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From the Golden Age to Natural Partner: Belt and Road Initiative forging Sino-UK relationship

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Authors: Zhou Dong-chen and Du Hui-yan

[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] A [/yt_dropcap]lthough Brexit was already a fait accompli, the British chancellor Philip Hammond has called for closer economic ties with China as Britain enters a new post-Brexit era. As early as in 2015 when Chinese President Xi Jin-ping made his first state visit to the United Kingdom, which ushered a “golden age” to bilateral relations, the two great powers declared their consensus in working together with all Belt and Road project partners.

Later, Prime Minister Theresa May further indicated that Belt and Road Initiative would create a productive and prospective platform for the two sides’ cooperation. Following that, Britain became the first major Western power to joint as a full member of the AIIB and the second largest contributor after China to inject capital into the AIIB special fund. As Chinese ambassador Liu Xiao-ming said recently, “these moves speak to British people of daring to take lead and Britain’s farsightedness and truly global vision. Given this, speaking at the start of a summit in Beijing celebrating President Xi’s “Belt & Road Initiative, Hammond heaped praise on his hosts and stated that Britain was a “natural partner” for China as it pushed ahead with a massive infrastructure campaign some called the most ambitious plan in history. As this year marks the 45th anniversary of China – UK ambassadorial diplomatic relations, it is necessary to explore the significance of the Sino-Britain co-operation for the reasons as follows in the context of the post- Brexit era.

Historically, Britain was the first global power in modern history in a sense that so far there have been 1/3 population or most states of the world taking English either as their official language or use it as a required business, commercial and legal language. China is no exception. Also because Britain was one of the four foreign powers profoundly affecting China’s modern destiny along with the United States, Russia (The Soviet Union) and Japan, the rise of China has been driven by the combined forces of its ancient glory and modern shame. Although on opposing sides of the Cold War, both countries were allies during World War II, and are members of the United Nations and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Actually, Britain is the also first major power of the West recognizing the P.R.C. as the government of China in 1950 and posted a charge d’ affaires ad interim in Beijing from 1954 until 1972 when China accords full recognition to HMG, permitting the exchange of ambassadors. Despite the vicissitudes of the Cold War politics, various efforts were made to facilitate understanding from both parties through trade and governmental visits. For example, in 1954 a British Labour Party delegation including Clement Attlee visited China at the invitation of Premier Zhou Enlai, followed by the Sino-British trade committee formed as semi-official trade body (later merged with the Group of 48). From 1961 on, the UK began to vote in the General Assembly for Beijing’s seat in the UN, though it had abstained on votes since 1950. Given this, China obviously seeks to work with Britain in order to set course for strategic ties now in the name of “comprehensive strategic partnership of the 21st century”.

Internationally, China and Britain are not only the UN founders but also have shared the common interests in preserving “Yalta Agreement” and “Potsdam Declaration” that are seen as the cornerstones of the post-WWII world system. Although it is not involved into the disputes between China and Japan, the British government has highlighted its position on the Belt and Road Initiative proposed by China with the announcement that it has become a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) that is surely a remarkable milestone in the bilateral relations between the two major powers of the world today. This mutual tie aims to argue for the multiple world order which should be built upon a consensus on the cooperation among all the states and anti-hegemony of any single power or power bloc. As Hammond said recently, “I welcome Belt and Road Initiative as an opportunity to strengthen our economic tie, as our two countries have a long and rich trading history.” As the nationalism and the trade protectionism gained their strength worldwide especially in US in the past few years, the two political and economic power–Britain and China should cooperate to defend the ideology and practice of free trade and Paris Climate Agreement through bilateral communication channel and multilateral inter-governmental organizations such as UN, WTO, IMF and AIIB to ensure longer-term sustainable development for the world.

