[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] A [/yt_dropcap] strange phenomenon is observable lately among experts on Russia-US relations. There is a trend to explain the various thorny intricacies of such a relationship merely via economic strategies and formulas.
The narrative usually begins with the end of World War II when the World Bank (otherwise known as the Marshall Plan) was set up to help in the reconstruction of Europe, something whose success is usually praised by the experts. The main genial idea was that of giving rather than lending money to the tune of 13 billion dollars, in order to restore the economy of 17 EU countries (in today’s currency value it would be the equivalent of 120 billion dollars) as long as those countries agreed to use the money to buy goods from the US.
Then the narrative seems to jump some 40 years or so to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the setting up of the Western economically prosperous camp under NATO’s and the EU’s influence, and the Eastern camp under the influence of Russia. So, having eliminated ideological beliefs and strife (i.e., Communism vs. Capitalism) the split is now a mere spheres of influence opposition. This, so the argument goes, could have been easily eliminated if Russia had been economically been integrated into the G7 and brought up to speed, but alas it did not happen and that explains the present geo-political turmoil; in other words if another Marshall Plan had been devised benefitting the whole Eastern region.
At first blush it seems to make sense, but it’s a bit too facile and naïve. There are truths here, but there are also half-truths and false assumptions. It assumes that indeed ideology and political principles have simply disappeared in the world; that a sort of “end of history” has occurred. The fact is that they have not, and that is discernible not by what there is but what is missing, namely Democracy, what was also missing during the Soviet era. Let’s dig a bit deeper into this analysis.
Indeed it is true that the Marshall Plan, within the World Bank, was set up specifically to help a devastated Western Europe and foment its economic development. In effect the Marshall Plan replaced the World Bank. It was decided that the reconstruction of Europe would be more efficient and cost-effective than mere loans. But the ultimate goal of this economic program was to buttress the capitalistic Western democratic block against the undemocratic Easter bloc sponsored by the USSR. This has to be kept firmly in mind when suggesting that a second Marshall plan should have been created after the fall of the Berlin wall or one risks comparing orange and apples.
It needs to be mentioned also that the US government has learned from the mistakes made in the 1920s and 1930s. At the end of the first World War, the Treaty of Versailles, imposed on Germany the payment of huge compensations for war debt and reparation. Germany soon found it difficult to pay and this led to social discontent. The Wall Street crash that occurred in 1929 brought on a global economic crisis. The US drastically reduced capital outflow. Germany stopped paying its debt to France, Belgium and Britain, and these countries in turn stopped paying their debts to the United States. The more industrialized world sank into recession and massive unemployment, and international trade plummeted. To prepare for a different outcome after WWII, Washington decided on policies that would be completely different from those implemented after WWI and until the early 1930s. It set up the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations. This was the international institutions approach.
The US government’s major concern at the end of the Second World War was to maintain the full employment that it had achieved thanks to the tremendous war effort. It also wanted to guarantee that there would be a trade surplus in relations between the US and the rest of the world. |2| But the major industrialized countries that could import US commodities were literally penniless. For European countries to be able to buy US goods they had to be provided with lots of dollars. But how? Through grants or through loans? To put it simply, the US reasoned as follows: if we lend to our European allies the money they need to rebuild their economy, how are they going to pay us back? They will no longer have the dollars we lent them since they used them to buy from us. In all, there were three possibilities: first possibility, Europe pays back in kind. If this happens European goods will compete with ours on our home market, full employment will be jeopardized and profits will fall. This is not a good solution.
Second possibility, Europe pays back with dollars. They cannot use the dollars they received on loan to pay us back since they have used them to buy our goods. Consequently, if they are to pay us back, we have to lend them the same amount again, plus interest . The risk of being caught in an infernal cycle of indebtedness (which puts a stop to or slows down the smooth running of business) is added to the risk attached to the first possibility. To reduce their debts towards us the Europeans they will try to sell their goods on our home market. They will thus get some of the dollars they need to pay us back, but this will not be enough to rid them of their debts and it will endanger employment in the US.
We are left with the third possibility: we give Europe the money with which to recover. Rather than lend to Europeans (through the World Bank or otherwise) it seems appropriate to give them the dollars they need to build up their economy within a fairly short time. Europeans will use these dollars to buy goods and services from the US. This will guarantee an outlet for US exports which will help to maintain full employment. Once economic reconstruction is achieved Europeans will not be riddled with debts and will be able to pay for what they buy from the US. The US authorities thus concluded that it would be better to proceed by grants, and therefore launched the Marshall Plan.
