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Lula vs Bolsonaro: The populist moment in Brazil

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[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] S [/yt_dropcap]ince the election victory of Donald Trump, many have tirelessly talked about populism. It is not a first appearance. This phenomenon has been recently experienced in Latin America, it has also been the spirit of the interwar period of fascism in Europe and it has happened in Russia in 1917. In fact, it has happened many times, in many different places.

Since the emergence of so-called left-wing populism in Greece and Spain, with SYRIZA and “citizen platforms” in union with Podemos, up until more recent right-wing populism from the National Front in France, Donald Trump and the Alt-Right, and Brexit and the UKIP, Geert Wilders (in addition to Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, Norway) etc; the “western” world seems to be haunted by the specter of populism. Finally, has Brazil, which lived its personal drama between the reelection of Dilma Rousseff (November 2014) and her impeachment (August 2016), also achieved this international trend?

Crisis, House of Cards, and more crisis.

In Political Science, especially in International Relations, a large technical vocabulary is used to refer to Brazil’s position in the International System. It has varied recently from the euphemistic use of the term “peripheral nation” to the ambitious “emerging power.” In both cases attention is drawn to the geography and mechanics used. It is almost unnecessary to point out that these are relational terms; Someone is peripheral to something or someone, as well as who emerges, does so from one environment to another. It is derived from this physics that waves originating in the “center” propagate to the “periphery”, as well as that turbulences in an environment can transfer to a neighboring environment.

President Lula da Silva, for example, referring to the 2007-08 Financial Crisis, once said that it was a “tsunami” in the United States, but Brazil would only have a “marolinha” (a wavelet). History proved him wrong, but the analogy still holds some value, after all something arrived in Brazil at last, although late. One can propose another vision for the mechanics envisaged by Lula if only we look back at the major historical events of the last century. Namely, that the great historical characters and facts, according to Marx, seem to repeat themselves – first as tragedy, then as farce.

Does this mean, for instance, that the tragedy of the 1929 Crisis and its “superstructural” (political and ideological) effects on international politics, of a transnational populist “moment” in the 1930s and 1940s simply returns today as a farce? Difficultly. World political history does not seem to follow a single unvarying and identifiable flow. In fact, those who are well acquainted with history and politics in general know that there are flows and reflows, movements and counter-movements, revolutions and counter-revolutions. But the ebbs don’t ever mean a return to the exact previous status quo, but rather a dialectical and historical overtake. The “movement” of history, therefore, is more like a war of position, of trenches, of gains and losses, rather than a frontal, immediate and unequivocal irruption, as Gramsci would say.

Yet, just as so-called “right-wing populism” spread throughout the European scene of material scarcity and personal hopelessness in the first half of the last century, something similar (but not the same) is happening today in Europe itself and in the United States. But how has the “wavelet” arrived in Brazil?

Let us make a rather superficial summary of the last years of Brazilian political life, justified only by the impracticability of dealing fully with the historical conformation of the Brazilian crisis conjuncture. In 2010, Dilma Rousseff (PT) is elected president after running against José Serra (PSDB) in the second round. In her campaign, Rousseff presents herself as a continuation of her and President Lula’s party policies (such as the welfare program Bolsa Família, which aimed at providing financial aid to poor Brazilian families on condition that children attended school and are vaccinated) – as Lula leaves the presidency with a record approval rating of 87%. What followed was a slowdown in the Brazilian economy during her first term (2011-2014), a desertion from the counter-cyclical measures taken by the PT government since the end of the Lula administration to combat the international crisis and finally the great protests of June 2013 (Jornadas de Junho). Nevertheless, Rousseff is re-elected at the end of 2014, defeating Aécio Neves (PSDB), also in the second round, with a difference of only 3% of valid votes.

