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The status of Chinese–Russian energy cooperation in the Arctic

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Authors: Ekaterina Klimenko & Camilla T.N. Sørensen

[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] T [/yt_dropcap]he Arctic is estimated to contain 30 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves. Climate change has accelerated the melting of the Arctic ice, making these resources more available. This backgrounder looks at the status of Chinese–Russian energy cooperation in the Arctic.

In the past decade, Russia has been actively developing Arctic resources and shipping routes, while boosting its military presence in the region. While Russia has primarily worked with European countries to develop its energy resources, including in the Arctic, a number of factors have led Russia to reconsider and look even more to Asia for potential investors and technology partners, and as a key consumer market. China is increasingly highlighted as an important partner for Russia in developing the Russian Arctic.

China has increased its focus on and engagement in the Arctic over the past decade. From a Chinese perspective, cooperation with Russia on Arctic resources and shipping routes also helps facilitate a greater Chinese role and influence in the region and gradually gain respect and acceptance for China as a legitimate Arctic stakeholder.

Interests in the Arctic

Russia’s Arctic strategy identifies the following core national interests: (a) use of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base; (b) safe-guarding the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation; and (c) use of the Northern Sea Route as a national integrated transport-communication system for Russia in the Arctic. Among these goals, the development of offshore and onshore oil and gas resources is a top priority.

The Russian economy is largely dependent on revenues from oil and gas. At least 50 per cent of federal budget revenue is generated from exports of energy resources. Most of Russia’s oil and gas production is concentrated in the traditional areas of western Siberia. However, their depletion over the past decade means that the geography of production has been shifting to new regions to the north of western Siberia, including the Yamal Peninsula and the Arctic seas.

To date, China’s focus and activities in the Arctic region have been primarily concentrated on its scientific interests, particularly those that relate to how the melting ice and changing climate in the Arctic will affect China. However, over the past decade, China’s activities have begun to concentrate more on economic interests and concerns about securing and diversifying China’s supply of energy resources and minerals. China has also developed a growing interest in the Arctic shipping routes, which could provide it with alternatives to the longer and strategically vulnerable routes currently in use. Furthermore, China is interested in securing a voice in the evolving Arctic governance regime, which is related to its importance and potential implications for wider global and regional governance.

As a result, China seeks to diversify and strengthen its bilateral relations with all the Arctic states by establishing stronger diplomatic ties, scientific cooperation, and economic partnerships.

Drivers of Chinese–Russian energy cooperation in the Arctic

Russia

Major shifts in world energy markets have significantly affected the development of Russia’s Arctic shelf resources and the expansion of the current onshore resources of the Yamal Peninsula. At least three key factors have led to a significant overproduction of natural gas in Russia and hence delayed the development of gas resources on the Arctic shelf: (a) EU plans to prioritize the diversification of gas suppliers in the European market; (b) difficult relations with Ukraine, which is the third largest consumer of Russian gas; and (c) shale gas revolution has also resulted in the loss of other potential markets.

In relation to oil, estimates suggest that the fall in oil prices has made the development of the Arctic shelf oilfields unprofitable. This will continue to be the case while the price of oil stays below USD $100 per barrel. However, the decisive factor in the need for Russian companies to diversify their partnerships has been the geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine.

The USA and the EU introduced sanctions against Russia in 2014 after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Among these sanctions, the third package, which was introduced in July 2014, has had significant implications because it concerns the transfer of technologies. The USA and EU sanctions include a ban on the transfer of equipment and technology for deep drilling below 150–152 metres, as well as on exploration and development of Arctic shelf shale oil reserves.

These sanctions forced ExxonMobil, Statoil and other Western companies to suspend their cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. The third package of sanctions also introduced strict financial restrictions, applied to loans of longer than 30 days. The largest Russian banks and corporations in Russia, such as Rosneft, Transneft, Gazpromneft, Gazprom, Novatek, Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz, remain under sanctions. This has made it difficult to seek financing for Arctic projects in Western financial markets.