Strategically, Britain has been able to maintain“special relations” with the United States which is what Europeans still occasionally refer to as “Anglo—Saxon” powers. Besides having a large number of cultural ties between the two sides, they have habitually concerned not just with the balance of power in one particular corner of the world but with the evolution of what we today call “world order”. Due to this, both Britain and the US are more interested in promoting business and trade globally, a world-wide system of trade and finance/investment which has been proposed by China would be able to extend huge benefits to Britain, as “our ambition is for more trade, not less trade, and China clearly share this ambition”, as Hammond argued. True, as China is the largest rising power, it is wise to understand Britain’s relations with the United States, simply due to the fact that the Anglo-American bloc is the ruling power of the world today. Obviously, it is a correct approach diplomatically and a political wisdom to deepen strategic tie between China and Britain. Closer relationship between Britain and China casts no threat to the existing “Anglo-Saxon” special relations. China does not aim at overturning the US-UK ally and current world order but simply involving itself in. With China’s involvement and influence, the existing order will become stronger.

Undoubtedly, regarding the bilateral relations between the two sides, there are still serious issues between China and Britain in foreign affairs, such as the human rights, democracy in Hong Kong and other concerns involved. However, in terms of the conventional and non-conventional problems of international relations, China and Britain have been aware that it is good for both sides and the general peace of the world to work together. Specifically speaking, previous visit of President Xi to Britain aimed to upgrade mutual respect and trust in the overall cooperation, to support Chinese companies going abroad, to work with British partners and all other prospective states to build the AIIB into a professional and efficient infrastructure financing platform, to discourage any state to seek hegemony and safeguard the world peace and justice. All in all, China needs to cooperate with the former global power and all other states of the world as well in order make sure that the rise of China would be peaceful and acceptable to the other states of the world community. For sure, history memories on both sides can’t be disappear in a short time. If the 1840s’ opium War hurt Chinese national pride then, so did the reversion of sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997 to the UK. Yet, the reality is that if UK politicians say much about the Hong Kong issue, they will just get beaten up, particularly in Beijing, and told to keep out of China’s internal affairs. Like it or not, the balance of power in the East Asia and the world in general has shifted dramatically in the last 15 years. Today, Britain acts as an intellectual partner of China in a general term and a “natural partner” in Belt and Road Initiative, since the two powers agree to build a new kind of economic structure and deal with certain huge environmental and sustainability issues.

In sum, China and Britain need to use Xi’s proposed Belt and Road Initiative to raise awareness of the mutual benefits and overall exchanges of people to people. For it is the people who are eventually going to decide the destiny of the world economy, to that end, China and Britain would be able to find a better way to speak to each other with a view to creating a new type of major powers relationship and to total avoidance of “Thucydides trap” in the 21st century. Ideology should not stand in the way of the economic goodwill of the Belt and Road Initiative. Britain’s active participation is crucial for this initiative. In return Britain will also become a winner of it economically and politically.

(*) Du Hui-yan, MA at Konstanz university/ Warwick university

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East Asia

Who would bell the China cat?

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If the G-7 and NATO china-bashing statements are any guide, the world is in for another long interregnum of the Cold War (since demise of the Soviet Union). The G-7 leaders called upon China to “respect human rights in its Xinjiang region” and “allow Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy” and “refrain from any unilateral action that could destabilize the East and South China Seas”, besides maintaining “peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits”.

China’s tit-for-tat response

The Chinese mission to the European Union called upon the NATO not to exaggerate the “China threat theory”

Bitter truths

Amid the pandemic, still raging, the world is weary of resuscitating Cold War era entente. Even the G-7 members, Canada and the UK appear to be lukewarm in supporting the US wish to plunge the world into another Cold War. Even the American mothers themselves are in no mood to welcome more coffins in future wars. Importance of the G-7 has been whittled down by G-20. 

Presumptions about the China’s cataclysmic rise are unfounded. Still, China is nowhere the US gross National Product. China’s military budget is still the second largest after the US. It is still less than a third of Washington’s budget to be increased by 6.8 per cent in 2021.

India’s role

India claims to be a natural ally of the G-7 in terms of democratic “values”. But the US based Freedom House has rated India “partly free because of its dismal record in persecution of minorities. Weakened by electoral setbacks in West Bengal, the Modi government has given a free hand to religious extremists. For instance, two bigots, Suraj Pal Amu and Narsinghanand Saraswati have been making blasphemous statements against Islam at press conferences and public gatherings.

