Authors: Ekaterina Klimenko & Camilla T.N. Sørensen
[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] T [/yt_dropcap]he Arctic is estimated to contain 30 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves. Climate change has accelerated the melting of the Arctic ice, making these resources more available. This backgrounder looks at the status of Chinese–Russian energy cooperation in the Arctic.
In the past decade, Russia has been actively developing Arctic resources and shipping routes, while boosting its military presence in the region. While Russia has primarily worked with European countries to develop its energy resources, including in the Arctic, a number of factors have led Russia to reconsider and look even more to Asia for potential investors and technology partners, and as a key consumer market. China is increasingly highlighted as an important partner for Russia in developing the Russian Arctic.
China has increased its focus on and engagement in the Arctic over the past decade. From a Chinese perspective, cooperation with Russia on Arctic resources and shipping routes also helps facilitate a greater Chinese role and influence in the region and gradually gain respect and acceptance for China as a legitimate Arctic stakeholder.
Interests in the Arctic
Russia’s Arctic strategy identifies the following core national interests: (a) use of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base; (b) safe-guarding the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation; and (c) use of the Northern Sea Route as a national integrated transport-communication system for Russia in the Arctic. Among these goals, the development of offshore and onshore oil and gas resources is a top priority.
The Russian economy is largely dependent on revenues from oil and gas. At least 50 per cent of federal budget revenue is generated from exports of energy resources. Most of Russia’s oil and gas production is concentrated in the traditional areas of western Siberia. However, their depletion over the past decade means that the geography of production has been shifting to new regions to the north of western Siberia, including the Yamal Peninsula and the Arctic seas.
To date, China’s focus and activities in the Arctic region have been primarily concentrated on its scientific interests, particularly those that relate to how the melting ice and changing climate in the Arctic will affect China. However, over the past decade, China’s activities have begun to concentrate more on economic interests and concerns about securing and diversifying China’s supply of energy resources and minerals. China has also developed a growing interest in the Arctic shipping routes, which could provide it with alternatives to the longer and strategically vulnerable routes currently in use. Furthermore, China is interested in securing a voice in the evolving Arctic governance regime, which is related to its importance and potential implications for wider global and regional governance.
As a result, China seeks to diversify and strengthen its bilateral relations with all the Arctic states by establishing stronger diplomatic ties, scientific cooperation, and economic partnerships.
Drivers of Chinese–Russian energy cooperation in the Arctic
Major shifts in world energy markets have significantly affected the development of Russia’s Arctic shelf resources and the expansion of the current onshore resources of the Yamal Peninsula. At least three key factors have led to a significant overproduction of natural gas in Russia and hence delayed the development of gas resources on the Arctic shelf: (a) EU plans to prioritize the diversification of gas suppliers in the European market; (b) difficult relations with Ukraine, which is the third largest consumer of Russian gas; and (c) shale gas revolution has also resulted in the loss of other potential markets.
In relation to oil, estimates suggest that the fall in oil prices has made the development of the Arctic shelf oilfields unprofitable. This will continue to be the case while the price of oil stays below USD $100 per barrel. However, the decisive factor in the need for Russian companies to diversify their partnerships has been the geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine.
The USA and the EU introduced sanctions against Russia in 2014 after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Among these sanctions, the third package, which was introduced in July 2014, has had significant implications because it concerns the transfer of technologies. The USA and EU sanctions include a ban on the transfer of equipment and technology for deep drilling below 150–152 metres, as well as on exploration and development of Arctic shelf shale oil reserves.
These sanctions forced ExxonMobil, Statoil and other Western companies to suspend their cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. The third package of sanctions also introduced strict financial restrictions, applied to loans of longer than 30 days. The largest Russian banks and corporations in Russia, such as Rosneft, Transneft, Gazpromneft, Gazprom, Novatek, Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz, remain under sanctions. This has made it difficult to seek financing for Arctic projects in Western financial markets.