To those grants in the framework of the Marshall Plan we must add the partial cancellation of France’s debt to the US in 1946 (2 bn USD were written off). Similarly Belgium benefited from a reduction of its debt to the US as compensation for the uranium provided to make the first two atomic bombs which were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki causing the first nuclear holocaust. The uranium had been extracted from the mine of Shinkolobwé (near Likasi, then Jadotville) located in the province of Katanga in the Belgian Congo. In the first instance: Belgium was granted debt cancellation thanks to the natural resources from its colony, which it lavishly exploited. Then: some fifteen years later, Belgium transferred, to the newly independent Congo, the debts it had incurred in order to exploit those natural resources as well as its population.
From the end of the second World War until today major powers have refused to implement a Marshall plan for developing countries (with two exceptions, South Korea and Taiwan). Loans with interest have been the main instrument used to allegedly finance the Third World’s development. Such refusal shows that creditors do not really want these countries to develop and be rid of their debts. Creditors consider that it is in their better interest to maintain developing countries in a permanent state of indebtedness so as to draw maximum revenues in the form of debt reimbursement, but also to enforce policies that serve their interests and to make sure that they remain loyal partners within the international institutions.
What the United States had done through the Marshall Plan for industrialized countries that had been ravaged by war they exceptionally repeated towards South Korea and Taiwan, two allied developing countries at strategic locations on the outskirts of the Soviet Union and China. As from the 1950s these two countries received significant aid, that largely contributed to their economic success.
Economists and geo-political area experts are now asking the crucial question: why was not a new Marshall Plan devised for the impoverished Eastern countries (former satellites of the Soviet Empire) after the fall of the Berlin Wall? It would have indeed made eminent sense if we stay with economic considerations. But there is another important consideration and it is the consideration of Democracy and a new ideology called Eurasianism to which we turn next.
What is Eurasianism? It is a kind of prophetic vision envisioning Russia’s destiny as that of leading all Slavic and Turkic people in a grand empire to resist corrupt Western values. Its main proponent is Alexander Dugin. His philosophy glorifies the Russian Empire—while on the Western side of the equation Bannon and the conservative website that he founded, Breitbart News, has revived the slogan of “America first.”
What Bannon and Dugin have in common is the idea that global elites have conspired against ordinary people—and the old order must be overthrown. In the West this is called populism. As Dugin declared to Newsweek: “We have arrived at a moment where the world is discovering a new model of ideologies. The election of Trump shows that clearly.”
Eurasianism seems like a mutual admiration society: Bannon admires Dugin for placing traditional values at the heart of the nationalistic revival and he has said as much at a Vatican Conference he attended in 2014. Dugin admires Bannon for rejecting Western liberalism.
One may ask: which are their common enemies? They are secularism, multiculturalism, egalitarianism and what both Dugin and Bannon dub the “globalized and internationalist capitalist liberal elite.” Which is to say the global ideological struggles will be reduced to an ultimate struggle between culturally homogenous—mostly white-homogenous groups founded on Judeo-Christian values and practicing a humane sort of capitalism, and the international crony-capitalist network of bankers and businessmen.
Both Bannon and Dugin wish to revive the nation-state. Hence their support for anti-European Union candidates from England and France to Hungary and Greece. They both are firmly against pan-European Union. In the US they have invented the Deep State or what they see an over-centralized government but paradoxically they’d rather have a strong state with an authoritarian personality on top, one that in effect ignores the freedoms as set-up by the founding fathers to be controlled at the local level.
In order to appear democratic and not ethnic chauvinists both Dugin and Bannon have declared that they believe in multi-civilizations which have their own identity and destiny and follow their own course. They have both described themselves as revolutionaries; Bannon has described himself as a Leninist who wants to destroy the State (i.e., the Deep State), while Dugin is the founder of the National Bolshevik Party which has been fomenting armed uprising among Russian minorities in former Soviet Republics. In any case, those states are always white, non Asian which of course is redolent of the theory of the “super-race” of Hitler and Mussolini.
