Connect with us

Middle East

Israel and Saudi Arabia

Giancarlo Elia Valori

Published

on

[yt_dropcap type=”square” font=”” size=”14″ color=”#000″ background=”#fff” ] I [/yt_dropcap]n Syria, on February 24 last, Iraq carried out its first bombing against Isis in the region of Abu Kemal, but the tactical and intelligence support to the Iraqi forces was been given by Russia and Iran, not by the United States which, however, also tacitly allowed the operations.

This also means that Putin has lost his patience and fears the new fragmentation of power and factionalism in the United States, considering Donald Trump’s Presidency and the intelligence agencies now deployed against the new President. Hence Putin goes on with his operations in Syria with the support of Iran and not with the US support, as had previously been planned by the Russian intelligence services.

It is also assumed that the United States does not accept the primary role of the Turkish forces in the conquest of Raqqa, the capital of the so-called “Caliphate”. However, after the conquest of the town of Al Bab in Northern Syria, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, announced that the Turkish armed forces would continue actions towards Raqqa with the support of France, Great Britain, and Germany – not to mention the United States.

Therefore, if the United States is de facto expelled from Syria, it will be irrelevant in the Greater Middle East. If the United States is short-lived in the Greater Middle East, America will be fully marginal in Europe. If it will not be present in Europe, this will not be a problem for the European Union which will not even notice it, but the United States will also be non-existent in the Maghreb region and in Central Asia.

The US absence will not be a danger for the EU’s foreign policy. The European foreign policy does not even exist now, let alone in the future.

Nevertheless for Russia and China it will mean “green light” for the great Eurasia planned by Russia and for the new Silk Road, namely the Road and Belt Initiative, conceived by China as early as 2013.

In both cases, this marks the end of the EU-US relationship as we currently know it, but in Brussels nobody has yet noticed it – hence let us leave them asleep.

It is exactly in this context that the rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia must be seen.

Between February 21 and 22 last, while the United States showed their weakness in the Middle East and in the rest of the world, the Saudi Chief of the intelligence services, Khalid bin Ali al Humaidan, secretly visited both Ramallah and Jerusalem.

Al Humaidan, recently appointed Head of the main intelligence service of the Saudi Kingdom does not belong to the network of the most important princes of the Al Saud family, the so-called “seven Sudayri”, but has emerged solely thanks to a brilliant military career – and it is the first time that this happens.

In fact, the Saudi intelligence services are very worried about the project, authorized a few weeks ago by the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and also by President Rouhani, whom Westerners stupidly define as a “reformist” – a project that the Iranian Armed Forces define as Riyadh, at first.

For Iran the issue lies in adding further 100 kilometres to the range of their SCUD-C and SCUD-D missiles, which is currently 600 and 700 kilometres, respectively, so as to enable the missile to directly reach the Saudi capital city.

Currently the Iranian operation is implemented at the Al Ghadi base in the Ganesh area, about 48 kilometers from the capital city of the Shiite republic.

Al Ghadi is a few kilometres from Hamadan, the base that Iran granted to the Russian air force last August which, however, has already been left by it, with some Iran’s complaints.

Therefore the strategy of the Shiite republic is clear: instead of accepting diversions or multiple regional conflicts by proxy, Iran will hit immediately and directly the Saudi Kingdom with such a missile salvo as to block its decision-making centres and much of its economy.

On the other hand, just on February 4 last, Yemen’s Shiite Houthi rebels attacked with a Borkan missile (i.e. a Volcano 1 missile) – which has an average range of 800 kilometers – the Saudi camp of Al Mazahimiyah, 40 kilometres west of Riyadh.

The Borkan 1 is a tactical ballistic missile developed on the basis of the R-17 Soviet Elbrus model, but it is not very likely for this medium-range missile fuelled with solid propellant to have been launched by the Houthis. It is rather the first test of the new Iranian extended-range SCUD missile.

What will the Head of the Saudi intelligence services have said to the Palestinian leaders gathered in Ramallah?

Certainly he will have told the PLO heirs to stop strengthening their ties with Iran.