Seen from Beijing, Russia, as the biggest Arctic state, stands as an important gatekeeper and ‘necessary partner’ for non-Arctic states such as China. China knows that in many ways it is dependent on Russia—for example, for Russian goodwill and support—if China is to increase its activities and consolidate its role as a legitimate stakeholder in the region. Consequently, in a Chinese analysis, there is no way to avoid dealing and getting along with Russia in the Arctic.
Despite the lower growth rate of the Chinese economy in recent years, its demand for energy and resources continues to grow and its state-owned enterprises are continuously encouraged to identify and establish new areas for exploration and extraction. China sees the Russian Far East, Siberia and the Russian Arctic as increasingly important due to their potential in relation to energy resources, export markets and new shipping and trading routes. It also sees these regions as recipients of and partners in Chinese-led infrastructure and other development projects.
These activities have synergies with China’s high-profile ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, through which China is seeking access to vital European markets through Central Asia and Russia. China also seeks to take advantage of current Russian geostrategic and geo-economic vulnerabilities and of Russia’s need for China as a partner to gradually strengthen its presence and relationships in the Arctic.
Concrete steps towards Chinese-Russian cooperation on the development of the Arctic shelf
In February and March 2013, during a round of oil delivery negotiations, Rosneft and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) discussed opportunities for cooperation on shelf projects in the Arctic Barents Sea and Pechora Sea, with a particular focus on the Zapadno-Prinovozemelsky, Yuzhno Russky, Medyskoe Sea and Varandeyskoe Sea deposits. Among these, the Medyskoe Sea and Varandeyskoe Sea are the most promising, containing an estimated 3.9 million and 5.5 million tonnes of oil per year, respectively. Although the head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, confirmed a commitment to work with China on the Arctic shelf early in 2014, however, no official confirmation or details have yet to emerge.
In late 2015, Russia’s Deputy Energy Minister reiterated that Rosneft was still ‘negotiating’ and ‘discussing’ its participation in Arctic shelf energy and extraction projects with China. The relative lack of progress over nearly two years could indicate that China is either reluctant to invest or trying to get a better deal. Moreover, the fact that China did not invest in the Vankor deposit in East Siberia and did not buy Rosneft’s shares could demonstrate that its interest in the Russian upstream has decreased, or that it cannot accept Rosneft’s conditions. It could also be argued that the Russian oil and gas delivery deals that China secured in 2013 and 2014 have reduced its overall interest in the Russian upstream, including in the Arctic. Nonetheless, analysts continue to claim that China wants not just to be part of, but to have a managerial stake, in these Arctic projects.
Another unanswered question is the extent to which Chinese companies can replace the work of Western partners on the Arctic shelf, particularly their technological assistance. Despite such concerns, Russia and China have increased their technological cooperation in the oil and gas sectors since the imposition of sanctions. In September 2015, for example, China Oilfield Services Limited (COSL) signed deals with Rosneft and Norwegian Statoil to drill two exploration wells in the Sea of Okhotsk, which has similar conditions to the Arctic. Igor Sechin noted that the agreements unlocked new potential for cooperation on oil and gas resource exploration by industry leaders in Russia, Norway and China. The extent to which this potential will affect the Arctic remains to be seen.
Emerging Chinese-Russian cooperation on the Yamal Peninsula
If offshore projects remain a question for the future, onshore cooperation in the Arctic is already advancing. In February 2013, the head of Novatek visited China as part of an official Russian delegation to discuss opportunities for cooperation on its main Arctic project, Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG). As a result of this visit and several subsequent rounds of negotiations, on 5 September 2013, Novatek and CNPC signed a contract for the sale of a 20 per cent stake in Yamal LNG. The agreement includes a long-term contract for the supply of not less than 3 million tonnes of LNG per year to China, which is 18 per cent of total capacity. The deal was approved by the Russian Government in November 2013 and signed in January 2014.
