Connect with us

Russia

Tillerson visits Moscow: A New “Yalta” during the Trump and Putin Administrations?

Published

on

[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] U [/yt_dropcap].S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson arrived in the Russian capital Moscow on Wednesday, April 12 for talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. On the top of their agenda will be bilateral relations as well as the situation in Ukraine, Syria and the Middle East as well as North Korea. The two permanent UN Security Council members may, as counter-intuitive as it may seem for those who limit their analysis to propaganda, both benefit from a well-managed policy of tensions.

The U.S. administration of President Donald Trump had hoped Tillerson could arrive in Moscow with ammunition in the form of sanctions over Russia’s alleged knowledge about the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Army. However, an attempt by Tillerson, to reach consensus on sanctions,at the G7 meeting, failed. The G7 ministers’ decision in Italy means that Tillerson will be shooting blanks if he threatens with any other than unilateral sanctions against Moscow.

Moreover, even UN experts stressed that there is a need to fully investigate the alleged chemical weapons use in Syria and warned against jumping to conclusions – which was precisely what the U.S. did when it launched 59 cruise missiles against a Syrian airport. Moscow has, on the other hand, and to the surprise of many, stressed that the U.S. – Russian security hotline for Syria is suspended, but that Russia on the other hand does not have a mandate to intercept U.S. cruise missiles should the U.S. decide to launch another attack.

The first eye to eye meeting between Tillerson and Lavrov will afford the possibility to “get a better feeling” for how bilateral relations can develop and could define the course of bilateral relations between the two permanent UN Security Council members during a time marked by fundamental reorganizations in the Middle East and other host-spots like eastern Europe and East Asia.

Tillerson and Lavrov have already met earlier on the sidelines of the foreign ministerial meeting of G20 in Germany’s Bonn on February 16. They have also had two phone conversations devoted to the death of Russia’s Ambassador to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin and the US missile strike on Syria’s airbase in the Homs Governorate. The discussions usually last for several hours. So far it is uncertain how long the meeting will last and whether it will be followed by a joint press conference. It is also currently uncertain whether Tillerson also will be meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

A New Yalta under the Trump and Putin Administrations?

An objective assessment of the situation in the Middle East shows that Syria cannot be understood as an isolated theater of war. The U.S. is actively supporting the founding of an independent Kurdish State in northern Iraq. It is a policy that also aims at weakening Iran and Iran’s role in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Moreover, an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq dominated by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), would serve as a stronger springboard for the Kurdistan Democratic Party – Iran (KDP-I) and strengthen its insurgents in northwestern Iraq.

It is unlikely that Moscow would or could oppose this development, but Moscow’s counter-strategy is its support of “other Kurds” including the Goran (Change) movement in northern Iraq, its unofficial but very real support of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey as well as its support of the Syrian PKK ally, the PYD and its military wings the YPG and YPJ.

Moscow’s primary objective in Syria is not necessarily to “maintain Syria’s territorial integrity at all cost” but to guarantee a stable government that enables Moscow to maintain a strategic presence near NATO member Turkey, and to maintain Russia’s Mediterranean naval base in Tartus. The Dardanelles and the Bosporus are a vital component of Russian power projection. A Kurdish construct, eventually within the framework of a federalized Syria could probably be acceptable for Moscow.

The United States, for its part, could be content with a weakened Syria that no longer poses a direct threat to its primary regional ally, Israel; A Syria that no longer could challenge Israel’s planned permanent annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights. It is noteworthy that there are considerable U.S. economic interests in the energy resources in the Golan.

Another geopolitical hotspot to be discussed is Ukraine and most importantly the rebelling Donbas Republics and Crimea. Russia claims Crimea legally declared independence from Ukraine and legally acceded into the Russian Federation. The U.S. maintains that Russia illegally annexed Crimea and violated Ukraine’s right to territorial integrity. All posturing, positioning and propaganda set aside, the problem is that both are right and wrong.

In its 1973 Declaration of Principles that UN recognized that the right to self-determination and the right to territorial integrity have equal legal standing as long as the one isn’t implemented to the exclusion of the other. That is, the U.S. and Russia, as permanent U.N. Security Council members, should have fulfilled their mandate and helped solve the issue politically, within the framework of international law.

The problem is that legal principles and Realpolitik are not always compatible – especially not when the geopolitical interests of superpowers and the five permanent UN Security Council (P5) members are involved.