India’s main problem

Modi government’s mismanagement resulted in shortage of vaccine and retroviral drugs. The healthcare system collapsed under the mounting burden of fatalities.  

Media and research institutions are skeptical of the accuracy of the death toll reported by Indian government.

The New York Times dated June 13, 2021 reported (Tracking Corona virus in India: Latest Map and case Count) “The official COVID-19 figures in India grossly under-estimate the true scale of the pandemic in the country”. The Frontline dated June 4, 2021 reported “What is clear in all these desperate attempts is the reality that the official numbers have utterly lost their credibility in the face of the biggest human disaster in independent India (V. Sridhar, India’s gigantic death toll due to COVID-19 is  thrice  the official numbers”, The frontline, June 4, 2021). It adds “More than 6.5 lakh Indians, not the 2.25 lakh reported officially are estimated to have died so far and at best a million more are expected to die by September 2021. The Seattle-based Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation estimates that actual Indian casualties may be 0.654 million (6.54 lakh), not the official count of 0.221 million (2.21 lakh as on May 6 when the report was released. That is a whopping three times the official numbers, an indicator of the extent of under-reporting”.

Epidemiologist Dr. Feigl-ding told India Today TV on April, 16, 2021 that “actual number of COVID-19 cases in India can be five or six times higher than the tally right now” (“Actual COVID-19 cases in India may be 5 to 10 times higher, says epidemiologist. India Today TV April 16, 2021).

Concluding remarks

India’s animosity against China is actuated by expediency. There is no chance of a full-blown war between China and India as the two countries have agreed not to use firepower in border skirmishes, if any. Modi himself told the All-party conference that not an inch of Indian territory has been ceded to China. In May this year, the Army Chief General M M. Naravane noted in an interview: “There has been no transgression of any kind and the process of talks is continuing.”

It is not China but the Quad that is disturbing unrest in China’s waters.

History tells the USA can sacrifice interests of its allies at the altar of self interest. India sank billions of dollars in developing the Chabahar Port. But, India had to abandon it as the US has imposed sanctions on Iran.

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Xinjiang? A Minority Haven Or Hell

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While the G7 meets under the shadow of Covid 19 and the leaders of the most prosperous nations on earth are focused on rebuilding their economies, a bloodless pogrom is being inflicted on a group of people on the other side of the world.

In this new era, killing people is wasteful and could bring the economic wrath of the rest of the world.  No, it is better to brainwash them, to re-educate them, to destroy their culture, to force them to mold themselves into the alien beings who have invaded their land in the name of progress, and who take the best new jobs that sprout with economic development.  Any protest at these injustices are treated severely.

Amnesty International has published a new 160-page report this week on Xinjiang detailing the horrors being perpetrated on Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.  Amnesty has simultaneously announced a campaign on their behalf.

Persecution, mass imprisonment in what can best be described as concentration camps, intensive interrogation and torture are actions that come under the definition of ‘crimes against humanity’.  More than 50 people who spent time in these camps contributed first-hand accounts that form the substance of the report.  It is not easy reading for these people have themselves suffered maltreatment even torture in many instances.

The UN has claimed that 1.5 million Muslims (Uighurs, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Tajiks) are in these internment camps and China’s claims of re-education camps made to sound as benign as college campuses are patently false.

People report being interviewed in police stations and then transferred to the camps.  Their interrogation was frequently conducted on ‘tiger chairs’:   The interviewee is strapped to a metal chair with leg irons and hands cuffed in such a manner that the seating position soon becomes exceedingly painful.  Some victims were hooded; some left that way for 24 hours or more, and thus were forced to relieve themselves, even defecate, where they sat.  Beatings and sleep deprivation were also common.

Activities were closely monitored and they were mostly forbidden to speak to other internees including cell mates.  Trivial errors such as responding to guards or other officials in their native language instead of Mandarin Chinese resulted in punishment.