Following the breakout of the crisis in Ukraine, Novatek became the target of sanctions and Yamal LNG faced further financial difficulties. Novatek was forced to seek further engagement with foreign partners and China was among the few remaining alternatives. In September 2015, Novatek sold the Silk Road Fund, a Chinese sovereign fund, a further 9.9 per cent of Yamal LNG for approximately EUR €1.09 billion. In December 2015, as part of the deal, Novatek received a loan from the Silk Road Fund of EUR €730 million for a period of 15 years to finance the project.
As a follow-up to these advances, on 29 April 2016 Yamal LNG announced the signing of agreements with the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank on two 15-year credit facilities of a total amount of EUR €9.3 billion to finance the project. China will therefore provide up to 60 per cent of the necessary capital to implement the project.
Despite this impressive track record of cooperation on Yamal LNG, two problems reveal the limits of possible Chinese-Russian energy cooperation. First, Novatek had serious difficulties in securing Chinese financing for the project. The deal was only concluded after numerous delays and negotiations. Second, China also received huge benefits from the deal, since up to 80 per cent of the equipment for Yamal LNG will be produced in Chinese shipyards.
This shows that, despite China’s interest in energy projects in the Arctic and Russia’s eagerness to obtain Chinese partnerships, there are a lot of difficulties ahead. Chinese companies will work on projects that they are interested in only under conditions that they find acceptable. Thus, Russia will have to offer good conditions to attract the Chinese and develop Chinese–Russian energy cooperation.
Despite the stream of positive adjectives flowing from both Russia and China in recent months about partnership and friendship, cooperation in the Arctic has not progressed much. Except for cooperation on the Yamal Peninsula, Russian and Chinese companies have not yet found further mutual ground for energy cooperation in the Arctic.
On the one hand, Russian companies need and welcome Chinese investments and loans; on the other hand, they are not entirely comfortable allowing Chinese companies to play too big a role in Russian energy projects, including those in the Arctic. Chinese companies, in contrast, are in a very strong position at the moment and would not agree to anything less than a significant controlling and management role.
As a result, there is a degree of disappointment in Russia that energy cooperation with China has not developed as anticipated and thus has not mitigated the crisis with the West to the desired degree. Seen from Russia, China has taken advantage of the situation, for example to extract especially favourable terms on energy deals and to insist on high interest rates on major Chinese loans. That is, China has not shown the expected goodwill, which is why using the Chinese–Russian partnership as leverage against the West has not worked.
This topical backgrounder is based on the upcoming policy paper ‘Emerging Chinese–Russian Cooperation in the Arctic: Possibilities and Constraints’ by Camilla T. N. Sørensen and Ekaterina Klimenko. First published at SIPRI.org
(*) Camilla T. N. Sørensen is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen.
How U.S.-China trade deal is going to impact Iranian oil exports?
U.S., and China are going to sign a trade deal, which is expected to ease the tensions between the two economic rivals and push the global economy out of recession and bring markets back to life.
The deal, which is labeled as the “Phase 1 trade deal”, is going to be signed by U.S. President Donald Trump and China’s Vice Premier Liu He, at the White House.
Despite the undeniable positive impact of the deal on the global markets, the consequences of this deal for the Iranian oil market could be a little complicated. Since, on one side, the increase in oil prices as the result of the trade deal would benefit the Iranian oil industry like all others, but on the other side, it could force China to take some reassuring actions in order to show its determination for ending the trade war.
That means, under U.S. pressures, and to cement the agreement with the Americans, China could probably cut or even end its oil imports from Iran.
The U.S.-China-Iran triangle
Tensions between the U.S. and Iran have been escalating in recent weeks after the U.S. assassinated the top Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in an airstrike, and Iran answered with an attack on U.S. military bases in Iraq.
Following Iran’s revenge, Washington imposed new sanctions on the Iranian metal sector and some of the country’s senior officials.
The Trump administration has also intensified the pressure on Iranian allies, like China, for reducing their economic transactions with the Islamic republic and follow the Americans’ lead in isolating Iran.
China, however, so far, has been resisting such pressures and despite the U.S. threats and imposing penalties on Chinese tanker companies dealing with Iranian oil, the country has continued to import oil from the Islamic Republic.
