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ISIS Drones: Evolution, Leadership, Bases, Operations and Logistics

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Asaad Almohammad, Ph.D. & Anne Speckhard, Ph.D.

[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] T [/yt_dropcap]he use of drones by terrorist organizations has been documented for over a decade [[1],[2], & [3]]. During November 2004, Hezbollah used Mirsad-1, an Iranian made drone, for reconnaissance over Israeli territories, for 20 minutes without being intercepted. Hezbollah operatives managed to fly the drone back to Lebanon.

It is reported that Hamas, the Palestinian terror group, had a development and storage facility for drones that were destroyed by the Israel Air Force during mid-November 2012 [[4]]. By mid-July 2014, Hamas also used Ababil-1, an Iranian made drone, which was shot down by the Israeli forces [[5]]. Furthermore, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, another designated terrorist organization, was able to hack the video feeds of the Israeli’s army drones for the period from 2011 to 2014 [[6]].

The first successful and significant use of drones to attack rival forces by a non-state actor has only occurred recently. It was carried out by Hezbollah agents in Arsal, Syria during late September 2014 in which their aerial attack targeted and killed 32 fighters of al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda’ affiliates in Syria. More recently, ISIS began using drones to drop Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), most often grenades, to successfully hit enemy targets.

Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) commented to The Washington Times on ISIS’s use of IED loaded drones [[7]] [[8]]:“In the end the IEDs are the terrorist’s artillery… This is not rocket science. This is a natural progression for IEDs. This isn’t crazy stuff that this is happening now. We should have seen this coming.”

Indeed, terrorist organizations’ obsession with drones is not new.

Hezbollah, a Shiite militia, and Hamas, a Sunni jihadi group and an affiliate of the Muslim Brothers, are both supported by the Iranian regime. Their drones, both the units and the training to operate them, are also Iranian sponsored. Unlike these two terrorist organizations, ISIS developed its drone program using off-the-shelf commercial drones and there is no evidence that they relied on any state actors in improving such capabilities. As ISIS started to appear on the defeat, the group increasingly began to release materials on its drone-based operations, including surveillance, command and control, and attacks. These published pictures and videos were largely employed for propaganda purposes.

By February 2017, ISIS drones became the sexy new topic among ISIS’ sympathizers and nemeses, instigating the discussion, debate, and projection of the nature and employment of these weapons in potential terrorist attacks. Alarmed by the current and potential danger of drones as a tool of terror, this report is devoted to collecting intelligence on drone-related operations within ISIS-held territories in Syria. Before presenting the obtained information, a review of the jihadi group’s activities and operations regarding this program is instrumental to inferring the current and future implications of ISIS’ progression in this area.

ISIS’ Use of Drones

In this section ISIS drones’ capabilities and activities are summarized based on a wealth of available open-source information. ISIS’ documented use of the technology has been covered thoroughly by commentators, analysts, and academics. The following list presents a chronological summary of ISIS’ rapid progression and utilization of drones across Iraq, Syria, and Libya for the period spanning August 2014 to March 2017:

  1. The National Defense Magazine reported on a YouTube video showing one of the first instances of the use of drones by ISIS in late August 2014 [[9]]. The video showed aerial footage of army bases in the close vicinity of Raqqa city. The National Defense Magazine argued that ISIS’ utilization of the technology would allow the jihadi group to gain situational awareness and use more advanced propaganda material.
  2. In a video released during early September 2014 [[10]], an ISIS operative claimed that the group used drones in surveilling and collecting intelligence on the Tabqa Military Airbase, Raqqa before they launched an assault and seized it from al-Assad’s forces. A propaganda video that was released by al-I’tisam, a media company of ISIS, on the 9th of September 2014 showed some reconnaissance footage that seemed to be taken by ISIS operatives before they attacked the base [[11]].
  3. ShamiWitness, a major twitter account that used to spread ISIS propaganda and methods, shared a guide providing beginners with instructions on how to start building multi-copter drones during mid-October 2014 [[12]].
  4. In early September 2014, ISIS captured and released aerial footage of a terrorist attack that targeted fighters in the Kurdish town of Kobane, Syria [[13]]. The video, taken by an ISIS drone, was used for propaganda purposes.
  5. In late January 2015, ISIS agents and/or sympathizers tweeted a link to a document that commented on the shortcoming of ISIS’ drones, argued the justifications behind the downing of the drones by rival forces, recommended different commercial drones, and provided instructions and resources on how ISIS can modify and improve its current drones [[14]].
  6. In early April 2015, ISIS released a video of an archaeological site, claiming the site had pagan idols, which they intended to destroy [[15]]. An ISIS drone took the opening footage. On two other separate occasions during early April 2015, ISIS claimed, through a released video and a picture, to have used its drones in reconnaissance missions to coordinate its attacks on an oil refinery in Baiji Iraq [[16]] and Ain Sheep checkpoint in Idlib governorate [[17]].
  7. In mid-December 2015, ISIS used a drone to film a suicide mission in Anbar province, Iraq [[18]].
  8. In early January 2016, an ISIS-released pictorial report surfaced online [[19]]. That report showed footage taken by an ISIS drone that was used to plan an attack on an Iraqi militia camp in the close vicinity of Fallujah. Moreover, during early January 2016, ISIS released a video captured by drones showing suicide missions in al-Anbar, Iraq [[20]].
  9. In late January 2016, ISIS released a video of the Benghazi battle in Libya. The video was largely used to threaten forces fighting ISIS and other Islamists factions [[21]]. In the video an operative appeared to be using a smartphone to control a drone that captured footage of the battle.
  10. In late February 2016, ISIS launched a Telegram channel to connect to and use the knowledge of scientists and engineers who sympathize with the militant group [[22]]. That channel discussed topics related to the assembly and development of ISIS’ drones, including remote control of missiles.
  11. In mid-May 2016, ISIS released a picture taken by a drone that captured an attack in the close vicinity of Ramadi, Iraq [[23]]. In late May 2016, a photo of ISIS’s operatives using a computer to control a drone during an attack on Iraqi forces in Fallujah surfaced in an announcement made by A’maq, ISIS’ news agency [[24]]. Moreover, ISIS also released a video that had scenes that had been captured by a drone [[25]]. The footage featured the assault on Peshmerga forces in the north of Mosul, Iraq on the 3rd of May 2016. During that attack Charles Keating, a U.S. Navy SEAL, was killed. In addition, during late May 2016, ISIS released a picture that included drone footage of its attack on Peshmerga forces in Ninawa, Iraq [[26]].
  12. In early July 2016, the Pentagon reported that ISIS was using drones equipped with full-motion cameras and IEDs [[27]].
  13. In late September 2016, ISIS released a video of a suicide attack on an Iraqi military base that shows drone footage of Belgian ISIS militants before carrying out the mission [[28]]. The video shows a Belgian jihadi, among others, calling for European Muslims not to fear death and to conduct similar attacks in the name of ISIS.
  14. In early October 2016, the Iraqi forces announced that they downed a drone belonging to ISIS in the south of Mosul [[29]]. The drone was reported to be carrying out a reconnaissance mission to surveil Iraqi forces’ advancement towards ISIS strongholds.
  15. In mid-November 2016 ISIS released a video showing its operations against Iraqi forces that were advancing to retake Mosul [[30]]. The film is full of drone footage that capture ISIS’ suicide attacks.
  16. In early December 2016, a video released by ISIS showed a more systematic and professional use of its drones in a raid in the close vicinity of Mosul, Iraq [[31]]. During that period, ISIS released drone footage of two operations, one that captured footage of an attack on Turkish and Syrian rebel forces around al-Bab Aleppo [[32]] and the other against the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces west of Mosul [[33]]. Moreover, in mid-September 2016, a pictorial announcement of suicide attack in the vicinity of Benghazi, Libya was released. That image showed drone footage of the operation [[34]].
  17. In early January 2017, ISIS released a film that contained drone footage [[35]] praising the suicide missions that were carried out by foreign and local jihadis during the battle for Mosul. In late January 2017 ISIS released a propaganda video showing its drones dropping grenade-sized munitions on Iraqi soldiers and tanks [[36]]. The video captures the damage caused by the bombs and claims that ISIS drones have become a nightmare for the forces battling the militant jihadi group. Moreover, during that period ISIS released another video showing an operation in which a drone dropped a bomb on a military site in Iraq [[37]].
  18. In early February 2017 ISIS released propaganda posters on Telegram and social media platforms. One of the posters features ISIS drones attacking and destroying U.S landmarks [[38]]. During early and mid-February 2017, ISIS released a flood of images of the damage caused by its combat drones across Iraq and Syria [[39], [40], & [41]], using them as propaganda material. In mid-February 2017, ISIS operatives or sympathizers started to call for the use of drones to target civilian populations, places of worship, and infrastructure (e.g., power grid), among other targets, in the West, Middle East, and North Africa [[42]]. This is no small thing given that when ISIS called for use of vehicular rammings and knife attacks a spate of them followed across Europe and elsewhere. Similarly when al-Qaeda and later ISIS repeated instructions for pressure cooker bombs and other homegrown attacks these calls were also heeded, although to a lesser extent.
  19. Moreover, ISIS also released a video using areal footage taken by its drones [[43]]. That video featured Iraqi and Syrian ISIS bombers, including two Yazidi children, carrying out suicide missions. In addition, ISIS operatives or sympathizers shared photos on Telegram that featured ISIS combat drones carrying out attacks during night time [[44]]. In February 2017, ISIS released a video showing their operatives in Salah Al-Din, Iraq learning how to modify and weaponize drones [[45]].
  20. In late March 2017, an Arab media outlet released an original file, which had been obtained from a hard a drive taken from ISIS headquarters in northern Syria, that showed Fadhel Mensi, a Tunisian national known in ISIS circles as Abu Yusri Al-Tunisi, who is an ISIS engineer working on increasing the weight that the drones could carry to 20 kilograms [[46]] increasing the damage they could do by dropping larger payload IEDs.

As mentioned earlier, ISIS developed its drones program without any support from state actors. That sets the jihadi militant group apart from terrorist organizations sponsored by Iran. Moreover, the program has been used to improved ISIS’ effectiveness on the battlefield since August 2014. The brief summary of ISIS’ employment of drones indicates that the group has rapidly improved its experience in using drones and has managed to improve its combat experience through use of the technology in surveillance missions, command and control, and in carrying out attacks against rival forces. The above review shows that the program has been largely used to harm the enemies of ISIS, but even more so to produce propaganda material to make ISIS look strong versus weakened under enemy assault and to instill fear in its rival forces, boost the morale of its own fighters and supporters, improve its brand, and increase recruitment. The material was also employed to provide its sympathizers across the globe with the knowledge required to use a cheap, non-suicidal tool of terror. The odds of drones being used by lone wolves in the West should alarm many [[47]]. There is a wealth of guides and instructions online, distributed by ISIS, for beginners to modify and weaponize off-the-shelf commercial drones and as stated earlier, ISIS’s calls for homegrown attacks and instructions on how to carry them out has been heeded in the past.

February 2017 marked a spike in ISIS’ use of drones and the release of propaganda associated with the program by ISIS media operatives and sympathizers. ISIS is on the defeat in Iraq and Syria and such deployment might enhance their chances of slowing the advancement of Syrian, and Iraqi forces and their American allies. Alerted to the danger of ISIS’ surveillance and combat drones, the Iraqi forces are now using the Raysun MD1, a Taiwanese made multicopter jammer, to neutralize this danger [[48]]. During late July 2016, the American forces were also seen in Iraq using a new technology known as DroneDefender (i.e., an assault-rifle-like device that functions as a frequency jammer to down ISIS drones [[49]]. Reports that a drone flew over the American Embassy Baghdad were also circulated of late. Some analyst argued that the aforementioned measures were not enough to tackle this sort of threat. For instance, Peter Singer, the New America Foundation’s analyst, reported [[50]]:

“The drone defender gun is not part of the regular kit,” implying it should be, and continued that American soldiers are “going to face this potential threat across the world, in anything from battles to doing an embassy evacuation. And that’s not good. We should have seen this coming and developed a plan and equipment, not just for us, but for allied forces.”

Furthermore, talking to reporters during the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium, Maj. Gen. Jay Silveria, deputy commander of U.S. Air Forces Central Command, argued that it’s critical to go after ISIS logistics, finance, leadership, and storage when it comes to the jihadi group’s drones program:

“Find how ISIS is training the pilots, where they’re storing the aircraft—not just wait until the thing shows up and then shoot it down.”

Indeed, if the group uses a swarming technique in a surprise attack it might be difficult to do so and jamming the drones could end up in them simply falling from the sky and exploding their payloads in any case.