In terms of Realpolitik Russia “had to” counter moves by a NATO-friendly Ukrainian government that could have threatened Russia’s access to the Black Sea and by extension to the Mediterranean. Its hands were, so to speak, forced by the developments in Ukraine; Developments that had been prepared with the help of the United States. The USA, for its part, benefits from a “crisis in Ukraine” because such a crisis counteracts those forces in France, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Austria, and other European countries, that would advocate for closer Eurasian relations.

Likewise, Moscow perceives the rebelling Donbas Republics in eastern Ukraine not merely as culturally Russian, but as a buffer zone while the U.S. would benefit from protracted tensions in that region for the above mentioned reasons. There is, in other words, plenty of common ground as long as the two sides agree to “carve out new spheres of interest” while maintaining an “at least official” posture as adversaries.

There is, despite all posturing and propaganda, also the potential for common ground with regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) a.k.a. North Korea. Donald Trump has, among others, been able to win the presidential elections because his position that the U.S. should have a military second to non; Posturing with regard to veterans secured that many military leaders, veterans, and most importantly, members of the military industrial complex would endorse his presidency.

A policy of increased tensions with North Korea guarantees the sustained support of the military industrial complex and the military. A policy of tensions will also contribute to silencing the voices of those in South Korea and Japan who would like to see a rapprochement instead of confrontation. Russia, for its part, may posture and position itself in opposition to such “imperialism”, but it also reaps very real benefits from this U.S. Policy.

Japan will be more likely to agree to Russia’s de-facto annexation of Japan’s northern territories (designated as South Kuril Islands by Russia) in exchange for Moscow “letting Tokyo in on lucrative development projects”. With Japan not being particularly interested in a full-scale war at its doorstep, it is more likely to try to appease both the U.S. and Russia.

Moreover, Moscow perceives a more isolated North Korea as a means to counterbalance China’s influence in the region. Beijing, being likely to use the United States as scapegoat, appears to be more than willing to go along with sanctions. Moscow will, halfheartedly go along as long as it eyes an opportunity to assert Moscow’s influence over Pyongyang while weakening China’s dominant role in the Pacific.

Moscow would also benefit from increased U.S. – Chinese tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea – everything that challenges Beijing’s dominant role in the Pacific goes as long as it does not pose a direct threat to Russia’s national security and helps cement its new sphere of interest at the cost of Beijing.

With regard to U.S. – Russian relations in the coming decade there is, in other words, as much ground for bellicose posturing and positioning as there is common ground; That is, as long as this policy of tensions benefits both Washington and Moscow.

CH/L – nsnbc 12.04.2017

Continue Reading
Comments

Russia

Steering Russia-US Relations Away from Diplomatic Expulsion Rocks

Published

on

As the recent expulsions of Russian diplomats from the US, Poland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic demonstrate, this measure is becoming a standard international practice of the West. For the Biden administration, a new manifestation of the “Russia’s threat” is an additional tool to discipline its European allies and to cement the transatlantic partnership. For many European NATO members, expulsions of diplomats are a symbolic gesture demonstrating their firm support of the US and its anti-Russian policies.

Clear enough, such a practice will not be limited to Russia only. Today hundreds, if not thousands of diplomatic officers all around the world find themselves hostage to problems they have nothing to do with. Western decision-makers seem to consider hosting foreign diplomats not as something natural and uncontroversial but rather as a sort of privilege temporarily granted to a particular country — one that can be denied at any given moment.

It would be logical to assume that in times of crisis, when the cost of any error grows exponentially, it is particularly crucial to preserve and even to expand the existing diplomatic channels. Each diplomat, irrespective of his or her rank and post, is, inter alia, a communications channel, a source of information, and a party to a dialogue that can help understand your opponent’s logic, fears, intentions, and expectations. Niccolo Machiavelli’s adage, “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer” remains just as pertinent five centuries later. Unfortunately, these wise words are out of circulation in most Western capitals today.

A proponent of expulsions would argue that those expelled are not actually diplomats at all. They are alleged intelligence officers and their mission is to undermine the host country’s national security. Therefore, expulsions are justified and appropriate. However, this logic appears to be extremely dubious. Indeed, if you have hard evidence, or at the very least a reasonable suspicion that a diplomatic mission serves as a front office for intelligence officers, and if operations of these officers are causing serious harm to your country’s security, why should you wait for the latest political crisis to expel them? You should not tolerate their presence in principle and expel them once you expose them.

