On October 6th 2016, the Parliament of Catalonia designated the 17th of September 2017 as the date in which the population of that region are to vote in a referendum to determine whether to remain as part of the Kingdom of Spain or formally assume the status of a sovereign country.
Catalonia’s Regional President Carles Puigdemont made it clear that though he would ideally hold the referendum with the central government’s approval, he would hold it “with or without Spain’s blessing.” For its part, the central Spanish government which is based in Madrid has voiced its opposition to the prospect of Catalan independence as apart from the undermining of territorial integrity, it would mean losing a sixth of its population, and a key economic contributor to the stagnant Spanish economy, in which some approximate 22 percent of the population are unemployed. But what would Catalan independence really mean? In the context of financial flows between Catalonia and Spain, as well as international trade, globalisation, the EU, NATO, and cultural confluences between the two entities, would Catalan independence be a mere formality? In other words, has the Catalan Question been relegated to the symbolic by these twenty-first century forces?
The question of Catalan independence is as old as Spain itself. Having been originally independent as the County of Barcelona, it was merged with Aragon in the 11th century, (and – ironically – served as an important launch-pad seaport that allowed Aragon to become an important seagoing nation, and an important naval power in the Mediterranean and eventually subdue other nations such as Valencia, which is still a part of Spain) which itself in turn was merged with Castile in 1469 in the personal union that arose from the marriage between King Ferdinand of Aragon and Queen Isabella of Castile that birthed the Kingdom of Spain. In the following five centuries, perhaps the most tumultuous and unstable in Spain’s history (enduring a war of succession, occupation by Napoleonic France, civil war, no less than two coup d’états and restorations), the Catalan province enjoyed unpredictable relations with the Crown of Spain. To begin with, in the early 18th century, with the death of the childless King Charles II, Spain had a new King whom Catalonia had opposed in the 12-year war of succession (1702-14) in Louis XIV’s grandson, Philip V, the ancestor of the Spanish branch of the Bourbon dynasty, which retains the crown of that country to this day. In the ensuing years of his reign, King Philip energetically enacted “Spanification” attempts that saw him clamp the relative regional autonomy that the various medieval kingdoms such as Catalonia had enjoyed – with the exception of Basque, which had supported him in the war – and began a process of centralisation along the lines of what Cardinal Richelieu and later Louis XIV had done in France. He also established a Royal Academy that perhaps in retrospect came to be the agitating cause of the desire for independence among the Catalans as its implicit foundational mandate was the replacement of various regional languages, including Catalan, as languages of government and of literature in their respective territories.
Between 1931 and 1939, with the fall of the monarchy and the rise of the (second) Spanish Republic, Catalonia once again enjoyed regional autonomy and was even self-confident enough to declare independence under the charismatic Francesc Macià i Llussà in 1931, only to later renegotiate its relationship with Spain and become a greatly independent Generalitat de Catalunya within Spain a year later. With the victory of General Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) came many reversals to the autonomy of Catalonia once again. The conservative, fascist government, which had won the war partly as a result of assistance from Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, enacted measures that once more rolled back regional autonomy, and went as far as to ban regional languages from public use.
With the death of Franco and the restoration of the monarchy, Spain entered had a surprising democratic transition and a period of economic growth that economists rendered almost miraculous. And importantly, regional autonomy was put back on the table, with Catalonia walking away with a greater deal of it than most of Spain’s other regions. Increasingly, however, Catalans wanted more of it. Today, as a result of the seismic 2015 election in that region, the 135-seat Parliament of Catalonia is under a 72-seat majority held by the pro-independence Together for Yes (Junts pel Si) coalition of secessionist parties which won the highest number of seats at 62 as well as the pro-independence, anti-Euro, anti-NATO, Eurosceptic CUP (Candidatura d’Unitat Popular) which came third place (a position it shares with many pro-union parties), winning 10 seats. Both parties ran on manifestos promising a referendum on independence, and did so against the backdrop of a 2014 non-binding (and, some say, illegal) referendum in which 80% of those who answered voted “Yes” (hence the name of the coalition). The French-born leader of the coalition Muriel Casals i Couturier, who died in early 2016 from motor injuries, described the motivation behind separatism in these terms: “the dream of traditional Catalanism has been shown to be unworkable, and that if we want to live as Catalans we mustn’t seek to transform Spain – just our relationship with it.”