In attempt to understand ISIS’ leadership, logistics, finance, storage, and training relating to the militant group’s drone program, the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) tasked a number of sources on the ground to collect intelligence. Constrained by the duration of data collection and resources, this report does not provide exhaustive details on the aforementioned aspects of ISIS’ drones program. However, information was obtained that was related to the leadership, development facilities, training centers, operations, logistics, and the interaction between different entities involved in the program. The following section presents the information obtained by ICSVE. The details are compared to data released by researchers and analysts, when possible, to present a clear picture and to carry out analyses.

Bases, Leadership, and Logistics

The data obtained by ICSVE related to ISIS’ drone activities within its territories in Syria. Trusted sources reported that they first saw ISIS drones during mid-January 2017. Previous reports show that ISIS has been actively using the technology at least since August 2014. As of mid-January 2017, ISIS had moved over 200 young militants known as Ashbal al-Khilafa (“Cubs of the Caliphate” in English) from the city of Raqqa to the town of Maadan. Members of the Cubs of the Caliphate were armed and equipped with suicide vests. A militant led the Cubs of the Caliphate by the name Harith al-Shmari (a.k.a. Abu al-Bara). The Cubs of the Caliphate shipped 12 small multicopter drones, each equipped with a small bomb using pickup trucks. Trusted sources connected the shipped drones to Abu Ukba al-Marakshi, one of ISIS’ key engineers. Al-Marakshi, a French national, who use to operate from al-Bab, Aleppo appeared in Raqqa during late December 2016. He was seen with Ali Juma Al-Shwakh (a.k.a. Abu Luqman, the emir of Emni [the director of ISIS security forces]).[51] Abu Luqman attended an exercise in the use of combat drones. Al-Marakshi was reported to be the one testing the drone and it was reported that he demonstrated the use of the technology to Abu Luqman. Al-Marakshi took part in the modification and weaponization of multicopters. In late January 2017, he moved with the Cubs of the Caliphate to Maadan, Raqqa.

Training Center

In early March 2017, ICSVE learned that ISIS ran a center to train militants on the use of drones in surveillance and combat capacities. During that period, ISIS trainees were seen flying multicopters in the city of Raqqa. To be exact, the drones flew over the intersection of 23 Shbat and Tal Abyad Streets in Raqqa. Sources traced the drones to their launching point. In mid-March 2017, a number of trusted sources reported the location of ISIS’ drone training center (see map below). The center used to be a female clothing outlet by the name Banat al-Yawm (translates literally to Today’s Girls and loosely to Modern Girls). Other sources obtained information on the individuals running the center. These members are as follow:

  • Ahmad Banawi (a.k.a. Abu Uqba), a Syrian national from the Idlib governorate, is in charge of the center. Ahmad Banawi was seen in public, teaching ISIS operatives how to use surveillance drones. He instructed the operatives in the area opposite the center. He is reported to have a degree in aerospace engineering.
  • A Libyan national by the alias Abu Amarah al-Libi reports to Ahmad Banawi. Al-Libi coordinates with other centers that are involved in ISIS’ drone program.
  • A French national by the alias Abu Muawia al-Faransi used to be connected to the training center. He is reported to be in France as of mid-March 2017. Sources could not obtain much on al-Faransi except that he is tall and blond.
  • An Iraqi national by the name Jibril (a.k.a. Abu Suhil) reports to Ahmad Banawi. He coordinates with entities that oversee ISIS’ drone program in Iraq. Jibril originates from Rawa, Iraq

Dronemap1

Map 1. Drones’ training center (latitude, longitude): 35.9514406, 39.0125906

In mid-March 2017, ICSVE received information indicating that individuals running ISIS’ drone training center in Raqqa were in constant contact with operatives who were affiliated with three other entities. The aforementioned entities were believed to be handling a number of drone-related operations. Data obtained at later dates uncovered that the three operational bases and the training center work closely with each other under one leader.

Initial Modification and Maintenance

After obtaining commercial drones, ISIS moves them to a base close to Panorama Park in Raqqa. The facilities used to be the headquarters of the environment directorate in Raqqa (see map below). This base is in charge of initial modification and the maintenance of ISIS’ drones. It is noteworthy that the base is not exclusive to drone-related operations. It was reported that other electronic and mechanical operations are also carried out from that base. Some information regarding the names and nationalities of engineers and technicians who operate from that base was obtained by ICSVE. Their details are as follow:

  • A Jordanian national by the alias Abu Azam.
  • A Syrian national by the alias Abu Saad.
  • A Syrian national by the alias Abu Usama..

dronemap2

Map 2. Initial Modification and Maintenance Base (latitude, longitude: 35.9415194, 38.9928067)

IEDs and Weaponization

The entity that handles the initial modification of the drones works closely with another base. That base receives modified surveillance drones to weaponize them. This weaponization base’s key operation is to produce IEDs, be they airborne or otherwise. According to sources close to ISIS, a man by the name Umar (a.k.a. Abu al-Zubair) is in charge of this base. He is an Iraqi national from Diyala, Iraq. He was an Emni (security forces) operative before being reassigned to his current position. His second in command is a Moroccan national by the alias Abu Yazid. Umar and Abu Yazid commute using a black Jeep. Sources reported the address of this weaponization and IED development base (see map below). The weaponization of drones is carried out from the basement of that building. Engineers, technicians, and IED experts cooperate to equip drones with bombs. In late March 2017, sources reported that operatives working from that base tested a drone carrying an IED weighing almost 5 kilograms. However, this center does not store weaponized drones. All operational drones are sent to a storage and distribution center. Drones that malfunction or have defects are sent back to the modification and maintenance center.

dronemap3

Map 3. IEDs and Drones’ Weaponization Base (latitude, longitude: 35.9427865, 39.0200579)

Storage and Distribution

The storage and distribution center receives weaponized and surveillance drones from the former operational base. This entity also receives surveillance drones from the modification and maintenance center. The location of this base was reported in late March 2017 (see map below). Requests for combat drones from militant ISIS members are received by operatives managing storage and distribution. Combat and surveillance drones are provided.

dronemap4

Map 4. Storage and Distribution Base (latitude, longitude: 35.948772, 38.9979565)

to militants in areas of heavy fighting. In addition, this center cooperates with the training center to provide militants with trained members to operate surveillance or combat drones if needed. Moreover, this base handles the distribution of the drones within ISIS-controlled territories in Syria and Iraq. A number of Europeans operate from base. Their details are as follow:

  • A British national by the alias Abu Jarir is the director of the base.
  • A French national by the name Muhammad Jalalia reports to the director of the base. He oversees operations related to the storage of the drones.
  • A Swedish national known as Islam reports to the director of the base. He is in charge of the distribution of the drones.

Leadership

In mid-April 2017, sources reported to ICSVE that the highest ranked ISIS operative who is in charge of their drone program is a militant by the name Muhammad Islam. He is in his thirties and holds a degree in information technology for a British University. Muhammad is a European citizen of Malaysian descent. This suggests that he does not have Malaysian citizenship as the Malaysian government does not allow dual citizenship. In ISIS’ ranks, Muhammad has the title of Emir that could refer to manager, director, or minister. He oversees drone-related operations. In late April 2017, ICSVE learned that a Syrian national by the name Yahia al-Abdullah was the second in command for Muhammad Islam, the Emir of ISIS’ drone program. Al-Abdullah was born in 1987. He holds a degree in software engineering from Aleppo University. Based on information obtained by ICSVE, the organizational structure that governs the operational interaction between members involved in ISIS’ drone program was inferred.

Recent Operations and Logistics

Information obtained from trusted sources indicates that in mid-April 2017, Muhammad Islam, the Emir of ISIS’ drone program, directly supervised a joint operation between the modification and maintenance center and the IED and weaponization center. Muhammad was overseeing the operations, started sometime before March 2017, to modify commercial drones to increase their operational time, distance and flying capabilities, and the IED load they could carry. The new design was modified for drones to be equipped with 6 small IEDs. Moreover, the modification and maintenance center was working on the inclusion of a solar panel on top of the drone body to further increase its operational life. The drones were also painted with a wax-like coating. Twenty-seven drones were reported to be subjected to this modification. They were all small drones; their diameter being less than 70 centimeters.

In late April 2017, the storage and distribution center received a number of drones matching the description of the drones that were undergoing modifications through the aforementioned joint operations. Each drone was equipped with a solar panel. Full motion, high resolution cameras were installed on the lower and middle sections of the drones’ bodies. However, no IEDs were installed. It is not clear whether the drones were only modified to carry out surveillance operations. It can be safely argued that those drones could be weaponized before being deployed to the battlefield. That said, that center also received drones of a different design in late April 2017. These drones were equipped with two small IEDs. The drones of this type were quickly distributed, only staying in the storage facilities for a few days. Drones that resemble the two above-described designs were seen in the training center slightly earlier than the documentation of them in the storage facilities. That suggests ISIS might have tested and trained its operatives using these drones.

In addition, sources reported to ICSVE that in early March 2017, the storage and distribution center shipped a number of surveillance and combat drones from Raqqa to the city of Mayadin, Deir ez-Zor. Those drones were carried using pickup trucks. This move corroborated an earlier report that argued an increasing significance of the city of Mayadin in the fight against ISIS [[52]].

Furthermore, as of early March 2017 ISIS’ agents were reported to have obtained commercial drones from Lebanon and then shipping them to ISIS held-territories in Syria. A recent study on tracking the supply of components used by ISIS showed that ISIS was able to obtain detonating cords and detonators through an intermediary, Maybel, based in Lebanon [[53]]. This corroborates the information received from ICSVE’s sources. Moreover, in late April 2017, it was reported that the Emir of ISIS’ drone program, Muhammad Islam, used his second in command, Yahia al-Abdullah, to procure commercial drones and electronics required by the modification and maintenance centers. Based on information obtained from trusted sources, the procurement is not exclusive to the needs of ISIS’ drone program. That said, ICSVE learned that ISIS trades antiquities and artifacts to pay for purchases made in Beirut, Lebanon. Al-Abdullah was reported to be a key operative in such dealings. The purchased products then get shipped to Homs, Syria. From there, ISIS agents smuggle them to Raqqa. To that end, extrapolating on information obtained by ICSVE, the procurement and logistics operations of ISIS drones program are illustrated in the following figure.

Conclusion

This report provides a brief review of ISIS’ use of drones. The review outlines the operations the terrorist organization has carried out using off-the-shelf commercial drones. Noticeably, ISIS’ capabilities and expertise in using drones in surveillance, command and control, and attacks have improved. It is noteworthy that in February 2017, ISIS’ use of drones and release of material documenting such employment had increased dramatically. It appears that ISIS is on the defeat in both Iraq and Syria. ISIS’ deployment of drones and disbursement of associated propaganda could have been to reinforce its brand as a terrorist organization and to do as much damage as possible while losing on the battleground. Through its recent propaganda ISIS claimed that its drones are eliciting fear and hysteria in its enemies. Moreover, the group is capitalizing on the technology and their employment of it, in claiming revenge, improving their credibility in the eyes of sympathizers, increasing the recruitment of new members, and positing drones as a cheap tool of terror to be used outside the Syrian and Iraqi theaters as well. Its sympathizers were called to use drones to inflict substantial damage and cause horror in civilian populations across Europe, the United States, and MENA. That turn of events is alarming and has multiple implications for national security.

Drones are increasingly being used by civilians in the public domain (e.g., taking aerial pictures and footage, mail delivery, etc.). This growing use of drones by the general public provides an opportunity for terrorist organizations to adapt methods they previously employed, which used other tools of terror such as delivery trucks, to drones. There seems to be a pattern in ISIS’ encouragement of using tools unlikely to raise an alert, when attacking civilian populations. For instance, the approach of ISIS’ new magazine, Rumiyah, towards the use of trucks as a tool of terror was justified in the following [[54]]:

“Though being an essential part of modern life, very few actually comprehend the deadly and destructive capability of the motor vehicle and its capacity of reaping large numbers of casualties if used in a premeditated manner” P. 10.

Modified and weaponized off-the-shelf commercial drones might present a less dangerous tool of terror for wannabe terrorists that prefer an alternative to suicide missions. Such uses could be hard to detect in urban settings, yet could lead to devastating aftermath if not intercepted. Compared to the delivery trucks, all this method requires is to get hold of instruction manuals that are available online, and ammunitions.

ISIS managed to disburse a large number of guides and instructions on the modification and weaponization of drones and ISIS-inspired lone wolves might be able to get hold of material required to produce IEDs through criminal networks [[55]]. Moreover, this new tool is likely to complicate the work of law enforcement agencies that are trying to prevent acts of terror. Giving that the use of drones for commercial and personal purposes is expected to increase in the future, policy makers may need to consider passing regulations. They could enact policies to restrict the sale of commercial drones without digital identification numbers. Police officers may then need to be equipped with the technology required to identify the number of operational drones. Such a numbering system could be linked to the identity of the operator. Police officers may need to be equipped with frequency jammers to down suspected drones although if they are loaded with explosives that is not always a good solution. Notwithstanding that the suggested measures might cause certain inconveniences for operators using drones for legitimate commercial and personal reasons, these measures are intended to allow law enforcement agencies to intercept and down drones that might target civilian populations.