So it comes as no great surprise that Trump’s election was greeted with enthusiasm in Russia. Trump would give Russia the respect it has so far been denied. St. Petersburg Cossacks have given Trump the honorary title of “captain” in case he decides with Bannon, to “make Russia great again.”
But this love-fest has been rather short-lived. Bannon has not advised to lift sanctions on Russia (imposed after Crimea’s annexation in 2014), nor to lift a travel ban on Dugin (imposed when he acclaimed Putin for taking over Crimea and invading the Ukraine) as he had previously hinted at. After all there are allegations making the round of contacts between Trump advisers in the White House and Russian spies. Suddenly Trump has became “tough on Russia” as I have endeavored to explain in my daily column “The Caligula Presidency.” At this point the appearance of collusion needs to be avoided at any cost, not to encourage the FBI to dig deeper.
Lastly let’s see what the reaction to these economic explanation has been among the nations of the EU. What is missing in those expert analysis: the very concept of Democracy. Let’s begin with England that has already divorced the EU. Theresa May is treating Britain to a surprise election in June. Even politicians have been blind-sided.
Were one to ask “what do so many disparate nations of the EU have in common?” one could find plenty of cultural common strains, but in purely political terms, perhaps the most apt answer may be “democracy.” That is the concept that seems obvious but one hardly ever hears in the debates and discussions about the possible dissolution of the EU, even when referenda and elections are taking place.
There is much bickering over fish, farms, cheese, sausages, pork pies, but little is mentioned on what unites and what divides so 27 disparate countries that consider themselves a super-nation. One hears about differences over currency, the return of sovereign rights control of one’s borders.
But one hears little about Free Speech or the ability to argue every detail of an issue without fear of arrest or worse. Democracy in fact remains the only indispensable pre-requisite needed to join the EU but nobody seems to notice it.
What one hears is advocacy for exit from the EU. One such example is already in place. The election of April 23 may determine if France and others will follow. Authoritarianism is on the rise and the putrid smell of dictatorship is in the air, Recep Tayyip Erdogan took control of his country out of the hands of the people, in effect turning his back on the model of democracy enjoyed in Europe, meanwhile he continues arguing for access to the EU and its single market. That’s now unlikely to happen.
What’s happening in the Ukraine is just as bad. There Russian President Vladimir Putin takes Ukraine’s desire to tip toward democracy as an insult. He is quite good in his rhetoric describing an overreaching NATO encroaching on regions of historic Russian interest, but what the experts out to defend him forget is that the vast majority of Ukrainians despise his manipulations of the media and the economy.
Meanwhile at the EU’s borders the anti-democratic forces are converging. They smell blood in the water. Erdogan for one, not unlike Donald Trump, treats every EU negotiation as business deal of sorts. Take the refugee deal: it started off as 3 billion euros in aid which quickly became 6 billion euros.
Then there is Putin whose strategy seems to be divide and conquer: not so much by brute military or economic force where he knows he will be beaten, but by breaking up the EU’s unity and resolve to punish his land grabs and flagrant violations of international law. Neither men give a damn fro North Atlantic values, never mind that of democracy itself. Their appetite for power creates a powerful contrast with what the EU has in common: Democracy and the democratic process which allows the likes of Theresa May to hold snap elections and be assured that the outcome will be free and fair. The same cannot be said for Russia or Turkey.
On Sunday the 23rd nobody will be voting to end democracy, which in fact is not on the ballot, but that may not be sufficient to stop democracy from being placed on the backburner while good old xenophobic nationalism gets moved to the front. That, I dare say, is the challenge that the Russia experts have to deal with yet.
Serbia bracing up for “difficult autumn“
Serbia is preparing for a “difficult autumn” as it tries to resolve the Kosovo problem, President Aleksandar Vucic said following a visit to the United States. He described the discussions he had had in Washington as “extremely important,” all the more so amid the continuing disagreements over the situation in Kosovo.
“A difficult autumn awaits us, a difficult winter awaits us. First and foremost because of Kosovo,” Vucic said. Pledging continued fight for Serbia and the ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo, he still admitted that Serbia is too small to influence the policies of a “giant” like the United States. Aleksandar Vucic, Kosovo leader Hashim Thaci, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and possibly a senior member of the Trump administration are expected to meet in Paris later this month to discuss the situation in Kosovo. The participants are expected to agree a list of measures to normalize relations between Belgrade and Pristina, including provisions for redrawing Kosovo borders and the transfer of the country’s Serb-populated northern regions to Serbian control. The Serbian opposition strongly rejects the idea of signing such an agreement with Pristina under the auspices of the European Union and the United States.
