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The End of Pax Americana and Putin’s New Russianness

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[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] I [/yt_dropcap]f one surveys Putin’s official pronouncements of the last few years on Russia’s historical role in the 21st century, one may soon notice that the language of ideological fanaticism, so prevalent during the Soviet era, has slowly evolved in that of values, character, spiritual identity, tradition and historical heritage.

At first blush it appears that it’s no longer a game of raw power and economics, but one of “soft power,” if not exactly that of reasoned philosophical dialogue, morality, and spiritual vision.

The question arises: has the leopard changed its spots? Is this a new ideology based on a vision, on the “inner strength” to be discovered in centuries upon centuries of Russian history and spiritual ties, the way a Dostoyevsky understood it? In other words, while acknowledging that Russia is not the West with its particular notions of electoral democracy, freedom of speech, and human rights, Mr. Putin and company would like to promote the idea that Russia remains unique: it is not bourgeois, essentially greedly capitalistic; it is no longer tied to the Communist ideology, nor is it corrupt and decadent as the West.

A corollary question arises: is this a new, less ideological, definition of Russianness? A mishmash of patriotism coupled to religious fervor (Russian Orthodoxy), the cult of the mother, sports, and the resurgence of provincial intelligentsia? Putin, after all, seems to be a genius in finding out what people want and then cleverly manipulating them. There is an affinity here with Donald Trump’s kind of populism, which may go a long way in explaining their mutual, if perplexing, sympathy.

The problem persists however: there is a colossal lack of trust between Putin and his people despite what he’d like us to believe about his popularity. It is a trumped up popularity due to the fact that he totally controls and manipulates the media, and just about everything else in Russia. Restoring that trust may prove harder than articulating a new national idea.

Many Russians no longer accept the idea of being subjects of the State; they wish to be citizens contributing to its overall prosperity. Here Putin and his oligarchs, who have greatly enriched themselves after the demise of the Soviet Union, leave much to be desired. Until that trust is restored and people feel that their aspirations, input and contributions are respected, beginning with credible and legitimate elections, authoritarianism will continue to increase in Russia at the expense of a truly democratic society.

Be that as it may, let’s return to the struggle, be it cultural or be it geo-political, between Russia and the West. It’s hard to imagine a period, since the end of the Cold War, when relations between Russia and the US have been so disastrous. What happened to the new era, the so called reset, which the end of the Cold War was supposed to usher in? Some political science experts today talk of a New Cold War, others mention an enormous misunderstanding in the grasping of a new Russia and the new ideology as above delineated, which of course they alone are able to understand and explain. It gets pretty confusing. Let’s see if we can unravel some of this mess.

The undeniable fact is that Russia, since the end of the Soviet Empire, has returned to the world stage with a vengeance, wielding an agenda that wants to appear visionary, for Russians at any rate, but looks progressively more Machiavellian. It seems rather to be eager to redress the real or perceived slights perpetrated by the West, NATO and the Atlantic alliance, and restore a semblance of its former global role. Some have imputed this attitude to the slightly paranoid narcissistic mind of a former KBG operative named Vladimir Putin.

But the question persists. Where did it all go wrong with the relationship and who is to blame? Is it a question of US overreaching or one of Russia’s nostalgia for Soviet imperial greatness buttressed by a new powerful ideology? Since the economy of Russia is smaller than that of Italy and California, is it gambling it all on nuclear weapons and intimidation, not to dissimilar to the North Korean misguided strategy? To answer that question may require a book the length of Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, but let’s try a few brief pointers.

Perhaps the initial fault does lie with the West, after all. It began when the West miserably failed to treat Russia as a nation that had had the courage to shake off Soviet Communism. Instead of welcoming it into a new community of nations, NATO treated it almost as a successor state to the USSR, inheriting the distrust of the West toward it.

Russia was later admitted into the G7 club making it the G8, but not as a full respected member but as an observer. This mistake was compounded when the West enthusiastically approved NATO’s expansion into Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, countries with their own nationalistic traditions of struggle against Moscow’s rule. Then it added the Baltic States who also had been satellites of the Soviet Union. Should we really wonder why Russia is so adamant about stopping the absorbing of Georgia and the Ukraine into NATO’s orbit and that Putin may be already eyeing those Baltic countries while pursuing a strategy of divide and conquer. That strategy is quite apparent even in the Western part of the EU where ultra-nationalistic movements are being funded and interference in their elections is being practiced via misinformation and cyber-warfare.