As early as 2014 Hamas and the Al Qassam Brigades have publicly reaffirmed their political-military relationship with the Shiite republic, even though Hamas is an offshoot of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood that has always been the number one enemy of the Sunni kingdom of the Al Saud family.

While in 2012 Hamas had broken its relations with Iran, in the phase of the silly “Arab Springs”, by supporting the political legitimacy of President Hadi in Yemen, currently Haniyeh, the Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, wants a preferential relationship with Iran for its financial and military support, while the Saudi and Arab Emirates’ support is vanishing.

And this happens even though the Hamas leaders would accept, at first and preferentially, the support of the Saudi Kingdom.

Support to the Palestinian struggle which, however, is currently not provided “for internal reasons within the Saudi regime,” as said by our sources within the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian Territories.

Furthermore a meeting was already held between Iranian and Palestinian delegations in Brussels, in mid-February 2017.

It is that meeting which alerted the Saudi intelligence services.

The whole Iranian delegation had been appointed directly by President Rowhani, the “reformist,” while the Palestinian one was led by Jibril Rajoub, whom Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority, will probably appoint as his deputy in the coming days.

Rajoub is “persona non grata” for Jordan; he emerged as leader at the Fatah Congress held in Ramallah in 2016 and   cannot even travel to Egypt.

On the contrary, in Jerusalem, the Head of the Saudi intelligence services will have talked about the issues relating to the next Middle East Conference proposed by President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in their last meeting.

However, what is the current relationship between Israel and the Gulf petromonarchies?

It is worth recalling that Israel sent its first diplomatic mission to the United Arab Emirates, precisely to Abu Dhabi, on November 27, 2015.

Obviously both for the United Arab Emirates and for Saudi Arabia the relationship with the Jewish State is instrumental to contain Iran, a sworn enemy of both counties.

But we must consider the economy and, above all, the advanced technology, which is essential for the economic diversification of the Sunni petromonarchies.

Recently Qatar has even tried to establish some unofficial diplomatic channels with Israel – channels that had been disrupted after the 2008-2009 Israeli military actions in the Gaza Strip.

Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf petromonarchies are ever less interested in the Palestinians, but ever more greedy for the Israeli advanced technology that the United States has not or does not want to grant.

As early as the Six Day War, the Jewish State’s leadership has used the concessions made to the Palestinians with a view to defusing the threat that the Arab States posed to its very survival.

Moreover the Israeli diplomacy has always used the 1994 model of normalizing relations with Jordan to propose similar actions with the other Arab League countries.

And, over the years, the Qatari support to Hamas and the Saudi support to the whole Palestinian military and political region has become ever less passionate and relevant.

The primary reason is the massive corruption reigning in the Territories, which prevents also the Saudi and the Emirates’ counterparts from doing business, while the Saudi strategic equation is increasingly focused on Al Sisi’s Egypt, a ferocious enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood, rather than on Hamas, which is the Palestinian armed wing of the Brotherhood and, hence, directly operating in the Sinai region.

Currently the Saudi and Emirates’ support to the Palestinians is increasingly tactical and vague, except for preventing Iran from conquering the thriving market of “aid” to the Palestinian National Authority’s military forces.

Saudi Arabia does not want the increasingly close relationship between Mahmoud Abbas and Iran, nor it wants to support a military struggle against Israel – and it is worth noting King Salman Al Saud’s absence from the Arab League’s meeting held in Mauritania on July 25, 2016 – a Summit focused precisely on the Palestinian issue.

Currently the Israeli high-tech products and advanced technologies for irrigation have already entered the Kingdom through “third” companies.

In 2011, some Israeli companies sold military technology to the Arab Emirates to the tune of 300 million US dollars, while the members of the Gulf Security Council use technologies produced by the Jewish State to maintain safety and security in their oil wells.

In 2009 Saudi Arabia even tested its air defences to check the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran launched from its territory while, on the basis of 2015 data, 53% of the Saudi citizens see Iran as the primary threat, while Israel is considered the number one enemy only by 18% of the Saudi citizens.

Moreover, Israel publicly supported the Egyptian granting of the two Red Sea islands to Saudi Arabia in April 2016, while the primary strategic relationship in which Israel is interested is the one regarding the Saudi – or anyway Sunni – opposition and contrast to Iran’s penetration into the Palestinian universe.