Now with the U.S. and China on the verge of signing the significant agreement, the Trump administration is using this deal as leverage to make the Chinese side bend to their wills in cutting ties with Iran.
Earlier on Sunday, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Steven Mnuchin, told Fox News that “The United States is working closely with China to have it cut off altogether imports of Iranian crude oil.”
Possible deal outcomes
As I mentioned earlier, despite the U.S. sanctions, China still remains Iran’s top oil customer, and the idea of the Asian country cutting ties with Iran would be a huge blow to the Iranian oil industry and economy in general.
However, despite all the hype around the trade deal between the U.S. and China, many believe that this deal is just the first step toward a possible truce and the two sides have a long way ahead for reaching a complete alliance.
As reported by Reuters, Myron Brilliant, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Executive Vice President said on Monday that the Phase 1 trade deal “stops the bleeding” but does not end the trade war.
So it is very unlikely that China would lose one of its biggest trade partners in the Middle East region over a deal which is not even very promising.
Considering the fact that, so far, Washington has done everything in its power to cut off Iran’s oil exports to zero, but it hasn’t succeeded in this regard, under the current circumstances too, it is unlikely that its pressure on China will lead to a disruption of the country’s oil exports.
Therefore, the trade agreement could also have a bright side for the Iranian oil industry. That is to say, a proper trade deal could benefit the global economy and leads it out of recession and thereby alleviate the dark prospect of oil demand.
The trade deal could act as a stimulus for demand growth and, by removing the biggest obstacle to the rising of oil prices over the past year, push the oil prices to higher levels, and consequently boost Iran’s oil revenues.
From our partner Tehran Times
TANAP Is Inaugurated: What Southern Gas Corridor Promises To The Europe And Stakeholders?
Ever since the creation of mankind, human beings have always been in search of energy. Several conflicts and wars happened over energy resources for many centuries. Depletion of energy resources is the most important challenge that the major powers are struggling for. Energy policy is a big issue for almost any country in the world which is dependent on external resources. Energy consumption in the EU is more than any other region in the world while being poor in terms of energy sources. Implementation of renewable alternative energy projects requires proper and expensive infrastructure, which not all of the states are capable of it in an economic context. Therefore, alternatives and new routes in the traditional energy sources are vital priorities for the EU.
Since the last gas dispute with Russia, the EU has started to build effective policies to bring energy sources safely to the internal market by efficient transportation. Thus, the EU is trying to reduce energy dependency level on Russia by using geographical proximity advantage to the energy centres. In this sense, the Caspian region offers more stable and secured energy flow considering the fact that the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) project is designed for this purpose between the region and the EU. Therefore, the EU is providing substantial support for the reconstruction and development of the infrastructure of gas pipelines, which passes from transit countries such as Georgia and Turkey and brings energy resources to Europe. There are several important reasons that the EU took into consideration while implementing SGC. Firstly, the 2006 and 2009 gas dispute showed that Ukraine is not a reliable transit country anymore. Instead, Turkey can be the more optimal alternative route as it has a desire to become a regional power. Secondly, Azerbaijan offers more stable and secured energy supply by using its foreign energy relations experience from 1994. Also, Azerbaijan is more interested in to cooperate with the West in energy relations rather than sticking into one direction and using intermediary actors. Because having reliable and effective transportation networks for easy access to the world market is essential for economic development and security of Azerbaijan due to its geographical location as a landlocked state. Thirdly and most important factor is security. In the modern era, the prior direction of the states’ foreign policy is the solution of the security problem. Eastern part of the EU, especially CEE countries, are highly dependent on Russian gas, which makes them go under both political and economic pressures from time to time. Therefore, the principal direction of the EU is to ensure energy security as well as the national security of the Member States by diversifying their economic trade partners. Energy security can be described either additional category of the national security or a category which is based on the synthesis of economic and political security. Thus, as the energy security has both economic and political implications, the EU makes great efforts to protect its borders from any threat by addressing to the issue in two ways; international aspect which is targeted to provide reliable, cost-effective and low-risk energy imports to the domestic warehouses, and local aspect which is intended to establish uninterrupted supply of energy with affordable price for the population and industrial workers (consumers).