Of course there is another side to this coin, that of the West which prefers to speak of Russian “revanchism” as personified by Vladimir Putin who once described the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” Lately he has been showing an extremely assertive behavior in the Ukraine, Georgia, and Syria. And of course the experts debate which side is the correct side.

The fact remains however that presently there is no discernible politically super-charged ideological competition going on, one resembling the one that went on in the Cold War. And that is a good thing. There is however a competition for influence and here it must be admitted that economically Russia is still a power of a lesser order. The temptation remains for Russia to vaunt its nuclear weapons or its new found weapon: weaponized misinformation and cyber-warfare with which to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, and about which the US Congress is presently investigating.

While it may be true that Pax Americana is over with and a firmer NATO alliance based on cooperation and trust may be needed, a new reset button with Russia is nowhere on the horizon. In any case, for the sake of global stability, can a new warmer sort of relationship with Russia be envisioned? Hard to tell at the present moment.

The experts will continue to explain away to demonstrate their expertise, the spies will continue to misinform and conduct cyber warfare, but in the final analysis it will be history which will render the final verdict on this thorny conundrum.

Professor Paparella has earned a Ph.D. in Italian Humanism, with a dissertation on the philosopher of history Giambattista Vico, from Yale University. He is a scholar interested in current relevant philosophical, political and cultural issues; the author of numerous essays and books on the EU cultural identity among which A New Europe in search of its Soul, and Europa: An Idea and a Journey. Presently he teaches philosophy and humanities at Barry University, Miami, Florida. He is a prolific writer and has written hundreds of essays for both traditional academic and on-line magazines among which Metanexus and Ovi. One of his current works in progress is a book dealing with the issue of cultural identity within the phenomenon of “the neo-immigrant” exhibited by an international global economy strong on positivism and utilitarianism and weak on humanism and ideals.

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Steering Russia-US Relations Away from Diplomatic Expulsion Rocks

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As the recent expulsions of Russian diplomats from the US, Poland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic demonstrate, this measure is becoming a standard international practice of the West. For the Biden administration, a new manifestation of the “Russia’s threat” is an additional tool to discipline its European allies and to cement the transatlantic partnership. For many European NATO members, expulsions of diplomats are a symbolic gesture demonstrating their firm support of the US and its anti-Russian policies.

Clear enough, such a practice will not be limited to Russia only. Today hundreds, if not thousands of diplomatic officers all around the world find themselves hostage to problems they have nothing to do with. Western decision-makers seem to consider hosting foreign diplomats not as something natural and uncontroversial but rather as a sort of privilege temporarily granted to a particular country — one that can be denied at any given moment.

It would be logical to assume that in times of crisis, when the cost of any error grows exponentially, it is particularly crucial to preserve and even to expand the existing diplomatic channels. Each diplomat, irrespective of his or her rank and post, is, inter alia, a communications channel, a source of information, and a party to a dialogue that can help understand your opponent’s logic, fears, intentions, and expectations. Niccolo Machiavelli’s adage, “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer” remains just as pertinent five centuries later. Unfortunately, these wise words are out of circulation in most Western capitals today.

A proponent of expulsions would argue that those expelled are not actually diplomats at all. They are alleged intelligence officers and their mission is to undermine the host country’s national security. Therefore, expulsions are justified and appropriate. However, this logic appears to be extremely dubious. Indeed, if you have hard evidence, or at the very least a reasonable suspicion that a diplomatic mission serves as a front office for intelligence officers, and if operations of these officers are causing serious harm to your country’s security, why should you wait for the latest political crisis to expel them? You should not tolerate their presence in principle and expel them once you expose them.

Even the experience of the Cold War itself demonstrates that expulsions of diplomats produce no short-term or long-term positive results whatsoever. In fact, there can be no possible positive results because diplomatic service is nothing more but just one of a number of technical instruments used in foreign politics. Diplomats may bring you bad messages from their capitals and they often do, but if you are smart enough, you never shoot the messenger.