Amnesty’s sources reported the routine was relentless.  Wake up at 5am.  Make bed — it had to be perfect.  A flag-raising and oath-taking ceremony before breakfast at 7 am.  Then to the classroom.  Back to the canteen for lunch.  More classes after.  Then dinner.  Then more classes before bed.  At night two people had to be on duty for two hours monitoring the others leaving people exhausted.  You never see sunlight while you are there, they said.  That was because they were never taken outside as is done in most prisons.

The re-education requires them to disavow Islam, stop using their native language, give up cultural practices, and become Mandarin-speaking ‘Chinese’.

Such are the freedoms in Xi Jinping’s China.  If China’s other leaders prior to Mr. Xi effected moderate policies in concert with advisers, it is no longer the case.  Mr. Xi works with a small group of like minds.  He has also removed the two-term or eight-year limit on being president.  President for life as some leaders like to call themselves, then why not Mr. Xi.  His anti-democratic values make him eminently qualified. 

An enlightened leader might have used the colorful culture of these minorities to attract tourists and show them the diversity of China.  Not Mr. Xi, who would rather have everyone march in lockstep to a colorless utopia reminiscent of the grey clothing and closed-collar jackets of the Maoist era. 

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Looking back on India-China ties, one year past the Galwan incident

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modi xi jinping

Two nuclear-armed neighbouring countries with a billion-plus people each, geographically positioned alongside a 3,488-km undemarcated border in the high Himalayas. This is the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China’s Tibet Autonomous Region. Differences in perception of alignment of this border for both sides have contributed to a seemingly unending dispute.

Chinese unilateral attempt to change status quo in 2020

One year back, on 15 June 2020, a clash between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley of eastern Ladakh turned bloody, resulting in the death of 20 soldiers in the former side and four in the latter side. It was an unfortunate culmination of a stand-off going on since early May that year, triggered by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops encountering Indian troops who were patrolling on their traditional limits.

It was followed by amassing of troops in large number by China on its side and some of them crossed the line over without any provocation, thereby blocking and threatening India’s routine military activities on its side of the traditionally accepted border. It was a unilateral attempt by the Chinese Communist Party-run government in Beijing to forcefully alter the status quo on the ground.

The LAC as an idea

Over the years, the LAC has witnessed one major war resulting from a Chinese surprise attack on India in 1962 and periodic skirmishes along the various friction points of the border, as seen in the years 1967, 1975, 1986-87, 2013, 2017, and the most recent 2020 Galwan Valley incident, the last being the worst in five decades. Post-Galwan, the optics appeared too high on both sides.

The LAC as an idea emerged with the annexation of Buddhist Tibet by Chinese communist forces in the early 1950s, bringing China to India’s border for the first time in history. This idea just emerged and was taking shape through the Jawaharlal Nehru-Zhou Enlai letters of correspondence that followed.

In 1962, while the world was engrossed upon the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Chinese inflicted a huge military and psychological debacle on unprepared and outnumbered Indian soldiers in a month-long war along this border.

Even to this date, there is still no mutually agreeable cartographic depiction of the LAC. It varies on perceptions.

What could’ve led to 2020 stand-off?

One of the reasons that led to the current new low in India-China ties, other than differing perceptions, is the improvement in Indian infrastructure capabilities along the rough mountainous terrains of the Himalayan borders and its resolve to be on par with China in this front. This has been a cause of concern in Chinese strategic calculations for its Tibetan border.

The carving up of the Indian union territory of Ladakh with majority Buddhists from the erstwhile Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 has indeed added to Beijing’s concerns over the area.

For the past few years, India has been upfront in scaling up its border infrastructure throughout the vast stretch of LAC, including in eastern Ladakh, where the 2020 stand-off took place. There is a serious trust deficit between India and China today, if not an evolving security dilemma.

Post-Galwan engagement

Several rounds of talks were held at the military and the diplomatic levels after the Galwan incident, the working-level mechanisms got renewed and new action plans were being formed before the process of disengagement finally began.

The foreign ministers of both countries even met in Moscow on the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meet in September, which was followed by a BRICS summit where Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping came face-to-face in November, although virtually.