Even the experience of the Cold War itself demonstrates that expulsions of diplomats produce no short-term or long-term positive results whatsoever. In fact, there can be no possible positive results because diplomatic service is nothing more but just one of a number of technical instruments used in foreign politics. Diplomats may bring you bad messages from their capitals and they often do, but if you are smart enough, you never shoot the messenger.

Diplomatic traditions do not allow such unfriendly actions to go unnoticed. Moscow has to respond. Usually, states respond to expulsions of their diplomats by symmetrical actions – i.e. Russia has to expel the same number of US, Polish or Czech diplomats, as the number of Russian diplomats expelled from the US, Poland or the Czech Republic. Of course, each case is special. For instance, the Czech Embassy in Moscow is much smaller than the Russian Embassy in Prague, so the impact of the symmetrical actions on the Czech diplomatic mission in Russia will be quite strong.

The question now is whether the Kremlin would go beyond a symmetrical response and start a new cycle of escalation. For example, it could set new restrictions upon Western companies operating in the country, it could cancel accreditation of select Western media in Moscow, it could close branches of US and European foundations and NGOs in Russia. I hope that the final response will be measured and not excessive.

The door for US-Russian negotiations is still open. So far, both sides tried to avoid specific actions that would make these negotiations absolutely impossible. The recent US sanctions against Russia have been mostly symbolic, and the Russian leadership so far has demonstrated no appetite for a rapid further escalation. I think that a meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin remains an option and an opportunity. Such a meeting would not lead to any “reset” in the bilateral relations, but it would bring more clarity to the relationship. To stabilize US-Russian relations even at a very low level would already be a major accomplishment.

From our partner RIAC

Continue Reading

Russia

Russia becomes member of International Organization for Migration

Published

on

Photo credit: Anton Novoderezhlin/TASS

After several negotiations, Russia finally becomes as a full-fledged member of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). It means that Russia has adopted, as a mandatory condition for obtaining membership, the constitution of the organization. It simply implies that by joining this international organization, it has given the country an additional status.

After the collapse of the Soviet, Russia has been interacting with the IOM since 1992 only as an observer. In the past years, Russia has shown interest in expanding this cooperation. The decision to admit Russia to the organization was approved at a Council’s meeting by the majority of votes: 116 states voted for it, and two countries voted against – these are Ukraine and Georgia. That however, the United States and Honduras abstained, according to information obtained from Moscow office of International Migration Organization.

“In line with the resolution of the 111th session of the IOM Council of November 24, 2020 that approved Russia’s application for the IOM membership, Russia becomes a full-fledged member of the organization from the day when this notification is handed over to its director general,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a website statement in April.

Adoption of the IOM Constitution is a mandatory condition for obtaining its membership, which opens “extra possibilities for developing constructive cooperation with international community on migration-related matters,” the statement stressed in part.

It is significant to recall that Russian President Vladimir Putin issued an order to secure Russia’s membership in the organization in August 2020 and submitted its Constitution to the Russian State Duma (lower house of parliament) in February 2021.

Headquartered in Geneva, the International Organization for Migration, a leading inter-government organization active in the area of migration, was set up on December 5, 1951. It opened its office in Moscow in 1992.

IOM supports migrants across the world, developing effective responses to the shifting dynamics of migration and, as such, is a key source of advice on migration policy and practice. The organization works in emergency situations, developing the resilience of all people on the move, and particularly those in situations of vulnerability, as well as building capacity within governments to manage all forms and impacts of mobility.

IOM’s stated mission is to promote humane and orderly migration by providing services and advice to governments and migrants. It works to help ensure proper management of migration, to promote international cooperation on migration issues, to assist in the search for practical solutions to migration problems and to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in need, be they refugees, displaced persons or other uprooted people. It is part of the structured system of the United Nations, and includes over 170 countries.

Senator Vladimir Dzhabarov, first deputy chairman of Russia’s Federation Council (Senate) Committee on International Affairs, noted that the organization’s constitution has a provision saying that it is in a nation’s jurisdiction to decide how many migrants it can receive, therefore the IOM membership imposes no extra commitments on Russia and doesn’t restrict its right to conduct an independent migration policy.