However, the transformation of that relationship may prove somewhat vacuous.
The Spanish-speaking community outside of Spain, mainly concentrated in Latin America, maintains close relations with the former mother land, to the extent that the now-defunct government-in-exile of the second Spanish Republic during the Franco years chose Mexico City as its headquarters. According to Sam Wang, researcher at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Spain, although having lost its continental possessions in the Americas two centuries ago, still regards relations with Latin America as a top foreign policy priority, and maintains strong political, business, and cultural links with Latin America. Although Spain’s economy and political influence is dwarfed by those of the United States, Britain, and China, Spain commits proportionally more resources to Latin America than any major power in diplomacy, foreign aid, investment, and cultural activities. In Spain, many people, including government officials, believe that Madrid’s relation[s] with Spanish-speaking Latin America is a “special” one: characterized by a common language and a shared cultural history and identity.”
What is interesting is the economic side of the story. For a considerable number of Latin American countries, Spain is their second-largest trading partner outside of the more economically and politically potent and geographically closer US: Spain enjoys particularly strong economic ties with Mexico (18 percent), Colombia (13 percent), and the Central American economies, and in 2014, a total of 19.6 percent of Spanish FDI flowed to Latin America. To put it in context, about 40% of Spain’s FDI for the same period was towards the EU with whom Spain has much more formalised ties thanks to the common tariff.
Being “heavily reliant on Spain’s Treasury credit lines,” according to CNBC’s Caroline Roth, Catalonia, much as the secessionist elements would have it otherwise, is unlikely to be rid of that dependency for a long time; and should political independence be won, the economic one will merely take a different form. Indeed, former colonies (as no doubt many pro-independence politicians would characterise Catalonia’s status in Spain) tend to have notoriously resilient trade pathways with their former colonisers. Spain as a market is a very important one for Catalonia. In 2012, for example, Catalonia exported goods worth €58,282 million to foreign countries; a figure well in excess of sales to the Spanish market, which amounted to €49,026 million, but one which, at 45.7%, signifies Spain’s importance to Catalonia. “A key aspect to consider in our analysis is the presence in Catalonia of numerous Spanish companies, for whom the Catalan market represents between 15% and 25% of the Spanish market as a whole. The ten Spanish firms with the largest turnover are: Telefónica, Repsol, Santander Bank, Endesa,Iberdrola,ACS Group,CEPSA, BBVA, Mercadona and El Corte Inglés.Most of them are present on a large scale in Catalonia,” stated Francesc Raventós who served as Chief Executive Officer and Director at Catalana d’Iniciatives S.C.R., S.A., in a report published by Association of Economists of Catalonia on September 11, 2014 (Catalonia’s national day).
And so, a hypothetical break with Spain need not mean a severing of ties. And far from it; the existence of the EU could effectively render Catalan independence only symbolic. With the existence of a common tariff (should it ascend to the EU), the Schengen Area, and the CSDP, cooperation and confluence with Spain would be quite concentrated as common issues such as the economy, terrorism, and migration make insulation an improbability in today’s Europe. And should it desire to, an independent Catalan Republic would most likely gain entrance in the EU (unless of course Spain vetoes the ascension, which is a possibility). It has a strong economy (having been the least affected by the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing recession, unlike the rest of Spain), a vibrant democracy and stable institutions. And so, ironically, Catalonia is an ideal EU member for the same reasons that it wants out of Spain. As the Catalan economist, David Ross Serra has put it, “juridically,…an independent Catalonia would fit into EU legislation and International law.”
On the cultural front, apart from Catholicism (which represents a religious uniformity not even England can boast regarding Ireland and Scotland), the key commonality between Catalans and Spaniards is the social currency of football; their two respective flagship teams being among the best in the world: FC Barcelona and Real Madrid FC, respectively (Barcelona currently being 2nd and Madrid 1st). FC Barcelona has a presidency and a substantial number of players who wish for Catalonian independence, a fact which triggered the president of the Spanish Sports Council, Miguel Cardenal, to come out and state that Barcelona would lose a lot of income from the loss of La Liga broadcasting rights. And for their part, the pro-independence elements in the soccer team would like to continue to be able to play in La Liga. “[On this issue] perhaps a compromise is possible,” said Jan Marot of Politico.