From the beginning of 2015 onwards, what took place was politics in its purest form. In addition to a dramatic intensification of the effects of the international crisis in Brazil (greater than a wavelet), Brazil experienced an endless series of unpredictable events of greater drama than the Latin American soap operas themselves. In short, it was part of the everyday life of the Brazilian citizen (and it still is), when opening the newspaper in the morning, to come across: Some new arrest of a high-influence politician or a billionaire from the construction industry as a new phase of Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato); Some new plea bargain agreement that compromises politicians of almost every party; Conspiracy theories involving people of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; Leaks from secret audio recordings of these same people which would prove right or wrong some of the theories; Accidents and tragic deaths of key figures in the investigations; More conspiracy theories; Motions for impeachment directed to the President of the Republic (Dilma Rousseff); Motion to remove the President of the Chamber of Deputies (Eduardo Cunha, PMDB) who ironically had just accepted the motion against Rousseff and eventually got arrested by Lava Jato; A suspension order issued by Justice Mello to the President of the Senate (Renan Calheiros, PMDB) who simply decided to ignore it; Impeachment motion directed to the governor of Rio de Janeiro (Luis F. Pezão, PMDB) and the arrest of two former governors of the same state (Garotinho, PR, and Cabral Filho, PMDB); Protests against the government; Protests supporting the government. Finally, an almost endless chain of events resulted in the Senate vote in August 2016, for the removal of Dilma Rousseff from office. This marks the start of then Vice President Michel Temer’s (PMDB) presidency, raising a heated public debate about the legitimacy of his government.

Populism in Brazil: There and Back Again

On February 15, 2017, the National Transportation Confederation (CNT) and the MDA Research Institute announced the results of their poll regarding voting intention for the 2018 presidential elections: Lula da Silva (PT) leads with 30.5%, followed by Marina Silva (REDE) with 11.8% and, most impressively, Jair Bolsonaro (PSC) with 11.3%.

What is surprising? The accumulation of forces of right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro. Although it’s true little attention has been given to Marina Silva, this is justifiably so. Silva is a former senator from the Amazonian state of Acre, with moderate or unclear positions on most major political issues. Located at the center of the political-ideological spectrum, Marina Silva is affiliated with the hardly relevant REDE, a party with environmental outfits, but with little theoretical formulation or practical action. The senator’s performance most likely results from her performance in the 2010 and 2014 presidential elections, ranking third in both and presenting herself as the “middle way” between left and right. Her seasonal appearance every four years in Brazilian electoral politics usually fails to build up momentum and hardly presents her as a viable political alternative.

The 30.5% obtained by Lula does not fail to impress. As it is widely known, Lula was president of Brazil for two terms: 2003-2006 and 2007-2010. His name is both the most controversial and the strongest of the current political left in Brazil. The progressive field also counts on probable candidates that are critical of Lula. Namely, Ciro Gomes (PDT), former governor of the state of Ceará, a national-developmentalist, owner of an eloquent and aggressive discourse. Lastly, it is likely that a new candidate will still be announced by PSOL, a party that is more ideological than PT and PDT, but of little strength outside the intellectual and academic circles.

The big news, however, is the inclusion of Jair Bolsonaro in the list. His rise to third place outperforms all other leaders traditionally associated with the political right, such as former candidates Aécio Neves and José Serra (both from PSDB). But who is Bolsonaro? Member of the Christian Social Party (PSC), Bolsonaro is a former captain of the 8th Artillery Group of the Brazilian Army, a federal deputy for the state of Rio de Janeiro and father of the also politicians Eduardo, Flávio and Carlos Bolsonaro. The Bolsonaro family, in general, is unquestionably associated with far-right ultraconservatist politics and they carry out polemic statements ranging from the defense of the Military Dictatorship in Brazil (1964-85), to positions considered intolerant, sexist and homophobic. In 2015, for example, when asked about an Amnesty International study of the country’s public security crisis (in 2014, more than 3,000 people in Brazil were killed by the police), Jair Bolsonaro literally stated: “I think the Military Police of Brazil should kill more”. It is unnecessary to clarify that Bolsonaro is critical of the notion of Human Rights and regards it as the creation of socialists seeking cultural hegemony.

In this electoral framework, with no intentions of underestimating Marina Silva, what strikes the attention is the dispute between the populism of Lula and that of Bolsonaro. Is it an “old” populism of the South American Pink Tide against a “new” far-right populism? What do they have in common? And more importantly – what is populism?