The companies resulting from the spin-off of the Israeli intelligence services are used by Saudi Arabia to probe the deep web, while much of cybersecurity in the Emirates is originated from Israel.

Recently the United Arab Emirates have spent six billion dollars in security infrastructure, by using Israeli engineers and companies owned by or linked to Israeli businessmen.

The main intermediary for these relations, at least at government level, is Ayub Kara, an Arab-Israeli Druze who is currently Minister in Netanyahu’s government.

He is a Likud man, who cherishes no illusions about the strategic aims of Israel’s possible “friends” in the Middle East.

The starting point for new networks between Riyadh and Jerusalem is the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance Project.

The “Two Seas Canal” will bring drinking water from Aqaba to Lisan, in the Dead Sea – water available to Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Territories – and will generate electricity. It is located entirely on the Jordanian territory and will be funded by the Jordanian government and by some international donors.

Its construction is expected to start next year and Ayub Kara, in particular, supports the redevelopment and enhancement of the Haifa port for the transport of goods to the EU and Turkey, in addition to conceiving a role for the Israeli port towards Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Another Israeli project in which Saudi Arabia is interested is the old Red Sea pipeline, an old network of 50 years ago from Eilat to Ashkelon, built jointly with the Iranian Shah.

It avoids the Suez Canal and hence reduces many political costs, as well as the costs for transporting oil to Europe and the United States.

Last year, however, a Swiss court granted to Iran 1.1 billion US dollars for loss of earnings, but Israel refuses to pay this sum to Iran, as can be easily imagined.

Other Israeli companies in the safety and security sector sold to the United Arab Emirates integrated systems for monitoring networks and people flows – systems which are also used for the remote supervision of pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina.

Hence the new strategic coordinates of the Greater Middle East will be, on the one hand, the Iranian management of the Shiite minorities in Bahrain, Yemen, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Syria and, on the other, Saudi Arabia’s opening to every Iranian enemy in the region.

The United States will continue their withdrawal from the Middle East system. Russia will become the true and only broker of military power and equilibriums in the Fertile Crescent. If there are no future military crises on its borders, in addition to the Syrian one, Israel will become the point of reference both for Russia and the Sunni world, which is orphan of the United States.

As is currently the case, Europe will be irrelevant and devoid of ideas.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

Continue Reading
Comments

Middle East

What will Middle East gain from US’ “retreat”?

Published

on

Throughout the year, American commentators have been sounding alarm over the weakening of the US positions in the Middle East. Optimists say Washington has intentionally been “cutting down on its commitments”. According to pessimists, America is quickly losing credibility amid an acute crisis of trust in its relations with its closest allies. Some of these allies are even working to harmonize relationships with Washington’s geopolitical rivals, or are looking for common ground to strike with those who are officially deemed “US enemies”.

Experts say the policy of the Trump administration in the Middle East should be more consistent, both in conceptual and personnel terms. This policy should be devoid of any sudden or drastic moves which could only undermine trust between the United States and the Gulf countries, Yasmine Farouk of the Carnegie Foundation said in February. Over the past six months, there have appeared sufficient grounds to believe that Iran “is gripped by fear and experiences a sense of despair in the confrontation with the United States.” However, the White House’s current policy on Tehran, which is lacking clear vision and trustworthy strategy, is sowing more and more seeds of distrust between America and its Sunni allies. This schism is the very “fundamental geostrategic success” that Iran has “sought to achieve over the past 40 years.” Now, Tehran sees more and more “opportunities and advantages” for itself, wrote Kenneth Pollack, an expert with Foreign Policy, at the end of September.

