Connect with us

East Asia

The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s future geostrategy

Giancarlo Elia Valori

Published

on

[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] A [/yt_dropcap]s is also the case with Chinese traditional philosophy, present, future and past always tend to coincide in one single choice in the Chinese strategic vision.In Xi Jinping’s initial proposals for the “Belt and Road Initiative” – or, to use the official terminology, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which were outlined by him on two occasions between September and October 2013 – he starts from two evaluations, namely a strategic evaluation and another one having an immediate interest.

The Maritime Silk Road was actually outlined for the first time by the Chinese President in a speech to the Indonesian Parliament in October 2013, while the Terrestrial Silk Road was first quoted by Xi Jinping in his State visits to Central Asia in September 2013.

The first long-term strategic idea is based on the design of a Greater Eurasia, hinged around Russia, China and the great countries of the Heartland, namely the “world island” as Sir Halford Mackinder called it.

The second most immediate evaluation is that the world has not yet emerged from the great economic crisis which began in 2008.

The Thunder and the River, namely the moment of immediate concreteness and the infinite flow of Time – just to use two concepts and images of Taoism.

But where does the Terrestrial Silk Road pass and which seas are connected by the Maritime Silk Road?

Six corridors have been designed in great detail and paying specific attention to local characteristics: firstly, the New Eurasian Land Bridge, from Western China to Western Russia, which in the future will connect the city of Lyanyungang, in the Jangsu Province, with the Dutch city of Rotterdam.

It is mainly a railway line, with a link between Bulgaria and Turkey, crossing inevitably the Iranian territory.

Secondly the China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, from Northern China to Eastern Russia; thirdly the China-Central Asia-Western Asia Corridor, from the territory of the People’s Republic of China to Turkey. Fourthly the Corridor from Southern China to the Indochinese peninsula up to Singapore; fifthly the China-Pakistan Corridor where, in the Gwadar port recently purchased by China, there will be one of the links between the Terrestrial and the Maritime Silk Roads. Sixthly the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor and finally the very long Maritime Silk Road, from the Chinese coast to Singapore up to the Mediterranean.

At strategic and economic levels, the individual projects are manifold and significant. Russia, in particular, together with China, is focused on establishing economic and financial alliances allowing to reach a great geopolitical result, which is currently the same both for Russia and China: reduced EU and NATO pressure on its Western and Southern borders and the related expansion of the Eurasian area of influence, precisely the New Greater Eurasia, towards the Mediterranean and our own Eurasian Peninsula, namely Western Europe.

While the United States failed to reach the TTIP agreements with the EU, which negotiated that dossier jointly, with the two Silk Roads, Russia and China will make to the EU and the entire Mediterranean region a proposal they will not be able to refuse – otherwise the current economic recession will persist – a proposal also combined with North America’s and European Central Bank’s monetary expansion policies.

With the two Silk Roads, the United States will be cut down to size drastically.

In fact, Xi Jinping policy lines on the “Belt and Road Initiative” point to the implementation of the old Maoist project of the “Three Worlds”: the World of “global peripheries”, which will have only China as beacon and geopolitical and military representation; the First World which is marginalized also militarily and finally the Second World, the world of the old Soviet universe, that the collapse of “revisionist imperialism” – as Mao Zedong would have called it – has made a stable ally of the new Chinese geopolitics.

Moreover, as early as 2001, the Russian Federation already established a Eurasian Economic Community with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 2010 Belarus and Kazakhstan created a customs union and finally, in 2011, those same countries signed a Declaration on Eurasian Economic Integration and a new Treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Commission.

Furthermore, in 2012, the decision was also taken to launch the Eurasian Economic Union.

The future integration process will be centred on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ASEAN and hence the two Chinese “Initiatives”.

The aim is to limit the world recession damage but, above all, to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions on the Russian Federation.

Putin wants to quickly merge all strategic-economic integration initiatives into one single process, which would also optimize the anti-cyclical effects of all these initiatives and would provide the opportunity for a “Eurasian phase” of Russian politics – a phase that Vladimir Putin has already announced.

It is worth noting, however, that, by proposing the two integrated Silk Roads, China does not intend to establish binding political mechanisms or to recreate a series of military and strategic buffer zones around China.

Xi Jinping has been very clear about it.

In fact, China clearly wants a horizontal, non-vertical integration and it always clarifies that there is no hegemonic plan inherent in the Two Silk Roads.