This report used intelligence information that focused on operational bases, leadership, activities, procurement, and logistics. That knowledge, if confirmed, is expected to allow forces fighting ISIS to strategically disrupt and neutralize ISIS’ drone operations. An earlier report presented evidence indicating that ISIS is highly bureaucratic when it comes to its drones program [[56]]. Based on information obtained by ICSVE, ISIS’ bureaucracy regarding its drones program is task specific, systematic, and complex. The data shows a top to bottom organizational flow that pervades ISIS’s operations and upholds it’s “hear and obey” philosophy.[57] The Emir of ISIS’ drone program, Muhammad Islam, oversees the operation of four entities that are involved in the program. These entities are, namely, the centers for modification and maintenance, IEDs and weaponization, storage and distribution, and training. The centers were reported to cooperate in joint missions and to carry out task-specific operations.

Furthermore, this report provides some details on a number of individuals who are involved in the program. This includes the program’s top leader, his second in command, the directors of three out of the four centers, engineers, technicians, and operatives tasked with managerial functions. This endeavor also presented details on the interaction between operatives involved in the drones program. That glimpse allowed for the deduction of the organizational hierarchy of ISIS’ drone program.

Through the second in command, of the Emir of the program, Yahia al-Abdullah, the leadership of the four entities procures from Beirut drones and the materials required for modifying them. ISIS agents were reported to trade artifacts and antiquities to pay for the purchased products. Those products get smuggled to Homs, Syria by ISIS operatives. ISIS’ agents in Homs handle transporting the shipment of the products to Raqqa, Syria. Once the drones and technology required to modify it get to Raqqa, they get delivered to the modification and maintenance center. At most this center produces surveillance drones. It was reported that this center cooperated with the entity tasked with weaponizing the drones, the IED and weaponization center, to develop and improve ISIS combat drones. Commonly, the IED and weaponization center works on equipping the drones with airborne IEDs. The storage and distribution center receives surveillance drones from the entity in charge of modification and maintenance and combat drones from the one tasked with weaponizing them. ISIS militants submit forms requesting drones at the storage and distribution center. When needed, the storage and distribution center communicates with the drones’ training center to provide militants with operatives trained in using the drones. The training center also teaches militants who are assigned to drone-based tasks. Using that insight, ICSVE was able to infer the procurement and logistics involved in ISIS’ drone program.

Reference for this Report: Almohammad, Asaad & Speckhard, Anne (May 4, 2017) ISIS Drones: Evolution, Leadership, Bases, Operations and Logistics, ICSVE Research Reports http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/isis-drones-evolution-leadership-bases-operations-and-logistics/


 

[1] “Hezbollah says it has capability to bomb Israel from air,” Haaretz, Nov 12, 2004

[2] Eugene Miasnikov, “Terrorists Develop Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environment Studies at MIPT, Dec 2004, http://www.armscontrol.ru/uav/mirsad1.htm

[3] Hezbollah Mirsad-1 UAV Penetrates Israeli Air Defenses,” Defense Industry Daily, April 20, 2005.

[4] Yoav Zitun, “Watch: Hamas UAV that can reach Tel Aviv,” YNETNEWS, November 16, 2012, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4306887,00.html

[5] Lorenzo Francheschi-Bicchierai“Israel Shoots Down Hamas Drone,” Mashable, July 14, 2014, http://mashable.com/2014/07/14/israel-shoots-down-hamas-drone/#yAEFyiQgFgqs

[6] Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Islamic Jihad Member Convicted in Plea Bargain for Hacking IDF Drones,” Jerusalem Post, January 31, 2017, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Islamic-Jihad-member-convicted-in-plea-bargain-for-hacking-IDF-drones-480092

[7] Adiv Sterman, “Hezbollah drones wreak havoc on Syrian rebel bases,” Times of Israel, September 21, 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-drones-wreak-havoc-on-syrian-rebel-bases/

[8] Rowan Scarborough, “How ISIS-controlled drones like this are striking new fear within the U.S. military,” The Washington Times, January 24, 2017, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/24/isis-drone-dropping-precision-bombs-alarms-us-mili/

[9] Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Islamic State Militants in Syria Now Have Drone Capabilities,” National Defense Magazine, August 28, 2014

[10] https://vimeo.com/177453167

[11] Geoff Earle & Bruce Golding, “ISIS using surveillance drones to target Syrian military,” New York Post, August 26, 2014, http://nypost.com/2014/08/26/isis-using-surveillance-drones-to-target-syrian-military/

[12] For more on ShamiWitness see Channel 4, “ISIS propagandist ShamiWitness: Man charged in India,” June 1, 2015, https://www.channel4.com/news/isis-shami-witness-medhi-masroor-biswas-charged

[13] Kiran Moodley, “Isis releases drone footage of suicide bombings in Kobani,” Independent, December 11, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-release-drone-footage-of-suicide-bombings-in-kobani-9917198.html

[14] Justpaste.it/jnabi7

[15] Steven Stalinsky & R. Sosnow, “A Decade Of Jihadi Organizations’ Use Of Drones – From Early Experiments By Hizbullah, Hamas, And Al-Qaeda To Emerging National Security Crisis For The West As ISIS Launches First Attack Drones,” MEMRI, February 21, 2017, Inquiry & Analysis Series No.1300, https://www.memri.org/reports/decade-jihadi-organizations-use-drones-%E2%80%93-early-experiments-hizbullah-hamas-and-al-qaeda#_edn135

[16] Ralph Avellino & Gilad Shiloach, “Video: ISIS Uses Drones In Oil Refinery Assault,” vocative, Apr 17, 2015, http://www.vocativ.com/world/isis-2/isis-using-drones-in-iraq/

[17] Steven Stalinsky & R. Sosnow, “A Decade Of Jihadi Organizations’ Use Of Drones – From Early Experiments By Hizbullah, Hamas, And Al-Qaeda To Emerging National Security Crisis For The West As ISIS Launches First Attack Drones,” MEMRI, February 21, 2017, Inquiry & Analysis Series No.1300, https://www.memri.org/reports/decade-jihadi-organizations-use-drones-%E2%80%93-early-experiments-hizbullah-hamas-and-al-qaeda#_edn135

[18] Justpaste.it/pm4r

[19] Justpaste.it/q47o

[20]Shamikh1.biz/vb/showthread.php?t=253023,Ia601506.us.archive.org/35/items/azmulkumah2/azmulkumah2.mp4

[21]Shamikh1.biz/vb/showthread.php?t=253858.Ia801507.us.archive.org/19/items/BangazeeAlThbat2/bangazee%20al-thbat%202.mp4

[22] MEMRI Cyber & Jihad Lab, “ISIS Engineers And Scientists Collaborate On Projects In Telegram Channel,” March 21, 2016, http://cjlab.memri.org/lab-projects/tracking-jihadi-terrorist-use-of-social-media/isis-engineers-and-scientists-collaborate-on-projects-in-telegram-channel/

[23] Justpaste.it/u80v

[24] Steven Stalinsky & R. Sosnow, “A Decade Of Jihadi Organizations’ Use Of Drones – From Early Experiments By Hizbullah, Hamas, And Al-Qaeda To Emerging National Security Crisis For The West As ISIS Launches First Attack Drones,” MEMRI, February 21, 2017, Inquiry & Analysis Series No.1300, https://www.memri.org/reports/decade-jihadi-organizations-use-drones-%E2%80%93-early-experiments-hizbullah-hamas-and-al-qaeda#_edn135

[25] Elizabeth Mclaughlin, “New Video Shows Intense ISIS Battle That Killed a US Navy Seal,” ABC News, May 5, 2016, http://abcnews.go.com/International/video-shows-intense-isis-battle-killed-us-navy/story?id=38896834

[26] Justpaste.it/ung5

[27] Bloomberg News, “Islamic State fighters using drones with IEDs and spy cameras, says Pentagon,” Telegraph, July 7, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/07/islamic-state-fighters-using-drones-with-ieds-and-spy-cameras-sa/

[28] MEMRI, “Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM) Weekend Summary,” MEMRI, Special Announcements No.486, https://www.memri.org/reports/jihad-and-terrorism-threat-monitor-jttm-weekend-summary-215

[29] AlALAM, “Iraqi Army Targets ISIS Drone near Mosul,” ALALAM, October 03, 2016, http://en.alalam.ir/news/1868370

[30] MEMRI, “ISIS Video Documents Group’s Military Response To Campaign To Retake Mosul, Promises Resilience And Victory,” Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor, November 13, 2016, https://www.memri.org/jttm/isis-video-documents-groups-military-response-campaign-retake-mosul-promises-resilience-and

[31] https://twitter.com/memrijttm/status/805404027198590980?lang=en, December 4, 2016

[32] Twitter.com/memrijttm/status/806811378543493121, December 8, 2016

[33] Justpaste.it/e_makhmor, posted December 8, 2016

[34] Justpaste.it/11iqe, December 19, 2016

[35] Multimedia, “IS Video Shows Several Suicide Bombings in Ninawa Recorded by Drones, Execution of Spy by Drowning,” SITE Intelligence Group, January 03 2017, https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/is-video-shows-several-suicide-bombings-in-ninawa-recorded-by-drones-execution-of-spy-by-drowning.html

[36] https://vimeo.com/200866575/29d47a4f02

[37] BCNet Staff, “ISIS Dropping Bombs with Drones in Iraq,” Boston Commons High Tech Network, March 2, 2017, http://bostoncommons.net/isis-dropping-bombs-with-drones-in-iraq/

[38] Steven Stalinsky & R. Sosnow, “A Decade Of Jihadi Organizations’ Use Of Drones – From Early Experiments By Hizbullah, Hamas, And Al-Qaeda To Emerging National Security Crisis For The West As ISIS Launches First Attack Drones,” MEMRI, February 21, 2017, Inquiry & Analysis Series No.1300, https://www.memri.org/reports/decade-jihadi-organizations-use-drones-%E2%80%93-early-experiments-hizbullah-hamas-and-al-qaeda#_edn135

[39] S02.justpaste.it/files/justpaste/d389/a14419344/9.jpg

[40] S04.justpaste.it/pdf/1396s-justpaste-it-647309.pdf

[41] S04.justpaste.it/pdf/137uq-justpaste-it-638825.pdf

[42] MEMRI, “Private Pro-ISIS Telegram Channel Promotes Use Of Weaponized Drones Against Targets In West,” Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor, February 16, 2017, https://www.memri.org/jttm/private-pro-isis-telegram-channel-promotes-use-weaponized-drones-against-targets-west

[43] MEMRI, “ISIS Video Features Drone Footage Of Martyrdom Operations, Including Ones Carried Out By An Iraqi Man Who Returned From Europe And Two Yazidi Children,” Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor, February 14, 2017, https://www.memri.org/jttm/isis-video-features-drone-footage-martyrdom-operations-including-ones-carried-out-iraqi-man-who

[44] Steven Stalinsky & R. Sosnow, “A Decade Of Jihadi Organizations’ Use Of Drones – From Early Experiments By Hizbullah, Hamas, And Al-Qaeda To Emerging National Security Crisis For The West As ISIS Launches First Attack Drones,” MEMRI, February 21, 2017, Inquiry & Analysis Series No.1300, https://www.memri.org/reports/decade-jihadi-organizations-use-drones-%E2%80%93-early-experiments-hizbullah-hamas-and-al-qaeda#_edn135

[45] https://player.vimeo.com/video/205103463

[46] Anthony Kimery, “Identity Of ISIS Drone Engineer, Plan To Improve Drones’ Ability To Carry Explosives,” Homeland Security Today, April 04, 2017, http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/identity-of-isis-drone-engineer-plan-to-improve-drones-ability-to-carry-explosives/ba7f425aa5de23cdc850dac0a72de0ec.html

[47] Ahmet S. Yayla & Anne Speckhard (Feb 28, 2017) The Potential Threats Posed by ISIS’s Use of Weaponized Air Drones and How to Fight Back. ICSVE Brief Reports http://www.icsve.org/brief-reports/the-potential-threats-posed-by-isiss-use-of-weaponized-air-drones-and-how-to-fight-back/

[48] Tom O’Connor, “ISIS has no Air Force, but it has an Army of Drones that Drop Explosives,” NEWSWEEK, April 17, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/isis-air-force-army-drones-drop-bombs-585331