China

Seen from Beijing, Russia, as the biggest Arctic state, stands as an important gatekeeper and ‘necessary partner’ for non-Arctic states such as China. China knows that in many ways it is dependent on Russia—for example, for Russian goodwill and support—if China is to increase its activities and consolidate its role as a legitimate stakeholder in the region. Consequently, in a Chinese analysis, there is no way to avoid dealing and getting along with Russia in the Arctic.

Despite the lower growth rate of the Chinese economy in recent years, its demand for energy and resources continues to grow and its state-owned enterprises are continuously encouraged to identify and establish new areas for exploration and extraction. China sees the Russian Far East, Siberia and the Russian Arctic as increasingly important due to their potential in relation to energy resources, export markets and new shipping and trading routes. It also sees these regions as recipients of and partners in Chinese-led infrastructure and other development projects.

These activities have synergies with China’s high-profile ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, through which China is seeking access to vital European markets through Central Asia and Russia. China also seeks to take advantage of current Russian geostrategic and geo-economic vulnerabilities and of Russia’s need for China as a partner to gradually strengthen its presence and relationships in the Arctic.

Concrete steps towards Chinese-Russian cooperation on the development of the Arctic shelf

In February and March 2013, during a round of oil delivery negotiations, Rosneft and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) discussed opportunities for cooperation on shelf projects in the Arctic Barents Sea and Pechora Sea, with a particular focus on the Zapadno-Prinovozemelsky, Yuzhno Russky, Medyskoe Sea and Varandeyskoe Sea deposits. Among these, the Medyskoe Sea and Varandeyskoe Sea are the most promising, containing an estimated 3.9 million and 5.5 million tonnes of oil per year, respectively. Although the head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, confirmed a commitment to work with China on the Arctic shelf early in 2014, however, no official confirmation or details have yet to emerge.

In late 2015, Russia’s Deputy Energy Minister reiterated that Rosneft was still ‘negotiating’ and ‘discussing’ its participation in Arctic shelf energy and extraction projects with China. The relative lack of progress over nearly two years could indicate that China is either reluctant to invest or trying to get a better deal. Moreover, the fact that China did not invest in the Vankor deposit in East Siberia and did not buy Rosneft’s shares could demonstrate that its interest in the Russian upstream has decreased, or that it cannot accept Rosneft’s conditions. It could also be argued that the Russian oil and gas delivery deals that China secured in 2013 and 2014 have reduced its overall interest in the Russian upstream, including in the Arctic. Nonetheless, analysts continue to claim that China wants not just to be part of, but to have a managerial stake, in these Arctic projects.

Another unanswered question is the extent to which Chinese companies can replace the work of Western partners on the Arctic shelf, particularly their technological assistance. Despite such concerns, Russia and China have increased their technological cooperation in the oil and gas sectors since the imposition of sanctions. In September 2015, for example, China Oilfield Services Limited (COSL) signed deals with Rosneft and Norwegian Statoil to drill two exploration wells in the Sea of Okhotsk, which has similar conditions to the Arctic. Igor Sechin noted that the agreements unlocked new potential for cooperation on oil and gas resource exploration by industry leaders in Russia, Norway and China. The extent to which this potential will affect the Arctic remains to be seen.

Emerging Chinese-Russian cooperation on the Yamal Peninsula

If offshore projects remain a question for the future, onshore cooperation in the Arctic is already advancing. In February 2013, the head of Novatek visited China as part of an official Russian delegation to discuss opportunities for cooperation on its main Arctic project, Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG). As a result of this visit and several subsequent rounds of negotiations, on 5 September 2013, Novatek and CNPC signed a contract for the sale of a 20 per cent stake in Yamal LNG. The agreement includes a long-term contract for the supply of not less than 3 million tonnes of LNG per year to China, which is 18 per cent of total capacity. The deal was approved by the Russian Government in November 2013 and signed in January 2014.