Diplomatic traditions do not allow such unfriendly actions to go unnoticed. Moscow has to respond. Usually, states respond to expulsions of their diplomats by symmetrical actions – i.e. Russia has to expel the same number of US, Polish or Czech diplomats, as the number of Russian diplomats expelled from the US, Poland or the Czech Republic. Of course, each case is special. For instance, the Czech Embassy in Moscow is much smaller than the Russian Embassy in Prague, so the impact of the symmetrical actions on the Czech diplomatic mission in Russia will be quite strong.

The question now is whether the Kremlin would go beyond a symmetrical response and start a new cycle of escalation. For example, it could set new restrictions upon Western companies operating in the country, it could cancel accreditation of select Western media in Moscow, it could close branches of US and European foundations and NGOs in Russia. I hope that the final response will be measured and not excessive.

The door for US-Russian negotiations is still open. So far, both sides tried to avoid specific actions that would make these negotiations absolutely impossible. The recent US sanctions against Russia have been mostly symbolic, and the Russian leadership so far has demonstrated no appetite for a rapid further escalation. I think that a meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin remains an option and an opportunity. Such a meeting would not lead to any “reset” in the bilateral relations, but it would bring more clarity to the relationship. To stabilize US-Russian relations even at a very low level would already be a major accomplishment.

From our partner RIAC

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Russia becomes member of International Organization for Migration

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Photo credit: Anton Novoderezhlin/TASS

After several negotiations, Russia finally becomes as a full-fledged member of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). It means that Russia has adopted, as a mandatory condition for obtaining membership, the constitution of the organization. It simply implies that by joining this international organization, it has given the country an additional status.

After the collapse of the Soviet, Russia has been interacting with the IOM since 1992 only as an observer. In the past years, Russia has shown interest in expanding this cooperation. The decision to admit Russia to the organization was approved at a Council’s meeting by the majority of votes: 116 states voted for it, and two countries voted against – these are Ukraine and Georgia. That however, the United States and Honduras abstained, according to information obtained from Moscow office of International Migration Organization.

“In line with the resolution of the 111th session of the IOM Council of November 24, 2020 that approved Russia’s application for the IOM membership, Russia becomes a full-fledged member of the organization from the day when this notification is handed over to its director general,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a website statement in April.

Adoption of the IOM Constitution is a mandatory condition for obtaining its membership, which opens “extra possibilities for developing constructive cooperation with international community on migration-related matters,” the statement stressed in part.

It is significant to recall that Russian President Vladimir Putin issued an order to secure Russia’s membership in the organization in August 2020 and submitted its Constitution to the Russian State Duma (lower house of parliament) in February 2021.

Headquartered in Geneva, the International Organization for Migration, a leading inter-government organization active in the area of migration, was set up on December 5, 1951. It opened its office in Moscow in 1992.

IOM supports migrants across the world, developing effective responses to the shifting dynamics of migration and, as such, is a key source of advice on migration policy and practice. The organization works in emergency situations, developing the resilience of all people on the move, and particularly those in situations of vulnerability, as well as building capacity within governments to manage all forms and impacts of mobility.

IOM’s stated mission is to promote humane and orderly migration by providing services and advice to governments and migrants. It works to help ensure proper management of migration, to promote international cooperation on migration issues, to assist in the search for practical solutions to migration problems and to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in need, be they refugees, displaced persons or other uprooted people. It is part of the structured system of the United Nations, and includes over 170 countries.

Senator Vladimir Dzhabarov, first deputy chairman of Russia’s Federation Council (Senate) Committee on International Affairs, noted that the organization’s constitution has a provision saying that it is in a nation’s jurisdiction to decide how many migrants it can receive, therefore the IOM membership imposes no extra commitments on Russia and doesn’t restrict its right to conduct an independent migration policy.

On other hand, Russia’s full-fledged membership in IOM will help it increase its influence on international policy in the sphere of migration and use the country’s potential to promote its interests in this sphere, Senator Dzhabarov explained.