President Vucic may still be forced to go for it as “the lesser evil,” which may require a certain degree of pragmatism on Russia’s part. According to the new Russian ambassador in Belgrade, Alexander Botsan-Harchenko, who formerly represented Russia in the mediating “troika” overseeing the Kosovo status talks, Moscow “supports and encourages everything regarding the initiative role of Belgrade. If some decisions are made, and if Serbia asks Russia to join a certain group of states, then we can (why not) go for it. But at the same time, our position and our commitment to Resolution 1244 must be taken into account. There is no other option for us and, I think, for Serbia either. We are now ready to contribute to the resumption of dialogue. ”
Serbia’s other option is refusal to continue negotiations with Kosovo and, therefore, to see its application for EU membership suspended. This is a possibility many in Europe and the US are fully aware of.
“The Serbian point of view is that Russia defended its position on Kosovo in the UN and opposed NATO bombings,” former US ambassador to Belgrade, William Montgomery, said, adding that, according to opinion polls, Russia still tops the list of countries Serbians like most.
He described the EU’s position on Serbia’s membership in the bloc as short-sighted and a strategic mistake, emphasizing that the European Union will bear responsibility for the consequences of its failure to do more to bring Serbia into the bloc.
Serbian officials are equally aware of the complexity of the situation. In an interview with the Belgrade-based newspaper Vecernje novosti, diplomat Zoran Milivojevic expects a clash of “big power” interests in the Balkan region: “Serbia clearly occupies an important place in this standoff and will continue doing so since the West has not yet abandoned its interests in this region. Because Serbia plays such a decisive role in the Balkans, it will be the primary target of Western pressure.”
If Serbia rejects a deal with Kosovo, thus complicating its relations with Brussels, it will inevitably have to generally revise its foreign policy priorities and start to actively build up across-the-board cooperation with Russia and other global “centers of power” outside the Euro-Atlantic camp. This also implies closer trade and other economic ties with Russia and its Eurasian allies.
One such cooperation format is the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which can offer Belgrade a serious trade and economic alternative to European integration, while simultaneously allowing Serbia to serve as a “bridge” in the economic (and, therefore, political) relations between Russia and the West.
Meanwhile, Belgrade is already taking concrete steps in this direction. On August 15, Serbia officially joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as its 73rd member with the country’s finance minister Sinisa Mali describing this as an important event, which offers Serbia access to easy loans to finance the implementation of priority projects.
In addition to members from the Asia-Pacific region, the Beijing-headquartered AIIB, which has been operating since 2016, also has among its members such leading European countries as Britain, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
In October, Serbia may sign an even more economically and politically significant agreement on a free trade zone with EAEU member-countries. According Russia’s envoy in Belgrade, Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko, such an agreement is expected to be inked on October 25.
“This is a significant event, which has naturally attracted a lot of media attention. The EAEU is an effective integration project that meets modern requirements. For Belgrade, the implementation of the document will mark a completely new stage of presence in Eurasia, with an access to a market of over 182 million consumers and a combined GDP exceeding $1.9 trillion,” Botsan-Kharchenko emphasized, adding that “Serbia may eventually become a bridge between the EU and the EAEU.”
Established on the basis of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, the Eurasian Economic Union has been in business since January 1, 2015 and currently includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, with Moldova having an observer status.
During the August 2019 meeting by the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev emphasized the need to speed up the preparation of agreements on the EAEU free trade zone with Serbia and Singapore. He also called for expediting the implementation of integration processes within the EAEU itself.
“Negotiations on free trade are successfully underway with Singapore, Israel, Egypt, and an interim agreement on a free trade zone with Iran, an agreement on trade and economic cooperation with China will soon be launched. This gives our goods certain advantages in these countries’ markets,” Medvedev said. He emphasized that the EAEU also seeks to expand the number of its foreign partners, including through regional organizations such as ASEAN.
“We strongly support such activities. I think that it is necessary to expedite the procedures that are necessary to sign agreements on a free trade zone with Serbia and Singapore,” Medvedev added.