From 1991 to 2010 the United States enjoyed “incontestable supremacy in the Middle East. Even on the eve of the “Arab Spring”, most states in the region depended on America for help and “understanding” in many vital issues. However, the results of the Middle East policy of recent years are disappointing, Dennis Ross and Dana Stroul from the Washington Institute for Middle Eastern Policy say. The recent moves taken by the Trump administration, starting from the US withdrawal from the “nuclear deal” in May last year, which aimed at forcing Iran to make concessions, have “fallen through.” The attempt to reduce Iran’s activities in the region to zero by tightening sanctions, which, according to the White House, were to deprive Tehran of resources to pursue a full-fledged foreign policy, “did not work to effect.” If President Trump had actually managed to “isolate” anyone in the region, then it is not Iran, but the United States. Experts believe that the ambitious statements that have been made by Washington on a daily basis were not supported by convincing action, political or military. The White House’s flagrant reluctance to defend its allies deepens the gap between America and its partners in the Gulf Region. In addition, the policy of ill-thought sanctions led to the alienation of the European allies as well, without whom pressure on Tehran makes no sense.

Donald Trump strongly disagrees with such criticism, emphasizing that his foreign policy is based on “pragmatism” and “objective interests”. Concerning the Middle East, these words can be understood in at least two different ways. On the one hand, the current US administration believes that “cooperation” implies, first of all, the promotion of the “monetization” of the alliance, which was unequivocally announced in the Trump National Security Strategy in December 2017. Allies and partners are required to “contribute” by allocating more funds for the purchase of American weapons.

On the other hand, domestic oil production in the US has increased significantly in recent years, primarily due to the introduction of shale oil extraction technologies. As a result, America is rapidly turning “into a major competitor” of oil and gas suppliers from the Middle East. The presence in Washington’s regional policy of many Cold War – era features, including the dominance of ideology and the division of countries into “friends” and “foes,” may also have a new, extremely unpleasant interpretation for the Persian Gulf states. What is meant is Washington’s attempts to breathe new life into maintaining (or formal strengthening – despite the apparent setbacks, for example, of the concept of “Arab NATO”), a political architecture in which the region is divided into warring blocs. Given the situation, the deeper the region plunges into the chaos of destabilization, the easier it will be for the United States to deprive Saudi Arabia of its current status as the “regulator” of the global oil market.

Meanwhile, the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape is becoming ever more polycentric as more and more countries of the region demonstrate their intention to “stand for their interests”. In this context, the Trump administration’s obsession with the “Iranian threat” is causing ever more bewilderment among some Arab allies, as Tehran, for its part, has put forward and supported initiatives to alleviate regional tensions. According to IRNA, on September 23, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced proposals “to ensure the safety of navigation in the region” and promote interstate cooperation in the Persian Gulf. The project, known as the “Hormuz Peace Initiative”,  encompasses “both security and economic issues.” “All countries of the Persian Gulf are invited to participate in a new format of regional dialogue,” –  the Iranian president said.  On October 1, Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani welcomed a statement made the day before by Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, that he was ready to start a dialogue between the two countries.

Six months ago, Riyadh, as well as Bahrain, unconditionally supported the US line for a tough confrontation with Iran. However, serious doubts were voiced by  leaders of Egypt, Jordan and Qatar. Kuwait, Qatar and Oman even came up in favor of diplomatic methods of resolving disagreements with Iran. In recent months, this policy has also been backed by the UAE. However, on September 14, a number of Saudi Arabia’s major oil infrastructure facilities came under a massive attack by drones and cruise missiles. Saudi Arabia and the US “have no doubts” that Iran is behind the attack. A lot will be clarified after the results of an inquiry by the international commission are made public: the publication of evidence that proves Tehran’s direct involvement in the attack could become a casus belli for the Saudis.

In this case, America’s Arab allies will be waiting for the White House’s reaction, which puts the Trump administration “in a pretty difficult position”. Whether part of the leadership in Riyadh is ready to go all-in and strike at Iran on their own, in the hope that the United States will not be able to stay away in case of a new war in the Gulf, will become a relevant issue again. However, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated a “weakness of its army” in Yemen. And the blow against the Saudi oil refining facilities, whoever was behind it, has raised the question of the effectiveness of American means of control of regional airspace, as well as the combat readiness of the air defense system based on American technology. The absence of a clear and decisive reaction from Trump can ruin the authority of the United States, both in the Gulf countries and in the entire Middle East Region. In addition, this may have a negative effect on American voters. Meanwhile, “… America cannot and does not want to wage a war against Iran”.