[49] Brendan Mcgarry, “Drone-Killing Gun Spotted at US Base in Iraq,” Defense Tech, July 26, 2016, https://www.defensetech.org/2016/07/26/drone-killing-gun-spotted-at-us-base-in-iraq/

[50] Ben Watson, “The Drones of ISIS,” Defense One, January 12, 2017, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/01/drones-isis/134542/

[51] Speckhard, A., & Yayla, A. S. (2017). The ISIS Emni: The Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence Apparatus. Perspectives on Terrorism, 11(1). Retrieved from http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/573

[52] Almohammad, Asaad & Speckhard, Anne (April 3, 2017) Is ISIS Moving its Capital from Raqqa to Mayadin in Deir ez-Zor? ICSVE Brief Reports, http://www.icsve.org/brief-reports/is-isis-moving-its-capital-from-raqqa-to-mayadin-in-deir-ez-zor/

[53] Conflict Armament Research, “Tracing the Supply of Components used in Islamic State IEDs: Evidence from a 20-month investigation in Iraq and Syria,” Conflict Armament Research Ltd., London, UK, February 2016, file:///C:/Users/Asaad/Downloads/Tracing_The_Supply_of_Components_Used_in_Islamic_State_IEDs.pdf

[54] Rumiyah, “Just Terror Tactics,” Rumiyah, Issue 3, 2017, http://qb5cc3pam3y2ad0tm1zxuhho-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Rumiyah-ISIS-Magazine-3rd-issue.pdf

[55] Ahmet S. Yayla & Anne Speckhard (Feb 28, 2017) The Potential Threats Posed by ISIS’s Use of Weaponized Air Drones and How to Fight Back. ICSVE Brief Reports http://www.icsve.org/brief-reports/the-potential-threats-posed-by-isiss-use-of-weaponized-air-drones-and-how-to-fight-back/

[56] Don Rassler, Muhammad al-`Ubaydi, & Vera Mironova, “CTC Perspectives – The Islamic State’s Drone Documents: Management, Acquisitions, and DIY Tradecraft,” Combating Terrorism Center, January 31, 2017, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ctc-perspectives-the-islamic-states-drone-documents-management-acquisitions-and-diy-tradecraft

[57] Speckhard, A., & Yayla, A. S. (2016). ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate: Advances Press, LLC.

Anne Speckhard, Ph.D., is an adjunct associate professor of psychiatry at Georgetown University School of Medicine and Director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE). She has interviewed over 500 terrorists, their family members and supporters in various parts of the world including Gaza, the West Bank, Chechnya, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and many countries in Europe. She is the author of several books, including Talking to Terrorists and ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate. Follow @AnneSpeckhard

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The AUKUS Alliance and “China’s Maritime Governance Strategy” in the Indo-Pacific

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1) Announcing the (French-Indian alliance) to confront the (Australian-American alliance) for establishing a (new multilateral system), and the AUKUS alliance conflicted with the (Anglo-Saxon Five Eyes intelligence alliance), and New Zealand’s rejection of the Australian deal with Britain

2) The AUKUS alliance and the division between (technological and defense democracies against Washington), in favor of strengthening Chinese technological and defense alliances with pro-Beijing political regimes

3) The division of (the Quadruple Regional Alliance) against China led by Washington, (India’s alliance with France in defense, and India’s alliance with Iran economically and strategically in favor of China) fails and restricts (AUKUS alliance) against China

4) Uniting the front of the Chinese naval communist alliances in the face of the authoritarian maritime democracies led by Washington

5) Beijing’s support for the strategy of “maritime governance” in the (Indo-Pacific) region, in the face of “AUKUS Defense Alliance” led by Washington

   Since the signing of the “AUKUS Defense Alliance between the United States of America, Australia and Britain“, the Egyptian researcher, as a well-known expert in my region on Chinese political affairs, as well as my closeness to a number of Chinese political files in the Middle East, noticed a dangerous thing happening, namely:

A- I was academically and analytically, surrounded by an increasing number of emails from American and Western think tanks and research centers, to promote the idea of ​​(AUKUS Alliance and the creation of a new world order by the USA).

B- The insistence of a large number of academic colleagues in the West and the United States of America, that it recognize China’s defensive and security defeat in the face of Washington, by declaring the “AUKUS Defense Alliance, in addition to the former Quad alliance, also led by Washington”.

C- This was also accompanied, perhaps for the first time, with a large number of international invitations that I received to work in several universities and a number of research projects, to develop my perceptions and ideas of the shape of the new world order, especially with my in-depth research and academic experience for many years in the files of China in the Middle East and globally.

D- It also coincided with an invitation that I received from the Syrian TV to analyze the “Australian submarine crisis with France, and the AUKUS Defense Agreement”, on Wednesday, September 22, 2021, and to note the American follow-up to my analysis of this crisis with other international analysts, by covering a speech by the US State Department spokesperson before the program will immediately begin to analyze the crisis raised, regarding the “AUKUS Defense Agreement between Washington, Australia and Britain“.

E- This is also in line with (the deep research and academic desire within me to continue my research, academic, analytical and practical career from inside Beijing once again, to study all those new actual changes in that region surrounding China), especially with the American insistence in 2017, to change its name from (the “Asia-Pacific” region to the “Indo-Pacific” region), as an American attempt to ensure the exclusion of China from the interactions of that region surrounding it regionally, in return for involving India as an ally of Washington and a competitor to China.

F- Perhaps what academically, intellectually and research surprised the Egyptian researcher, given my deep understanding of the interactions of that sensitive area surrounding China, according to the (Chinese and American viewpoints together), is the global academic and research situation that occurred, with the establishment of many (think centers, centers and giant research and discussion groups, and international peer-reviewed scientific journals), all of which bear the name of (Indo-Pacific), and not under its previous name (Asia-Pacific).

G- This previous mentioned point, means analytically that defining it (in the Pacific), leads to ensuring the exclusion of China from its interactions, and restricting the freedom and movement of China’s extensions, ambitions and movements in the (South and East China Sea regions, extending its territorial and maritime borders to the Indo and Pacific region), according to the Chinese perception, which is what Washington and its allies completely rejected.

L- Accordingly, upon my following up with a deep analysis, as an Egyptian academic expert in Chinese political affairs, of all those American and Western analyses that I have received, read and understood their analytical angle well, on the “formation and reshape of a new world order led by the United States of America“, so, based on my very accurate understanding of all American perceptions and the Western aforementioned, I favored to develop this comprehensive detailed international analysis in all its aspects and dimensions, which scientifically proves and responds to all previous analyzes, with my new analysis, which I am proving here in practice, that we are actually in the process of:

   (Features of a new global division between maritime and technological democracies according to American ideological terms, division and conflict of American and Anglo-Saxon defense agendas, violation of the democratic laws of some allies of countries to Washington, such as: “New Zealand“, preparing for a new (European defense alliance) and excluding Washington from it, and the contradiction of the goals of the “AUKUS American Defense Alliance” with the “Alliance of Five Eyes Anglo-Saxon Intelligence”, the French announcement of coordination with India, as the Washington’s ally to create a new multilateral system, rejection of “New Zealand”, as a Washington’s ally and Australia of the Australian nuclear submarine deal, and the Beijing’s start to create new regional maritime alliances, and the re-introduction of its “Chinese Maritime Governance document” to restrict and curb the (American naval ambitions and influence in the Maritime offshore near areas of China).

– This previous brief summary analysis, I preferred to put in the beginning to “analytically, academically, militarily, security and defensively” respond, and most importantly, from my practical experience to understand the American mentality towards China, and how Beijing can respond to any alliances or moves led by Washington against it in the first place.

   From here we understand, and we almost all agree, that the “AUKUS Agreement” is basically a defense agreement directed against China, a point reinforced by the fact that the leaders (Britain, the United States, Australia) have appeared together through the video that has spread globally, to announce this partnership, due to the increasing importance of the “Indo-Pacific region” for both the United States and the United Kingdom.

  Although British officials insisted that the new “AUKUS defense agreement” is not a response to any country, Britain reiterates that it is directed to maintain (security and stability in the Indo-Pacific regions) and to support a “peaceful rules-based order“. It’s not a secret that Britain, the United States and Australia share concerns about (the Chinese military build-up) in the region, and the fears of threatening their interests.

   The AUKUS deal represents a strategic turning point, especially as it is the first time that the United States of America has made a deal to provide such sensitive technology with a country other than Britain, and here we find that the only country with which the United States has shared this type of (nuclear propulsion technology for the AUKUS submarine  Nuclear deal) to Australia is Britain only, since 1958, which is a dangerous strategic shift in the US military and defense thought against China, by seeking to strengthen Washington’s alliances and its allies in all directions to confront Beijing, through (forming a strategic security alliance in the Indo-Pacific region).

– The Egyptian researcher found analytically that the most prominent results of this (maritime division) that was begun by Washington in confronting China and France itself as a freely democratic country, are the following:

1) Announcing the (French-Indian alliance) to confront the (Australian-American alliance) for establishing a (new multilateral system), and the AUKUS alliance conflicted with the (Anglo-Saxon Five Eyes intelligence alliance), and New Zealand’s rejection of the Australian deal with Britain

  Perhaps the most analytical point that caught my attention was the division created by Washington in the regions of Indo-Pacific, causing French and also New Zealand anger for contradicting the AUKUS alliance with its interests, and perhaps the anger of other international and Western parties from Washington for breaking its covenants against France, which could call, according to the Chinese, that:

(Democracies contradict the core of their liberal and humanistic values)

– The most serious consequences caused by the United States of America breaking its covenants with the French, were:

1) The French assertion came – in response to the US-Australian defense alliance against French interests – by publicly declaring France to coordinate work with the Indian side to consolidate a (new pluralistic international order), as two large sovereign states in the Indo-Pacific region.

2) France considered that the American abandonment of the French submarine project and the announcement of (a new partnership between Washington and Australia) constitute unacceptable behavior between (the allies and democratic partners) and inevitably leads to division among the democratic countries in the world, and its consequences affect the concept of (the network of alliances and partnerships for maritime democracies), regarding the importance of the Indo-Pacific region to Europe.

3) Accordingly, the statements of the French politicians, and the French leadership itself confirmed it, by declaring that:

“France is unable to trust Australia in the ongoing talks on a trade agreement with the European Union after the capital, Canberra, abandoned a deal to buy French submarines in favor of American submarines”

4) With the affirmation of the Minister of State for European Affairs, “Clément Bonn” through the various media, by verbatim saying that:

“We are in French trade negotiations with Australia, but we don’t know how we can trust our Australian partners”

5) The most important analytical point for me is what the French Minister, “Clement Bonn“, stated, by emphasizing, that:

“What happened is a serious breach of trust on the part of Australia. International relations are not naivety and good feelings, but the word. Signing contracts means something, but if we lose confidence, we cannot move forward”

6) In addition to the growing distrust (the European Commission) and the unification of the front of the European Union itself against the United States of America and against Australia, which France is an active part in the system of its European countries, where Australia is negotiating with France a large number of trade agreements, noting that (France is negotiating here on behalf of the European governments that are members of the European Commission), and Australia has entered the (eleventh round) of trade negotiations with its European partners, which started with the European Commission since 2018.

  A decade before and the announcement of the Australian-American nuclear submarine deal, it was scheduled to hold a next round of talks between Australia and Europe, covering areas, including:

(Trade, services, investment, intellectual property rights)

7) In a French comment on (the consequences and repercussions of French anger), regarding the ongoing trade negotiations between the European Union and Australia to conclude a (Free Trade Agreement), “Dana Spenant“, Deputy Spokesman for the European Commission, confirmed that:

“There will be no immediate impact on discussions and relations with Australia, with the full assurance that there is great anger among politicians, the French street and all shades of public opinion”

8) The French considered that (the American-Australian-Brtish defense alliance is directed against France mainly to exclude it from the Indian and Pacific regions), to prevent any French leadership role there. It is a project that threatens to undermine French ambitions in the region, and even distance it from it.

9) The (AUKUS Alliance) is preparing to ensure that Australia obtains a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, a matter that led to the Australian side canceling another huge deal it had concluded with the French side to buy French-made submarines, which in turn would lead to the sensitivity of relations between those countries concerned with France, in the sense that (the United States of America has caused the division of the democratic countries against each other), and not, as Washington is promoting, that the AUKUS deal is the inauguration of a new multilateral world order in the face of China, because the AUKUS agreement has led to the (division and conflict of interests of the maritime and western democracies in the face of Washington  basically).

10) Perhaps my analysis of the situation is that there are French fears that Washington deliberately distance France from the (Indo-Pacific region), as a key partner and ally in it, which will increase the state of European fear and distrust in general in confronting the United States of America and partnering with it.