In addition to the EAEU, Serbia has spent the past few years trying to participate more actively in other integration projects outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Since 2013, it has had an observer status at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and, according to various reports, is now mulling the prospect of its gradual “connection” to the structures of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Increased US and EU pressure on Belgrade concerning the issue of Kosovo recognition will obviously give an additional boost to the abovementioned trend, which objectively meets the interests of the Russian Federation.
From our partner International Affairs
President Macron’s plans and ambitions: Realism or rhetoric?
In the run-up to the G7 Summit in Biarritz, French media reports focused on the global political and diplomatic plans of President Emmanuel Macron. Journalists say that for President Macron the G7 summit presented a unique opportunity “to return France its historical role of a “ mediator ”in global conflicts and to contribute to outlining a new geopolitical agenda”. How realistic are such ambitions?
France acquired the tradition of demonstrating its sovereign and special international status in the times of Charles de Gaulle. Paris also succeeded in securing effective mediation in various conflicts under Francois Mitterrand and Nicolas Sarkozy. Playing into Paris’ hands is the nuclear arsenal, the status of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and one of the leading roles in the global arms market. France’s mediation efforts have won perhaps the greatest trust among the Western powers. In the past, France was able to speak on behalf of united Europe, while Macron has repeatedly signalled his determination to consolidate the EU foreign policy.
The EU itself has long been showing a “tendency to strengthen its role as a major player in global crisis management.” But in order to expand diplomatic and humanitarian mediation efforts under the patronage of the EU one should follow the current format of making foreign policy decisions within the community, which requires the consensus among all the participants. Thus, to guarantee the agenda and the role claimed by President Macron it is essential to reconsider foreign policy priorities and probably reform the institutions of united Europe. It is also necessary to consolidate and coordinate the increasingly “mosaic” and diverse interests of member states, which are regularly at odds with one another even on issues that are declared by the EU leadership as being of top priority for all member countries. A long-term geopolitical strategy continues to play a significant role too, as a result of which the development of a pan-European foreign policy turns into a frantic search for the “lowest common denominator”.
In the meantime, Macron’s “mediation” on a number of priority issues has been mostly about defending the interests of France. The second half of last year was marked by relations between the two “locomotives” of the EU – France and Germany – hitting a new level. However, the beginning of February this year saw serious disagreements between the two parties. As it turned out, the interests of Paris and Berlin clash. Regarding the construction of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline, France managed to impose on Germany “the format that the German government wanted to avoid.” On the issue of transatlantic trade, the French position blocked the start of negotiations with the US, which was fraught with the introduction of duties against German-made products, in the first place. The EU members managed to overcome this discord only by mid-April. Finally, this summer, after a fierce backstage fight, in which Macron took center-stage, a “compromise” was reached in favor of France. The posts of presidents of the European Commission and the European Central Bank went to candidates who are politically dependent on Paris. This so-called realpolitik inevitably raises the question of whether Macron with his geopolitical ambitions might push Europe to an even greater internal split? In this regard, there have been suspicions that the French president wants to turn the EU countries into an instrument of Paris’s foreign policy agenda.
Some experts believe that Macron’s ambitions are great beyond description, that “his horizon is the future balance of strength in the world.” They talk about his determination to “go beyond European and Atlantic solidarity and return to the concept of multipolarity and multilateralism”. The Champs Elysees seeks to maintain a regular dialogue even with powers whose interests run counter to Western ones; and even with countries that oppose the allies of France. At the same time, Macron is committed to NATO and “is seeking to rely on the concerted effort of the North Atlantic Alliance” in a hope to give the organization a “new impetus”. In addition, Macron’s foreign policy follows clear “ideological principles,” which make his supporters look to him with double hope, while opponents see him as the main obstacle to effective diplomacy. All this restricts his “independence” and the possibility of new agreements.
Finally, many analysts say that Macron’s foreign policy is characterized by controversy. A few days ago he said that he wanted to turn France into a “power of equilibrium.” But just a year ago, he demonstrated strong support for the German idea of transforming the entire European Union into a balancer, “balancing” the international situation. What is closer to Macron, the “individual leadership” of France or the “sovereignty of Europe”? Over the previous two years, being at the top of power, he has significantly changed his views on the transatlantic model of globalism and signaled the need to give a new role to Europe, to “strengthen” its position in the new alignment of forces. A year ago, Macron urged the EU to “guarantee its own security”, since such powers as China and the United States hardly see Europe as an equal force. And if the Europeans fail to quickly change this state of things, then “we are in for a bleak future” . On August 27 this year, as he spoke at a meeting of ambassadors, Macron stated: “we are witnessing the end of Western hegemony in the world,” … “new powers are coming to the fore”, primarily Russia and China.” In this regard, it is important to understand what is behind the frequent change in rhetoric of the current French leader, adaptability of a far-seeing strategist or a time-serving pragmatism of a politician whose major concern is the next elections.