Russia’s position is aimed at resolving disagreements and potential conflicts in the Middle East through negotiation with the participation of all parties involved. In a recent interview with International Affairs Chief Editor Armen Oganesyan, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov expressed hope that “the crisis involving Iran will be settled without a new outbreak of conflict”. According to Ryabkov, Moscow believes in the triumph of common sense in the region,  which is being torn by several conflicts. In early October, in response to questions from the Valdai Discussion Club, the head of Russian diplomacy Sergey Lavrov  dwelled on Russia’s vision of the challenges facing the region. “Undoubtedly, security must be ensured in the Persian Gulf, but Iran has proposals that are not directed against anyone, they are not exclusive, they invite all countries to join forces.”

Russia, in turn, has come up with a proposal to begin a comprehensive and constructive dialogue on the concept of a Collective Security Treaty for the Persian Gulf with the prospect of its expansion to the entire Middle East. Addressing the participants in the Valdai Forum on October 3, President Vladimir Putin recalled how Moscow “together with partners of the Astana format” had brought together the interested countries in the region and the international community to launch a political settlement in Syria. The negotiations were joined by the United States. President Putin paid tribute to “President Trump’s courage and ability to take extraordinary steps”. The crisis involving the Korean Peninsula dissolved very quickly, he said, once the US administration moved from head-on confrontation to dialogue. The Syrian settlement  “may become a kind of model for resolving regional crises. And in the vast majority of cases, it will be the diplomatic mechanisms that will come handy. The use of force is an extreme measure, a forced exception,” –  President Putin emphasized. Moscow advocates convergence of efforts to address common threats. The latest initiative, which is based on this principle, is the idea of creating an organization “for security and cooperation, which, in addition to the Gulf countries, could comprise Russia, China, the USA, the EU, India and other countries concerned as observers”.

According to optimistic-minded American observers, the US leadership’s demonstration of restraint and caution on the use of force can have positive consequences – it could prompt countries of the Middle East to seek diplomatic solutions . But is Washington ready and able to “seize on the chance” and join international efforts to launch an extensive dialogue of all regional countries concerned? Up to now,  the Trump administration has demonstrated the potential to weaken, or even completely destroy,  multilateral institutions and formats, rather than create or support them. In the end, it is the “credo” of unilateralism that is behind the US doctrinal documents and foreign policy practice.

The Middle East faces a long and difficult search for solutions if it wants to successfully address many internal problems, which, in most cases, are knotty, to say the least. The process of overcoming the consequences of the “crises of the decade” will take years. Considering this, the Middle Eastern states will have to play an ever greater role in resolving regional problems. Contributing to this  will be the weakening of the former hegemon, which has been increasingly hinging on the use of force in recent years.  Russia’s return to the Middle East for securing a balance of strength will make it possible to avoid the detrimental consequences of underestimating the international dimension of threats coming from a number of regional conflicts. In addition, it will encourage a departure from the counterproductive policy of forming artificial “division lines”. 

From our partner International Affairs

Continue Reading

Middle East

Turkey in the Kurdish Rojava

Giancarlo Elia Valori

Published

on

Since the beginning of clashes in Syria, Turkey has aimed at  annexing the left bank of the Euphrates up to Mossul, a strip of land about 500 kilometers long and 30 kilometers wide – an area which is large enough to accommodate the 3.6 million Syrian refugees who have entered Turkey since the beginning of the hostilities against Bashar el Assad.

 The above mentioned area between the Kurdish Rojava and Turkey was established by the latter, in agreement with the United States, in August 2019.

It is the area that was invaded a few days ago.

Since the beginning of the clashes in Syria, the United States has wanted the Turkish Armed Forces to be targeted directly against President Assad’s forces, so as to lead either to a splitting of Syria or to the creation of a new regime, open to US and Western influences.

President Erdogan, however, has never agreed to do all the “dirty” work against Assad’ Shiites on his own. He has always asked for the direct and equal support of the US forces.

Here the US and its allies’ operations in Syria have essentially stopped.

 The United States has quickly responded to this substantial refusal of Turkey to do the US work in Syria, by involving the Kurds and organizing a Force uniting the YPG Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces. It has done so with a military mechanism that – in principle-oversees mainly the areas already bombed by the US Air Force and by the coalition that supported the US dual struggle against Assad and the jihadists of the “Caliphate”.