Definitions and non-definitions

Many definitions and interpretations have emerged or been recalled since Donald Trump’s victory. Namely, in December 2016, after the outcome of the American presidential election, Time magazine devoted an entire article, “The Populists” by Simon Shuster, to deal with the populism of Donald Trump and Nigel Farage (UKIP), however, without caring about defining or explaining the phenomenon. This lack of conceptual clarity on populism is not exclusive to Time. As Ernesto Laclau explains in his book “On Populist Reason” (2005), most of the time, intellectual understanding is replaced by appeals to an “unspoken intuition” or by descriptive enumerations of a variety of “relevant characteristics”.

Appealing to intuition and enumerating “relevant characteristics” is precisely what Forbes does, in its January 24, 2017 article entitled “Why Populism Is Rising and How To Combat It” and signed by IESE Business School. Astonishingly enough, the article begins with the statement: “Readers relax, I’m not going to talk politics.” What follows are some painful paragraphs of pure ideological verbiage and, finally, a list of characteristics that, in short, associate populism with a deviant practice that divides people between “us” and the “elite”.

Examples multiply. We could also mention the part of the specialized media that tried to deal with the subject with less common sense. Foreign Affairs, in the article of the well-known Fareed Zakaria “Populism on the March” of November / December of 2016. Zakaria points out to economic factors are not the most important to explain contemporary populism, but cultural factors are. Problems arise here concerning the idealistic ontological foundations of Zakaria. Why, for example, is populism manifesting only now if the cultural components of Western democracies have not changed since the recent past, and more importantly, if these cultural components have recently changed, what made that happen?

We are finally left with a definition that seems to embrace the different types of populism in geography and history as well as to understand it from a process that is historical, conjunctural and comprises changes. On November 9, 2016, Pablo Iglesias, Secretary General of the Spanish left-wing party Podemos (and a populist himself), describes populism in his article “Trump y el momento populista” in his column “Otra Vuelta de Tuerka” at “Diario Público”. According to Iglesias, populism is not an ideology nor a “pack of public measures”, but rather it is a way of constructing the political from an “outside” which expands in moments of crisis. He also claims that populists are outsiders and they can be located anywhere on the political spectrum. However, that should not suggest that the “extremes” (right and left) join together or are similar in any way.

“Trump is not close to Sanders”, Iglesias explains. Rather, Trump’s immigration policies are close to the ones of the Republican Party and the European Union. Therefore, populism doesn’t define political options but political moments. Trump simply took advantage of the moment.

Conclusion – Back to Brazil

The clash between Lula and Bolsonaro is therefore not simply a Brazilian peculiarity. It is contained within a larger logic. One that results from a conjunction of historical factors that go beyond abstract constructs like national boundaries. It is not our intention, as opposed to cultural variables, to present the international political economy as the “ultimate determinant” of the populist phenomenon, but to understand it as the construction of the political. Tautologically, it emerges when the conditions for it emerge, that is, it occurs in its moment. This moment, indeed, is constantly found between an “old” and a “new” world orders, that is, between different “historical blocs”.

No doubt an “old” social, political, and economic arrangement has already died in Brazil. The “Jornadas de Junho” in 2013 were a prelude to its deterioration, all the mobilization and all the conspiracies that followed the 2014 elections indicated a worsening of its clinical condition and its death was finally declared by the impeachment in August 2016. Any deeper analysis to be made of this moment must therefore consider the hegemonic dispute in question. That means it should be taken into account the dialectics “structure” and “superstructure” in the context of a serious economic crisis, as well as the dialectics “political society” and “civil society” in the context of a populist dispute for “empty signifiers”.

In conclusion, some theses can be proposed about the current Brazilian situation. Firstly, the political form based on the polarization PT vs PSDB has reached exhaustion, just as the economic and neo-developmental form ends in the neoliberalism of Michel Temer. Secondly, Lula’s strength is greater than the strength of his party, and it has to do with his populist political construction, which again finds a favorable moment. Lastly, the emergence of Bolsonaro has little to do with the content of his politics and policies, but only with the populist moment.

