastrophic consequences and lead to an indefinite delay in settling the Libyan conflict.
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