11) On the other hand, it can be considered that (AUKUS alliance is working against the idea of ​​the European Union working system and works against its interests, by including Britain, which left the European Union front), and this is a great diplomatic victory for the British strategy aimed at sparing the country international isolation after Britain left the European Union, especially since the AUKUS treaty or alliance will link Britain, Australia and the United States more deeply, which will reflect on the level of trust between them and confirm the depth of their goal of forming a strong alliance against China.

12) The AUKUS alliance leads to the (independence of the European Union as democratic countries strategically from Washington and the failure of any US-European alliance in the future), especially if it is directed against China.

13) it’s expected for the upcoming period (increase in the European distrust towards Washington), especially with the catastrophic American failure in several global files, such as: withdrawal from Afghanistan, and others, which leads to a lack of effective cooperation between the European Union countries as democratic countries with the American side that can’t be trusted.

14) It is as well expected that after the AUKUS agreement and the betrayal of the American-Australian trust towards their democratic partners in Europe, the European Union will move to discuss ways to strengthen (the issue of strategic independence and the European Union’s defense system), perhaps in the face of Washington itself.

15) It is worth noting that the EU and France were upset about the deal not because they were not included in it, but because they were not consulted in the first place. This was confirmed by the European Union’s foreign policy coordinator “Josep Borrell“, who confirmed that:

“The AUKUS Agreement, which was concluded without the consultation of the European Union, requires the need to put strategic European autonomy high on the agenda”

16) Perhaps one of the most dangerous analytical point for the Egyptian researcher, is what was confirmed by the French side, considering the Europeans’ defense and independence from Washington, as the only effective means of defending European interests in the international community, including the Indo-Pacific region.

17) Based on the foregoing, the European Union “EU” announced (a new strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, after few hours of unveiling of the “AUKUS Alliance”, which considered by the Europeans that it was directed against all of them, not only against France.

18) What deepened the crises of the democratic countries allied with Washington and their division in the face of the United States of America, despite the fact that they are democratic, maritime and technological countries also with the same American approach, is (the rejection of the State of New Zealand as a democratic system also close to the United States of America, Britain and Australia), by allowing submarines to enter  Australian nuclear to the depth or borders of New Zealand territorial waters, and New Zealand’s anger at (Washington’s exclusion of it from the new partnership agreement between the capital, Canberra and Washington), and New Zealand’s rejection of the Australian nuclear submarine deal, based on the policies officially established in New Zealand, since 1985, which expressly states, on:

“The state of New Zealand prohibits the entry into its territorial waters of any nuclear-powered ship”

19) Perhaps, we find that with the continued refusal of New Zealand to enter Australian nuclear submarines to its territorial waters near Canberra, this may threaten in the future severe tension in relations between (Australia, Britain and the United States of America in the face of New Zealand and its policies), despite the state of the alliance and permanent partnership between Australia  And New Zealand for decades due to the proximity of the territorial waters and the maritime borders between the two countries.

20) Expectations also increasethat (many of democratic countries surrounding themselves will not join the AUKUS defense alliance with Washington), given the complex requirements that Washington imposes on its allies, given the nature of large defense alliances, especially against China, which requires special security arrangements that are not available in many countries, even with the democratic ones.

21) The State of New Zealand also considers that (AUKUS Defense Alliance is an alliance against its vital interests with both Australia and Britain), which shares with “New Zealand” in another defense and security alliance in the “Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance”, which worries New Zealand about its conflicting interests.  With Washington’s interests and ambitions with Australia towards China.

22) There are also criticisms from within (the countries of the Quad Quartet alliance led by Washington and its allies against China), directed at the AUKUS defense alliance led by Washington also against China), with the focus of the “AUKUS Alliance” on (the US security dialogue and defense coordination with the Anglo-Saxon countries, not the Asian region in the most near Beijing).

23) In the same context, other criticisms were directed to Washington from some democratic countries themselves, that are friendly and ally to it as well, that the “AUKUS Defense Alliance”, doesn’t include any new security arrangements, and didn’t seek to involve other countries allied to Washington, and therefore the “AUKUS Alliance”, according to a number of friends and allies of Washington, as support to:

(Quartet Security Dialogue, ASEAN Agreement, Bi-Regional Partnerships in the Asian Region, and Indo-Pacific area)

   From here, we can analytically understand, the growing state of distrust between the European partners in the face of Washington, which may lead to the failure of the American strategy to form (a new democratic world order according to American perceptions), after the United States of America lost the confidence of its European democratic allies and even the “Anglo-Saxon state of New Zealand”, and France, of course, deepened the state of suspicion and mistrust in any future alliance with Washington.

    And, this case analytically is similar to the Egyptian researcher, as it goes back to an old theory, called “the theory of democracies are going to fight each other”, as the previous mentioned analysis reveals to us with evidence that the AUKUS alliance or agreement is an actual return for us to the same previous concept meaning, about “the division of democratic countries against each other, and their fight against each other by searching for their self-interests and distrust or mutual coordination between them, as in the case of the Australian nuclear submarine deal against French interests“.

  Here, it comes the most dangerous from my point of view, that the growing sense of mistrust and lack of transparency towards Washington from its European partners and the democracies themselves, may hinder Washington itself from making any other alliances coming in the future, especially with (European leaders, the European Commission and the Anglo-Saxon state of New Zealand), as a result of Washington betraying their trust, by violating French covenants and agreements with Australia and Britain for narrow American interests directed primarily against China, and representing an attack on the maritime sovereignty of the territorial waters of New Zealand, and contradicting defense agreements and alliances that exist in the first place, Washington had to enter it to strengthen its allies, instead of increasing the state of division by creating  America’s new defense alliances.

2) The AUKUS Agreement and the division between (technological and defense democracies against Washington), in favor of strengthening Chinese technological and defense alliances with pro-Beijing political regimes

   One of the most prominent negative results of the (AUKUS agreement) was what was announced by the United States of America and US President (Joe Biden) himself, by announcing a new defense alliance between Australia, the United States and Britain, expanding the scope of the technology of American submarines operating with nuclear propulsion to include Australia, in addition to the (security technologies, Electronic) alliances, additionally, the (artificial intelligence, and underwater marine capabilities), as a declared US alliance between American-Australian liberal democratic technologies, in the face of Chinese communist digital technologies. This brings us to another level of analysis, through:

1) Confirmation of the link between the concepts of (democratic technologies and maritime democracies in the face of China), and others. What confirms the previous proposition is the circulation of a new term in mind that has raised China’s concerns regarding (maritime democracies), meaning that the US alliance was only made between (freely democratic countries that pursue liberal ideology), just as Washington divided digital technology into (democratic technology that follows the Western approach, and authoritarian communist technology on the Chinese approach), for countries that have benefited from Chinese fifth-generation networks.

2) Washington deliberately integrates the “technology component of defense” into the (Australian submarine deal), which is an indirect message to Washington in the face of Beijing’s defense technological superiority, which pushes in the region around the Indo-Pacific to increasingly the number of hypersonic missiles at several times the speed of sound, which the current US military capabilities lack reliable defenses against, as well as the advanced Chinese electronic warfare capabilities, which are directed against the (US command, control, and navigation systems), and against (the US Global Positioning System), in addition to China’s technical and technological superiority in the field of using advanced counter-weapons for satellites to reduce the use of intelligence and early warning capabilities of US forces.

3) The Chinese rejection of the new American security partnership with Australia came in its vital strategic environment, because it is “an American ideological deal in the first place”, and it reflects (the same Cold War mentality and the American ideological bias against regimes and countries that are ideologically different from it), with the constant American insistence on spreading its liberal values ​​and ideologies around the world, which has proven its failure in “Iraq, Afghanistan, Latin America, Africa“, and all the different countries of the world in their systems than what Washington is promoting.

4) China called the American mentality in the Indo-Pacific region, as reflecting of (the American ideological bias state, in favor of its allies at the expense of other international and regional powers, including Washington’s allies itself), which came in the form of a Chinese protest against the official level, by calling on the Chinese embassy in Washington, that the United States of America should abandon the (Cold War mentality, ideological bias, conflict and competition).

5) Also, the official Chinese warning to the United States of America of its establishment of forms of (exclusionary blocs), with the aim of targeting or harming the interests of other countries, such as: China.

6) The spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, “Mr.Zhao Lijian“, issued a strongly worded statement, in which he considered:

  “Washington and London have taken irresponsible behavior that would undermine regional stability and efforts to limit nuclear proliferation, which means intensifying the nuclear arms race by providing Australia with harmful nuclear technology to other neighboring countries such as China”

7) On the other hand, Britain, through its Prime Minister “Boris Johnson“, defended the (AUKUS defense alliance) with Washington in the Indo-Pacific regions, and the United States of America supplied the Australian side with advanced nuclear technology, “Boris Johnson” stated, emphasizing:

“Australia’s acquisition of submarines that operate with advanced nuclear technology maintains regional stability in the region, and that this step was not intended to antagonize any country”

8) The situation of “the ideological, technological and maritime division between the United States and China” has increased in the Indo-Pacific region, with a belief at all levels in China that the “AUKUS Defense Agreement” is (a threat to the Chinese presence in its areas of influence), and an American attempt aimed at (Chinese communist ideology restrained in favor of promoting American ideas and values, centered on democracy and economic and political liberalism), which does not fit the specific circumstances of individual countries such as China.

9) It is clear here that this American insistence on the predominance of (the pattern of ideological character over the strategic competition between Washington and China), and even the American conflict itself, which will extend to all ideologically different countries with American liberal values ​​during the coming period in the form of (conflict or ideological competition to divide the world into Democratic and authoritarian regimes), according to the same American division.

11) It is expected – as a reaction to the new US defense deal with Australia – that China will resort to (employing the economic tool in the face of US defense initiatives), by adopting the method of deals, partnerships and economic investments, in order to prevent countries from siding with the American side in its conflict with the other Chinese side.

12) Likewise, Washington’s intention (merging the maritime and western democracies with the pattern of democratic digital technology, according to the description of the current US administration), through the exchange of advanced American technologies with its network of democratic allies to confront common democratic security challenges, so that it includes multiple other areas of cooperation to meet the emerging security challenges before democratic countries, in the face of other authoritarian and non-democratic regimes, as promoted by the United States of America.

13) Hence, Washington deliberately concluded (democratic defense and technological deals, i.e., with its allies ideologically as liberal democratic countries), as happened with Australia and Britain, through cooperation in a number of fields related to defense, security and democratic technology, such as:

(Cyberspace, artificial intelligence, cyber defense, technology of additional capabilities under the sea)

14) Here, we find the assertion of all the parties allied to Washington against China, that what is happening is (an alliance between democratic, military, technological, defense and political regimes against non-democratic countries), which is almost the same direction taken by the leaders of the three countries (USA, Australia, Britain), by full affirmation, and declaration after completing the AUKUS Defense Deal together:

“It was only natural that the extended defense cooperation relations between the countries of the three maritime democracies culminated in a step that strengthened the relations of friendship and trust that unite them”

15) Hence, it is like (an ideological game of competition to divide the world into two parts, or two parts, or two alliances, liberal-democratic American, and communist authoritarian China), which is something President Biden deliberately declared implicitly that the partnership with Australia will take two forms of (defensive, and technology ideological rivalry), and deliberately linking them together in the name of (democracy).

16) The same context applies to the problem of introducing the concept of “maritime democracies”, based on the common history of the AUKUS countries, as maritime democracies, that is, as countries bordering the seas and adopting a democratic approach.

17) We find that China’s fears revolve mainly around the fear of (Australia’s possession of nuclear-powered submarines on its borders), and China’s desire to differentiate between (submarines operating with nuclear propulsion, or a US submarine deal for Australia equipped with nuclear weapons, which will inevitably be directed against China).  Australia, which was denied, asserting that it (works only with nuclear propulsion and is not equipped with any nuclear weapon, according to Chinese fears).

18) As we know, “Joe Biden“, announced several times that the American investment in forming alliances against China, whether they were defensive, economic, or technological, in partnership and the alliance with similar democracies like the USA, according to the American expression, in the face of Chinese communism, and this matter is the greatest source of strength for China to Washington.

19) Hence, we can understand the United States’ attempt to stifle and contain the strategic and vital ocean of China by forming American alliances with the democratic Chinese neighbors, according to the American propaganda, especially since there is another alliance directed against China also by Washington is the “Quadruple Regional Quartet alliance“, with the intention of US President “Joe Biden“, on September 24, 2021, in a meeting at Washington, aimed at establishing an alliance confirmation that includes (Australia, India, and Japan), with a primary goal of (re-launching the quadripartite alliance known as the “Quad” or “Quadruple Security Dialogue”, which includes those four countries.