Only in the coming months shall we see the development of our crisis, little can be anticipated. Variables that intervene to any predictions may arise from the most diverse possibilities; from a new Lava Jato arrest (and there are those who guarantee that Lula is next in line) to some event that sparks the political violence that lies latent in Brazil. In any case, politics continues in Brazil as it has never ceased to be: the farce of tragedy and the tragedy of farce

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Trump Plans to Keep U.S. Troops Permanently in Iraq

Eric Zuesse

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A reliable and exceptionally knowledgeable source, who doesn’t wish to be publicly identified, has confidentially informed me that an agreement has been reached in which U.S. troops will remain permanently in Iraq but under exclusively NATO command, no longer under the command of CentCom (US Central Command in the Middle East).

On February 12th, NATO’s defense ministers agreed to increase operations in Iraq. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has been working ever since Fall of 2019 to prepare this plan (Trump had been pushing for it even before that), and Stoltenberg has consulted in Jordan with King Abdullah, and also in Brussels with Sabri Bachtabji, Tunisia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, because Tunisia is a key part of Trump’s plan, to use other NATO nations as America’s proxies controlling the Middle East.

On February 1st, pro-Muslim-Brotherhood Turkey agreed to the plan, and will be transferring jihadists (al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, plus some ISIS) from Syria’s jihadist-filled Idlib Province, into Libya, via Tunisia, so as to boost the forces of Fayez al-Sarraj (former monarchist now backed by U.S., EU, and Turkey) to defeat the forces of Khalifa Haftar (former Gaddafi-supporter, now in the Libyan civil war claiming as his objective the defeat of all jihadists there). Whereas U.S., EU, and Turkey, back al-Sarraj, Russia isn’t involved in the war, except trying to negotiate peace there, but al-Sarraj rejects any involvement by Russia. Turkey’s interest in Libya is to win Libya’s backing so as to be in a stronger position to win turf in the emerging competition for rights to oil and gas under nearby parts of the Mediterranean Sea. To have Libya beholden to Turkey would be to increase the likelihood of Turkey’s getting that offshore oil.

America’s position regarding the jihadists that Turkey has been protecting in Syria’s Idlib province is that they can be useful as proxy boots-on-the-ground to defeat Haftar, whom America too opposes, favoring al-Sarraj, whom Turkey likewise backs; so, Turkey and U.S. are cooperating on this effort in Libya.

America’s interest is in overthrowing Syria’s secular Government and replacing it with one that would be acceptable to the fundamentalist-Sunni Saud family who own Saudi Arabia. In order to do this, America will therefore need to keep its forces in Iraq. Otherwise, Russia and Iran, both of which America and the Sauds hope ultimately to conquer, would have stronger influence in the Middle East, which neither America nor the Sauds want. America invaded Iraq not only directly for its international corporations to profit, but also in order to have its hundreds of bases there from which to control the entire Middle East — bases that are supplied out of the world’s largest Embassy building (from which even other U.S. embassies are supplied), which building was constructed in Baghdad after the 2003 invasion. Trump’s plan now is to bring in NATO allies, so that they will help out in the Middle East, more than in the past. Trump wants America’s vassal-nations to absorb some of the financial burdens of imposing empire, so that America’s taxpayers won’t need to fund the full cost of it, for the benefit of the billionaire owners of international corporations that are based in the United States and in its allied (or vassal) (including other NATO) countries. This is why Stoltenberg has been working, for months, to effectuate Trump’s plan.

On February 1st, the veteran Middle Eastern reporter David Hearst headlined at his Middle East Eye site, “EXCLUSIVE: US military offers Iraq a partial pullback”, and he reported that,

A representative of the US military told the Iraqis present that the United States was prepared to leave positions in or near Shia-majority areas, such as Balad Air Base, which is located 80km north of Baghdad and houses US trainers and contractors.

Washington, the Iraqis were told, could even consider reducing its presence in Baghdad.

“We are prepared to leave some of the Shia-majority areas, like the base in Balad. Maybe we could reduce our presence in Baghdad,” the military representative told his Iraqi counterparts, who understood from this that the US presence in the Iraqi capital would be reduced to guarding its embassy and the airport.

However, the US side categorically ruled out withdrawing from their biggest air base in Iraq, and indeed the whole Middle East, Ain al-Assad. …

For the US side, Ain al-Assad was its “red line”.