Nor a political one in the strict sense of the term.

Quite the reverse. Indeed, the issue lies in putting an end to the US “hegemony”, not in creating others.

Moreover, macroeconomic data is already very interesting: considering the 2014 data, trade within the SCO region has increased by ten times.

It is worth recalling that in the SCO region (Russia, China, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan) 3.92 billion people live (according to 2014-2015 data), namely 54,4% of world’s population, that generates an aggregate GDP accounting for 32.2% of the global gross domestic product.

It is also worth noting that the Economic Silk Road begins in Xinjiang (hence the importance and the mortal danger represented by the Uighur jihad) and reaches the Caspian Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Ukraine and Romania up to Europe and the Mediterranean.

The meeting of the Beijing Forum held in May was attended by over thirty Heads of State and Government, as well as experts from 110 countries, including the United States. Sixty-five countries are already directly involved in the operations, while, in recent days, many Latin American countries have adhered to the project.

South America no longer wants to have “open veins” – just to use the title of a famous book by Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America: Five centuries of the Pillage of a Continent .

Xi Jinping has also promised additional 100 billion yuan (equivalent to 14.5 billion US dollars) of new investment in road infrastructure, while China will also provide 60 billion yuan (8.7 billion US dollars) to fund the countries and the international organizations which participate in the project by creating infrastructure.

Furthermore, with specific reference to the two Silk Roads, China has already pledged 250 billion yuan worth of loans by the China Development Bank, as well as additional 130 billion yuan of the Export-Import Bank of China, further two billion yuan in food aid and one billion US dollars for the South-South cooperation fund.

Hence the total sum amounts to 480 billion yuan, while since 2015 the Russian Federation has replaced Saudi Arabia as the first oil exporter to China, by settling payments with the two national currencies, thus avoiding recourse to the US dollar.

Over the last seven years, Russian oil exports to China have more than doubled, with 550,000 barrels per day, while the area in which the US dollar is used gets increasingly narrower: currently only in the Third World does the US currency still reign, but it is a phenomenon that is bound to last for a short lapse of time.

In a situation in which the US public debt amounts to 20 trillion dollars, the Federal Reserve tends to raise interest rates in a world of zero or even negative interest rates and public spending is expected to rise under Trump’s Presidency, the 1971 old wisecrack by John Connally, the former Head of the Federal Reserve, is still topical: “The dollar is our currency, but it is your problem”.

In recent times, the dollar value in word trade has increased by about 25%.

It is currently 40% higher than in 2011.

Goldman Sachs also claims that the dollar is largely overvalued as against the other major currencies.

And 60% of the global economy is still somehow linked to the US currency value.

Hence we are no longer faced with the “Triffin dilemma”, namely the mechanism whereby as long as the US dollar remains the global reserve currency, trade and production create an additional demand for dollars.

If that happened, however, there should be a constant deficit in the US balance of payments, thus putting pressure on that currency and making it progressively unnecessary for trade.

Now we are in a similar situation, even though Triffin made reference to a context still governed by the Bretton Woods Agreements.

Moreover, the entry of the Chinese currency into the World Bank’s Special Drawing Rights system in 2016 currently allows larger yuan fluctuations. Hence considering this yuan ability, in particular, a free yuan is an excellent way to further internationalize the Chinese economy.

The steps of this process have already been marked: in 2010, the World Bank President, Zoellnick, assumed a new global gold-based financial system – the one that Keynes called the “tribal residue” of the economy.

In 2012, Iran accepted the yuan as means of payment for its oil.

In 2013 the Chinese Central Bank stated it no longer needed to accumulate reserves in foreign currencies. In 2014 gold could be bought on the Shanghai Stock Exchange with the yuan and in 2015 Russia accepted the yuan as means of payment for its oil supplies to China.

According to official statements, the Chinese Central Bank’s gold reserves have increased by almost 56% over the last three years.