TANAP AND AZERBAIJAN-EU ENERGY RELATIONS
In 2011 Azerbaijan and the EU signed a joint declaration on the Southern Gas Corridor. SGC was more an optimal and promising version of the Nabucco pipeline project. The direction of the project was also crucial for Europe because the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) in the SGC will deliver Azerbaijani gas to the South of Europe. Thus, this pipeline both will meet the gas needs of these regions and diminish Europe’s energy dependence on Russia slightly. Unlike Nabucco, the SGC is a more promising and strategic start to bring gas resources from the Caspian Sea, Middle East, and Central Asia. The primary purpose of this project is to diversify energy routes by using completely new and alternative directions. The geopolitical significance of the TAP project is quite high in terms of diversifying energy sources. Although the main direction of the TAP project is Italy and Greece at initial stage, the pipeline can supply Azerbaijani gas to several European countries, such as Austria, Central Europe region, Bulgaria, Balkan countries, Southern Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as United Kingdom, Germany, France and Switzerland.
The project was announced on November 17 2011 at the Third Black Sea Energy and Economic Forum held in Istanbul and following this a memorandum of understanding was signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey on December 26 2011. The opening ceremony of TANAP was held on November 30, 2019, in Ipsala of Turkey’s Edirne province. Ipsala is located near the Turkey-Greece border, and TANAP is connected to the TAP, which will bring Azerbaijani gas to European region directly. TANAP is the largest and central segment of SGC and has strategic importance for both Azerbaijan and Turkey. First and foremost, Azerbaijan will be able to transfer its natural resources directly into the European market for the first time in history. Second, by joining this project, Turkey reaffirms its position in the regional security by becoming a reliable regional energy hub. Third, European states support the energy supply from the Caspian Sea to the European market and by providing economic and political support. Thus, SGC is a multinational natural gas pipeline supported by the European Commission and financed by the World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Despite the US has not invested and will not get any commercial benefit from the project, Washington supports TANAP due to its promotion of diversification of energy supplies.
The EU is making significant efforts to diversify its energy supply and deliver Caspian gas to Europe without Russian intervention. On the other hand, procedures between the EU and Azerbaijan show that Azerbaijan is interested in independent cooperation with the EU. Although the Nabucco project failed, with the choice of TAP and TANAP projects, Azerbaijan proved its pragmatic partnership and its aim to increase revenues. At the same time, from its independence, the absence of internal conflicts in Azerbaijan, continuous promotion of peace, active involvement in international missions resulted in a robust, durable and stable economy and political system. In fact,as long as Azerbaijan is interested in delivering energy to the West by supporting transit projects, the EU does not face any difficulties in the region.
In order to describe the big picture, as presented by the EU Commission prior to the global financial crisis and alternative energy routes, it is essential to note that volume and cost are not the only elements at stake in the SGC.It has crucial geopolitical consequences. Building East-West transportation corridor passing through South Caucasus to connect Europe to Asia offers to establish new infrastructures, railways, highways and pipelines, new job opportunities, security as well as different transport facilities. This corridor sits right at the intersection of both politics and economics. In terms of economics, it creates new chances for the regional countries to connect to global markets and to stimulate economic development by fostering integration with the global economy. On the other hand, politically, it enhances the strength of sovereignty of both sides by opening new supply routes. Because the creation of transit corridors requires diversified access to the international arena considering the fact that being dependent on a single route may emerge potential blockade by the exporter.