Meanwhile, the mediatory efforts undertaken by Macron while getting ready and holding the G-7 summit were also filled with striking discrepancies. The participants failed to work out a “model” on the Iranian dossier, although the media had reported a statement by the French president on reaching an agreement on “joint communication” on maintaining a nuclear deal with Tehran. However, it soon became clear that Paris is in no position to influence the United States. In the Russian direction, Macron yet again tried to “entice” Moscow by the narrative about “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok.” However, Russia remembers that a little over a year ago Macron spoke as confidently about it as being “non-Europe”, thereby suggesting conflicting trends in international relations – the “Big Seven” is more and more like a relic of the past”, and a return to this past in its “current format makes no sense”.
What inspires some optimism is the fact that Macron seems to understand that Russia is not the country that can be “excluded from all parties.” The broader its cooperation with Moscow, the fewer problems the West will face. Addressing the French ambassadors during a meeting mentioned above, the French president made it clear “that France needs to reconsider and build new relations with Russia.” But one of the many puzzles he has to solve along the way is the “paradoxical situation” that has developed to date, “when the same countries within NATO and the European Union support opposite political platforms regarding Russia.” As part of the NATO agenda, Europeans are pursuing a policy that combines a “systematic (military-political) deterrence of Russia” with the need to maintain dialogue, despite the fact that all formal options for such a dialogue are frozen. As part of its own agenda, the European Union, whose 22 members are also members of NATO, terminated a “systematic political dialogue” with Moscow, based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, in 2014. At the same time, there are statements about the expediency of selective cooperation – in issues that meet the interests of the EU. “How is it possible to develop selective cooperation without political dialogue? How is this possible without coordination of mutual interests?” – an expert from the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences asks.
Meanwhile, the world is in acute need for “global legal standards”, and not only for the regulation of traditional “conflict-use of force” challenges. Issues such as climate change, threats to destabilize cyberspace, attacks on informational reality, cross-border social disasters, pandemics cannot be handled effectively at the level of individual states. More and more issues enter “the world level”. And if we are to address them, we need the appropriate “world order”, the harmonization of universal norms so that national governments could work together to “secure effective global governance”.
Russia welcomes and is actively participating in transforming international relations in the direction of “multilateral diplomacy”, “collective efforts at the level of the international community and the regions.” However, are the West as a whole, and France, in particular, ready for “restraint and compliance with the international law and order”, for “working in an open format”, and for abandoning the “ideology-dominated foreign policy”? Are they ready that the new model of diplomacy will be “complex and multifaceted,” sometimes fitting badly if at all into any previous formats in terms of the approaches that will be adopted by all participants. For example, in the case of the “Big Seven,” Moscow suggests looking at the situation from a broader perspective and discuss the prospects for the Group’s modernization not only through the return of Russia, but also through expansion to include India and China. This transformation into the “Big Ten” may become “a powerful phenomenon in global politics that would change directions, approaches and formats”.
Emmanuel Macron is thus to provide the answers to a large number of difficult questions: to what extent can France be independent in determining its foreign policy? Also, is it possible to effectively play the role of an “intermediary power”, while remaining bound by the “strict obligations to other players”? And wouldn’t it be possible for France, in that case, to find itself squeezed between the “hammer” of the everyday realities of modern international politics and the “anvil” of the maxim, which they say belongs to the French, that genuine realists “demand the impossible”?
From our partner International Affairs
The Vatican and the Russian Federation
Currently the Vatican is the largest and most effective mediator between the various ideological worlds and between the old, great political alliances.
A system in which the Church operates by mediating both between them and between them and the West.
This is the case of the Russian Federation, with which the Catholic Church has a special and long-standing relationship, which started with the mission to the Tsar in 1452 and later continued with a very long story of deep ideological contrast with the Marxist-Leninist State atheism, but also of friendship and support – especially nowadays.