Following the breakout of the crisis in Ukraine, Novatek became the target of sanctions and Yamal LNG faced further financial difficulties. Novatek was forced to seek further engagement with foreign partners and China was among the few remaining alternatives. In September 2015, Novatek sold the Silk Road Fund, a Chinese sovereign fund, a further 9.9 per cent of Yamal LNG for approximately EUR €1.09 billion. In December 2015, as part of the deal, Novatek received a loan from the Silk Road Fund of EUR €730 million for a period of 15 years to finance the project.

As a follow-up to these advances, on 29 April 2016 Yamal LNG announced the signing of agreements with the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank on two 15-year credit facilities of a total amount of EUR €9.3 billion to finance the project. China will therefore provide up to 60 per cent of the necessary capital to implement the project.

Despite this impressive track record of cooperation on Yamal LNG, two problems reveal the limits of possible Chinese-Russian energy cooperation. First, Novatek had serious difficulties in securing Chinese financing for the project. The deal was only concluded after numerous delays and negotiations. Second, China also received huge benefits from the deal, since up to 80 per cent of the equipment for Yamal LNG will be produced in Chinese shipyards.

This shows that, despite China’s interest in energy projects in the Arctic and Russia’s eagerness to obtain Chinese partnerships, there are a lot of difficulties ahead. Chinese companies will work on projects that they are interested in only under conditions that they find acceptable. Thus, Russia will have to offer good conditions to attract the Chinese and develop Chinese–Russian energy cooperation.

Looking forward

Despite the stream of positive adjectives flowing from both Russia and China in recent months about partnership and friendship, cooperation in the Arctic has not progressed much. Except for cooperation on the Yamal Peninsula, Russian and Chinese companies have not yet found further mutual ground for energy cooperation in the Arctic.

On the one hand, Russian companies need and welcome Chinese investments and loans; on the other hand, they are not entirely comfortable allowing Chinese companies to play too big a role in Russian energy projects, including those in the Arctic. Chinese companies, in contrast, are in a very strong position at the moment and would not agree to anything less than a significant controlling and management role.

As a result, there is a degree of disappointment in Russia that energy cooperation with China has not developed as anticipated and thus has not mitigated the crisis with the West to the desired degree. Seen from Russia, China has taken advantage of the situation, for example to extract especially favourable terms on energy deals and to insist on high interest rates on major Chinese loans. That is, China has not shown the expected goodwill, which is why using the Chinese–Russian partnership as leverage against the West has not worked.

This topical backgrounder is based on the upcoming policy paper ‘Emerging Chinese–Russian Cooperation in the Arctic: Possibilities and Constraints’ by Camilla T. N. Sørensen and Ekaterina Klimenko. First published at SIPRI.org

(*) Camilla T. N. Sørensen is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen.

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Energy

Potential of Pakistan’s Power Sector

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A few years ago, several hours of load-shedding in Pakistan was very common, even in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan was without electricity for 6 hours on daily basis. Thanks to CPEC, thanks to China, who has completed several power projects and the people of Pakistan are relieved a lot. Now there is still load-shedding but only for couple of hours. The country was able to produce 16000 MW of electricity in the 7 decades almost. And most of the mega projects were completed in 1960s or 1970. Last 4 decades the nation was unable to add any significant amount of power into national grid.

China helped Pakistan to over-come its power shortage and just within few years, under CPEC, the country was able to add 11000 MW of power into National Grid. There are several power projects under execution or in the pipe line. It is believed, that next couple of years and we may get rid of load-shedding absolutely. However, it is also expected that due to planned industrialization, the demand may also increase tremendously. We still need to focus on the power generation, transmission and distribution. As the transmission is rather old and line losses are rather high. There is a need to up-grade our transmission system on urgent basis. The major issue is still the distribution, which resulted in theft of electricity. Line losses and theft made electricity rather expensive as it has to be recovered from consumers.