Russia has had an inflow of migrants mainly from the former Soviet republics. The migrants have played exceptional roles both in society and in the economy. The inflow of foreign workers to Russia has be resolved in accordance with real needs of the economy and based on the protection of Russian citizens’ interests in the labor market, according to various expert opinions.

The whole activity of labor migrants has to be conducted in strict compliance with legislation of the Russian Federation and generally recognized international norms.

State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and many state officials have repeatedly explained the necessity of holding of partnership dialogues on finding solutions to emerging problems within the framework of harmonization of legislation in various fields including regional security, migration policy and international cooperation. Besides that, Russia is ready for compliance with international treaties and agreements.

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Relegating the “Russia Problem” to Turkey

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Image credit: Prezident.Az

Turkey’s foreign policy is at a crossroads. Its Eurasianist twist is gaining momentum and looking east is becoming a new norm. Expanding its reach into Central Asia, in the hope of forming an alliance of sorts with the Turkic-speaking countries — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan — is beginning to look more realistic. In the north, the north-east, in Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, there is an identifiable geopolitical arc where Turkey is increasingly able to puncture Russia’s underbelly.

Take Azerbaijan’s victory in Second Karabakh War. It is rarely noticed that the military triumph has also transformed the country into a springboard for Turkey’s energy, cultural and geopolitical interests in the Caspian Sea region of Central Asia. Just two months after the November ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey signed a new trade deal with Azerbaijan. Turkey also sees benefits from January’s Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan agreement which aims to jointly develop the Dostluk (Friendship) gas field under the Caspian Sea, and it recently hosted a trilateral meeting with the Azerbaijani and Turkmen foreign ministers. The progress around Dostlug removes a significant roadblock on the implementation of the much-touted Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) which would allow gas to flow through the South Caucasus to Europe. Neither Russia nor Iran welcome this — both oppose Turkey’s ambitions of becoming an energy hub and finding new sources of energy.

Official visits followed. On March 6-9, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu visited Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Defense cooperation, preferential trade deals, and a free trade agreement were discussed in Tashkent. Turkey also resurrected a regional trade agreement during a March 4 virtual meeting of the so-called Economic Cooperation Organization which was formed in 1985 to facilitate trade between Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Though it has been largely moribund, the timing of its re-emergence is important as it is designed to be a piece in the new Turkish jigsaw.

Turkey is slowly trying to build an economic and cultural basis for cooperation based on the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency founded in 1991 and the Turkic Council in 2009. Although Turkey’s economic presence in the region remains overshadowed by China and Russia, there is a potential to exploit. Regional dependence on Russia and China is not always welcome and Central Asian states looking for alternatives to re-balance see Turkey as a good candidate. Furthermore, states such as Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are also cash-strapped, which increases the potential for Turkish involvement.

There is also another dimension to the eastward push. Turkey increasingly views Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan as parts of an emerging geopolitical area that can help it balance Russia’s growing military presence in the Black Sea and in the South Caucasus. With this in mind, Turkey is stepping up its military cooperation not only with Azerbaijan, but also with Georgia and Ukraine. The recent visit of Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Turkey highlighted the defense and economic spheres. This builds upon ongoing work of joint drone production, increasing arms trade, and naval cooperation between the two Black Sea states.

The trilateral Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey partnership works in support of Georgia’s push to join NATO. Joint military drills are also taking place involving scenarios of repelling enemy attacks targeting the regional infrastructure.

Even though Turkey and Russia have shown that they are able to cooperate in different theaters, notably in Syria, they nonetheless remain geopolitical competitors with diverging visions. There is an emerging two-pronged strategy Turkey is now pursuing to address what President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sees as a geopolitical imbalance. Cooperate with Vladimir Putin where possible, but cooperate with regional powers hostile to Russia where necessary.

There is one final theme for Turkey to exploit. The West knows its limits. The Caspian Sea is too far, while an over-close relationship with Ukraine and Georgia seems too risky. This creates a potential for cooperation between Turkey and the collective West. Delegating the “Russia problem” to Turkey could be beneficial, though it cannot change the balance of power overnight and there will be setbacks down the road.

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