Should independence be won, it is highly probable that the Together for Yes coalition, which was born out of a desire to deliver independence would lose its mandate (as has UKIP in the UK, some argue, after Brexit) and become divided on the nuts and bolts of what independence should mean, not in the least as it pertains to the relationship with Madrid, as well as with Brussels. As it stands, the party with the highest number of seats within the coalition is the pro-EU Catalan European Democratic Party, with its junior partners having no particularly consequential Eurosceptic views. On the other hand, apart from the Eurosceptic CUP, most of the other parties who compose the rest of the Catalan Parliament, including the 32-seat Citizens Party, are pro-EU. And so, in the event of independence, it is likely that Catalonia would not completely rule out membership in the EU, and therefore concentrated economic, political, and even human exchange with Spain.
Come September 17th, I am not sure what the Catalan people will choose, and there is evidence that they are not yet either (the 80% who voted for independence in the 2014 referendum were less than 50% of Catalonia’s population; and despite their parliamentary majority, Catalonia’s separatist parties garnered only 48% of the popular vote), and what Spain will make of it; though there is clear evidence that the pro-independence camp has the edge and Madrid will have few choices outside of recognising the outcome. Essentially, it would appear that what Catalonia wants from Spain has already been granted to it in that the region enjoys formal autonomy from Madrid and has a distinct culture for which its people are not persecuted (though pledging loyalty to the Bourbon King continues to be a sore subject). From the football pitch, to questions of human settlement (think India and Pakistan in 1947, though perhaps with far less bloodshed and urgency), security issues, as well as the economy, should independence be won, the existence of the deep ties between the two entities will – as they are being unravelled – become more and more visible (if not retightened anew, as was the case in the early 1930s). It is quite clear therefore that, for better or for worse, there will always be Spanish Catalonia, and for that matter Catalan Spain.
Iceland’s Historic(al) Elections
The morning of September, 26 was a good one for Lenya Run Karim of the Pirate Party. Once the preliminary results were announced, things were clear: the 21-year-old law student of the University of Iceland, originating from a Kurdish immigrant family, had become the youngest MP in the country’s history.
In historical significance, however, this event was second to another. Iceland, the world champion in terms of gender equality, became the first country in Europe to have more women MPs than men, 33 versus 30. The news immediately made world headlines: only five countries in the world have achieved such impressive results. Remarkably, all are non-European: Rwanda, Nicaragua and Cuba have a majority of women in parliament, while Mexico and the UAE have an equal number of male and female MPs.
Nine hours later, news agencies around the world had to edit their headlines. The recount in the Northwest constituency affected the outcome across the country to delay the ‘triumph for women’ for another four years.
Small numbers, big changes
The Icelandic electoral system is designed so that 54 out of the 63 seats in the Althingi, the national parliament, are primary or constituency seats, while another nine are equalization seats. Only parties passing the 5 per cent threshold are allowed to distribute equalisation seats that go to the candidates who failed to win constituency mandates and received the most votes in their constituency. However, the number of equalisation mandates in each of the 6 constituencies is legislated. In theory, this could lead to a situation in which the leading party candidate in one constituency may simply lack an equalisation mandate, so the leading candidate of the same party—but in another constituency—receives it.
This is what happened this year. Because of a difference of only ten votes between the Reform Party and the Pirate Party, both vying for the only equalisation mandate in the Northwest, the constituency’s electoral commission announced a recount on its own initiative. There were also questions concerning the counting procedure as such: the ballots were not sealed but simply locked in a Borgarnes hotel room. The updated results hardly affected the distribution of seats between the parties, bringing in five new MPs, none of whom were women, with the 21-year-old Lenya Run Karim replaced by her 52-year-old party colleague.
In the afternoon of September, 27, at the request of the Left-Green Movement, supported by the Independence Party, the Pirates and the Reform Party, the commission in the South announced a recount of their own—the difference between the Left-Greens and the Centrists was only seven votes. There was no ‘domino effect’, as in the case of the Northwest, as the five-hour recount showed the same result. Recounts in other districts are unlikely, nor is it likely that Althingi—vested with the power to declare the elections valid—would invalidate the results in the Northwest. Nevertheless, the ‘replaced’ candidates have already announced their intention to appeal against the results, citing violations of ballot storage procedures. Under the Icelandic law, this is quite enough to invalidate the results and call a re-election in the Northwest, as the Supreme Court of Iceland invalidated the Constitutional Council elections due to a breach of procedure 10 years ago. Be that as it may, the current score remains 33:30, in favor of men.