20) Hence, we find that the AUKUS Alliance, as well as the “Quad Quartet alliance”, led by Washington and its allies in the region surrounding China, aims mainly to put pressure on Beijing’s activities in that region, under the incomprehensible rubber slogan promoted by Washington and its allies called (the Alliance of Democratic Countries), which is incomprehensible from a superpower like Washington, and neglects the different orientations, policies and ideologies of countries and does not understand the special circumstances of each country separately, as Chinese and other nations are always confirming.

21) What added to China’s concerns was the declaration of the countries of the alliance with Washington that (the four partners in the Quad Quadruple Alliance), they should join forces to deepen their commitment to make the “Indo-Pacific region open and free”.

22) Hence, we understand that these phrases are just stretchy phrases or methods adopted by Washington, as diplomatic tools to denounce Chinese regional aspirations in (the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions and the South China Sea), then link them to the development of a system of democratic technologies for the American democratic allies, such as: Australia.

   From here, it becomes clear to us by analysis, this basic direction of the policy of the US alliances and its adoption of the formula or the word “democratic technology and democratic freedom”, and thus, to divide the world into two parts or two fronts in the first place (democratic allies with Washington in the face of non-democratic countries led by China), whether politically Defensively, technologically, scientifically…etc.

3) The division of (the Quadruple Regional Alliance) against China led by Washington, by (India’s defense alliance with France, and India’s alliance with Iran economically and strategically, in favor of China), which fails and restricts (American AUKUS alliance) against China

   Indian coordination with the French side after the signing of the AUKUS Agreement between the United States of America and Australia is an important response to Washington, as well as a number of other Indian moves, through which it seeks to secure its interests, which may conflict with its ally Washington, as follows:

1) The Indian-Iranian agreements, and the increase in Indian investments in (Chabahar port), despite the US sanctions imposed on Iran.

2) Likewise, India’s announcement several times through its politicians of India’s desire to settle the Iranian nuclear crisis with Washington is also an important example in this context.

3) Also, it can be said that in the event of a settlement of the Iranian-American crisis, this will undoubtedly reflect positively on the chances of implementing the Indo-Iranian axis in the face of American influence in the first place.

4) India is trying to revive the idea of ​​(establishing a trade corridor linking the regions of South, West and Central Asia and Western Europe, all regimes and countries that are mainly allies of China), and India actually began implementing this project in September 2000, with the signing of an actual agreement between (India, Russia, Iran) to create this corridor, all of which are not completely allies of Washington in the same region surrounding the Indo-Pacific regions.

5) India has taken actual measures to establish and even strengthen this former alliance, in order to create a large trade corridor, to link several regions surrounding the (Indo-Pacific) region, by negotiating with several surrounding countries to join and strengthen it, all of which are not allies at all to Washington, such as:

(Central Asian countries, Caucasus region, Armenia, Ukraine, Turkey, plus Bulgaria as an observer member)

6) Despite the great importance of this mentioned project for both (India and Iran), the chances of its implementation were severely affected by the crisis of the Iranian nuclear program, and the associated waves of international economic sanctions on Iran, which led to its temporary suspension, with the expectation that it will be completed once the American negotiations with Iran resume. This is something that India strongly encourages.

7) The most dangerous remains, India’s endeavor to revive the “North-South Corridor” project, which includes countries allied to China, mainly:

(International North-South Transport Corridor “INSTC”)

  The former corridor aims to (link India through the port of Mumbai, which is located on the Arabian Sea, and Western Europe through a number of different sea and land routes).

8) Despite the multiple proposed paths of the Indian corridor with those countries close to Western Europe and the Arabian Sea, but (the sea route from the port of Mumbai in India to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz, and then the land route inside Iran via the railway network), represents a major component in This project proposed by India with its various tracks.

9) Also, what may irritate Washington more towards its ally India in the “Quad Quadruple Alliance”, is this strict Indian tendency towards strengthening and supporting its influence in (the Iranian port of Chabahar), in order to balance (the Chinese influence in the Pakistani port of Gwadar).

10) Hence, we find that the growth of Indo-Iranian relations basically takes on broader and more dangerous dimensions than the Indian presence in the Iranian port of Chabahar, especially with the intensity of analyses on the development of the “Indo-Iranian axis” to balance the “Chinese-Pakistani axis”.  Hence, the Indian insistence on the economic, political, and geo-strategic alliance with the Iranian side threatens the failure of the “Quad Quartet alliance led by Washington and its allies to confront Beijing”, especially with that deep strategic partnership between China and Iran in confronting Washington, while India, with Washington forms a front of Quad Quartet alliance against Beijing, but, in the same time, India is establishing an actual relations with the Iranian side, as an archenemy enemy to Washington, and the most closest regime to China.

11) With regard to the American mobilization of New Delhi against the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean region, it has become clear that the Indian lack of interest in sharing Washington’s ambitions in this regard, with the Indian naval mobilization only interested in heading mainly towards (New Delhi’s direct areas of influence), which extend from the (eastern coast of Africa, all the way to the strategic stopping points leading to and from the Indian Ocean, especially the Straits of Malacca and Singapore), and others. Looking at these areas, the Indian mobilization is directed more towards (securing interests within the immediate Indian Ocean region and not to securing the interests of Washington), while projecting Indian naval power in further regions is a secondary task for India, in contrast to the American strategy in that region.

  Through the previous detailed analysis of the Egyptian researcher, she was able to demonstrate in a practical way that the Washington’s democratic allies in the (Indo-Pacific regions), led by India, as a mainly Washington’s ally in the (Quad Quadruple Alliance against China), are basically allied with regimes and countries that constitute prejudice to the US national security, such as: (Iran), additionally the countries of (Central Asia and the Caucasus), which are more closest to Russia and China, in the face of Washington.

  Hence, we can practically prove by evidence, the applying to (theory of democracies are fighting each other and struggling to search on their interests, even in the face of their liberal ally of the USA).

4) Uniting the front of the Chinese maritime communist alliances in the face of the maritime authoritarian democracies led by Washington

   The importance of the United States’ alliances with Australia and Britain, specifically in the “Indo-Pacific” regions surrounding China, is the result of a number of important factors, most notably, are:

A) The growth of Chinese influence beyond the Pacific Ocean region and the South China Sea, and its extension to the Indian Ocean region and the group of sub-regions associated with it.

B) American fear of China has taken more than one level, due to: the large geographical area of ​​the Belt and Road Chinese Initiative, and the extension of the Chinese initiative to a number of major regions in the Indo-Pacific regions, as well as other sub-regions associated with it.

C) In addition to the large Chinese concessions within the seaports on the coasts of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and China’s direction, and most importantly, to build a (new maritime governance).

   Hence, China seeks to revitalize a number of its regional alliances in the face of Washington’s alliances in the Indo-Pacific regions, through:

1) Supporting the (Chinese Maritime Silk Road) as a Chinese strategic plan to encircle the Indo-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific regions in the face of the (AUKUS Defense Agreement), which is mainly between Washington and Australia.

2) China will add to its maritime network many of the so-called “nutrition or strategic corridors network“, such as: (securing and strengthening the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), and these corridors are called “economic corridors”, which in fact serve as strategic highways, allowing China to reach (Indian Ocean through the North Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal).

3) China will undermine the US and Australian naval movements, by strengthening its network of alliances with Asian countries that have joined the (Chinese Belt and Road projects), such as: (Pakistan, Myanmar, Maldives, Sri Lanka) by providing huge infrastructure investments to these countries that are friendly to Beijing, which is eventually allows it to use the ports of those countries close to the areas of American influence in the “Indo-Pacific oceans” to encircle and control American ambitions in the region surrounding China.

4) China will also expand the establishment of “naval and military bases” to protect its interests in the face of Washington, and we find that (China’s naval base in Djibouti), as a prominent example of the increasing development in China’s naval strategy.

5) Also, the arrival of China and its investments in several nearby ports, such as: (Gwadar port in Pakistan, Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, and the ports of the Maldives), would facilitate China’s use of such ports (as logistical support centers for Chinese ships to expand its maritime influence on these ports).  Naval spaces facing American moves).

6) China will support its economic weight within the regional countries surrounding the “Indo-Pacific” regions, by establishing:

  (A huge Chinese market, a stable Chinese position that ensures the decision-making of trade and investment flows in the region, China’s influence as a center of gravity for the main actors within the emerging international groups, such as: (the Group of Twenty, the BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and dozens of trade agreements  free and regional), which resulted in maximizing the gains of the economies of these countries in their relations with China.

7) China seeks to make a group of (polarizing alliances), that is, to attract partners in confronting Washington.  In fact, China’s dilemma in pursuing (balanced policies in the Indo-Pacific) will not be confined to the borders of this region only, but also extends to most other sub-regions, including Southeast Asia.  This can be confirmed by the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, in which he proposed (signing a treaty of friendship and peace in the Indo-Pacific region), in a clear indication of the preoccupation of the countries of the region with the risks of conflict and polarization between China, the United States of America, Australia and their allies in that region, which will be reflected on the level of trust between them and in the face of each other.

8) China seeks to strengthen the path of the Chinese project “Belt and Road” to encircle and control the United States of America, through the (economic corridor) that links China with (Central Asia – West Asia), and aims in particular to link China with the Asia region and the Indo-Pacific region across the region. The strategy surrounding it, which enables Beijing to accurately monitor Washington’s movements in the Indo-Pacific regions, which reinforces the failure of US alliances in that region facing China and its regional partners.

9) Also, China will try to thwart American moves in the “Asia-Pacific region“, with the intensification of the dependence of the major economies in the “Indo-Pacific” regions (especially in East and Southeast Asia) on China to provide the largest proportion of its various imports, which gives China special importance within the Indo-Pacific region, even if countries, such as: Australia, are mainly allies of the United States of America.

10) China will also re-emphasize (the strategy of naval deployment in the face of American expansion), which reminds us of what happened in 2014, which witnessed a remarkable extension of the Chinese spread in the maritime domain of the Indian and Pacific oceans, when (three ships from the Chinese navy sailed through the Lombok Strait), which is for the first time that movement has taken place from (the South China Sea to the Pacific Islands), and was followed by the entry of several Chinese warships into (Indian waters) under the pretext of searching for a missing Malaysian plane, which increased Indian and American fears at the time about Beijing’s movements in the Indian and Pacific Oceans region.

11) Beijing will seek to exert control pressure on any American movements in the area facing Australia and China after the “AUKUS Defense Alliance”, as confirmed by (the Australian Broadcasting Corporation) in mid-July 2021, as Australia announced that “it had detected a second Chinese spy ship on its way to enter the waters off the Northeast Australia Coast, a move that enhances Beijing’s presence in the area near Washington and Canberra to monitor, especially after Canberra and Washington began joint military exercises in mid-July 2021”.

   Therefore, the Australian Navy monitored the approach of a Chinese naval spy ship approaching Australia, through the (Solomon Sea around Papua New Guinea).

12) The Australian media has also announced several times before that there are movements of Chinese naval intelligence ships on their way to the area around Australia, through the (Torres Strait), with Australian forces announcing that they are monitoring their movements.

13) We find that there are American and Australian accusations leveled at Beijing during the month of July 2021, of China sending two naval vessels to monitor (the Exorcism Sword exercises between the United States of America and Australia), which are exercises that Washington calls “routine exercises in the military cooperation between the United States and Australia”, and are carried out every two years, which aroused fears and ire of China in its confrontation with Washington and Canberra, while seeking to restrict and curb Australian ambitions in the region with mainly American assistance.

  Hence, we almost analytically understand the importance of these Chinese moves at all levels, to globally weaken the maritime strategy of the United States and the places of its positioning and spread, after the United States of America relied more on the three main strategic fulcrums in (Europe, Middle East, Asia and Pacific region), the United States is now focusing intensively its efforts on the Indo-Pacific region, which China has tried to exploit by filling the void left by Washington in other maritime areas of influence.

  This makes us analyze another level of American deployment in the face of China, which is (the realistic option), meaning:

“The United States can only enhance the position of the global police by being a good policeman in the Asia-Pacific region, and on the western coast of the Pacific, with no real places of power in it except to guard and secure it as a policeman for the region against China”

5) Beijing’s support for the strategy of “maritime governance” in the (Indo-Pacific region), in the face of the “AUKUS Defense Alliance” led by Washington

   China issued a new document in 2017, as a part of its strategy in the “Maritime Silk Road“, to build what Beijing described as a “new maritime governance” in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, in order to limit the US naval spread in the region, and limit the maritime regional influence of neighboring and surrounding countries to strengthen the mechanism of “maritime consultation, partnership and mutual benefit for all”, according to Beijing’s definition of the “maritime governance” strategy, as a new maritime strategy centered on China within the framework of the maritime part of the Belt and Road Initiative.