Full diplomatic relations between the two countries were resumed in 2009, with 178 countries now recognizing the Holy See diplomatically, while in 1978 the Vatican had official diplomatic relations with 84 countries.
Certainly, the present-day Russia, like the Tsarist and later the Marxist-Leninist one, has an Orthodox Church closely linked, by its very nature, to the political power. Not even Stalin could escape said rule altogether.
Still today, however, remnants of the past Communist regime can be found not in the mass aesthetics of the current system centred on Vladimir Putin, but in the one focused on some inveterate and deep habits of the population.
Recently, during a visit paid to the ancient monastery of Valaam, President Putin himself ideologically associated Communism with the Christian tradition.
Still today, many Russians regard Lenin’s Mausoleum in Red Square as a ” sacred place” while, according to reliable statistics, 51% of Russians still admire Stalin.
Why the return of Stalin’s myth, and exactly now? Because the “Man of Steel” is seen as an enemy of bureaucracy and “elites” and, above all, as the architect of the Soviet great victory against Nazism.
This shows to what extent the deep tendencies and trends of contemporary society and the old ideas about the Second World War mix up in popular myths.
Probably – as Curzio Malaparte already noted in his book, “The Technique of Revolution”, written in 1931 when he was an Italian diplomat to Warsaw – nowadays Stalin embodies the simple and virile assurance and stability of the Russian peasant, while Trotzky acted nervously and unconfidently, “like a modern European intellectual” -just to put it in Malaparte’s words.
Moreover, the current Russian relationship with the Catholic Church and the other national autocephalous and autonomous Churches stems directly from Putin’s new strategy of expansion into the so-called “near abroad”.
Ukraine is, in fact, at the heart of Putin’ strategic project. Without Ukraine no expansion is possible, however along with the Caucasus and Central Asia.
But one of the centres of Ukrainian power and national identity is the Greek-Catholic Church, which still follows a Byzantine rite and is closely linked to Rome.
After the great repression of 1946, it has been the largest and fastest growing religious community in the world.
The passion with which the Greek-Catholic Church proposes the Social Doctrine of the Church has long been a very credible substitute for Marxist eschatology or, in any case, for the Soviet social ideas.
Currently, however, the relations with the Patriarchate of Moscow are excellent.
Throughout his papacy, however, Pope Francis has always been proposing dialogue instead of confrontation.
Hence, while the EU and the USA are increasingly opposed to Putin’s Russia, the Vatican listens carefully and deals effectively with Russia.
The naive superiority – typical of the weak subjects – with which the EU and the USA deal with the Kremlin will be the sign of a harsh defeat, in Syria as in other parts of the world.
In the sixth visit paid by the Russian leader to the Vatican, Pope Francis spoke with him about various international issues.
Never – not even during Stalin’s rule – did Russia think that the Vatican diplomacy was uninformed or powerless. Indeed, during the Second World War he used it for the matters concerning Hitler and his demise, as well as to deal with the USA, which had already adapted to the Cold War.
Reportedly the Pope and Putin discussed at length about Syria – where the stance of the Holy See is very far from the empty and ambiguous “democraticism” of the West-and about the whole Middle East and its new set-up, as well as about the status of Jerusalem and finally about the moral decadence of the West and, hence, about a sort of alliance between Putin’s Russia and the Vatican to defend ancient and eternal values.
So far, however, the Pope has paid no visit to Russia. Obviously the Synod of the Ukrainian Greek Church would create some understandable problems.
Putin has already had two confidential conversations with Pope Francis, in 2013 and 2015.
He will be in the Vatican next January, when, an exhibition of Russian art will be inaugurated at the Holy See.
Foreign Minister Lavrov often has contacts with his counterparts of the Roman Catholic diplomacy, at all levels and constantly.
Here we can find, in essence, the great idea of Pope Francis, his careful and profound opening to the Russian Orthodox Church that counts 150 million believers and has considerable economic power, which has sometimes been used also to rescue public finances.
In 2016, Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill met in Cuba and a month later the Pope approved the appointment of Archbishop Celestino Migliore as Apostolic Nuncio to Moscow.
In 2017 he was also conferred the Apostolic Nunciature of the Holy See to Uzbekistan.
The Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Pietro Parolin,paid a visit to the Russian Federation from August 20 to 24, 2017, expressly invited by the Russian State and by the highest hierarchies of the Orthodox Church.