Progressives’ progress and threshold for socialists
On the whole, there were no surprises: the provisional allocation of mandates resembles, if with minor changes, the opinion polls on the eve of the election.
The ruling three-party coalition has rejuvenated its position, winning 37 out of the 63 Althingi seats. The centrist Progressive Party saw a real electoral triumph, improving its 2017 result by five seats. Prime-minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir’s Left-Green Movement, albeit with a slight loss, won eight seats, surpassing all pre-election expectations. Although the centre-right Independence Party outperformed everyone again to win almost a quarter of all votes, 16 seats are one of the worst results of the Icelandic ‘Grand Old Party’ ever.
The results of the Social-Democrats, almost 10% versus 12.1% in 2017, and of the Pirates, 8.6% versus 9.2%, have deteriorated. Support for the Centre Party of Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, former prime-minister and victim of the Panama Papers, has halved from 10.9% to 5.4%. The centrists have seen a steady decline in recent years, largely due to a sexist scandal involving party MPs. The populist People’s Party and the pro-European Reform Party have seen gains of 8.8% and 8.3%, as compared to 6.9% and 6.7% in the previous elections.
Of the leading Icelandic parties, only the Socialist Party failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold: despite a rating above 7% in August, the Socialists received only 4.1% of the vote.
Coronavirus, climate & economy
Healthcare and the fight against COVID-19 was, expectedly, on top of the agenda of the elections: 72% of voters ranked it as the defining issue, according to a Fréttablaðið poll. Thanks to swift and stringent measures, the Icelandic government brought the coronavirus under control from day one, and the country has enjoyed one of the lowest infection rates in the world for most of the time. At the same time, the pandemic exposed a number of problems in the national healthcare system: staff shortages, low salaries and long waiting lists for emergency surgery.
Climate change, which Icelanders are already experiencing, was an equally important topic. This summer, the temperature has not dropped below 20°C for 59 days, an anomaly for a North-Atlantic island. However, Icelanders’ concerns never converted into increased support for the four left-leaning parties advocating greater reductions in CO2 emission than the country has committed to under the Paris Agreement: their combined result fell by 0.5%.
The economy and employment were also among the main issues in this election. The pandemic has severely damaged the island nation’s economy, which is heavily tourism-reliant—perhaps, unsurprisingly, many Icelanders are in favor of reviving the tourism sector as well as diversifying the economy further.
The EU membership, by far a ‘traditional’ issue in Icelandic politics, is unlikely to be featured on the agenda of the newly-elected parliament as the combined result of the Eurosceptics, despite a loss of 4%, still exceeds half of the overall votes. The new Althingi will probably face the issue of constitutional reform once again, which is only becoming more topical in the light of the pandemic and the equalization mandates story.
New (old) government?
The parties are to negotiate coalition formation. The most likely scenario now is that the ruling coalition of the Independence Party, the Left-Greens and the Progressives continues. It has been the most ideologically diverse and the first three-party coalition in Iceland’s history to last a full term. A successful fight against the pandemic has only strengthened its positions and helped it secure additional votes. Independence Party leader and finance minister Bjarni Benediktsson has earlier said he would be prepared to keep the ruling coalition if it holds the majority. President Guðni Jóhannesson announced immediately after the elections that he would confirm the mandate of the ruling coalition to form a new government if the three parties could strike a deal.
Other developments are possible but unlikely. Should the Left-Greens decide to leave the coalition, they could be replaced by the Reform Party or the People’s Party, while any coalition without the Independence Party can only be a four-party or larger coalition.
Who will become the new prime-minister still remains to be seen—but if the ruling coalition remains in place, the current prime-minister and leader of the Left-Greens, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, stands a good chance of keeping her post: she is still the most popular politician in Iceland with a 40 per cent approval rate.