– Hence, the Egyptian researcher is trying to analyze the possibility of benefiting from this (new Chinese proposal) for the concept of “maritime governance”, to address the (AUKUS defense agreement) and the maritime division in the Indo-Pacific region, through the following Chinese standards and mechanisms:

1) The Chinese proposal for the concept of “strengthening joint maritime security” within the framework of (Chinese maritime governance of the Indo-Pacific region), as a proposal through which Beijing is trying to cooperate with the Australian side and all countries surrounding that maritime region, to jointly participate together to maintain security and stability of the maritime region, as a “proactive step” by Beijing, mainly to block and restrict the American arguments for (China’s maritime expansion in that region).

2) China, by introducing the “Maritime Governance Strategy”, means “collective maritime cooperation in all fields and various aspects of projects in the Indo-Pacific regions”, and promoting China’s win-win cooperation to deepen the collective commitment to maritime services along the Maritime Silk Road.

3) China has even gone beyond (the peaceful concept of maritime governance) to deeper defense aspects related to “strengthening defense, security, strategic and oversight cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region through consultative, coordinating and cooperative maritime governance”, and this is the essentially ambitious plan that China seeks to achieve in that surrounding region.  Australia, which is Washington’s closest traditional ally, is working to limit China’s influence in that region.

4) China called for obtaining the consent of the surrounding maritime countries, which China has taken care to call them in its (Maritime Governance Document), for collective regional maritime cooperation with China to maintain “joint maritime security against any external dangers, threats or interference”, through:

(Building a network for monitoring and controlling the seas, strengthening international cooperation on expanding the application of the Chinese system for “satellite navigation” services, which is known in China as “Beidou application”)

5) China called on all maritime parties surrounding the Indo-Pacific regions through the “Chinese Maritime Governance Document” to develop a number of important relevant regulations on (maritime safety and cooperation in the field of maritime safety and security), and Beijing proposed the following:

A- Establishing a mechanism for bilateral and multilateral management and control

B- Develop collective plans and strategies to maintain the security and safety of maritime navigation

C- Collective regional joint combating of crimes within the maritime lines separating the countries concerned

D- Working on the protection, security and safety of maritime navigation

6) Perhaps the most dangerous part, from the Egyptian researcher’s point of view, is the confirmation of the (Chinese Maritime Governance Document) on China’s readiness to assume all “appropriate obligations to maintain the security and stability of the relevant maritime region”, according to its vision of the implications of “maritime governance and its extension”.

7) Through the Maritime Governance Document, China called for (expanding the areas of win-win maritime cooperation), and those expanded areas for collective regional maritime cooperation in (Indo-Pacific regions) from a Chinese point of view of its concept and definition of maritime governance, passing through:

A- The Chinese Maritime Governance Document, calls for the establishment of a (high-level dialogue mechanism for maritime cooperation) between countries along the Indo-Pacific Maritime Route.

B- China is inviting to sign a (series of maritime cooperation documents) between the governments involved in the Indo-Pacific maritime borders across the Indo-Pacific.

C- The Chinese Maritime Governance Document called for maritime (collective partnership) to develop plans for maritime cooperation and implement projects and various areas of cooperation in that surrounding maritime area.

8) According to the Egyptian researcher’s accurate perception and analysis, the part or part related to the “Chinese Maritime Silk Road Initiative”, and its publication of the “Chinese Maritime Governance” document, may have come (as a proactive attempt by Beijing to confront the US naval expansion and spread in the Indo-Pacific surrounding areas of influence  China Maritime), which is the reason why the United States of America signed the (AUKUS Defense Alliance) with Australia and Britain to restrict the Chinese maritime governance document.

9) American fears, and the warnings of its rival allies to China in that region, such as: (Japan and Australia), have grown over the issuance of this Chinese document on maritime governance, which is primarily intended to maximize Chinese maritime influence.

10) Perhaps the most problematic for the signing of the (AUKUS Defense Agreement between Australia, Britain and the United States of America), is the fears raised by Washington and its allies about “the timing of issuing the Chinese maritime governance document,” and China’s overreaching its maritime region and borders that center around (the South China Sea region, and parts of the  Pacific Ocean), to cover new marine areas from the “Indian Ocean region”, which are not primarily within the maritime border area of ​​China.

11) In addition to other American and Australian accusations against China of trying to impose a maritime governance document, to extend China’s influence around a number of (water areas and seaports surrounding the Indian and Pacific oceans), (as a Chinese attempt to restructure the balance of power in its favor), and overturning all areas of influence of other powers for their own benefit and even control over them.

12) Because of this, the American consensus came with the network of traditional allies in the Indo-Pacific region, to agree on the need to primarily form alliances directed against Beijing’s maritime ambitions, whether (Quad Quartet alliances led by Washington or the AUKUS Defense Alliance led as well by Washington).

13) Perhaps this new transformation came in the re-drafting of a new maritime term that documents those “marine borders that do not enter or share with China to separate Beijing’s maritime borders with other surrounding regional maritime states”.

14) Therefore, the new emergence in recent years of new maritime security vocabulary, and the implicit abandonment of the use of the “Asia-Pacific” concept, and the “Indo-Pacific Document” was actually issued in 2017, because (the Asia-Pacific concept) shares China in a large parts of its borders, while its deportation by referring to the “Indo-Pacific” region, enters in China to another specific region that doesn’t fall within its scope, and this region, according to the American perception and its allies, is known as, the “Indo-Pacific” region.

15) Hence, the concept of “Indo-Pacific” adopted by Washington and its allies in the region surrounding China aims primarily to restrict and curb Chinese ambitions, and it is a concept contrary to the Chinese maritime space in the “Asia-Pacific” region, in order to mainly deal with all Chinese maritime movements in the region, which does not fall within China’s areas of influence, which China strongly rejects, stressing the entry of part of the Indo-Pacific region, and the new designation of the name of the region, as “Indo-Pacific” within the joint maritime borders of China with those countries.

15) The Egyptian researcher reached the Chinese viewpoint rejecting the concept of “Indo-Pacific“, as a vague concept put forward by the United States of America with its network of allies in the maritime region near China, in addition to proposing concepts and general borders that do not rise to dealing with the region.

  Based on the previous proposition, we note that the majority, whether on the American or Chinese side, is the intensification of reliance on (the pattern of alliances and partnerships) in confronting each other, which will make it difficult for the United States of America to create a new world order with an alliance of democracies together as promoted by the current American administration led by the  “Joe Biden“, which leads to the transmission of this split-over to other regions in the world, and the increasing intensity and degree of American and Chinese polarization against each other, which will increase the intensity and intensity of the level of competition / conflict in this important theater of regional and global politics, and its extension to regions  Others in the world such as the Middle East, South and Latin America, the Caribbean, and others.

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Intelligence

How Taliban Victory Inspired Central Asian Jihadists

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Old and young generations of Uighur jihadists

Following the fall of the US-backed Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani on August 15, al-Qaeda-linked Uighur, Uzbek and Tajik jihadi groups widely celebrated the Taliban’s “historic victory” over the “enemies of the Muslim Ummah”. In honor of the Taliban’s rebuilding of the Islamic Emirate, leading Jihadi groups from Central Asia and China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region issued special congratulatory statements, echoed jihadi nasheeds (chants of jihadi glory), arranged a festive feast for their Muhajeers (who immigrated to spread Islam and wage jihad) and gloatingly booed the US military forces leaving Afghanistan on jihadi media.

Turkestan Islamic Party called on all Muslims to unite around the Taliban as one body

Uighur jihadists of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), formerly known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) from Western China, were one of the first to congratulate the Taliban victory. On August 16, in a statement of the TIP’s Syrian branch, released by its propaganda arm, ‘Muhsinlar’, Uighur militants congratulated the Taliban’s emir Haibatullah Akhunzada and all Afghan fellow believers on the restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Notably, in its statement, TIP ‘discovered’ the root causes of the Taliban’s victory in the Muslim holy book of the Quran, which refers to Surah al-Fatiha “Indeed, we have given you, o Prophet, a clear conquest” (48:1). The TIP further emphasized that “one generation of Muslims have sacrificed themselves for the religion of Allah, for today’s boundless joy and rejoicing.” The Taliban’s victory is “a fruit of long and arduous struggle and God’s big gift to Muslims worldwide”, the statement reads.

The TIP’s Syrian branch has called on all Muslims to make dua’s (invocation of God) for the Afghan Mujahedeen, to cooperate and support their fellows of Taliban. Uighur jihadists emphasized the need for the integrity of the Islamic Ummah, which should be governed only by the rule of the Almighty as one nation and one country. At the end of the statement, TIP noted that “East Turkestan Mujahedeens, as an integral part of the Great Ummah, celebrated the historic victory of the Taliban with boundless joy, and will stand alongside them shoulder to shoulder.”

Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad’s amir Abdul Aziz al-Uzbeki celebrates Taliban victory

It is recalled that ETIM was designated as a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council resolutions 1267 and 1390 on September 11, 2002, for its alleged association with al-Qaeda, its leader Osama bin Laden, and the Afghan Taliban. As part of the “global war on terror,” the US Federal Government designated ETIM as a terrorist organization on August 19, 2002. At that time, China skillfully took advantage of the situation emerging after the 9/11 attacks, achieving the recognition of ETIM as a terrorist group by many members of the U.S.-led “war on terror” coalition.

However, on November 5, 2020, the US Department of State removed ETIM from the blacklist, which provoked a fuming reaction from official Beijing. China on the other hand is pursuing a harsh repressive policy against the Muslim minority in its Xinjiang region detaining more than one million ethnic Uighurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in so-called “re-education camps.” Despite the US decision, the post-Soviet Central Asian countries, Russia and China did not exclude TIP from their banned list of terrorist organizations.

According to the latest 2021 UN Security Council’s report, “several hundred Uighur jihadists of TIP located primarily in Afghan Badakhshan and neighboring provinces, whose strategic goal is to establish an Islamic Uighur state in Xinjiang, China.” The report stated that TIP affiliated with both the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and their ties remain “strong and deep as a consequence of personal bonds of marriage and shared partnership in struggle, now cemented through second generational ties.” Moreover, the notorious leader of TIP, Abdul Haq al-Turkestani, has remained a member of al-Qaeda’s elite Shura Council since 2005. For more two decades, the most wanted key Uighur jihadist has been openly loyal to the Taliban’s top leader Haibatullah Akhunzada and the al-Qaeda’s emir Ayman al-Zawahiri. Today, all three top emirs are successfully continuing their faithful jihadi fellowship, skillfully hiding their close relations, and throwing dust in the eyes of the US and its Western partners, tired of the “longest war”.

Thus, it can be assumed that despite the Taliban’s warm relations with the Chinese government after their return to power in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that they will break ties with the Uighur jihadists of TIP. On the contrary, both are expected to remain loyal to the oath of allegiance (bayat). The long relationship between the Taliban, al-Qaeda and TIP has shown that the bayat has a sacred religious value for them.

Taliban is a source of inspiration for Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad

The Uzbek jihadist group Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ) on its Telegram channel posted a video congratulating the Taliban on the victory over the most powerful evil empire in the world, which it considers the US. The congratulations were unusual, as the three KTJ leaders via video addressed the Taliban comrades in joint jihad in three official languages of Afghanistan – Pashto, Dari and Uzbek. In particular, the KTJ’s top emir Abdul Aziz al Uzbeki, whom the UN identified as ‘Khikmatov,’ spoke in Pashto, the military commander Sayfiddin in Dari, and the main ideologist of Central Asian Salafi Jihadism, the group’s imam Ahluddin Navqotiy in Uzbek.

Abdul Aziz glorified the Taliban’s victory over the foreign invaders and occupiers as a gift from Allah Almighty to the Ummah. He eulogized the vision of Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban’s first emir, who once said, “Allah has promised us victory and America has promised us defeat, so we shall see which of the two promises will be fulfilled.” Top Uzbek jihadist further noted that “today, after a long-suffering patience, tireless struggle and great jihadi perseverance, finally came Nusrat (victory) in Khorasan, promised by Allah.” “Because the Mujahedeen are stronger in spirit and faith in God than the invaders, who, despite their military might and immeasurable wealth, fled the country in shame”, concluded Abdul Aziz.

Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad leader Abdul Aziz al-Uzbeki (second right) and KTJ military commander Sayfiddin (second left)

Then, in an emotional speech, the group’s hard Salafi ideologist, Ahluddin Navqotiy, congratulated the Taliban Mujahedeen on behalf of KTJ Muhajeers waging a jihad in Syria’s Idlib province against Bashar al-Assad regime and pro-Iranian radical militias. He expressed confidence that today’s Nusrat of Allah in Afghanistan will become the driving force behind the establishment of Sharia rule in Central Asia.