Azerbaijan is one of the main actors of this corridor and can supply gas to the European market by improving European energy security and without creating additional geopolitical tension. Azerbaijan has experienced energy trade with Europe by implementing the BTC pipeline. Alternative supplies remain its significance by building affordable and relatively more feasible projects with necessary investments. Azerbaijan, in this picture, emerges as the most reliable supplier and trade partner with a clear understanding of supply, demand and transit routes. Therefore, the initiative of SGC, TANAP and TAP together with the EU aims to hinder Russia’s dominance in the European gas market. To put it briefly; SGC offers more benefits rather than its predecessors due to several reasons:
Energy resources in the Caspian Basin are important for the EU, and the geographical location of Azerbaijan makes it ideal and more optimal point for the transportation of these resources;
SGC is not long-distance route as Nabucco, therefore, it is affordable in terms of costs;
SGC will create competitive prices in the energy market, especially for Southern Europe at the first stage, and later for CEE countries;
SGC will strengthen Turkey’s position as a transit country, and enhance the EU-Azerbaijan relations.
In the future, it is planned to give life to the Trans-Caspian energy pipeline by connecting to the SGC. In this context, the legal status of the Caspian Sea defines the strategies of the five Caspian littoral states. Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea gave a ground that the other countries cannot intervene in the projects unless they are official partners. It means that by signing this convention, the five Caspian littoral states can build their energy strategies and policies independently. Thus, if the Trans-Caspian project is to be implemented in the future, it will be able to transport gas to Europe from other regions. The central part of this route will be the Southern Gas Corridor. Thus, Azerbaijan will also play a role in the region as a bridge to connect Europe with Asia, becoming a transit country. This means more investment, stronger infrastructure and well-built East-West relations.
TURKEY IS THE ‘KEY FOR THE ENERGY’
Turkey has limited natural resources which makes it dependent on external energy sources. As energy demand and dependency rate on external sources is increasing, energy issues have increased their weight by becoming the determinant of the dynamic of Turkish foreign policy gradually. The main objective of Turkey’s energy policy is to provide energy promptly to ensure economic growth as well as sufficient, reliable, competitive prices. Turkey imports its 98% energy demand from its energy-rich neighbours such as Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan thanks to its geographical location. On the other hand, Turkey is the vast market for these exporter countries. Therefore, the TANAP project has specific importance and means more than an energy project for Turkey. TANAP will not only diversify energy routes but also will contribute to the security of supply. Turkey considers this pipeline as an important project with its economic dimension because it will lead to the development of economic and political relations between Turkey and regional states. TANAP will improve the effectiveness of Turkey in the region as well as its position in the global energy projects. Another critical point is that Turkey aims to become an energy centre as Austrian Baumgarten if manages to involve as much as energy directions. This is important for the EU as well because by turning into an energy hub, Turkey can ensure Europe’s energy security and provide securitization of energy supply and formation of a market structure in which gas competes gas. Since TANAP offers regional prosperity and security, Turkey takes a critical role in every point of the value chain extending from producer to final consumer.
Since the dissolution of USSR, the Azerbaijan-Turkey axis has brought positive trends both in the political and economic fields. For instance, despite several issues and obstacles at the end of XX century, Azerbaijan and Turkey managed to implement the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (oil pipeline), Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (gas pipeline), and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (railway) projects and strengthen their geopolitical benefits in the world arena. Following this, TANAP project Turkey will gain a strategic momentum against Russia in the context of ensuring energy flow, especially to Europe in the near future.
In conclusion, since the restoration of state independence in 1991, the Republic of Azerbaijan has defined the integration and expansion of cooperation with the EU as one of the strategic directions of foreign policy. The economic integration interests of Azerbaijan towards Europe are shaped by geopolitical and geoeconomic position and socio-economic development of the country.The SGC is particularly vital in terms of EU’s energy security. The interest of the European countries in this project results in the construction of new infrastructure for the secure supply of energy resources from the Caspian region to Europe.Additionally, TAP and TANAP will have a positive impact on Europe’s as well as Turkey’s energy economy, while diversifying energy routes because these projects will create competitive prices in energy markets. Also, SGC is considered to be profitable for both the participating countries and companies directly involved in its implementation.
Oil market outlook 2020: It stands between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics
Global energy market is shivering. I saw this coming since last year and I’ve been sharing about this in my interviews in last few months. Iran and USA escalation would be bad for the global economic outlook. This is a very precarious time for the global markets. The need of the hour is diplomatic brinkmanship which lacks at the moment. Engagement strategy between Iran and USA looks a far fetched dream now.