The representative said: “We cannot even start talking about withdrawing [from that base]. Withdrawal is out of the question.”

Such was the sensitivity of these discussions that they were held well away from Iraq. The meeting took place in the private residence of the Canadian ambassador to Jordan in Amman, Middle East Eye was told.

Present at the meeting was a representative of the US military, a Nato official and a senior Iraqi security adviser.

America needs the vast Ain al-Assad base in order ultimately to overthrow Bashar al-Assad (no relation), Syria’s secular President, who is allied with Russia and with Iran. NATO will increasingly be taking over this function of assisting the war for regime-change in Syria.

On February 15th, Middle East Monitor bannered “Iraq: Washington to strengthen presence of NATO to disengage militarily from Baghdad” and reported that America’s allies will take over there but “This will only work if the NATO mission includes a strong US component.” So: America’s withdrawal will be only nominal. This will help NATO by assuring that Trump won’t abandon NATO if he wins a second term, and it will also help Trump to win a second term by Trump’s claiming to be withdrawing from the Middle East even without actually doing any such thing.

The aim of this is to fool the public everywhere. In international affairs, this is the way to win: first, fool your own public; then, get your allies to fool theirs. That builds a “coalition.” Donald Trump is doing precisely this.

Trump is continuing Barack Obama’s wars, just like Barack Obama continued George W. Bush’s wars. The plan for America to control the Middle East remains on course, now, ever since 2001. As Obama often said, “America is the one indispensable nation.” (All others are therefore “dispensable.”) It is certainly the leading nation. And America’s aristocracy possess patience. They know that Rome wasn’t built in a day. In order to be the leading nation and the biggest international aggressor (so that “America is the one indispensable nation”), what is essential is to treat every other nation as being “dispensable” (make them fear you), so that either they will do as the leading nation wants, or else they will be dispensed with — they will become added to the list of target-nations to be conquered. They are dispensable; they are disposable. A disposable nation is aware of its subordinate position. On February 15th, the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported that 

the US dedicated a significantly higher proportion of its defence budget to procurement and R&D than its NATO allies. European countries are increasing their defence investments as a share of their total spending – for those countries with available data, funds rose from 19.8% in 2018 to 23.1% in 2019 – but the equivalent category reached 29% in the US. The United States’ defence investments were thus worth around four times as much as European states’ combined.

A nation which spends 29% of its GDP on “defence” might be weak in other ways, but everyone in the world will fear it, and all other nations will know that they are “dispensable,” because the country which spends that high a percentage (and there is only one which does) also happens to have the world’s largest economy. Any other country, which isn’t one of its vassals, will be viewed by it (or by its aristocracy) as being an “enemy” — a nation that is targeted for “regime-change,” instead of for being a market. And being a targeted nation is very different than being a target market. It is to be only a target — a target of sanctions, a target of coups, and, if those fail, then a target of invasion and military occupation, like Iraq is.

(However, actually, the U.S. spends only around 7% — $1.5 trillion divided by $22 trillion — of its economy toward the Pentagon and the rest of America’s military. Still, it might be the highest percentage on Earth. Because around $1 trillion yearly in U.S. military spending is off-the-books, that ‘defence’ figure could actually be closer to 10%. But it’s not 29%. Right now, around 20% of U.S. GDP goes to buy healthcare, which is the very largest percentage for healthcare of any country on the planet. America’s quality of healthcare is at or near the lowest of all industrialized nations; so, the wastage in its healthcare is even larger than in its military.)  

Iraq and Iran and Syria — and every other nation that is friendly toward Russia — all of them, are targets of the U.S. regime. That’s why Trump plans to keep U.S. forces in Iraq: Iraq was conquered in 2003, and he wants it to stay that way.

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Trump impeachment failure: What is in store for America and the world?

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On February 5, the US Senate found President Donald Trump not guilty of actions which could be classified as requiring his removal from office. All Republican Senators, who have a majority in the house, except Mitt Romney, turned down both charges against the president which accused him of “abuse of office” and ” obstructing Congress work.”