Hence, if we consider all these data and statistics and we assess their strategic relevance, we can understand how and to what extent the Silk Road, as well as the Chinese and global Belt and Road Initiative will be the geopolitical, economic and financial paradigm of the near future.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs "La Centrale Finanziaria Generale Spa", he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group and member of the Ayan-Holding Board. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d'Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: "A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title of "Honorable" of the Académie des Sciences de l'Institut de France

Continue Reading
Comments

East Asia

The Implication of China’s Diplomacy in APEC and ASEAN

Published

on

It is truly unusual that the Chinese President Xi Jinping and its Premier Li Keqiang are visiting the same area during nearly the same time: Xi’s visit to APEC from15th to 21st November and Li’s visit to ASEAN on 15th November. Yet, if we look into China’s foreign policy towards this area over the past years since President Xi took power, it is not difficult to understand both Xi’s and Li’s official visits to the “larger Pacific” and the meaning beyond.

As we know, President Xi has reiterated that the Pacific is large enough for the countries involved to share the prosperity with each other. In order to achieve the inclusive rather than exclusive benefits for all, China’s diplomacy aims to reject any kind of unilateralism, trade protectionism and anti-globalization. Given this, Xi’s at APEC and Li’s at AEASN is defined as a signal of China’s diplomacy to further reform and bold openness.

As a rising great country, China is surely eager to expand its investment and trade with the south Pacific area, and Papua New Guinea (PNG) is the first country visited by Chinese president. What is more, PNG joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) early 2018 and then became the first state of Pacific islands to sign the MoU on “The Belt and Road Initiative” construction. As the theme “Harnessing Inclusive Opportunities, Embracing the Digital Future,” the APEC summit will focus on Regional economic integration, digital economy, connectivity, sustainable and inclusive growth and so forth.

Also during Premier Li’s visit to the ASEAN, he highlighted the necessity of the collaboration and mutual benefit among the countries involved on the 21st China-ASEAN leaders meeting. This is also the 21st ASEAN Plus Three Summit (10+3) and the 13th East Asia Summit (EAS).

Quite understandable, since the 1960s, the center of world economy has shifted from North Atlantic to Asia-Pacific, its dynamic growth in the region create countless jobs and push the development of world economy. This is the reason that Asia-Pacific region has the most trade agreements and the most complicated economic architecture around world. APEC and ASEAN, as two institutions that possess most member states, are the very pillars of the tumbledown regional economic architecture. APEC was launched by Australia and later included 21 member states in the region, amongst are United States, China, Japan, the economic giant three of the world economy. ASEAN is an institution that consist of ten small and middle states. Though they are not strong enough to meet the challenges from the power politics alone, ASEAN is a core force that firmly facilitate the economic integration of the whole region of East Asia and the Pacific. No matter what the way they embrace, they are the de facto basic regionalism of Asia-Pacific. The withdrawing of United States from Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and hard-achieved Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) once brought the regional economic architecture a fig leave and strengthened the impact of APEC and ASEAN.

As a result, the two visits of Chinese top leaders to the same region at the same time definitely attract worldwide attention, because they not only represent China’s recent diplomatic focus but also mark the fact that Asia-Pacific region has become one of the vital fields where China’s diplomacy will be actively conducting in terms of the Belt and Road Initiative, and carry on the good-neighbor policy. Since China has argued for creating a peaceful development milieu, to enhance economic transformation and upgrading oversea markets and partners in Asia-Pacific region.

Consider these facets, China, as the second largest economy, aims to promote its well-articulated stance on multilateralism and inclusiveness and globalization. As both President Xi and Premier Li have strongly said that China is ready to work with Pacific island countries to endeavor together and sail for a better future for bilateral relations. For the sake of that goal, China always believes that as long as all the countries involved have firm confidence in each other’s development, cooperation and the future of East Asia, and work closely together and forge ahead, all sides would achieve more and reach a higher level in the next 15 years.

For sure, China belongs to the part of a larger Asia-Pacific family, and the Chinese government defines its goal as the shared prosperity of this region. Therefore, China will continue to work hard and constructively to promote the overall development of impoverished but promising Pacific island countries under the Belt and Road Initiative.

Continue Reading

East Asia

An uncertain step in moving China-Japan relations

Published

on

Authors: Meshach Ampwera  & Luo Xinghuan

On October 26, Chinese President Xi Jinping met Japanese PM Shinzo Abe and praised that both China and Japan have pledged to strengthen bilateral ties amid continuous efforts made by the two nations. Xi said, “Bilateral relations have returned to the right track and gained positive momentum, which is something the two sides should cherish.” As the two largest economies in Asia, China and Japan are also the vital players in Asian security and the global development.