By February 2021, the process of disengagement of troops gained momentum on the ground around the Pangong lake area. So far, eleven rounds of talks were held at the military level on the ground at the border. But, the disengagement is yet to be fully completed in the friction points of Hot Springs and the Depsang Plains.

Diplomacy is gone with the wind

All the bilateral border agreements and protocols for confidence-building that were signed between the both countries in the years 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013 were rendered futile by the Chinese PLA’s act of belligerence in Galwan.

The spirit of two informal Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping summits to build trust after the 2017 Doklam standoff, one in Wuhan, China (2018) and the other in Mamallapuram, India (2019) was completely gone with the wind. This is further exacerbated by the Chinese practice of ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’, which is clearly undiplomatic in nature.

India’s diversification of fronts

Coming to the maritime domain, India has upped the ante by the joint naval exercises (Exercise Malabar 2020) with all the Quad partners in November, last year. Thereby, New Delhi has opened a new front away from the Himalayan frontiers into the broader picture of India-China strategic rivalry. Australia joined the exercise, after 13 years, with India, Japan, and the United States, a move indicative of militarisation or securitisation of the Quad partnership.

Recently, India has been consolidating its position over the union territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, lying southeast to the mainland, and close to the strategic Strait of Malacca, through which a major proportion of China’s crude oil imports pass through before venturing out to the ports of South China Sea.

Economic ties, yearning to decouple

Last year, India’s external affairs minister S. Jaishankar remarked that border tensions cannot continue along with co-operation with China in other areas. In this regard, the Narendra Modi government has been taking moves to counter China in the economic front by banning a large number of Chinese apps, citing security reasons, thereby costing the Chinese companies a billion-size profitable market. The Indian government has also refused to allow Chinese tech companies Huawei and ZTE to participate in India’s rollout of the 5G technology.

Moreover, India, Australia and Japan have collectively launched a Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) in 2020 aimed at diversifying supply chain risks away from one or a few countries, apparently aimed at reducing their dependence on China. In terms of trade, India is still struggling to decouple with China, a key source of relatively cheap products for Indian exporters, particularly the pandemic-related pharmaceutical and related supplies in the current times.

But, the Indian government’s recent domestic policies such as “Self-Reliant India” (Atmanirbhar Bharat) have contributed to a decline in India’s trade deficit vis-à-vis China to a five-year low in 2020, falling to around $46 billion from around $57 billion in 2019.

The broader picture

The border dispute remains at the core of a range of issues that define the overall India-China bilateral relations. Other issues include trade and economics, Beijing’s close ties with Islamabad, the succession of Dalai Lama who has taken asylum in India since 1959 and the issue of Tibetan refugees living in India, educational ties, and the strategic rivalry in India’s neighbourhood, i.e., South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, among others.

Chinese belligerence has led India to find its place easily in the evolving ‘new Cold War’

The more China turns aggressive at its border with India, the more it will bring India close to the United States and the West. Despite India’s traditional posture of indifference to allying itself exclusively with a power bloc, in the recently concluded G7 summit, India referred to the grouping of liberal democracies as a ‘natural ally’.

India has been raising the need for a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific in as many multilateral forums as possible, a concept which China considers as a containment strategy of the United States. Possibly, India might also join the G7’s newly announced infrastructure project for developing countries in an appropriate time, as it is initiated as a counterweight to China’s multi trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative.

There was a time in the past when the former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sought to lead Asia by cooperating with China. Considering today’s changed geopolitical realities and power dynamics, nowhere in anyone’s wildest dreams such an idea would work out. Prime Minister Modi’s muscular foreign policy imperatives are aligning well with the Joe Biden-led Western response to the looming common threat arising from Beijing.

Today, encountering Xi Jinping’s grand strategy of Chinese domination of the world (by abandoning its yesteryear policy of ‘peaceful rise’) is a collective endeavour of peace-loving democracies around the world, to which Asia is particularly looking forward. Most notably, it comes amid an inescapable web of global economic inter-connectedness, even among rival powers.

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