It was the first visit of a Vatican Secretary of State after 1989 and after the great, historic visit of Cardinal Agostino Casaroli in 1990, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet regime.
Cardinal Parolin had some “important and constructive meetings” – as he himself defined them – with President Putin, with Foreign Minister Lavrov, with Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Hilarion, as well as with some other members of the Patriarchate of Moscow.
Later Cardinal Parolin met with Putin in Sochi. Many of the topics discussed during their conversations are still very confidential, but one of them is already known: the issue of Christians in Syria and all the conflicts in the Middle East, considering that the Vatican recognizes the fait accompli, i.e. the Russian Federation as a great decisive power for the destiny of the whole Middle East.
They also discussed the status of Christians in the various areas with an Islamic majority – where the Russian Federation already counts very much – and their possible protection.
Russia is already available, while some Western countries not.
The following day, when Cardinal Parolin met with Foreign Minister Lavrov, they discussed the fight against terrorism and jihadism, as well as the promotion of a stable dialogue between countries and religions, and finally the protection of ethnic, religious and political minorities in all the possible solutions – partial or not-to the conflicts in the Middle East.
Cardinal Parolin and Minister Lavrov also discussed how to put an end to the clashes in Syria, using both the Astana Accords and the Geneva talks. The Vatican accepts both of them.
Furthermore, the Secretary of State reminded Lavrov and his aides of the urgent need to re-establish contacts and resume talks between the State of Israel and the Palestinian world, as well as to try and solve the strong tensions in Venezuela, where Russia still has a strong power projection.
Also the Catholic Church, however, has undisputed power.
Cardinal Parolin never discusses in vain and with an abstract and academic tone.
Later the Secretary of State vigorously outlined to the Russian leadership Pope Francis’ pragmatic and rational position on all the issues under discussion.
We can imagine that, with specific reference to Syria, Pope Francis and his Secretary of State want a concrete commitment by Assad – they implicitly recognize – for the protection and support of the population, as well as the return of refugees to Syria.
With specific reference to Libya, Pope Francis wants the conflict to end immediately, through a credible and substantial dialogue between the parties, possibly supported by the Vatican diplomacy and by the Russian Federation itself, which currently backs General Khalifa Haftar, the strongman of Cyrenaica.
As to South Sudan, the Pope wants President Salva Kiir and the rebel leader Riek Machar to meet and, in fact, a few days later Kiir asked Machar to form a government of national unity.
One of the many silly conflicts generated by oil and by the carelessness of the most important powers at economic level.
In addition, Russia seriously supports the Vatican’s efforts in Venezuela to stabilize the local political system peacefully.
Reverting to the Ukrainian issue, with specific reference to the current political and military situation in Ukraine and to the annexation of Crimea, Cardinal Parolin stressed that “international rules shall be fully enforced”.
In fact, the Holy See wants the 2014 Minsk Protocol, which has so far remained dead letter, to be clearly implemented by all parties.
Minister Lavrov clearly appreciated the Vatican support for the Minsk Protocol.
In short, as can be inferred from the messages of Cardinal Parolin coming back from his Russian missions and visits, it is good for the West not to neglect and, above all, not to isolate the Russian Federation.
It would be a fundamental strategic mistake.
Nevertheless, considering this geopolitics based on empty morality and political superficiality, there is not much to hope for in the West.
Catholics in Russia – the first traditional duty of the Vatican mission there – are very few: 773,000 believers in four dioceses that were established by John Paul II, the Pope who consecrated Russia to the Sacred Heart of Mary.
As the Virgin had long wanted in her messages of Fatima.
The Church of Rome does not proselytize in Russia, but the climate is not yet good for the Roman Catholic Russians.
And, in this case, the discussions and meetings of Cardinal Parolin with the leaders of the Orthodox Church were as important as those with Putin and Lavrov.
Meanwhile, Kirill II suggested the possibility of joint humanitarian operations between the Church of Rome and the Patriarchate of Moscow, especially in the Middle East.
Moreover, the Orthodox Christians will have the relics of Saint Nicholas at their disposal, temporarily transferred from Bari to Moscow and Saint Petersburg.
Hence a new phase has begun, characterized by stable and close relations between Russian Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, a phase that will certainly not be cancelled in the near future.
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