The 2021 Althingi election, with one of the lowest turnouts in history at 80.1%, has not produced a clear winner. The election results reflect a Europe-wide trend in which traditional “major” parties are losing support. The electorate is fragmenting and their votes are pulled by smaller new parties. The coronavirus pandemic has only reinforced this trend.
The 2021 campaign did not foreshadow a sensation. Although Iceland has not become the first European country with a women’s majority in parliament, these elections will certainly go down in history as a test of Icelanders’ trust to their own democracy.
From our partner RIAC
EU-Balkan Summit: No Set Timeframe for Western Balkans Accession
On October 6, Slovenia hosted a summit between the EU and the Western Balkans states. The EU-27 met with their counterparts (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo) in the sumptuous Renaissance setting of Brdo Castle, 30 kilometers north of the capital, Ljubljana. Despite calls from a minority of heads of state and government, there were no sign of a breakthrough on the sensitive issue of enlargement. The accession of these countries to the European Union is still not unanimous among the 27 EU member states.
During her final tour of the Balkans three weeks ago, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the peninsula’s integration was of “geostrategic” importance. On the eve of the summit, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz backed Slovenia’s goal of integrating this zone’s countries into the EU by 2030.
However, the unanimity required to begin the hard negotiations is still a long way off, even for the most advanced countries in the accession process, Albania and North Macedonia. Bulgaria, which is already a member of the EU, is opposing North Macedonia’s admission due to linguistic and cultural differences. Since Yugoslavia’s demise, Sofia has rejected the concept of Macedonian language, insisting that it is a Bulgarian dialect, and has condemned the artificial construction of a distinct national identity.
Other countries’ reluctance to join quickly is of a different nature. France and the Netherlands believe that previous enlargements (Bulgaria and Romania in 2007) have resulted in changes that must first be digested before the next round of enlargement. The EU-27 also demand that all necessary prior guarantees be provided regarding the independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption in these countries. Despite the fact that press freedom is a requirement for membership, the NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) urged the EU to make “support for investigative and professional journalism” a key issue at the summit.”
While the EU-27 have not met since June, the topic of Western Balkans integration is competing with other top priorities in the run-up to France’s presidency of the EU in the first half of 2022. On the eve of the summit, a working dinner will be held, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called for “a strategic discussion on the role of the Union on the international scene” in his letter of invitation to the EU-Balkans Summit, citing “recent developments in Afghanistan,” the announcement of the AUKUS pact between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which has enraged Paris.
The Western Balkans remain the focal point of an international game of influence in which the Europeans seek to maintain their dominance. As a result, the importance of reaffirming a “European perspective” at the summit was not an overstatement. Faced with the more frequent incursion of China, Russia, and Turkey in that European region, the EU has pledged a 30 billion euro Economic and Investment Plan for 2021-2027, as well as increased cooperation, particularly to deal with the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Opening the borders, however, is out of the question. In the absence of progress on this issue, Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia have decided to establish their own zone of free movement (The Balkans are Open”) beginning January 1, 2023. “We are starting today to do in the region what we will do tomorrow in the EU,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama when the agreement was signed last July.
This initiative, launched in 2019 under the name “Mini-Schengen” and based on a 1990s idea, does not have the support of the entire peninsular region, which remains deeply divided over this project. While Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are not refusing to be a part of it and are open to discussions, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, who took office in 2020, for his part accuses Serbia of relying on this project to recreate “a fourth Yugoslavia”
Tensions between Balkan countries continue to be an impediment to European integration. The issue of movement between Kosovo and Serbia has been a source of concern since the end of September. Two weeks of escalation followed Kosovo’s decision to prohibit cars with Serbian license plates from entering its territory, in response to Serbia’s long-standing prohibition on allowing vehicles to pass in the opposite direction.
In response to the mobilization of Kosovar police to block the road, Serbs in Kosovo blocked roads to their towns and villages, and Serbia deployed tanks and the air force near the border. On Sunday, October 3, the conflict seemed to be over, and the roads were reopened. However, the tone had been set three days before the EU-Balkans summit.
German Election: Ramifications for the US Foreign Policy
In the recent German election, foreign policy was scarcely an issue. But Germany is an important element in the US foreign policy. There is a number of cases where Germany and the US can cooperate, but all of these dynamics are going to change very soon.