In addition, since this is the first official visit to China by a Japanese PM in a seven-year “Cold Peace” period, it is widely assumed that Abe’s visit symbolizes the resumption of high-level visits and will be followed by an increasing rapprochement between China and Japan. True, the leaders of the two economic giants witnessed a wide range of agreements, including a 30 billion US dollar worth of currency swap pact, the establishment of a maritime and air liaison mechanism, and enhancing people-to-people exchanges.

Yet, three factors have to be considered seriously in looking into Japanese foreign policy given the current changing geopolitical landscape regionally and globally. First, Japan has still regarded itself as a “defeated” state during the WWII. Since then, Japan’s postwar posture has frequently described as a new pacifism; yet in fact it is considerably more complex. As Henry Kissinger put it: “Japan had acquiesced in the U.S. predominance and followed the strategic landscape and the imperatives of Japan’s survival and long-term success.” This means that the governing elites in Tokyo used to hold the constitution drafted by U.S. occupying authorities with its stringent prohibition on military action, and adapted to their long-term strategic purposes. As a result, Japan was transformed from the pacific aspects of the postwar order (that prohibited military action) into a nation that has focused on other key elements of national strategy, particularly using economic leverage regionally and globally, though not uncontroversial.

Second, in a recently-released paper written by the former US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, he maintained that “Japan is a close ally of the U.S. and a rising military power, too, because of legal and constitutional changes of great significance championed by Prime Minister Abe.” In practice, the Japanese administration has engineered an expansion to enable its military to operate regionally and even globally in response to the rise of China, violent extremist activity in Asia, and the alleged North Korean belligerence.

Actually in 2013, Japanese Government White Paper revealed a desire to become a “normal country” with an active alliance policy. In a searching for a new role in the Asia-pacific region, Japan aims to act as an “anchor” of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) concluded in 2018 after the withdrawal of the United States. Now it involves 11 countries and representing 13.4% of global GDP ($ 13.5tri.). As the largest economy of the CPTPP, Japan has been active in moving it forward. Early this year when the British government stated it is exploring becoming a member of the CPTPP to stimulate exports after Brexit in 2019, Abe stated that the United Kingdom would be welcomed to join the partnership. It is said that even the U.S. reconsiders possibly rejoining the CPTPP if it were a “substantially new deal” for the United States.

Japan’s ardent involvement into the US-led strategy in Asia has also been endorsed to expand steadily as a normal power regionally and globally. For example, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) is the result of the joint declaration issued by the India and Japan in 2016. Although it is premised on four pillars of development and cooperation, it is self-evident that the AAGC reflects a growing special “strategic and global partnership between India and Japan” in which both sides have viewed China’s growing, pragmatic and successful presence in Africa as a menace. There is no question that AAGC is a well-crafted vision and agenda of both India and Japan, linking with their own development priorities. But with increasing pressure from Washington and Brussels, Japan and India are in effect driven by the option for the AAGC to rebalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

From the inception of the BRI, they have more than ever before been concerned with being isolated in Africa by Beijing’s initiative. But, as Ampwera Meshach, a researcher at Jilin University put it, “Africa is on the growth trend and offers potential markets and raw materials. For this reason, Africa largely needs pragmatic and scientific, technological and development- oriented initiatives and these are clearly reflected in China’s BRI.” In light of this, the AAGC does neither reflect a novel nor pragmatic approach on how it fits within the African agenda. Instead, AAGC’s foundational pillars seem more inclined to the Western cooperation approaches that have for decades not been translated into development.

Controversially, two days before Abe’s visit to Beijing, Japan had decided to scrap official development assistance (ODA) to China, which is a program where Japan provides aids to developing countries starting back in 1954. Even though some people argue that Japan’s ODA is reasonably cancelled because China’s GDP is even 2.5 times larger than that of Japan, yet, it is necessary for Chinese to be aware of the reality that Japan is a longstanding ally of the United States. As Japan has long been an economic power, its impressive military capabilities would not be confined to a strict policy of territorial defense—no projection of Japanese power or the U.S.-Japan alliance to the region as a whole.

It is during the Abe’s administration which has recognized an environment of growing Chinese assertiveness, violent extremist activity in Asia, and North Korean hostility, and therefore, Japan has eagerly participated in Asian security, including training and exercising with other nations, beyond a purely passive, home-island defense role. This makes it an increasingly important player serving the US strategy in Asia but challenging the rise of China globally.