That impeachment is not the option was obvious to any Washington insider from the very beginning. To remove Trump from office it was necessary to enlist the support of two thirds in the Senate, which is unrealistic at the moment. The more moderate opponents of the head of the White House could, if they wanted, remind themselves and others that until the very last they were calling for considering all the pros and cons of an attempt to remove the president from office. A number of experts believed that “a threat of the impeachment procedure, without specific measures to this effect, would be a much safer way to ensure the defeat of Donald Trump in the next year’s presidential election.”The hearings as such would demonstrate the “incompetence” of the current head of state. Even Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, who ultimately came to lead the Democratic attack against Trump, warned in March last year that “impeachment divides the country in such a bad way that … we should not follow this path”. Last December, The Washington Post pointed out that in America, “there is extremism, there is no political clairvoyance, while the voices of reason are drowned in hyper-party cacophony.”

Over the past years, Washington has indeed seen a continuing buildup of fierce political battles. The political layout which came into place after the mid-term elections in 2018 – the Democrats control the lower house and the Republicans have majority in the upper – has resulted in a situation in which battles are waged not just for every yard, but for every inch of political space.

Success in the lower house midterm elections, that is, getting the largest number of seats since 1974, has clearly encouraged the Democrats. Given the situation, an attempt to impeach the president was seen by their leadership as a good opportunity to return anti-Trump inquiries to the political agenda. In addition, the expectations of Democratic Party supporters regarding the launch of impeachment procedure were so high that a refusal of the party leadership to try to remove Trump from office could cost Democrats votes this year. We should not forget that we are talking not only about the presidential election, but also about the next congressional election campaign.

The confrontational scenario of the 2020 election campaign appears almost inevitable. Critics of the president do understand this, so their statements after the failure of the impeachment move are predictably radical – now Trump is unbound. They believe that he will now move with renewed vigor towards the implementation of his “anti-American fantasies.” Trump’s supporters are so dazed by ideological confrontation with the opponents that they are ready to accept and defend “any lie from his mouth.” As for the American democracy, it is vulnerable “as never before.”

Trump, in turn, makes it clear that he craves political revenge. He has already fired several officials who testified against him during the impeachment hearings in the House of Representatives. Most likely, Trump will continue to rely on “American nationalism” and “white identity”, so hated by Democrats. He has also got more grounds to blame the obstruction-creating Democrats for all his failures during the election campaign. Moreover, what with all the achievements in the midterm elections two years ago, the Democrats were defeated, or could not sufficiently build up their positions in a number of states which are considered to play a key role in the upcoming presidential election. And the recent primaries in Iowa where the calculation of the results dragged on for several days demonstrated that the Democratic Party is still experiencing chaos and confusion.

According to a generalized view of domestic political processes in the United States, the executive branch’s futile attempts to push through the Congress projects of significant legislative changes have long become a “tradition” in American domestic politics. This process originated a long time ago – after the end of the Cold War, when the need for coming to a bipartisan consensus lost the status of a national security issue. As a result, discussions of almost every important point of the presidential election campaign are accompanied by  emotions, which prevail over facts and over attempts to propose a reasonable and comprehensive solution.

This trend is consistent under Trump. On the one hand, the Republican president has a good reason to criticize the legacy of his predecessors. He would also be right to appeal to the importance of launching “at last” the practical implementation of reforms, the need for which has been acknowledged by all administrations since the mid-1990s. On the other hand, the presence of a political will faces the realities of the political process, the participants of which, as before, appeal not so much to national interests as to the moods of the public. Demand gives rise to supply – Trump prefers to focus on issues that find the strongest emotional response in society. In response, the opponents accuse Trump of pursuing a “chaotic” policy on almost any issue. However, in the long run, what is taking place is a split that is running through the entire spectrum of American political system, and this split, as impeachment battles have demonstrated, has been deepened by the efforts from both parties, which are ready to contribute to its worsening with “unprecedented” vigor.

Aggravation of internal political struggle in the USA, as historical experience shows, often pushes American presidents into abrupt, often ill-conceived foreign policy measures. A similar situation happened in the days of Nixon and Clinton. It could be the impeachment threat that prompted Trump to take two steps that could “blow up” the Middle East – the assassination of Iran’s IRGC leader Kassem Sulejmani and an ostentatiously one-sided plan for a Middle East “settlement” that has already been rejected by the Palestinians and a number of Islamic states.