The Germans’ strategic culture makes it hard to be aligned perfectly with the US and disagreements can easily damage the relations. After the tension between the two countries over the Iraq war, in 2003, Henry Kissinger said that he could not imagine the relations between Germany and the US could be aggravated so quickly, so easily, which might end up being the “permanent temptation of German politics”. For a long time, the US used to provide security for Germany during the Cold War and beyond, so, several generations are used to take peace for granted. But recently, there is a growing demand on them to carry more burden, not just for their own security, but for international peace and stability. This demand was not well-received in Berlin.
Then, the environment around Germany changed and new threats loomed up in front of them. The great powers’ competition became the main theme in international relations. Still, Germany was not and is not ready for shouldering more responsibility. Politicians know this very well. Ursula von der Leyen, who was German defense minister, asked terms like “nuclear weapons” and “deterrence” be removed from her speeches.
Although on paper, all major parties appreciate the importance of Germany’s relations with the US, the Greens and SPD ask for a reset in the relations. The Greens insist on the European way in transatlantic relations and SPD seeks more multilateralism. Therefore, alignment may be harder to maintain in the future. However, If the tensions between the US and China heat up to melting degrees, then external pressure can overrule the internal pressure and Germany may accede to its transatlantic partners, just like when Helmut Schmid let NATO install medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe after the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan and the Cold War heated up.
According to the election results, now three coalitions are possible: grand coalition with CDU/CSU and SPD, traffic lights coalition with SPD, FDP, and Greens, Jamaica coalition with CDU/CSU, FDP, and Greens. Jamaica coalition will more likely form the most favorable government for the US because it has both CDU and FDP, and traffic lights will be the least favorite as it has SPD. The grand coalition can maintain the status quo at best, because contrary to the current government, SPD will dominate CDU.
To understand nuances, we need to go over security issues to see how these coalitions will react to them. As far as Russia is concerned, none of them will recognize the annexation of Crimea and they all support related sanctions. However, if tensions heat up, any coalition government with SPD will be less likely assertive. On the other hand, as the Greens stress the importance of European values like democracy and human rights, they tend to be more assertive if the US formulates its foreign policy by these common values and describe US-China rivalry as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism. Moreover, the Greens disapprove of the Nordstream project, of course not for its geopolitics. FDP has also sided against it for a different reason. So, the US must follow closely the negotiations which have already started between anti-Russian smaller parties versus major parties.
For relations with China, pro-business FDP is less assertive. They are seeking for developing EU-China relations and deepening economic ties and civil society relations. While CDU/CSU and Greens see China as a competitor, partner, and systemic rival, SPD and FDP have still hopes that they can bring change through the exchange. Thus, the US might have bigger problems with the traffic lights coalition than the Jamaica coalition in this regard.
As for NATO and its 2 percent of GDP, the division is wider. CDU/CSU and FDP are the only parties who support it. So, in the next government, it might be harder to persuade them to pay more. Finally, for nuclear participation, the situation is the same. CDU/CSU is the only party that argues for it. This makes it an alarming situation because the next government has to decide on replacing Germany’s tornados until 2024, otherwise Germany will drop out of the NATO nuclear participation.
The below table gives a brief review of these three coalitions. 1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism and 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism. As it shows, the most anti-Russia coalition is Jamaica, while the most anti-China coalition is Trafic light. Meanwhile, Grand Coalition is the most pro-NATO coalition. If the US adopts a more normative foreign policy against China and Russia, then the Greens and FDP will be more assertive in their anti-Russian and anti-Chinese policies and Germany will align more firmly with the US if traffic light or Jamaica coalition rise to power.
|Issues Coalitions||Trafic Light||Grand Coalition||Jamaica|
1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism. 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism.
In conclusion, this election should not make Americans any happier. The US has already been frustrated with the current government led by Angela Merkel who gave Germany’s trade with China the first priority, and now that the left-wing will have more say in any imaginable coalition in the future, the Americans should become less pleased. But, still, there are hopes that Germany can be a partner for the US in great power competition if the US could articulate its foreign policy with common values, like democracy and human rights. More normative foreign policy can make a reliable partner out of Germany. Foreign policy rarely became a topic in this election, but observers should expect many ramifications for it.
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