It is true that Abe tweeted about the trip — while recognizing the challenges in moving bilateral relations forward, he said that he would still work to “push Sino-Japan relations to the next level”. Given the two countries’ economic links, it is only understandable that there is a need for the two sides to come closer. Moreover, Japanese businesses has been an extremely active force behind the government’s shift of attitude on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Yet, all in all, we should never ignore that Japan’s ambitious foreign policy has gone beyond the economic goal.

Continue Reading

East Asia

Red Flags: Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy – Book Review

Published

on

George Magnus writes about the dangers of the Middle-Income Trap in the Middle Kingdom, among other issues, in Red Flags: Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy. President Xi’s face adorns the book cover, with his name looming above.  Fitting, seeing as China has removed presidential term limits; China’s fate is thus likely to be tied to the decision making of Xi for the next couple decades.

Magnus writes about the dangers of Xi’s likely ascendance to President-for-Life.  Ever since the excesses of Mao’s one-man rule, China’s Communist Party has largely ruled by consensus, while provincial governments have served as a counterweight to federal authority via control of their land and many of their local State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  Xi is challenging this staus quo.  So-called Xi Jinping Thought is now official party canon, being taught in schools and in the media.  The 2012 crackdown on corruption by Xi in his inaugural year was widely seen as a pretense for taking out political opponents and sending a message to his potential opponents.  Ever since, Xi has been working to centralize power to himself.  Magnus notes that being leader for life largely shields Xi from short-term popular discontent, but also means that every long-term decision, good or bad, will become part of Xi’s legacy.  Hence, the book informally reads as a personal policy checklist for Xi.

Red Flags lists four, well, red flags of likely impediments to Chinese economic development.  Firstly is debt.  China has been an unprecedented money-making machine for the past three decades or so.  However, signs are starting to appear of a possible economic slowdown.  Most significant is the debt-GDP ratio, which has skyrocketed over the past few years.  Magnus writes extensively about how China’s growth, up to this point, has largely been fuelled by credit (debt).  China’s much-maligned (by Trump, most notably) trade balance surplus has shrunk to no more than a few percent, statistically insignificant.  China could theoretically make up for shrinking foreign demand for goods and services with domestic consumers.  Magnus is unfortunately the bearer of bad news in this regard: “Household savings rose from about 5% of disposable income in the late 1970s to about 38% in 2016, or just over 25% of GDP. Savings by companies are also elevated, amounting to about 17% of GDP in 2016.”

Hence, the Xi regime has been trying to maintain economic growth via ever-greater sums of state investment funding.  Magnus explicitly warns against this: “The reason the investment rate has to fall is because the more China relies on it, the more inefficient that investment will become.”  Such a statement might seem self-evident, but Magnus backs it up with facts.  For instance, he points out, “Between 1978 and 2006, for example, China spent between 2 to 4 yuan of investment to get 1 additional yuan of GDP. Since then, the amount has risen steadily to reach about 9 yuan in 2015, corresponding to a marked fall in investment efficiency.”

Magnus writes a lot about the inefficiency of China’s thousands and thousands of SOEs.  “Officially, and according to some China-watchers, SOEs now account for just a fifth of output and a tenth of employment. The presumption though that the rest of the economy is in private hands, as we understand it in the West, is incorrect. Many private firms have large or majority state owners, who exercise significant control over senior appointments and corporate strategy, and state ownership is often disguised by multiple layers of investment companies ultimately owned by a state entity. Allowing for these opaque adjustments, the purely private part of the enterprise sector may actually be little higher than 20–30 per cent.”  SOEs have built much of modern China, but their efforts are increasingly being wasted on skyscrapers and airports that remain almost empty, Chinese Roads-to-Nowhere.  A blank check invites planners to ignore long-terms concerns of viability, blinded by short-term gains that go directly into the pockets of Party-affiliated contractors.  China’s financial services sector isn’t much better off.  Magnus writes about all the bailouts, takeovers and general heavy-handedness by the government of various Chinese banks and other related companies.  Due to a slowdown in trade and many other issues discussed in the book, state investment will figure to play an ever-larger role in China’s economy, inefficiency be damned.