Yet, even after the failure of the impeachment move the international community is unlikely to be able to breathe a sigh of relief. In the context of an easily predictable clash with Democrats in the House of Representatives, which is fraught with a dead end in promoting the legislative agenda, the most natural way for Trump to demonstrate effectiveness in the eyes of voters is foreign policy. From a legal point of view, it is in the field of foreign policy that the US president is least bound by the need to coordinate his steps with the Congress.

And hardly can we talk about the USA easing confrontation with China or Russia. Moreover, Washington has a bipartisan consensus on the need to tighten policies in relation to the two countries. On February 5, Trump’s National Security adviser Robert O’Brien said in Washington: “Look, our challenge and the challenge of our generation is China’s growth and the role that Russia continues to play on the world scene”.

After the failure of impeachment, the Democrats may well try to use their majority in the lower house to resume attempts to get the issue  of “Trump’s relations with Moscow” and “Kremlin interference” in US domestic politics back into the spotlight. The tightening of parliamentary pressure on the White House will create new obstacles to prevent contacts between Washington and Moscow. Meanwhile, there are grounds to fear that Washington will see a new round of fight for the title of the most irreconcilable opponent of Russia.

Optimists among Russian experts believe that the main focus of the White House, like all of American politics, is finally shifting to domestic issues. This may give Russia a certain freedom of maneuver in international affairs. Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center argues, “the risk of Congress introducing new sanctions against Russia will dwindle in the very near future.” Especially, if the Republicans consider them a potential threat to the image of Trump and his administration. On the other hand, … “Republicans may agree to approve the sanctions to once again dissociate themselves from” toxic “Russia,” – the expert said.

According to pessimists, for both Washington parties, relations with Russia remain “one of the main grounds of confrontation.” “Fairly soon, Americans may opt for a new strike on Nord Stream-2, the German Handelsblatt believes.” If Russia tries to complete the construction of the missing kilometers of the pipeline through the Baltic Sea, the House of Representatives and the Senate are ready to initiate another sanctions law, Washington’s diplomatic circles say. ”This bill could include sanctions against project investors from Europe, or companies that plan to buy Russian gas through the pipeline.“ As reported, a move to this effect  could be taken in in the very near future, possibly in February or March. ”

In general, the failure of impeachment is likely to further increase the degree of uncertainty in US policy. The realities of the political process remain the same – its participants will continue to appeal not so much to national interests as to public opinion, which is experiencing an ever deepening split. A certain political stabilization of America can be expected only after one of the parties regains control over both the executive and legislative branches of government.

From the point of view of an outside observer, what happened on Capitol Hill is all but a political formality. In essence, the US foreign policy will remain intact. 

From our partner International Affairs

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Impeachment & Intervention: Where American Foreign Policy Goes Wrong

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To any ordinary American citizen, it’s well known that government spending is spiraling out of control. The U.S. budget deficit now exceeds $23 trillion — with $1.109 trillion being added to the deficit in the fiscal year of 2019, and another $1.103 trillion projected to be added in 2020. Recently, on December 20th of last year, President Donald Trump signed into existence the huge 2,300-page general bill that includes two spending packages that approximate to $1.4 trillion. The bill received mostly bipartisan support and was lauded as a compromise on both sides.

Senator Ted Cruz, who is an open critic of the bill, said, “This is why Washington is corrupt. This is an example of a government of the lobbyists, by the lobbyists, and for the lobbyists.” This is the unfortunate reality Americans are faced with when it comes to the spending of taxpayer dollars, at home and abroad. In an age where every topic is politicized and party lines are drawn, there is little resistance to multiplying the national debt. While there is mostly bipartisan agreement in Congress for enlarging the deficit, it’s quite the contrary when it comes to impeachment.