However, Pakistan possess potential of 65000 MW hydropower generation. Some of the sits are natural dams and suits for electricity production easily. Building big dams or mega dams, require a lot of investment as well as technical expertise too. But, small dams are easily constructed by our private sector. The requirement of investment is within the reach of our private sector and the technology required is also available within the country.

Dams also store water which will be additional value for Pakistan. As Pakistan is a country which faces water related disaster twice a year. During the rainy season, heavy rains causes flood every year and damages our crops, cattle’s, villages and loss of human live. Floods cause spread of seasonal diseases and epidemics also cause a big loss to nation. Just after a few month, Pakistan faces drought season too. During the drought season, water shortage cause big damage to human life and animals’ and husbandry. Crops suffered heavy losses due to shortage of water.

If appropriate dams are built, it may generate power to meet the national requirements as well it stores water during rainy season to avoid floods and utilize water during the drought season. We can overcome some of our serious problems by indigenous technology and domestic resources, without going to International donors.

Usually building big dams requires a long time 10-15 years, but our political system is based on 5 years tenure term. Most of political parties do not initiate any project, which cannot be completed within their tenure and they get benefits of completed projects during the election. As a practice, most of political parties never takes any initiatives, which may goes to credit of next government. But recently, Pakistani voters have become matured and they understands the worth of long term projects and may vote for those who are visionary leaders and sincere with Pakistan, and take long tern initiatives for the best interest of the nation. Our political parties may also up-date their strategies accordingly.

Not only hydropower, even Pakistan is rich with coal. Only Thar coal can meet the nation’s energy requirement for next 500 years. Coal technologies are on its path of rapid development. There exists technologies to convert coal into natural gas, or diesel. Coal can also help the whole downstream hydrocarbon industry too. Clean coal technologies are already applied in the field. Pakistan can be major beneficiary of its coal reserves.

God has blessed Pakistan with unlimited solar energy. There are areas in Pakistan, where the Sun shine duration is above 300 days in a year, and upto 18 hours of Sun shine on daily basis. This unique potential may be exploited for green and clean energy. Wind is also one of our strength.

What do we need? An enabling policy from Government of Pakistan. The policy may be focused to attract local entrepreneurs based on incentives. Sustainable and long term incentives, and protection may be the priority of Government. Our private sector possess the potential of rapid growth. It may include International market too. But the indigenous know-how and domestic investment may be given priority.

If PTI government can deliver something like this, their next elections are guaranteed to win.  As per my perception, Imran Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan has vision, has will and sincere with the nation, based on our understanding, we expect he will take serious notice of things and include power sector in its priority too.

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Back to the future

Laszlo Varro

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In the classic Back to the Future movies, the future was powered by a decentralized clean-energy system. Houses and flying cars ran on fuel cells fuelled by residential garbage. The technology itself isn’t particularly far-fetched – not the flying car bit, but the process to power a fuel cell from hydrogen produced by methane from garbage is relatively straightforward for today’s biogas plants.

But time travel aside, what the 1980s vision of the future missed are the actual technologies that emerged started to reshape our energy system in the last three decades since the movies came out – namely wind, solar and battery electric cars. While the present of the energy system is strikingly similar to the 1980s with a practically unchanged domination of fossil fuels, the expectations of what will follow shifted. This is a very different future and one that creates a delicate challenge for the electricity sector.

Transport is a huge and growing energy consuming sector. It represents 28% of total final energy consumption, and is responsible for almost 60% of global oil demand. Electricity is used in transport, though today mostly in electric railways compared to which electric cars are still minor.

If garbage, or, in a more scalable fashion, biomass or hydrogen produced from natural gas, were to provide a clean-energy alternative for transport, the transport sector could move away from oil without integrating more deeply into the electricity sector. There would be no need to deploy new infrastructure to support electric car charging, no concerns about charging times and impacts on power flows, it would be business as usual for electricity.

In addition, garbage is easy to store, and fuel cells can regulate their production in a flexible fashion. In technical terms this creates decentralised dispatchable clean-energy production – meaning it can collect power into a central system, much like the current system. Such a technology would enable the continuation of a hundred-year paradigm of regarding electricity demand fluctuations as a given and managing the system from the supply side.