The book’s second diagnosed problem for China’s future growth is its currency, the renminbi.  Xi mirrors the isolationist mindset of China’s ancient emperors with regards to cash inflows and outflows.  It’s very hard for Chinese investors to send renminbi out of the country.  Likewise, China restricts the ability of foreigners to own reserves of renminbi, or Chinese financial assets in general.  The renminbi is subject not only to this lack of liquidity, but also the confines of a planned economy.  China is infamous for its strict control of its currency valuation, as well as its monetary policy via diktats, investment and bailouts.  Its ownership of USD and other foreign currency reserves must always be flawlessly balanced to safely back up the value of the renminbi.  This resulted, for instance, in the selling off of a trillion of its USD reserves between 2014-2016.  The combination of currency illiquidity and over-management limits the ability of the renminbi to fuel Chinese economic growth.

Thirdly, the book mentions the so-called Middle Income Trap.  Once a country reaches a certain benchmark of development, it’s hard to maintain further momentum.  China’s already experiencing slowed growth due to factors such as increased global manufacturing competition.  As Magnus points out, China has already had its coming-out party to the world economy.  It can’t join the WTO again or eliminate mass hunger again.  Likewise, China has stalled in terms of rural development and education.  Rural China is increasingly falling behind the major cities and the hukou system of restricted movement and rights for migrant workers isn’t helping.  Students in China still attend far fewer years of school than students in developed countries like the US, especially in advanced fields like IT.  These issues of inequality and 21st-century education must be addressed if China is to fully develop.

Lastly, Magnus writes about the demographics crisis.  China has one of the highest ratios of elderly people in the world.  Combine this with China’s 1.45 birth rate and the gender disparity caused by the 1-Child Policy and you have a ticking time bomb.  The workforce is increasingly running out of youngsters who can take the place of retirees, causing a slowdown in economic output.  The higher the elderly population becomes, the more each working-age person will have to contribute to pensions and healthcare.  The economic burden that only-children will have to shoulder taking care of their aging parents will inevitably lower marriage rates and thus further lower the unsustainably low birth rate.

This is the most dire problem because there’s very little that society can do about it.  Xenophobia has prevented any meaningful amount of migration to China, but even if China were to let in tens of millions of foreign workers, that would be a drop in the bucket for a nation of 1.4B people.  Even after China ended its One-Child Policy, couples are still averaging well below 2 children, despite increasing prosperity.  The only real hope for China’s demography problem would be a literal ex machina: automation.  Robots may be able to generate untold wealth that could buoy a small nation like Singapore, but even an army of robots is unlikely to completely offset the gradual loss of hundreds of millions of working-age people to aging.  Even if AI is a magic bullet for all productivity woes, it take probably at least a century to meaningfully scale up, by which time China’s population will have substantially shrank.  It doesn’t help that China is, in many respects, barely keeping pace in the AI race with the US, Japan and the EU.  In the race for artificial intelligence, even being a year behind the competition can cost trillions of dollars; China’s tech sector will likely take a few decades to completely match Silicon Valley.  Lastly, it should be noted that not even innovation can overcome the limit resources of our planet.  We’re already running out of industrial resources like oil and lithium.  It would be foolish to place all of one’s eggs in the basket of a sci-fi utopia.

Red Flags is a very detailed and interesting book about the future of China.  Magnus isn’t anti-China by any means; he gives credit to China’s marvelous successes and doesn’t moralize.  If anything, the book was too generous by barely mentioning the unrest in Xinjiang and not mentioning the occupation of Tibet at all.  In an objective fashion, he succinctly explains China’s problems and offers possible solutions.  China has shown an unprecedented ability to adapt to change.  This flexibility may wind up being undone not external adversaries or limitations, but by increasing autocracy.  Dictatorship has rarely resulted in long-term, across-the-board growth.  One can look at a fellow Communist country for an example: the Soviet Union.  Though the USSR made impressive leaps in technology, manufacturing and agricultural output and human longevity, it was ultimately undone by its ideological rigidity.  A lack of accountability for its leaders meant that the USSR was forever a captive to bad policy.  Likewise, a lack of freedom stunted innovation.  If Xi is to avoid the pitfalls of the USSR, he must avoid letting his power get to his head and embrace a flow of ideas from both fellow Party members and private citizens.  Xi’s consolidation of control and crackdown on dissent would point otherwise, unfortunately.  Only time will tell if China will continues to beat the odds…

Continue Reading

Latest

Trending

Copyright © 2018 Modern Diplomacy