In any case, however, Turkey does not want any Kurdish organization to monitor the borders between Turkey and Syria.

Hence, this is the dilemma. Turkey has already penetrated the Rojava area on the border with its country, while the Kurds –  be they from the PKK or the YPG, two often overlapping organizations – try to ally precisely with Assad, while there is also the concrete possibility of a further Iranian penetration between Mossul and the Southern area of the Kurdish Rojava.

 Turkey will also use its Syrian alliances, such as those of the Syrian Interim Government, to unite them with the Syrian National Army, which operates in the region north of Aleppo, and with the National Liberation Front stationed in Idlib.

 It should also be noted that President Erdogan knows the real reason for the recent electoral defeat of his AKP Party. Obviously Turkish voters are worried about the economic crisis and the monetary tensions on the Turkish lira, but they are mainly terrified of the pressure that the 3.6 million Syrian refugees on the ground put on the whole Turkish economic and social system.

 This is another political prospect for President Erdogan, namely becoming the protector – so to speak – of all Sunnis.

 In addition to the pan-Turkish project in Central Asia, President Erdogan knows that militarily Saudi Arabia is a giant with clay feet, while Egypt is unable to project itself onto Central Asia and the Islamic Republic of Iran is finally focused on its pan-Shiite project, with an inward-looking attitude.

 For some time now, the Turkish police has been monitoring and arresting a large number of Syrian, Christian or Shiite immigrants, while some leaders of the Syrian community have already been deported to Idlib.

It should also be recalled that the economic and financial effort to build at least 200,000 houses and services in the currently occupied Rojava area, mostly with non-Turkish funds, would be a major boost for the entire Turkish economy, which has long been floundering in a deep crisis.

Clearly, the inclusion of at least 3 million Syrians onto the Kurdish Rojava’s border with Turkey would greatly change the ethnic complexion of the area but, in the future, also of the whole Kurdish Rojava, with obvious positive effects for Turkey.

But there is also the other side of the coin, since there would be an increase of tensions between the Arab world, to which most Syrians belong, and the Kurdish and non-Arab universe that is alien to most of the political, religious and cultural traditions of the Shiite or Sunni Islam.

It should be recalled, however, that this has been the third Turkish penetration into the Kurdish Rojava since 2016.

As far as we can currently see, Turkey’s entry into the Kurdish country is limited to the “Kurdish canton” of Hasakah- Kobanè- Qarmishli.

The rest of the Turkish operation will obviously be calibrated on international reactions, especially of the countries directly concerned by Syria.

 The Kurds, however, with their structure of Syrian Democratic Forces, have been among the few real winners of the war in Syria.

 This has enabled them to stabilize the internal political structures and the borders of the Kurdish country, although no Kurdish leader has ever spoken of true independence of Rojava, but only of autonomy.

 Therefore, the Kurds’ optimal strategic equation depends on the US presence in the East and North-East of their area.

Otherwise- as indeed happened – Turkey would take the whole strip of land at the border.

 For the time being, the focus of Turkish operations goes from Ras Al Ain to Tell Abyad, in a span of about 100 kilometers.

As far as we know, in Tall Abyad, the Turkish penetration has been stopped by the Kurdish forces.

 This is an area, however, with a very high number of Arabs, that Turkey has already penetrated with its intelligence Services and its organizations.

 If the Kurds wanted to keep the territory already invaded by Turkey, there would be very hard clashes and it is not certain that they could win.

Pending the Turkish invasion, the Russian Federation has declared that Turkey has every right to defend its borders, but it has also added that the Syrian state and territorial unity needs to be preserved.

 Moreover, the invaded area is not yet under Assad government’s control, but the presence of the Turkish Armed Forces would trigger instability also for Syria, considering that the Kurds of Rojava were (and are) much more friendly with Assad than with the Turkish regime, which has often declared its intention to eliminate Assad’s power system.

 There were also massive gold acquisitions by the Turkish Central Bank immediately before the invasion of Rojava.