But, this market is tiny. Only a few thousand residential fuel cells are sold in Japan each year, nothing compared to the millions of solar panels sold around the world. To be sure, solar production varies with the weather and it is often not well correlated with demand. A solar rooftop with a battery in the garage seems like a perfect distributed dispatchable solution and generates increasing attention. However, more than 99% of the solar panels are deployed without batteries – their variability is handled at the system level rather than at a project level. In fact the optimal location is of batteries is often not next to the solar panel but in specific network nodes where their operation can relieve bottlenecks.

Solar and its twin brother, wind experienced a radical technological progress, cost declines and are rolled out at an impressive scale. While the energy system will continue to rely on a diversified set of fuels and technologies, the rapid growth of wind and solar will have to play a key role in tacking  disruptive climate change. Nevertheless, both of them generate electricity which accounts for only 20% of energy consumption today.  The full potential of wind and solar will be realised only if a much higher proportion of energy is consumed by electrifying other sectors, including transport. Such electrification not only reduces direct fossil fuel use in vehicles or buildings, but if done smartly it unlocks need new flexibility sources that wind and solar will need for really large-scale growth.

The transport technology that generates the most excitement is electric cars. Although personal cars represent only a minority of the oil use of the transport sector, electric cars capture public imagination in a fashion that is disproportional to their energy footprint. As a result, they tend to dominate discussions on the future of energy even though ships, aircraft or heavy trucks are most likely to continue to use oil for a considerable time. Linking electric cars to wind and solar creates major opportunities but also challenges. Cars and wind and solar production will need to interact through an interconnected system. An EV can’t be self-sufficient when coupled with a residential rooftop solar panel since solar production is low in the winter precisely when the car has a higher electricity need. In temperate climates, nearly all solar households remain connected to the grid with a changed utilisation pattern and wind is evolving towards a quintessential utility scale big business where technological progress makes wind turbines bigger and bigger rather than small and decentralised.

While early adopter electric cars used in suburban commuting can take advantage of the existing network and charge in the garage of the owner for mass adoption and long distance travel a new infrastructure development will be needed. High capacity chargers will require network reinforcements as well as a careful coordination of when the cars charge. Due to the energy density of hydrocarbons, it is not possible to copy the gasoline lifestyle to the electricity age. Plugging in and quickly filling the car at sunset will be part of the problem, responding to changes in wind with smart charging will be part of the solution.

A dominant role of electricity is not a new dream. The 19th-century science fiction novels of Jules Verne are full of electric cars, battery powered submarines and even electric helicopters. This electric future was delayed by the century of oil, but it is now arriving. Its features are becoming increasingly clear: A new electricity network that is more robust and more flexible at the same time. A new market design that is able to orient and optimise millions of producers, consumers and prosumers giving value to time and location. A new transport system where parking vehicles are not idle but act as active system assets.

Because of its security implications and importance to modern society, electricity will remain a heavily regulated industry where government policy plays a crucial role in guiding the transformation. This complex interplay of technology, investment, policy and regulation shaping the growing role of electricity will be depicted in the upcoming World Energy Outlook focus. In special effects, it might not be up to Hollywood’s standards, but it will be as exciting and innovative.

IEA

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Israel’s Gas Ambitions are Valid but Challenges Remain

Antonia Dimou

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The discovery of Israel’s natural gas resources promise important benefits of energy security and economic gains. Israel is a leading country because preparations to extract gas are already at advanced stages despite that its gas fields’ development has proved to be a lengthy process.