The hyper-partisan impeachment of President Trump is an ongoing matter. Both, the right and left have eagerly worked to spin the story to fit their narrative. Republicans say that it’s just another attempt by the left at overturning the 2016 election and/or undermining the upcoming 2020 election; Democrats allege that the President abused his power and tried to use foreign aid as leverage to coerce the newly elected Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, to investigate corruption linked to the Biden family. Whether you like Trump’s politics or not, what’s notable is that Democrats “have failed to allege a violation of established law, i.e. a ‘crime’ or ‘misdemeanor.’ Such an allegation has been present in every other impeachment in history, but not here.”

Nonetheless, foreign aid to Ukraine is at the core of the issue. Specifically, the aid amounted to $391 million of military and medical equipment to assist in their deadlocked civil war that started in 2014 with pro-Russian separatists. Since that time, the U.S. has handed over $1.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine overall. Instead of funding war, the U.S. should be actively promoting diplomacy. To what advantage, to the U.S. or its citizens, is sending billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine to help fight yet another proxy war? Absolutely none. Career politicians and academics on the left and right will say otherwise. In reference to the conflict, Stanford Professor Pamela Karlan told the House Intelligence Committee during impeachment hearings that intervening in Ukraine was vital, “so they fight the Russians there and we don’t have to fight them here.” Karlan’s logic is not only absurd, it’s dangerous with consideration to what she is suggesting. There is absolutely no evidence to back up her claim that implies Russia would eventually invade the U.S. if they didn’t arm the Ukrainians. This is the new era of McCarthyism. An era in which everything that has gone wrong or could possibly go wrong is blamed on Russia. And, if you disagree — well, you’re a Russian asset and do Putin’s bidding. This kind of manipulative narrative not only validates but fuels American interventionist foreign policy around the world. The U.S. involvement in Ukraine is just a small sample size of this truth. If you want to see the true ramifications of this type of foreign policy initiative, and the rabbit hole it sends the American taxpayer down, look no further than the Middle East.

Within the aforementioned omnibus bill, $4.2 billion is appropriated for the Afghan Security Forces Fund. That’s correct. The U.S. is sending $4.2 billion to Afghanistan to continue its seemingly endless endeavor in the Middle East. In recent years, there have been serious concerns regarding U.S. foreign aid to Afghanistan. Furthermore, this news is shocking bearing in mind the release of the Afghanistan Papers, which lay out in detail how senior U.S. officials knowingly misled the public to make it seem as if reasonable progress was being made in the region. The report bluntly states that over the years they “failed to tell the truth about the war,” “making rosy pronouncements they knew to be false and hiding unmistakable evidence the war had become unwinnable.” Critical statements from Ret. U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn provoked the extensive investigation that uncovered what many feared to be true. This is not the first time the American public has been fed lies from its government, abetted by the mainstream media, in order to mask the true intent of the war on terror. What is the real reason the U.S. is still to this day in Afghanistan? No one can be sure, but remarkably, opium production has skyrocketed since the U.S. arrived. What is now the longest armed conflict in U.S. history, spanning almost 19 years, there is still no end in sight. How much money has to be spent, and how many lives have to be lost before it’s all said and done with? The U.S. military occupation in Afghanistan is the prime example of foreign policy interventionism gone terribly wrong.

The American government should continue to stand strong with its allies and be an advocate of human rights, but they need to reevaluate the ways in which they do that. The U.S. needs to look at and approach international issues from a cost-benefit perspective. It’s time for a change in the establishment. There are valid questions to be asked about how, where, and why foreign aid is appropriated. These are questions of accountability. The status quo in the American government has gone on long enough, unimpeded, serving foreign interests with little benefit to the American public. The U.S. involvement in Ukraine and Afghanistan are just two instances at different scales that demonstrate this reality seen around the world. President Trump needs to critically assess foreign aid distribution, orient and repurpose the aid to specific points of interest that directly help the U.S.; imagine how much could be accomplished with respect to healthcare, education, and infrastructure if the U.S. started investing in itself more. Moreover, the U.S. would be better equipped to address more pertinent national security problems such as securing the border. President Trump would be addressing policy issues for the left, right, and everybody in between by confronting topics that are owned by his political opponents running for the Democratic nomination. If Trump wants to help solidify his chances at reelection, he should take a firmer stance in his “America First” policy and start putting America first.

From our partner RIAC

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