On other hand, Russia’s full-fledged membership in IOM will help it increase its influence on international policy in the sphere of migration and use the country’s potential to promote its interests in this sphere, Senator Dzhabarov explained.

Russia has had an inflow of migrants mainly from the former Soviet republics. The migrants have played exceptional roles both in society and in the economy. The inflow of foreign workers to Russia has be resolved in accordance with real needs of the economy and based on the protection of Russian citizens’ interests in the labor market, according to various expert opinions.

The whole activity of labor migrants has to be conducted in strict compliance with legislation of the Russian Federation and generally recognized international norms.

State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and many state officials have repeatedly explained the necessity of holding of partnership dialogues on finding solutions to emerging problems within the framework of harmonization of legislation in various fields including regional security, migration policy and international cooperation. Besides that, Russia is ready for compliance with international treaties and agreements.

Continue Reading

Russia

Relegating the “Russia Problem” to Turkey

Published

on

erdogan aliyev
Image credit: Prezident.Az

Turkey’s foreign policy is at a crossroads. Its Eurasianist twist is gaining momentum and looking east is becoming a new norm. Expanding its reach into Central Asia, in the hope of forming an alliance of sorts with the Turkic-speaking countries — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan — is beginning to look more realistic. In the north, the north-east, in Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, there is an identifiable geopolitical arc where Turkey is increasingly able to puncture Russia’s underbelly.

Take Azerbaijan’s victory in Second Karabakh War. It is rarely noticed that the military triumph has also transformed the country into a springboard for Turkey’s energy, cultural and geopolitical interests in the Caspian Sea region of Central Asia. Just two months after the November ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey signed a new trade deal with Azerbaijan. Turkey also sees benefits from January’s Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan agreement which aims to jointly develop the Dostluk (Friendship) gas field under the Caspian Sea, and it recently hosted a trilateral meeting with the Azerbaijani and Turkmen foreign ministers. The progress around Dostlug removes a significant roadblock on the implementation of the much-touted Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) which would allow gas to flow through the South Caucasus to Europe. Neither Russia nor Iran welcome this — both oppose Turkey’s ambitions of becoming an energy hub and finding new sources of energy.

Official visits followed. On March 6-9, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu visited Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Defense cooperation, preferential trade deals, and a free trade agreement were discussed in Tashkent. Turkey also resurrected a regional trade agreement during a March 4 virtual meeting of the so-called Economic Cooperation Organization which was formed in 1985 to facilitate trade between Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Though it has been largely moribund, the timing of its re-emergence is important as it is designed to be a piece in the new Turkish jigsaw.

Turkey is slowly trying to build an economic and cultural basis for cooperation based on the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency founded in 1991 and the Turkic Council in 2009. Although Turkey’s economic presence in the region remains overshadowed by China and Russia, there is a potential to exploit. Regional dependence on Russia and China is not always welcome and Central Asian states looking for alternatives to re-balance see Turkey as a good candidate. Furthermore, states such as Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are also cash-strapped, which increases the potential for Turkish involvement.

There is also another dimension to the eastward push. Turkey increasingly views Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan as parts of an emerging geopolitical area that can help it balance Russia’s growing military presence in the Black Sea and in the South Caucasus. With this in mind, Turkey is stepping up its military cooperation not only with Azerbaijan, but also with Georgia and Ukraine. The recent visit of Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Turkey highlighted the defense and economic spheres. This builds upon ongoing work of joint drone production, increasing arms trade, and naval cooperation between the two Black Sea states.

The trilateral Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey partnership works in support of Georgia’s push to join NATO. Joint military drills are also taking place involving scenarios of repelling enemy attacks targeting the regional infrastructure.

Even though Turkey and Russia have shown that they are able to cooperate in different theaters, notably in Syria, they nonetheless remain geopolitical competitors with diverging visions. There is an emerging two-pronged strategy Turkey is now pursuing to address what President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sees as a geopolitical imbalance. Cooperate with Vladimir Putin where possible, but cooperate with regional powers hostile to Russia where necessary.

There is one final theme for Turkey to exploit. The West knows its limits. The Caspian Sea is too far, while an over-close relationship with Ukraine and Georgia seems too risky. This creates a potential for cooperation between Turkey and the collective West. Delegating the “Russia problem” to Turkey could be beneficial, though it cannot change the balance of power overnight and there will be setbacks down the road.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Trending