 From January to August 2019, Turkey’s gold reserves reached 362.5 tons (+109), for a total value of about 17.9 billion euros.

Obviously, the fear of sanctions and the concern for national security have currently pushed Turkey to become one of the world’s largest gold buyers.

 The above mentioned militiamen linked to the Turkish army are already 7,000, while the Kurdish ones operating in the area are at least 35,000, in addition to the 15,000 soldiers of Asaysh, the internal Kurdish security and intelligence organization.

 Too many, and too well trained, not to be a very tough nut to crack also for the Turkish Armed Forces.

The United States – apart from the troops already withdrawn – still have 1,500 soldiers in the area, including special forces, military advisers and Marines – not at the border, but within the area of Rojava, on the border with Turkey and Iraq.

 The US bases still operational in the area are ten, plus three aerial installations that allow to operate with transport vehicles, drones and helicopters.

Not to mention the French and British special forces that continue to operate in the area.

The operational assumptions are the following: President Assad could permit Turkey to take Rojava, in exchange for Syria’s green light on Idlib, still largely in the hands of the various forms of  sword jihad.

Needless to say, the oil resources of the area are still in Kurdish hands and that both Assad and the other countries of the region want to quickly put their hands on it.

In President Erdogan’ strategic equation the energy problem is not secondary at all.

 In Syria, in the Persian Gulf and -as we will see -also in Libya.

 The Turkish ship Yavuz will shortly leave for Cyprus to drill the seabed.

 The Northern Cyprus State, a direct emanation of Turkey, blocks any autonomous economic action by Cyprus and the Turkish Navy has sealed the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus.

 Three large energy companies are interested in Cyprus’ natural gas, namely ENI, Total and Exxon-Mobil.

  The ship Saipem1200 was blocked by the Turkish Navy in February 2018, while in January 2019 the French Navy sent the ship Aconit for joint exercises with the Cypriot Navy, with the clear aim of opposing Turkey.

 The traditional lack of character – so to speak – of the Italian ruling class.

Turkey, however, has never accepted the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and hence does not recognize Greece’s Exclusive Economic Zone, since it aims at acquiring the island of Kastellorizo, which is very close to the Turkish coast.

President Erdogan, the Head of a traditional land power that, indeed, was essential in the Cold War vis-à-vis the Caucasus and Southern Russia, wants to reach full military autonomy by 2023, according to the Turkish plan Vision 2023.

  But, in particular, it wants to turn Turkey into a great maritime power, with a view to controlling the whole Aegean Sea and most of the Mediterranean.

Greece, however, is becoming the new US military center in the Mediterranean. The United States will support the new Greek military build-up but, above all, will help Greece to explore the depths of the Aegean and Ionian seas, as well as Crete, for oil.

 In terms of migration, which is the EU No. 1 problem, President Erdogan skillfully exploits the EU weak presence and strategic irrelevance – if not non-existence.

 In 2016, the Turkish leader collected the 6 billion euros promised by Germany and paid by the whole EU to keep the refugees in his country.

Turkey, however, wants a new agreement, much more burdensome for the EU, claiming it has already stopped as many as 270,000additional migrants in 2018 and 170,000 in 2019.

 It is easy to predict that the silly Europe will give President Erdogan what he wants.

It is by no mere coincidence that boats of migrants leave the Turkish coasts – without any control – heading to the Greek islands of Kos, the ancient kingdom of Hippocrates, and Chios, the homeland of Homer and Lesbos.

Migration management is an indirect strategy technique.

 Reverting to the Syrian case, another example of this new project of Turkish grandeur, we wonder why – assuming that there was a moment “x” – the United States gave the “green light” to President Erdogan for his invasion of Northern Rojava.

 Probably the United States is thinking of a possible future clash between Turkey, Russia and Iran, which right now are organizing a Syrian Constitutional Committee, with the UN support.

Causing difficulties for Turkey in the Astana negotiations? It is a possibility, but much more would be needed to create tension around Turkey.

 Turkey, however, should also deal with the 60,000 “Caliphate” fighters, detained in the Kurdish prisons.

 It is not at all certain that Turkey wants to take care of them.

 Dropping a jihadist bomb would be a threat for which no one could say no to Turkey.