Delays are attributed to the fact that the fields’ development is capital intensive and entails risks that unsettle investors. A major risk is the lack of energy transportation infrastructure in Israel. Leviathan field partners namely Noble Energy, Avner Oil Exploration, Ratio Oil Exploration and Delek Drilling are likely to develop infrastructure used exclusively by Leviathan, blocking out competitors and endangering prospects for future gas discoveries in Israel. In particular, the likelihood that competitors will have to finance their own transportation infrastructure, raises the costs of developing smaller fields at prohibitive levels. Concurrently, the Israeli Leviathan field’s development, the largest exploration success since December 2010,is capital intensive given that it requires significant investment that will be carried out in two stages: the first stage foresees four development wells with an annual capacity production of 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas, and, the second, four additional wells that would increase production capacity by another 9 bcm.

In regional terms, Israel’s efficiency as a gas exporter is significant. This is evidenced by the signing in early 2018 of two agreements valued $15 billion between Leviathan and Tamar fields’ consortium and Egyptian company Dolphinus Holdings for the provision of 64 bcm of gas over a ten-year period. The agreement are expected to produce three benefits. First, Egypt is a viable export market for Israeli gas and will thus generate interest from foreign energy companies to bid for licenses in future Israeli international auction rounds. Second, the Israeli government would benefit financially from royalties on sales and taxes on profits. Third, Leviathan partners will secure funding for the field’s development.

Reservations however subsist when it comes to the transportation of Israeli gas to Egypt via the existing pipeline infrastructure in Sinai as terrorist attacks on the pipeline could halt exports from Israel as it happened in 2012. The prospect of terrorism raises the cost of the Israeli fields’ development because of the increased risk premium. It is in this spirit that the construction of a subsea gas pipeline that connects Israel to Egypt could present a safer option. In any case, transportation of Israeli gas to Egypt is not only a milestone in regional gas cooperation, but also supports authentic Israel-Egypt normalization.

Israeli government interference in the form of heavy regulation and bureaucracy is a self-inflicted wound that prevents foreign energy companies from participating in bidding processes. Despite the approval of a revised framework for gas regulation by the Israeli government,  the first Israeli bidding process received limited attention taking into account that only a Greek energy company and a consortium of Indian companies participated. Notably, the main outlines of the revised gas regulatory framework included the mandatory sale by Delek Group Ltd, Avner Oil & Gas LP and Delek Drilling LP of all their rights in the Israeli Tanin and Karish fields that are currently owned by Greek Eneregan Oil & Gas Company; and, a stability clause which foresees that the Israeli government guarantees regulatory stability for ten years.

On a parallel level, overlapping maritime claims between Israel and Lebanon over a 854-square kilometer maritime boundary carry the risk of escalation. The January 2018 signing of Lebanon’s first exploration and production agreement (EPA) with a consortium of companies led by French Total as operator, and Italian Eni and Russian Novatek as partners signals competition that could evolve into confrontation over energy resources. Undoubtedly, in the absence of mutual diplomatic recognition between Lebanon and Israel, no trans-boundary natural resource sharing initiative can be taken. The consortium’s announcement that no operation within 25 km of the disputed area will happen leaves room for a third party mediation to minimize the risk of armed conflict and to work on reciprocal acceptance of the 2012 American proposal so that consensual and authorized economic activity becomes feasible. Noteworthy, the 2012 American proposal involved division of the disputed area granting Lebanon a larger share with the aim to serve as basis of bilateral discussions and be deposited with the UN.

To fulfill its energy potential, Israel should speedy proceed with the supply of gas pumped directly from the Leviathan and Tamar fields to LNG plants in Egypt as this will benefit both Egypt’s natural gas industry and development of Israeli fields.  Israel should also invest in security of its energy supply to refute the notion of insecurity that prevents foreign energy companies from investing in the country’s gas fields. Equally important, risks that concern investors like export sustainability should be addressed by guaranteeing a certain amount of financial recovery though the existing compensation mechanism. A transparent and predictable Israeli regulatory environment for foreign investors and access to external sources of project finance and loan guarantees and production commitments in Israel are important for the development of export oriented gas resources.

Unquestionably, decisive steps have to be taken by Israel so that a new horizon is revealed; the horizon of indigenous energy development.

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