Noteworthy, the KTJ leader, Abdul Aziz, had close ties with al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, in particular with the Haqqani network. As a native of the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, Abdul Aziz made a hijrah (migration) to Afghanistan fleeing the repressive policies of Uzbek President Islam Karimov in the early 2000s. He waged a jihad in Afghanistan as part of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Then, in 2015, along with dozens of comrade-in-jihad, he split the group and joined the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), a splinter faction of the IMU. At the time, Central Asian jihadists split over the internal conflict between al-Qaeda and ISIS struggling for the leadership of global jihad.

On August 20, 2015, when the IMU officially swore allegiance to the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the IJU followed in al Qaeda’s footsteps and renewed bayat to the Taliban’s emir Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. In May 2005, a decade before these events, the US government listed the IJU as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization in May 2005.

He belongs to the first generation of foreign fighters from Central Asia, who went through Taliban’s jihadi school in Afghanistan. He gained prestige among the fellow militants as a military strategist, and not as a deep scholar of the Quran or a public orator-ideologist of Salafi jihadism. In 2008-15, Abdul Aziz, along with the IJU’s leadership, was based in the al-Qaeda’s military hub of Mir Ali in North Waziristan. In one of his Jummah Khutbah preaching he admitted that allowing the Pakistani ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) to take refuge in North Waziristan saved the lives of many Uzbek jihadists from the US drone strikes. In 2019, Abdul Aziz made a hijrah to Syrian Idlib province and became the leader of the KTJ group.

Motivations and Strategies of the Central Asian Jihadism

The congratulations from the Central Asian Sunni militant groups to the Taliban were a vivid manifestation of their long-term and tested joint jihadi cooperation, which began in the late 1990s. Thus, Uighur’s TIP and Uzbek’s KTJ complemented a long list of global jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda’s Central Command and its franchises in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Hurras al-Deen (HD), Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Hamas, congratulating the Taliban on their ‘victory’ over the US and NATO forces.

To celebrate the Taliban’s ‘victory’, Uighur, Uzbek and Russia’s Caucasian Jihadists in Syria also hosted grand feasts for foreign and local Sunni Arab militants and heroized the Afghan Mujahedeen during Jummah Khutbah Sermons. The Central Asian jihadi media widely published photos and videos from these parties and against this background tried to recruit new supporters to make hijrah to Afghanistan and Syria to protect the values of Islam and wage the sacred jihad against the infidels. The dramatic picture of Afghan government soldiers fleeing to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan has made the Taliban and al-Qaeda more attractive for recruiting a new generation of Islamists from Central Asia. Calls to make hijrah, or migrate, to the Taliban’s so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are also surfacing on jihadist forums. If the Syrian province of Idlib falls, al-Qaeda-aligned and HTS-backed Uzbek and Tajik jihadists’ migration to Afghanistan will be inevitable. The Taliban can easily melt them into Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz societies in northern Afghanistan and use them as leverage over rebellious ethnic minorities.

So, analysis of the jihadist media indicated that al-Qaeda-linked and Taliban-backed Central Asian extremist groups, operating in both Afghanistan and Syria, were deeply inspired by the Taliban’s victory over the pro-Western government of Ashraf Ghani. As a result, small and fragmented Salafi-Jihadi groups from post-Soviet countries have received the biggest boost to unite around the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Consequently, conducive conditions after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan are expected to lead to a resurgence of al Qaeda in the Central Asian region. Latent al-Qaeda sympathizers and other radical Islamists in the “Five Stans” view the restoration of the Islamic Emirate on the other side of the border as the beginning of the great jihad’s revival and the approach of Nusrat. With the decline of ISIS and the rise of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, internal divisions, and inter-group feuds between the jihadist jamaats (group) of Central Asia, sometimes accompanied by bloodshed, are expected to diminish, and the volume of clandestine donations to jihad in the region are also expected to increase markedly.

But the main fear for local authoritarian and corrupt pro-Russian governments is that a Taliban victory could provide a historic boost for Uzbek, Tajik and Uighur violent extremist groups encouraging them in their campaigns to overthrow and replace local regimes. And although the Taliban is viewed by the world community as a Pashtun nationalist jihadi movement, and the Afghan jihad has always been more inward and parochial, nevertheless its ideological influence has always been strong among the Central Asian jihadists.

Despite the fact that the Taliban leadership publicly denies the presence of transnational terrorist groups in the country, a recent UN report revealed that there are about 10,000 foreign fighters in Afghanistan, who are members of al-Qaeda, Uighur’s TIP, Uzbek militant groups Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), KTJ, IJU and Tajik’s Jamaat Ansarullah (JA). Moreover, some of them took an active part in the recent military attacks against the Afghan army on the side of the Taliban, which led to the rapid fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, the strategically important capital of the Northern Alliance. As we predicted earlier, the Taliban exploited the Central Asian jihadists during the fighting in the north of the country as their “hard power” and political leverage on the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. When the Taliban captured a strategically important security checkpoint near Afghan border with Tajikistan in July, they assigned a Tajik jihadi group Jamaat Ansarullah (JA) to raise the Taliban flag on the site. They also put JA in charge of security in five districts of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province – Kuf Ab, Khwahan, Maimay, Nusay, and Shekay – near the Tajik border.

Although the Taliban has repeatedly promised not to allow Afghanistan to be used as a staging ground for any attacks, they will not sever their ties with Central Asian jihadi groups and will not violate the bayat. Uzbek, Uighur and Tajik jihadist groups are expected to maintain a safe haven in Afghanistan under the tacit and tight control of the Taliban. In the jihadist world, bayat or pledging allegiance is a heavy Islamic commitment reaching under the holy gaze of Allah Almighty, and reneging it is considered a serious offence. Therefore, the Taliban has never disavowed the group’s pledge.

In conclusion, the high fighting spirit and ideological strength of al-Qaeda-affiliated Central Asian jihadist groups in Afghanistan is associated not only with the Taliban’s lightning victory, but also with the humiliating and chaotic US withdrawal from the country. One of the Kyrgyz jihadists in Syria wrote on the KTJ Telegram channel that “the honor and dignity of America today is under the Taliban’s feet in front of the great Ummah.” This indicates that a new generation of Central Asian extremists has emerged on the scene of global jihadism, absorbing in itself the al-Qaeda’s Salafi-Takfiri military ideology, and synthesizing it with the Islamist nationalism of the Taliban, based on the common kindred Hanafi’s al-Maturidi Aqeedah (Sunni Islamic theology school). As the US counterterrorism capacity in Afghanistan weakened in the foreseeable future, the terrorism threat from Central Asian region will grow symmetrically for the US and the West as a whole.

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Intelligence

Russia, Turkey and UAE: The intelligence services organize and investigate

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The FSB (Federal’naja Služba Bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federácii, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) – created in 1995 from the ashes of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoj Bezopasnosti (KGB), the State Security Committee – is ready for additional responsibilities under the new national security strategy. President Putin’s recent redefinition of the FSB’s role provides some indications on the national security strategy that will soon be announced – a strategy that will affect seas, borders and the security of strategically important intelligence.

On June 1, 2021 President Putin issued a decree outlining the new priorities that will be given to the FSB in Russia’s revised national security strategy, which replaces the one that officially ended last year.

The changes to the Intelligence Service’s regulatory framework, including the peripheral one, provides some indications on the Russian security priorities. Some of the main changes include additional responsibilities for intelligence security, counterterrorism, border control and stronger protection of maritime interests.

Border control and the various references to counterterrorism in its broadest sense – as recently defined by Russia – means entrusting the security service with a number of new areas and tasks, including the redefinition of procedures to detect political radicalisation.

Border control is also strengthened in the revised rules, with FSB border guards acquiring records, filing and storing biometric data and obtaining and processing DNA information obtained during border checks.

The details on access to Russian soil shed light on the Kremlin’s problems with its own fellow countrymen. In the article on the FSB’s involvement in controlling entry into Russia, the decree mentions the “territories requiring special authorisation” such as Transnistria, some parts of Georgia and Eastern Ukraine, and states that the FSB will be involved in a national programme to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of Russians living abroad.

Intelligence is a valuable asset and its security has always been one of the Kremlin’s main concerns. Therefore, the new strategy makes the FSB the leading agency, not just the end user regarding computers, security and telecommunication encryption.

It will oversee and supervise the implementation of the new technological security throughout the community. All this was outlined in December in a law that redefined the role of the FSB’s Centre for State Licensing, Certification and Protection. It will grant licences for the use of “special technical means and equipment intended to receive information secretly”.

The FSB will also examine patents for classified inventions. In addition to its official role in intelligence warfare, the FSB has been tasked with producing more security measures to protect the identity of Russian intelligence agents, and keep the confidentiality of its own officials, officers and soldiers.

The Internal Security Service will also set up a new procedure to inspect agents and individuals entering the army, the intelligence services and the Federal Administration. Using the protection of marine life as an additional task, the FSB will also have increased responsibilities for the seas, including competence and powers over the protection of fishing grounds outside Russia’s exclusive economic zone, the establishment of checkpoints for fishing vessels entering or leaving the zone, and the power to suspend the right of passage for foreign vessels in certain Russian maritime zones.

The Service will also define the structure of operational offices in maritime zones. These measures follow a law adopted last October outlining the FSB’s role in “establishing control and checks in fisheries and the conservation of sea biological resources”.

An important concept in Russian history and life is the silovik. He is a representative of law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, armed forces and other structures to which the State delegates the right to use force. This concept is often extended to representatives of political groups, but also to businessmen, associated with power structures in Russia or formerly in the Soviet Union.

As a jargon term, this word is used in other languages as a broad political term in everyday conversation and in journalism to describe political processes typical of Russia or the former Soviet Union. The etymology of the word is the Russian word sila, meaning strength, force and power.

Trying to renew the aforementioned concept, President Putin provides momentum and injects new impetus into the meaning of this word. After putting the issue on the agenda of the National Security Council of May 28 last, the President is now pushing for the publication of the national security strategy. It has been delayed despite the fact that the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (Sovet bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii), Sergej Vachrukov, had announced it was to be published in February.

As we might commonly believe, the steps to strengthen the Russian secret services are not so much focused on the aforementioned and movie-style “derby” between secret agents, but are mainly targeted to Russia’s traditional “Ottoman” adversary, namely neighbouring Turkey.

President Erdogan’s official meeting with the UAE’s National Security Advisor, Tahnun bin Zayed al-Nahyan, and the renewed ties with Abu Dhabi are the result of behind-the-scenes regional intelligence operations in which the Kremlin wants to see straight and clearly.

While there is still a deep political divide both between Russia and Turkey, and between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, the Turkish President hopes to encourage future Emirates’ investment. Turkish President Erdogan’s unprecedented meeting with the UAE’s national security representative, the aforementioned al-Nahyan, in Ankara on August 18 can be largely attributed to the work of the two countries’ intelligence services over the last few months.

There is a desire to turn a new page after eight years of icy relations, crystallised by the 2013 overthrow of Egypt’s leader Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood’s member close to Turkey and firmly opposed by the United Arab Emirates.  

Steps towards reconciliation began on January 5, 2021 at the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in al-Ula. The Summit marked the end of Qatar’s isolation, thus paving the way for a resumption of relations between the UAE and Turkey. After the Summit, al-Nahyan flew to Cairo where he met President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who strongly encouraged him to begin a new chapter with Turkey.

At the same time, Egypt’s intelligence service, Mukhabarat al-Amma, engaged in secret talks with its Turkish counterpart, the Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatıı. However, it was al-Nahya’s meeting with the Turkish intelligence Chief, Hakan Fidan, in Cairo a few weeks later that achieved the first results.

That meeting was organized by the Chief of the Mukhabarat al-Amma and by Abbas Kamel, al-Sisi’s regional Director, along with Ahmed Hosni, the strongman of Jordanian Dayirat al-Mukhabarat al-Amma, that King Abdallah II had sent from Amman. Since then, there were eight additional meetings between Turkey and Abu Dhabi, which then led to the aforementioned meeting of President Erdogan with al-Nahyan, with the possibility of holding a future Summit between them.

This rapprochement still has difficulty hiding the deep divide between the two countries on key regional issues such as their respective positions on Syria and Libya, in particular. While they have managed to find some common ground for understanding – ending smear campaigns and trade blockades; resuming visa issuance; direct air links and the return of Ambassadors – President Erdogan and al-Nahyan are simply keeping quiet about their current irreconcilable differences.

Political considerations are put aside to facilitate future UAE’s investment in Turkey.

On August 25, the Emirates’ Group International Holding CO announced it would invest massively in Turkey’s health and agrifood industries, while it seems that the sovereign fund Abu Dhabi Investment Authority is willing to lend Turkey 875 million US dollars.

Is it just business? Russia is investigating.

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