 A trace of Turkey’s current “policy line” can also be found in Libya.

Turkey has provided Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA) with missiles, armored vehicles, drones and light weapons.

Probably Turkey has also favored the arrival of Jihadist militants from Syria to Libya.

 The real clash is, here, between Turkey and Egypt, supported by the Gulf States.

 Through their base in Niger, the Emirates support Haftar, who can thus control Fezzan.

Furthermore, through its support to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, Turkey wants to have a Libya divided between various areas of influence – as in Syria – with the aim of getting its hands – through al-Sarraj’s government – on the huge Libyan oil reserves: 48 billion barrels, plus the possible reserves from fracking, i.e. additional 26 billion barrels.

 Apart from the size of oil production, which is much more relevant in Libya, now we can clearly see it is the same project that Turkey is carrying out in Syria.

 Not to mention Misrata, where there is a tribe of Turkish origin, the Karaghla.

 In any case, Turkey will reach the maximum power of blackmail vis-à-vis the poor EU and, in the future, vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance itself, to play the game of Islamic radicalism in contrast with Egypt and the Gulf countries.

The starting point will be the Turkish presence in Syria, which will be used for a rational division of the spheres of influence.

Continue Reading

Middle East

Has Assad succeeded in overcoming the Syrian crisis?

Mohamad Zreik

Published

on

A series of revolutions swept through the Arab region. The first torch was from Tunisia when protester Mohamed Bouazizi burned himself in opposition to the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. This wave of revolts led to the overthrow of many Arab regimes and leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other Arab countries. There has been a state of destruction, displacement and economic collapse in the countries affected by the revolutions, a lot of killing, torture and political division, as well as the penetration of terrorist groups in the Arab world.

The revolution began in the form of peaceful protests, but soon developed using violence between the Syrian army and opposition groups. Over time, the Syrian opposition was divided into a peaceful opposition aimed at overthrowing the Assad regime through diplomatic means and the armed opposition, which was divided into several factions: the Free Syrian Army, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, as well as other armed factions.

This difficult situation brought the Syrian regime into a stage of internal popular and military pressure, which led to a request for military assistance from Russia. Russia responded to Assad’s request and defended the Syrian regime in earnest. Russia, which had good relations with the Libyan regime, did not veto the UN Security Council in favor of the Gaddafi regime. In the Syrian crisis, however, Russia and China have vetoed the UN Security Council in favor of the Assad regime, and they defended the Syrian regime in international forums.

Russia, which has historical ties with the Syrian regime, regards Syria as an extension of its strategic interests in the Middle East. Evidence of this is the presence of Russia’s military base in Syria, which is Russia’s only military base in the Middle East. Iran also stood by the Syrian regime in its war, and there was constant coordination between the Syrian and Iranian leaderships. On the other hand, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey demanded that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad step down and replace the existing regime with a new regime. The United States has repeatedly threatened military intervention to strike the Syrian regime, but the American threat has always been matched by a Russian willingness to retaliate, creating a balance of power on the Syrian battlefield.

Russia’s active support of the Syrian regime and its allies’ support led to Assad’s steadfastness, despite widespread international dissatisfaction with this outcome. Syria’s political position has not yet changed, but the Syrian-Russian-Chinese-Iranian alliance has been strengthened. Many military analysts believe that what happened in Syria cannot be repeated with other countries. The most important reason is Syria’s strategic geographic position and the need for a regime like Assad to govern Syria for the time being.

The Assad regime has not collapsed, but there has been an internal and international resentment that did not exist in the past. This is expected to happen because of the nature of the Syrian regime’s alliances and the division of the region between an eastern and a Western axis. But the Assad regime has been able to withstand and maintain its position in the face of the severe crisis in Syria.

The Syrian regime must work hard to involve the Syrian opposition in government and form a government that includes all strata of Syrian society so as not to feel a large segment of the Syrian people injustice, and must increase the margin of freedom in the country. These steps should change the perception that prevailed towards the Syrian regime, and lead to its acceptance internally and internationally in the next stage.

Continue Reading

Latest

Trending

Copyright © 2019 Modern Diplomacy