And if we get oil prices over $100 a barrel, kiss the global economy and equity markets good bye. Global economy will lead into deeper recession Tangible assets like Real estate, gold and silver shine in tempestuous times.
Geopolitical Risk Is Making Impact Across All Asset Classes
1. Geopolitics is always derived from grand strategic objective which is based on the 3/4 variables.
USA Grand Strategic Objectives are
– Containment of China and Russia
– Control fuel based assets
– Control trade and sea routes
China is going to invest $400 billion in Iran oil and gas sector. If war breaks out, CPEC would suffer and impacts china’s global trade
– Control Indian Ocean and few important straits
Markets Are Nervous
If the markets get jittery, USA is to blame for the whole mess. Oil market is already in the BACKWARDATION PHASE I.e (spot price is higher than future price). This is an ominous signal for the market players. Two geo strategic risk happened in less than 4 months.
1. Sept 14 in Aramco field, price went up 14% in one day 2. Jan 3 in Drone attack, price increased by 5.2% in less than 21 hours
History Of Oil Market: Outlier In Prices Possible
The question everyone is asking: what if war starts between Iran and USA, would we see 2008 levels when oil was trading at $147.17 / barrel on July 11-2008?. Premature to say but tensions are running very high and can turn into major conflict. Oil touching 3 digits cannot be ruled out according to market experts based in the energy market.
Oil Market Outlook -2020: Bedlam Is The Only Word
Oil market will remain precarious and in the mainstream media news reporting due to possible production cuts / geopolitical risk are coming into the energy market. I foresee oil prices to be touching around $62 to $90/barrel in 2020.
Premises are simple
1. Dollar to stay weaker
2. Geo political risk
3. Production cuts tantamount to 1-2 million barrel per day
4. Bankruptcies looming.
I have structured two possible scenarios taking into account few variables:
Probability of events,
Statistics of energy market
Market intelligence report and
3 days war between Iran and USA
Price range: 70 to 95
7 days or 1 month conflict between the two countries
Price range: $90 to $150/ barrel
In case of war, oil be trading at a premium ranging from $15 to $50/ barrel. Global macroeconomic stability goes into jeopardy. Tough times ahead of us.
The effect of wildfires on sustainable development
With only 10 years left to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, world leaders in September 2019 called for accelerated action...
Public and Private Sectors Unite on Need for More Renewables
Current energy systems are falling short of supporting the transition to a renewables-based system, participants of the third Public-Private Dialogue,...
India’s Modi: Messiah or Menace
When the Hindu sages developed their way of life, they divided people into four castes: Brahmins, the thinkers, scholars and...
Teenagers’ career expectations narrowing to limited range of jobs
Huge changes to the world of work over the past two decades have made little impact on teenagers’ career expectations,...
Deloitte Shares Insights on the Libra Project
Deloitte today published its viewpoint on the Libra Project, a payment tool that seeks to facilitate a more connected global...
ADB Loan to Unlock Long-Term Financing for Solar Power in Viet Nam
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) today signed a $37.8 million loan deal with TTC Energy Development Investment Joint Stock Company...
Technology can help track choices to balance nutrition and climate impact
Like the popular fitness apps, which help users track their exercise activities, food intake and more, an app called Evocco...
Green Planet3 days ago
You never miss the water, till the well runs dry
South Asia3 days ago
Genocide: Terrible and scaring ground situation in India
Economy3 days ago
Iran: Trade centers in regional countries to spur non-oil exports
Environment3 days ago
1t.org Announced to Accelerate Nature Restoration to Tackle Climate and Biodiversity Crises
Economy3 days ago
The EU-India FTA saved is human-rights earned
Economy3 days ago
Industrial Revolution of Mind: Image Supremacy of Critical Thinking
Defense3 days ago
Looking Behind the Daily News: Informed Narratives on Israel’s Nuclear Challenges
East Asia2 days ago
Tsai’s re-election Poses New Challenge to China